

Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago: Strategies and Tactics of the Chicago Police Department

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June 15, 2005

This project was supported by Grant #02DBBX0017, awarded to the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority by the Bureau of Justice assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The Assistant Attorney General Office of Justice Programs, coordinated the activities of the following program office and bureaus: Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Institute of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office of Victims of Crime. Points of view or opinions contained within this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, the U.S. Department of Justice or the Chicago Police Department. Correspondence should be addressed to: Dr. Dennis Rosenbaum, Professor and Director, Center for Research in Law and Justice, 1007 W. Harrison St. (M/C 141), University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60607. (312) 355-2469.

Acknowledgements

This report would not have been possible without the full support of the Chicago Police Department (CPD). We wish to acknowledge and thank Superintendent Philip Cline, who opened the doors of the organization and gave us full access to people, meetings, and records. Deputy Superintendent Thomas Byrne played a key role in facilitating all aspects of this study from start to finish. Each of the Deputy Superintendents, including First Deputy Dana Starks, Hiram Grau, Jerry Robinson, and Dr. Ellen Scrivner, contributed their time and resources to support this initiative. We thank them and their staff for providing assistance and interviews as needed. We are especially indebted to Mary Hansen who coordinated the contributions of all CPD bureaus and to Rachel Johnston who provided official statistics.

We also wish to thank Executive Director Lori G. Levin, Phillip Stevenson, and Tracy Hahn at the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority for supporting this project and overseeing its review and publication. Finally, we'd like to thank Jill DuBois and Susan Hartnett for their review and helpful comments on a previous draft.

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I. The Changing Violence Problem in Chicago and the Call to Action

For decades Chicago has struggled to discard an uncomplimentary image as a crime-ridden city and home to the legendary Al Capone. Contrary to stereotypes, in recent decades Chicago's violent crime pattern has looked similar to other major cities. Homicides, for example -- the primary indicator of violence -- rose dramatically in the early 1990s (peaking at 931 murders in 1994), followed by equally dramatic declines for the remainder of the decade (falling to 631 murders by 2000). The problem occurred in 2001, when the downward pattern halted and the number of homicides rose for the first time in years (to 665) -- a pattern that was not aligned with other major cities. Local and national media highlighted the fact that the absolute number of homicides in Chicago exceeded the figures for Los Angeles and New York City, and proceeded to label Chicago the murder capital of America. Thus, despite widely successful efforts by the mayor and civic leaders to make Chicago an attractive metropolis to the world¹, its image was tarnished by this media coverage, forcing city officials to refocus their attention on the problem of violent crime.

In 2003, Mayor Daley began to organize the city's response. He hired Matthew Crowl, a federal prosecutor from the U.S. Attorney's Office, to lead the charge from his office and then promoted Philip Cline to be the new superintendent of police and lead the charge within the Chicago Police Department. In 2003 and 2004, reducing the number of homicides became the primary objective of the Chicago Police Department.

The homicide problem in any city is complex and determined by a variety of factors. In Chicago, officials have chosen to focus on the role of gangs, guns, and drugs as contributors to violent street crime. More than half of all homicides in Chicago are gang related and gangs control the multi-million dollar illegal drug markets. Additionally, over 70 percent of Chicago's homicides each year are committed with a firearm (see figure 1). Hence, the Chicago Police Department's primary objective in 2004 was to crack down on these criminogenic activities by introducing a wide range of aggressive and visible enforcement programs in problematic locations, backed by new management and community anti-violence initiatives.

The extent to which these interventions are responsible for changes in the level of violent crime is uncertain (and the subject of additional study), but recent changes in both police practices and street violence are indisputable. In 2004, Chicago experienced a precipitous drop in the number of homicides. As shown in figure 1, Chicago's homicides have been around 600 or more for the previous five years, but then dropped to only 447 in 2004. This means there were 153 fewer murders in 2004 or a 25 percent decline from 2003. Historians will need to go back 39 years to 1965 to find a time when Chicago had fewer homicides. As one of the largest US cities, Chicago's violent crime and homicide numbers are often compared to Los Angeles and New York. When comparing the homicides in 2004 to 2003 in these cities we see that New York only experienced a 5 percent decline in homicides -- 596 in 2003 to 565 in 2004. And Los Angeles experienced a negligible decline of 0.4 percent -- 505 in 2003 compared to 503 in 2004.²

¹ As one of the top business and tourist destinations in the U.S., Chicago attracts more than 30 million visitors per year, who spend nearly 9 billion dollars in the local economy.

² Los Angeles experienced a 23 percent decline (153 homicides) from 2002 to 2003.

Figure 2 shows that "public violence" in Chicago, defined as any violent crime committed in the public way, also declined.³ Public violence with a firearm declined 13 percent and overall public violence declined seven percent in 2004 – from 550 in 2003 to 432 in 2004.

Figure 1: Chicago Homicides





Figure 2: Public Violence (excluding homicides)



³ "Public violence" incidents, as defined by the CPD, include all index incidents where the location code indicates it occurred outside AND the incident include either a non-index handgun weapons violation (IUCR code 141A) or other weapons violations (IUCR 141B). This can include aggravated assaults, batteries, robberies, and sexual assaults, rapes, and weapons violations that occur in the public way.

Why did the number of murders and public violence incidents, particularly those committed with firearms, drop so quickly in one year? To what extent should the Chicago Police Department be credited with this improvement in public safety? This report provides one piece of the puzzle by giving a synopsis of what the Chicago Police Department has done in the past two years to address the problem of public violence. It provides an overview of the management strategies, technological innovations, street-level operations, and community/partnership initiatives that have been introduced or intensified in 2003 and 2004. This report articulates, to the extent possible, why law enforcement officials contend that certain approaches are effective in combating street violence.

Marching to the Same Beat: The Superintendent's Agenda

Clarifying the immediate mission of the Chicago Police Department was an important task for the new superintendent, and he did so effectively. As a result, the work environment today is substantially different than it was even two years ago. The superintendent has sent a clear message to his employees -- the focus of the entire organization is public violence, and the primary goal is to reduce the number of homicides in Chicago. A related message was that everyone must work together, across traditional bureau boundaries and communication channels to achieve this goal. The independent-minded bureaus and fiefdoms of the past will be required to communicate and share information. Also, the new administration left no ambiguity about how performance would be measured at the beat, district, and Area levels. The number of reported violent crimes is what matters, along with the amount of police activity directed at these problems. Virtually everyone in the organization is now marching to the same beat.

Another message communicated both internally and externally is that gang teams and other resources are not "owned" by each of Chicago's 25 police districts, but will be used as needed to respond to existing and emergent violence problems throughout the city. Scarce resources must be concentrated where they will have the greatest impact, for example, hot spots for gang violence and drug markets. The superintendent created the Deployment Operations Center (DOC) to identify these locations and direct resources to them. The Bureau of Crime Strategy and Accountability (BCSA) was directed to evaluate whether "the cops are on the dots," (for example, whether resources are being optimally utilized to address hot spot locations) and whether police responses are sufficient and appropriate for specific problems. Thus, headquarters is sending the message that deployment and accountability will be data-driven. Public violence problems will be quickly identified with real-time information, thanks to new advanced information technology, and appropriate resources will be dispatched quickly, intensively, and visibly. Performance will be monitored and assessed during meetings held at the district, Area and headquarter levels. The message from the Superintendent is that, for the first time, individual units, district commanders and watch commanders, and Area deputy chiefs will be held numerically accountable by central administration for their performance in fighting violent crime.

II. Methodology and Objectives

This report is based on data collected through multiple methods, including interviews with more than three dozen command-level personnel (including the superintendent and deputy superintendents, district commanders, and commanders of special units), observations of various CPD meetings (for example, accountability, deployment, and community forums), a structured questionnaire administered to 80 exempt personnel, and the compilation and analysis of CPD data on crime and field activities. The primary objective of this report is to provide a brief overview of CPD anti-violence strategies and tactics in 2004 for the benefit of the public, government officials, police scholars, and other law enforcement agencies. The approach taken is largely descriptive rather than evaluative. Data collection will continue in 2005 to produce a more in-depth look at management strategies and to assess, with greater confidence, whether reductions in crime can be causally linked to changes in police operations over time.

III. Management Strategies

The Chicago Police Department's new management philosophy and style, although different from New York's and other cities in important ways, has some COMPSTAT-like features. After reviewing a number of departments, Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd (2004) identified six key elements in COMPSTAT-like programs, and each has some presence in Chicago:

(1) *Mission clarification:* We have already discussed how the new superintendent has clarified the CPD's new mission and focused all energies on reducing public violence.

(2) *Internal accountability:* In Chicago, district commanders and Area deputy chiefs are held strictly accountable during COMPSTAT-like "VISE" meetings (Violence Initiative Strategy Evaluation meetings) held every week, but this accountability is, at present, narrowly focused on indicators of public violence and homicide. The general accountability process in Chicago is, however, quite different from COMPSTAT-like programs, as discussed later. For all types of accountability meetings, one difference is that Chicago is not considered as punitive as the New York and other cities. Although feedback to command-level personnel can be embarrassing, the department gives them several opportunities in different settings to try and ameliorate the problem and/or explain the crime problems in their areas and their response.

(3) *Geographic organization of operational command:* Operational command is focused on specific geography and gives commanders the responsibility and authority for patrol officers and special units operating within this area. Historically, the CPD has acted more like 25 separate police departments, each under the control of a district commander. Under the new administration, however, these 25 commanders share control of their resources with the six Area deputy chiefs and centralized units.

(4) *Organizational flexibility:* The organization remains continuously flexible in its ability to deploy and redeploy resources whenever and wherever they are needed. Flexibility is at the heart of the new Chicago model, as the traditional command structure is asked to be responsive to new deployment plans from headquarters or Area deputy chiefs.

(5) *Data-driven analysis of problems and assessment of problem-solving efforts:* The CPD now has one of the most sophisticated information system in law enforcement (Skogan et al., 2004; 2005), and, as such, it plays an indispensable role in hot spot identification and an important role in accountability and assessments of problem-solving effectiveness.

(6) *Innovative problem-solving tactics:* According to this feature, an organization selects problem-solving tactics not because of their familiarity, but because they have the highest probability of success, based on “best practices” and available knowledge in the field. Chicago remains fairly parochial about "best practice," but has learned from visits to New York and Los Angeles. Also, Chicago has been very distinctive with its bottom-up proactive planning process. Problems (both quality of life and crime problems) are identified at the neighborhood level and solutions are crafted at the beat and district levels by police and community partners. In recent years, however, this problem solving process has taken a back seat to a top-down, statistics-driven management style.

From Theory to Practice in the Chicago Police Department

Why did the CPD expect it would be successful in reducing homicide? Applying some of the above organizational principles, and utilizing some of its own innovation, the CPD believed that deeper inroads can be achieved by: (1) increasing the flow of information between units within the Department; (2) increasing the flow of information between criminal justice agencies; (3) identifying relevant resources within the organization; (4) coordinating and deploying these resources to the right locations (5) targeting the highest risk individuals; (6) introducing both traditional and innovative enforcement strategies and tactics at these locations, and (7) holding all police personnel accountable for their responses to the violence problem. These strategies were based on several premises: first, more effective police responses are possible when information is comprehensive and disseminated in a timely manner; second, the department must gather any and all information pertaining to the violence problem; and third, the department needs to respond rapidly to solve homicides and prevent additional violence.

The Superintendent's Methods

To achieve these objectives, the superintendent needed the right personnel, the right management and operational structures, and the right knowledge/information to guide strategic decision-making and execute operational plans. First, the superintendent made the necessary personnel changes so that he had the right people “on the bus” – people with specific skills in investigations, gang intelligence, information systems, accountability, etc., and people that he could trust to carry out the mission. Second, special units were created and other units were beefed up – both management and operational – to implement the plan. These include the Deployment Operations Center (DOC) for gathering and analyzing information needed for deployment, and mobile response teams, such as the Targeted Response Unit (TRU) and Area Narcotics Enforcement Teams (ANET), each described below. Ultimately, the department consolidated some units to get more officers on the street; increased the number of narcotics officers working the streets, and reinstated and doubled the size of the gang intelligence unit to gather better information. Third, the CPD capitalized on recent developments under the CLEAR

(Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting) program and other technological advances. With real-time information, the CPD is able to increase the quantity, quality, and speed of information flow within the organization and with other criminal justice agencies. This has allowed the organization, for example, to quickly map violent crime incidents and flood hot spots with officers. Other technology changes include the use of highly visible cameras to monitor drug hot spots and deter drug activity. Finally, the superintendent stressed the importance of communication within and outside of the department. He encouraged collaboration and intelligence sharing between police units that in the past have been proprietary about data. As one commander said when describing what is different about the CPD today, “it’s all about communication.” Accountability meetings, as well as the centralization of crime and intelligence information in a large and accessible data warehouse, have helped to achieve this objective, although bureaucratic silos are difficult to dismantle.

Perhaps most important is the change in management philosophy and policy that allows for the rapid deployment of resources across traditional unit and geographic boundaries. To achieve maximum control over CPD resources, the superintendent has empowered the six Area-level deputy chiefs of Patrol, each with responsibility for several police districts. As one administrator noted, several years ago the deputy chiefs were considered “paper tigers” and district commanders were the final authority for most decisions. Today, deputy chiefs have permission to move gang teams between districts, on a temporary basis, to make best use of the correspondence between problem locations and police responses. This management change not only involves a centralization of authority in the Area deputy chiefs, but also a centralization of authority at police headquarters with the weekly DOC and VISE meetings, where district commanders and Area deputy chiefs are queried about violent crime and directed activities to reduce or prevent public violence in specific locations identified by headquarters.

Yet the new management approach was not simply about centralizing authority and deployment of special units at the Area level. In each of Chicago's 25 districts, the commanders, watch commanders and other supervisors were expected to give special attention to local violence problems through directed patrols and special missions. These district management teams had to ensure that officers continued to respond to calls for service and other general patrol activities but also engaged in activities similar to the Area units, for example, elevated responses to homicides and aggravated batteries and intensive patrols in any targeted hotspots. Thus, in many cases, districts' responsibilities increased as their manpower declined.

Deployment Operations Center (DOC) and Deployment Recommendations

One of the central actors in the CPD public violence reduction imperative is the Deployment Operations Center (DOC). The DOC is charged with analyzing violent crime and narcotic activities to establish patterns by combining data from official police and other criminal justice data sources with informal street-level gang intelligence. The DOC focuses on targeting violent offenders and trying to anticipate and quell intra- and inter-gang and narcotics conflicts using data-driven policing. In essence, the DOC attempts to predict geographic areas where violence is most likely to erupt and recommend increases in police presence and targeted enforcement activities in these areas. As First Deputy Superintendent Dana Starks noted, “DOC just isn’t about putting officers in locations after something has happened but it is preventative.”

The CPD defines three levels of geographic deployment for hot spots of violence: (1) Level 1 Deployment: These areas are defined by each police district and are the full responsibility of that district; (2) Level 2 Deployment: These areas are defined by the central DOC and are the joint responsibility of Area special units and the district in which it is located; and (3) Level 3 Deployment: The area is the entire city, and is the responsibility of all CPD personnel. (Level 3 deployments, also called "Operation Just Cause," are only activated under unusual circumstances, such as the shooting of a child or police officer. Technically, it is not a hot spot location and places everyone on alert). For this report, only Level 1 and 2 are discussed.

Each week the DOC recommends a Level 2 Deployment Area in each of Chicago's six police Areas. Based on an analysis and synthesis of violent crime data from CLEAR and gang and narcotics intelligence, the DOC recommends deployment in areas that warrant enhanced police presence. These deployment areas can cover 20-40 square blocks or run the length of a problematic street. The deployment areas are announced and examined at the weekly meeting, illustrated in packets distributed at the meeting and displayed in the CLEAR system so line officers can access the information. These Level 2 Deployment areas are expected to receive enhanced police presence from Area special units. Any police district that does not receive a Level 2 Deployment area for the coming week is required to establish a Level 1 Deployment area. Although the Level 1 Deployments are not selected by the DOC and do not receive Area-level support, these deployment areas are required to receive enhanced police presence and enforcement missions from existing district personnel. These personnel include beat and rapid response units, gang units, and tactical units from within the district.

The weekly DOC meetings at police headquarters are convened for two primary purposes: to review and discuss deployment areas' homicides and shootings from the preceding week and to present new (Level 2) deployment recommendations for the following week. During DOC meetings, command personnel (Area deputy chiefs, commanders) must explain how they used resources at their disposal to stem ongoing and/or predicted tumult in their deployment area. Area deputy chiefs and specialized units recount all operations that took place in their respective Level 1 and 2 deployment areas. The senior command staff also asks the Area and district personnel about the progress of homicide and shooting investigations, and asks about the quality and quantity of police activities in their relevant areas. If the activity numbers are perceived to be low or misdirected, then deputy chiefs and other relevant personnel are asked to explain.

Accountability meetings

In February 2000, the Chicago Police Department established what is now known as the Bureau of Crime Strategy and Accountability (BCSA). The unit was established to provide (in the words of its mission statement) "the necessary authority and the appropriate organizational purview to bring about an overall improvement in the management of the Chicago Police Department and to intensify the city's community policing strategy in all organizational bureaus of the Chicago Police Department." Directed by a deputy superintendent, the unit works to ensure that all CPD personnel and resources "are linked to strategies developed to address crime and disorder jointly identified by the community and police at the beat and district level." In Chicago's plan for managerial accountability, the 25 police districts are responsible for

identifying local priorities, planning strategies to address them and then executing their plans efficiently. Formal Strategic Operational Plans (SOPs)⁴ are developed "bottom-up" through beat community meetings and beat plans submitted by beat teams (composed of officers from all 3 watches) and prioritized by the district management team (composed of the district commander, three watch commanders, the tactical lieutenant, the CAPS lieutenant, and the Community Policing sergeant). These plans are assessed through accountability meetings at the district, Area, and headquarters levels. The role of BCSA is to oversee this process by arranging headquarter management accountability meetings and following up with specific districts and units to see that recommendations have been implemented.

At the district level, members of the district management team meet quarterly to review their SOPs. Districts are held accountable for their effectiveness in four domains: 1) reducing chronic crime and disorder in their districts, 2) identifying and containing emerging crime trends, 3) organizing community involvement and responding to community priority concerns, and 4) managing their personnel and other resources efficiently. Their effectiveness is primarily judged on their ability to "make their numbers" on a wide array of performance indicators. At present, however, the primary performance indicator is public violence. Because public violence is the central focus of the CPD at this time, special weekly accountability meetings (VISE) have been created to monitor progress in this area. The VISE meetings (described below) have much in common with COMPSTAT meetings and are quite different from Chicago's distinctive accountability process. The general management accountability meetings at headquarters, which monitor performance on multiple dimensions (not just public violence), have occurred only periodically in 2004 but are expected to return with greater regularity in 2005.

Violence Initiative Strategy Evaluation (VISE) Meetings

VISE (Violence Initiative Strategy Evaluation) is an abbreviated form of the management accountability process that focuses just on public violence. It operates in conjunction with the Deployment Operations Center (described below). VISE meetings involve the commanders of all of the districts that make up a police Area, plus their Area deputy chief. These one-hour review sessions closely examine trends in specific crimes, including district homicides, aggravated battery with firearms, and other public violence involving the use of firearms. The VISE meeting focus is short-term, typically confined to the four-week period prior to the meeting. The sessions review recent crime trends and possible patterns, and typically include a close examination of maps that identify violence hotspots and suspected crime patterns (for example, armed robbery patterns). BCSA presents analyses of where district units are making arrests, and if their efforts are focused in the right parts of the district and during the right time frames (day of the week and time of day). The emphasis is on how quickly the districts can identify crime up ticks and nimbly redeploy or direct officers in response.

The BCSA also tries to ensure that units are fully utilizing the department's new information technology system, CLEAR (Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting program). Specifically, are they properly entering the initial and follow-up reports and are they resourceful in using the CLEAR data? The importance of timely and accurate automated

⁴ Each SOP identifies offenders, victims, and locations that are the priority problems for the district management team and specific actions they will take to address them. Districts are working on about 3 SOPS at any time.

information is constantly stressed. In several instances, querying contact card database or tattoos displayed in Digital Mug Shot complement detective investigations. For educational purposes, BCSA will display examples of good and bad photos of tattoos. (The CPD now requires that any tattoos must accompany relevant Digital Mug shots).

In addition to the districts, representatives of the department's specialized units are typically quizzed about their contribution to solving the crime trends that are identified at a VISE session. These include Area detectives, the Narcotics and Gang Investigation Section (NAGIS), Targeted Response Unit (TRU), Special Operations Section (SOS), and the public housing, public transportation and fugitive apprehension units. VISE staff uses CLEAR and other data sources in advance to prepare analyses of their operations and determine whether these units have been effective partners in responding to district priorities. BCSA also prepares maps comparing the distribution of buildings targeted by the city's Strategic Inspections Task Force with police hot spots, to determine whether code enforcement efforts are being focused on the priorities of the police department. As in the accountability sessions described above, an important purpose of these meetings is to ensure that the various parts of the department are focusing on the same set of priorities.

Law Enforcement Partnerships

In recent years the department has collaborated with many external law enforcement agencies. Given the nature of law enforcement, the Chicago Police Department has always reached out to external agencies for assistance or to solicit information, but under Superintendent Cline's leadership, this collaboration has become more organized, consistent and focused on repeat offenders. The department regularly collaborates with the federal government on the Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative. The department also meets monthly with representatives from the State's Attorney's Office, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the US Attorney's Office, ATF, Illinois Department of Corrections, and Federal Bureau of Investigation to exchange information about targeted individuals on whom the group has decided to focus their collective efforts. The DOC also works closely with the Illinois Department of Corrections to anticipate potentially problematic releases and adjust deployment recommendations accordingly.

IV. Use of Technology

Technology has been pivotal to many of CPD's operational strategies and tactics, ensuring timely data to effectively execute street-level activities. Technology has exponentially sped up investigatory powers for police personnel. A commander characterized this technological acceleration by saying he can now query several locales for a nickname in minutes, and this would have taken him three months before. Additionally, technology has fostered cross-unit pollination for problem solving; units can query several databases belonging to different units simultaneously, a feat that would have been time consuming and nearly impossible two-and-a-half years ago. As one deputy chief stated, however, "Technology is only as good as the people who use it," highlighting the importance of training and effort among officers and staff.

CLEAR and I-CLEAR

Since 2001, the CPD, in partnership with Oracle Corporation and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), has been developing a state-of-the-art integrated criminal justice information system called CLEAR.⁵ The real benefits of CLEAR for the CPD began to materialize in 2003 and especially 2004, as key applications were rolled out and an ever-growing data warehouse became familiar to all police personnel. This information technology became the backbone of Chicago's efforts to "police smarter" by allowing employees easy access to a large repository of centralized, real-time data. The data warehouse is the engine that powers the numerous interrelated applications that comprise CLEAR. (See Skogan et al., 2005). The wide array of data elements on crime incidents and arrests makes Chicago the first large city in the nation to create a reporting program that meets (and exceeds) the standards set by the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) -- a system that will someday replace the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) for all law enforcement agencies.

CLEAR applications are expected to impact the organization in three functional domains: police management, criminal justice integration and community/business partnerships. In terms of police management, CLEAR is expected to promote effective resource allocation; officer management and accountability; risk management and early warning; tactical and strategic planning; and fiscal accountability. At present, CLEAR has become the information backbone of the Deployment Operations Center, providing real-time information from a relational database and strong crime-mapping capabilities to help identify hot spots. The database also aids criminal investigations by allowing detectives to search for matching information from a host of variables. CLEAR is also used in the department-wide management accountability process to monitor changes in crime conditions and measure police activity levels within designated hot spots and elsewhere.

In terms of criminal justice integration, the CPD envisions a unified information system across criminal justice agencies in Illinois that will increase efficiency, accountability between agencies, and crime solvability. Currently, the CPD is sharing information with hundreds of surrounding law enforcement agencies via the CLEAR data warehouse and is working with the Illinois State Police to develop a statewide information system. In early 2004, Governor Rod Blagojevich and Mayor Richard M. Daley announced their commitment to building a new database that would allow all 1,200 police agencies in Illinois to quickly share crime information. The new system is called I-CLEAR, with the "I" indicating that it will serve all of Illinois. This is the beginning of a fully-integrated statewide system for crime incident reports, arrest reports, and follow-up investigation reports. Other Midwestern states have already expressed an interest in joining the system.

Currently, the CPD uses all available databases, both inside and outside of the organization, to identify high-risk individuals and high-risk locations in Chicago. One example of this triangulation of information is parolee releases, particularly high-risk people, like gang leaders. The Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) communicates prisoner release information to the CPD on a monthly basis. The department then maps the locations of the

⁵ CLEAR was developed under the leadership of Assistant Deputy Superintendent Ron Huberman and former Deputy Superintendent Barbara McDonald.

releases, communicates with IDOC about the risk potential, reviews the intelligence gathered regarding the releases and conducts joint parole compliance missions in the field.⁶

In terms of community/business partnerships, CLEAR is expected to strengthen community policing and problem-solving capacities in a variety of ways and allow for easy online information sharing with the community. Enhanced communication also has the potential to support criminal investigations and increase crime clearances. Currently, the CPD has a partnership with Chicago residents through monthly beat community meetings and through District Advisory Committees in each of the 25 districts. Through the Internet, the CPD hopes to reach CAPS participants and other residents to enhance beat-level problem-solving, increase residents' involvement in community crime prevention, increase community-based accountability using new performance measures, and strengthen police-community relations. (See Rosenbaum, 2004). To help achieve these objectives, the CPD is embarking on a joint project with the University of Illinois at Chicago to develop and test a web-based community survey in 2005 (see "The Chicago Internet Project" below). The CPD is also embarking on a multi-faceted initiative called Project CLEAR-Path that is expected to increase the flow of integrated information to and from the community. Project CLEAR-Path is scheduled for development in 2005.

In sum, CLEAR and I-CLEAR provide the tools for predictive resource allocation to deploy officers when and where needed; unprecedented availability of information for management analysis, officer accountability, and crime clearances; shared performance and problem-solving information for community policing partners; pre-packaged information to support decision making at all levels of the Department; and a framework for information integration across criminal justice agencies.

Surveillance Cameras

The department has been using surveillance cameras in locations that produce a high volume of calls for service and are known historically as areas with high concentrations of drug and gang activity. These cameras are expected to serve as a deterrent for illegal activity. (See "Operation Disruption" below for a more detailed description of the use of surveillance cameras).

V. Specialized Units and Deployments

At the heart of Chicago's anti-violence model is the targeted deployment of special operational units. To understand the rationale for these units, the reader must first understand the department's analysis of the violence problem.

CPD's Theory of Action: The Gang-Guns-Drugs Nexus


The current CPD administration began with the premise that to reduce public violence significantly, the department would need to focus its attention on gang activity, drug markets, and guns. This approach is rooted in the fact that over 50 percent of all homicides in Chicago are

⁶ Now that the I-CLEAR data warehouse is available to hundreds of law enforcement agencies in northern Illinois, the CPD is beginning to communicate with these agencies about suspects, warrants, arrests and incidents.

gang and/or narcotics related (See figure 3). Additionally, many of Chicago’s shootings are the result of inter- or intra-gang conflict. Also, prior research indicates that communities with high concentrations of criminogenic commodities, such as alcohol, drugs, and firearms, are more likely to have higher rates of youth violence (Sherman et al., 1997). Reducing access to or demand for these commodities is a very difficult task (because of unrestricted access and the high demand for these products), but in Chicago, the focus is on gangs as criminogenic organizations and the money that supports them. The superintendent and his top staff argue that gang operations can be crippled and violence reduced by disrupting their drug markets and taking guns off the street.⁷ The gangs use the profits from their drug business to purchase more guns, buy more drugs, bond out their members, pay their attorneys, and generally, build their illegal business. As with any business, money feeds and strengthens the organization. As Superintendent Cline noted, "Anything we can do to choke off the money supply will help stop the violence."

Violence is not randomly distributed in Chicago. Specific neighborhoods in the city incur the bulk of violent crime, especially public violence. Not coincidentally, these areas are also the center of much of the city’s narcotics activities. Under the imperative to curb public violence, Areas and districts became responsible for geographically assessing levels of violence and responding proactively to the most violent areas.

Figure 3: Gang Related Homicides as a Percent of All Homicides*



Because drug markets and gang conflicts do not stop at beat or district boundaries, and because these problems are not randomly distributed, the department felt the need for Area-level and city-level coordination of resources and responses. Also, private property is often the location of narcotics sales, so the CPD realized that efforts to address the drug problem must also address problems with real estate, including vacant lots, abandoned or run-down buildings, and slum landlords.

⁷ This argument has the most credibility with African American gangs in Chicago, where conflict is often related to drug markets. Violence among Latino gangs, in contrast, is more likely to stem from turf issues.

As part of the CPD's ambitious mission to reduce public violence, they reasoned that they must be able to quickly deploy police personnel en masse and not be restricted by dated and rigid administrative boundaries. Below are descriptions, rationales and outcomes for several important specialized units and deployment initiatives.

Area Geographic Deployment

Some of the deployment and enforcement decisions that used to be the sole responsibility of the district commander have been turned over to the Areas deputy chiefs of patrol. Deputy chiefs (commanding officers of Areas) are responsible for coordinating responses from several Area- and city-level enforcement team and special units, for example the Targeted Response Unit and the Area Narcotics Enforcement Teams. Deputy chiefs are responsible for staffing the DOC-selected location in their Area (Level 2 Deployment), with support from local District forces. Ultimately, Deputy chiefs are accountable to keep violence down in the geographic "hot spots" established by the DOC. The district commanders, however, remain the primary authority for most district decision-making, and as noted earlier, they are fully accountable for deploying their own officers and creating missions within the Level 1 hot spots.

Gang/ Narcotic Loitering "Hot Spots"

In 1998, the Chicago City Council amended the Municipal code to prohibit "gang-related" or "narcotics-related" loitering in specified areas. This Gang and Narcotic Loitering Ordinance gives the Chicago police the legal authority to order people to disperse in areas that have been designated, through various sources of information⁸, as gang and drug loitering "hot spots". Officers patrolling the area can verbally inform the violators that gang or drug loitering is prohibited in this area and order them to disperse and remove themselves from sight and sound for at least three hours. Contact cards are completed for all individuals involved indicating the names, time, location, and other information. If they do not comply with the order, then police can arrest the violators. Deployment areas and "hot spots" can and do overlap but are determined differently. CPD Patrol staff submits "hot spot" location choices semi-annually; their determinations are based on calls for services and levels of past narcotics and gang activity. "Hot spots" are usually geographically smaller than DOC-identified deployment areas and are located all over the city. According to DOC staff, DOC deployment is based on a "high propensity for violence in a geographic area." Thus, the argument is made that DOC deployment areas (Level 2) are more predictive of violence than "hot spot" dispersal zones.

Both the loitering hotspots and DOC deployment areas are predicated on stifling activity in areas that have shown violent crime and narcotics activities in the past. The tables in Figure 4 show the staggering increase in dispersal activity in designated hot spots. Dispersal orders for loitering hot spot locations increased 129 percent from 7,281 in 2002 to 16,679 in 2004. Similarly, people dispersed from hot spots increased 89 percent from 28,794 in 2002 to 53,113 in

⁸ A criminal street gang loitering in the area (or a person engaged in narcotic-related loitering) must be identified on the basis of reliable, documented information from sources such as the analysis of crime patterns, observations by department personnel, witness interviews, interviews with admitted gang members, and information supplied by reliable informants.

2004.⁹ Figure 4 depicts the dramatic increase in dispersals ordered and number of people dispersed as a result of the orders. Figure 5 shows the number of arrest incidents and persons arrested as a result of dispersal orders that went unheeded.

Figure 4: Hot Spot Dispersals





Figure 5: Dispersal Arrests



Special Operations Section (SOS)

The Special Operations Section (SOS) is a part of the Special Functions Group within the Patrol Division. The Special Functions Group is responsible for numerous specialized police functions from critical response to mounted patrol and marine units. SOS is comprised of highly trained officers; oftentimes the police officers selected for SOS teams are the same caliber of officers that would be selected for TRU (see explanation below) and vice versa – well trained

⁹ Some portion of this increase may be an artifact of measurement, as the CPD apparently increased the average size of loitering hotspots in the summer of 2004. Hence, with larger hot spot areas, the number of dispersals might increase without more intense enforcement.

and aggressive. Both of these units require highly trained and disciplined officers. SOS teams are deployed instantly to wherever they are needed but the teams are much smaller than TRU teams, with only 8-10 officers and two sergeants, and they focus on conducting search warrants. TRUs, in contrast, are supposed to engage in more visible police activity like traffic stops and general patrol. The department tries to limit overlap of SOS and TRU deployment so as to maximize police presence within several problematic areas. Table 1 details SOS activity for the past three years.

Table 1: SOS activities 2002-2004

Year	# of Officers	Arrests	Warrant Arrests	Weapons	Contact Cards
2002	256	10,953	n/a	976	n/a
2003	302	9,827	n/a	840	n/a
2004	285	8,212	1,144	1,122	8,020

Targeted Response Unit (TRU)

When the Targeted Response Unit (TRU) was first deployed, it fell under the command of the SOS unit. In 2003 the TRU became a unit independent of SOS with its own commander. Precursors of the TRU were the saturation teams and “Operation Clean Slate” of the early 2000s. The objective of these entities was to inundate targeted areas and conduct mass arrests. In that vein, the TRU is deployed with the intent of quashing all criminal activity in a targeted area; however, the TRU can be deployed for longer periods and its deployment location is based on recommendations from the DOC.

The TRU is composed of three companies, each consisting of approximately 80 handpicked, highly trained police officers and 8 sergeants. One commander and two lieutenants oversee the three TRU companies. CPD began with two 80-person TRU companies and in the last quarter of 2004 they added another cadre of TRU officers. All TRU officers are on call and can be rapidly deployed to high crime areas to conduct aggressive and visible patrol. TRU teams are deployed based on recommendations from the DOC. The TRU commander and the DOC communicate constantly to ensure that TRU deployment is optimized. As an illustration of the fluidity of their response and placement, TRU teams are often used to curb displacement that may occur around DOC deployment areas and they can be deployed in the communities adjacent to the deployment area.

The TRU was characterized by one of the top command staff as an “overwhelming presence” communicating to the community that they will saturate violent areas to enforce order. To this end, the TRU makes numerous traffic stops and street contacts; conducts frequent patrols of targeted areas and conducts missions in targeted areas. When shootings or homicides occur, the TRU is immediately deployed to saturate the area where the violence occurred. Table 2 highlights the productivity of the TRU showing the number of arrests, weapons recovered, and field contacts attributed to this unit.

Table 2: TRU Activities (June 2003 - December 2004)

Number of officers (total)	254
Company A & B	174
Company C	80 ¹⁰
Arrests (total)	8,873
Part I & II crimes ¹¹	6,704
Warrant arrests	2,169
Felony narcotics	1,546
Misdemeanor narcotics	1,680
Contact cards	18,673
Weapons recovered	343


Enhanced Investigations

In addition to rapid deployment to quell violence, the CPD also stresses rapid response to crime scenes, particularly violent crimes, to ensure the evidence is preserved and collected. The detective division, which has received additional support under the current administration, is primarily responsible for criminal investigations and more importantly clearances (solving cases). The detective division receives investigatory assistance from the Narcotics and Gang Investigation Section (NAGIS). When an aggravated battery (shooting) or a homicide occurs NAGIS directs both the Area Narcotics Enforcement Teams (ANET) and gang teams to leverage information from all their sources in the area where the incident occurred (all of these units are discussed more thoroughly in a section below). Additionally, the contact card database (also discussed below) and many of the CLEAR functions and databases provide the detective division with a comprehensive set of investigative tools that they did not have before and that extraordinarily speed up search capabilities. As the detective division's investigations are enhanced, so should their clearance rates. If clearance rates increase, theoretically this should contribute to declining crime rates as offenders are apprehended. Reductions in the number of homicides, regardless of the cause, and increases in the number of cops on the street, should free up homicide investigators to more thoroughly investigate their cases, thus increasing clearance rates. The available data provide mixed support for the "Investigation" hypothesis. As Figure 6 shows, clearance rates for homicides occurring in a single year have not increased recently, and in fact, have declined from nearly 60% in 1999 to 48% in 2004. However, the detective division has been more aggressive in solving homicides committed in previous years. In 2004, the CPD cleared 148 homicides that occurred prior to 2004, the highest number in the past six years. This jump is consistent with the hypothesis that additional resources and technology, along with a decline in the absolute number of homicides, allowed investigators to turn their attention to older homicide cases with some positive results.

¹⁰ Company C was added to the TRU in the last quarter of 2004.

¹¹ See Uniform Crime Report definitions of Part I and Part II crime.

Figure 6: Homicide Clearance Rates*



Clearance figures as of Jan. 10, 2005

Gang and Tactical teams

Each district has a District Gang and Tactical Team that is led by one lieutenant who reports to the District Commander. There are two Gang Teams in each district, each with 8 to 10 officers and supervised by a sergeant. There are typically three Tactical Teams, each having a sergeant and 8 to 10 police officers. The Gang Teams' mission is to focus on developing intelligence about gangs in the district and on investigating crimes associated with gangs. They have close working relationships with the other, more centralized, Department units also focusing on gang activity such as the Area Detective Division, the Area Narcotics Enforcement teams (ANET) and the Narcotics and Gang Investigations Section (NAGIS). The Tactical Teams focus on investigation and enforcement of laws regarding vice activity (narcotics, prostitution, liquor license violations and gambling) and then other activity as deemed necessary by the District Commander. Both groups are responsible to the District Watch Commander during the working tour of duty. The Gang and Tactical Teams typically work the 2nd and 3rd watch but have the flexibility to adjust their hours as needed.

As part of the new department-wide effort to coordinate responses to gang activity, the operational management of the District Gang Teams has been shifted from the District's lieutenant to the office of the Area Patrol Deputy Chiefs. This was done, in part, in recognition of the geographic diffusion of gang activity. Administrative management (for example, coordinating vacations, discipline, etc.) remains with the District.

Narcotics and Gang Investigation Section (NAGIS)

Narcotics and Gang Investigation Section (NAGIS) orchestrate the Area and city-level gang and narcotics operations. Their signature tactical response in 2004 was Operation "Street Corner Conspiracy," which involved extensive undercover surveillance and enforcement in dozens of open-air drug markets (see Street Corner Conspiracy below). Although NAGIS carries out missions, they are also central in gathering and sharing intelligence for detective division investigations and the DOC.

Table 3: NAGIS Activity

Year	# of Officers	Arrests	Weapons Recovered
2002	333	3,304	583
2003	320	2,836	589
2004	320	3,203	288

Area Narcotics Enforcement Team (ANET)

ANETs are deployed by Area Deputy Chiefs immediately after a homicide or a shooting has occurred to canvass the areas. One of the main tactics they use is buy busts. ANET officers purchase drugs from dealers and then arrest the dealers and bring them for interrogation under the auspice of gang and drug violations. They collaborate with the detective division and try to garner information beyond the scope of the initial arrest to further homicide or shooting investigations. ANETs are important to the department's increased emphasis on instantly responding to public violence in an organized, cohesive manner. After a shooting or a homicide incident, ANETs are selectively deployed. They collect intelligence about the recent violence in the area by conducting buy busts, stings and canvassing their street contacts to leverage and elicit information about violent crime.

VI. Programs, Strategies and Tactics

Many of the Chicago Police Department's programs, strategies and tactics are focused on targeted enforcement of places and people and enhanced police presence in problematic areas. Some of the programs and tactics described are similar to traditional policing enforcement actions, but others suggest creativity in honing directed patrols, criminal investigations, and enforcement tactics in Chicago.

Street Corner Conspiracies

Street Corner Conspiracies are long-term investigations directed by NAGIS that involve extensive surveillance and aim to incriminate all players in drug dealing rings but particularly the high-end suppliers. As one commanding officer stated, "you are taking down the whole organization." The investigations involve weeks and even months of video surveillance and sophisticated investigation tying the entire supply chain to the evidence. Anecdotally, the department finds the SCC to be the most convincing and most prosecutable of their investigations because they can bring a "package of evidence" to judges rather than ad hoc cases against individual dealers. The SCC investigations show the depth of the drug trade and often result in stiffer penalties for all the players. The number of SCC has increased from six carried out in 2002 to 38 completed in 2004. Last year, Chicago Police took down 49 open-air drug markets and secured charges against more than 700 drug dealers as part of its on-going fight against violence caused by gangs and drugs.

“Operation Double Play”

“Operation Double Play” is a key element of Chicago's response to open air drug markets. Police officers pose as buyers and arrest many of the dealers. After the dealers are cleared out, the officers then pose as sellers and arrest customers as they try to purchase narcotics. The primary purpose of this mission is deterrence. Through these tactics the department is attempting to make it difficult to buy and sell drugs in Chicago.

“Operation Disruption”

Operation Disruption involves highly visible video camera pods mounted on light poles, with bullet-proof shields, flashing blue lights, CPD logo, and 360° digital cameras. The cameras are located in areas where the department predicts or observes both violent crime and narcotics activity. The purpose of the cameras is not to generate arrests but rather to act as a visible deterrent to illegal and violent activity. A CPD press release sums up the purpose of the cameras: “[they] hit gang bangers in the pocketbook by disrupting the drug trade and by sending a message that they are being watched.” (June 18, 2004). Additionally, the archived footage can be, and is being, used for criminal proceedings. Between April, 2003 and April, 2004 calls for service related to narcotics dropped by 76 percent and serious crime fell by 17 percent in the immediate areas where the pods were used. Thirty (30) units were operational between June, 2003 and June, 2004, with 50 more pods anticipated in 2005. The question is whether crime has been displaced beyond the view of the cameras or has been prevented.

“Operation Closed Market”

Operation Closed Market is an effort by the CPD to increase the number of sworn officers on the streets to interrupt open-air drug markets and drug dealing. All sworn personnel assigned to non-field duty or administrative positions are required to spend 20 percent of their working days in the field. “Closed Market” officers engage in proactive, visible mobile and foot patrol in their assigned area. Since the inception of “Closed Market,” officers have generated 1,212 total arrests, half of which were for narcotics activities and impounded 288 vehicles. As is the goal of many of the departmental strategies, the department aims to dissuade narcotics selling and buying through enhanced police presence. On the downside, some loss of management productivity can be assumed.

Street-Level Intelligence Gathering: The Contact Card

Since the beginning of 2003, the department has stressed that police officers collect basic demographics from people with whom they come in contact during the course of duty. Information is discretionarily collected from people that officers encounter, not necessarily suspicious persons but any persons that police officers think could assist in investigations. Officers collect people’s addresses, nicknames, gang affiliations and other pertinent data. The information gleaned from the cards is entered into a searchable database that can be queried for investigatory purposes. Individual contact card information is purged from the database six months after it is collected. The department has put heightened emphasis on collecting these cards, perceiving the cards utility in investigations. The number of contact cards collected by the

department between 2003 and 2004 increased 144 percent – from 86,034 in 2003 to a high of 209,719 in 2004.

Enforcement Activities

The department uses many different tactics to convey presence, saturate, and proactively enforce order in the deployment areas and hotspots. Although many of these tactics are not new and have been used in the past by law enforcement agencies, they are now being coordinated and concentrated to ameliorate public violence in targeted deployment areas. Buy busts and reverse stings are used to disrupt narcotics activities. Hot spots dispersals and subsequent arrests are used to diffuse potentially inflammatory situations – groups of street gang members congregating and possibly distributing narcotics. Vehicles are impounded and traffic tickets issued during all narcotics operations and missions to dissuade both buyers and sellers from “doing business” in problematic areas. Seatbelt missions are used both as a way to be active and present in high public violence areas and allow officers to systematically check for warrants and other felony crimes and misdemeanor violations. In 2004, seatbelt mission activity generated 14,557 citations, 1,262 impounded, 343 misdemeanor arrests, and 74 felony arrests. There were no guns recovered during seatbelt missions conducted in 2004. In other police missions and activities in 2004, there were 11,180 firearms recovered in the city of Chicago.¹²

VII. Community and Other Partnerships

CAPS and Community Action

The Chicago Police Department has one of the most widely publicized and carefully evaluated community policing initiatives in the nation (see Skogan & Hartnett, 1997; Skogan et al., 2004). Launched in 1993 as the “Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy” or CAPS, the program’s most distinctive feature is the beat community meeting, where residents and beat officers meet monthly in each of Chicago’s 280 beats to discuss local problems and engage in a problem solving process. (On average, 6,000 Chicago residents attend beat meetings each month). But CAPS is much more than these meetings. This citywide initiative also involved the improved coordination of city services to reduce disorder problems, the restructuring of the police organization to allow beat officers to take more responsibility for the problems on their beat, the training of all officers and civilians in problem solving, citywide public education campaigns to increase residents’ awareness and knowledge of roles and responsibilities, and efforts to organize community activism against crime and disorder.

The community activism and city service components are worth emphasizing here as examples of unique partnerships between government and local residents. At the district level, police officials and organizers from the CAPS Implementation Office encourage residents to engage in aggressive activism to “take back” their neighborhood from drug dealers, gangs, and other social deviants. Most police districts sponsor marches, anti-graffiti campaigns, “smoke outs” (barbeque picnics), positive loitering (to harass prostitutes and customers), and regular citizen patrols or watches. These efforts are designed to send a strong message that local

¹² Data obtained from firearms inventoried in e-track.

residents, rather than drug dealers, have control of the neighborhood, and that criminal behavior will not be tolerated.

Recently, under the leadership of Deputy Superintendent Byrne, the CPD is linking CAPS activism with hot spot policing in an effort to achieve longer-lasting effects. The CPD is quick to acknowledge that arresting a few drug dealers at a particular location is insufficient to make a neighborhood safer. One dealer is quickly replaced by another one eager to make a profit. When a particular street corner or building is targeted for police surveillance and enforcement, the CAPS army of volunteers is then activated. Active community residents maintain order after the enforcement actions (see TURF program described below). Also, at a larger geographic level, the CPD has sought to organize community marches within areas designated as Level 2 deployment zones. These marches are meant to reinforce the actions taken by the police in these hot spots and show solidarity of purpose in the fight against violence.

Coordinated Delivery of City Services

Many of the problems discussed at CAPS community beat meetings, although indirectly linked to violence, fall outside the purview of the police, such as removing graffiti, replacing street lights, trimming trees, filling potholes, and towing abandoned vehicles. Hence, CAPS planners had the foresight to create the CAPS Service Requests, which laid the foundation for an innovative tracking system that would eventually enhance the coordination and delivery of city services to neighborhoods. Originally submitted by police officers after listening to residents' complaints at beat meetings, requests can now be submitted online by residents and police alike.

With city services coordinated through the CAPS Office, they can be dispatched to work with the CPD on special projects in high-crime neighborhoods. Under Operation CLEAN (City services, Law Enforcement And Neighbors), for example, a massive amount of city services are rapidly delivered to a specific target area in a coordinated fashion. As the CAPS evaluators note, "These service blitzes, held about 30 times per year, include aggressively towing seemingly abandoned cars, graffiti removal by the city's Graffiti Blasters (so named because they use high-pressure soda blasters), tree trimming, rat poisoning, sewer cleaning, clearing and mowing vacant lots, repairing streets and sidewalks, installing new street signs and lamp posts, and painting fire hydrants and other public structures." (Skogan et al., 2004, p. 87). As part of this process, building and business inspectors do their job. This process has now been linked to CPD efforts to close drug houses under the TURF program (see below). The important point is that these blitzes are location specific and are intended to empower local residents, sometimes in concert with enforcement actions. As part of the process, CAPS employees and community activists go door-to-door to encourage residents to reclaim their neighborhood and participate in anti-violence activities and community block clubs.

Targeting Urban Real-estate and Felons (TURF)

The Targeting Urban Real-estate and Felons (TURF) initiative can be viewed as a truncated, high-speed "Weed and Seed" program (Roehl et al., 1996), whereby criminals are "weeded out" and the neighborhood is "seeded" with community and city services to prevent future offending. In concert with the Street Corner Conspiracies operation and Operation

CLEAN-type services, TURF seeks to (1) clean up specific drug and gang houses; (2) restore order on the block, (3) mobilize the community to reclaim the area, (4) hold third parties responsible for keeping privately owned property free of illegal drug activity, and (5) encourage private sector investment to stabilize the neighborhood.

This program is a partnership between the CPD and other agencies designed to enforce drug and housing laws and engage the community in preventative actions. The program is carried out as follows: Based on community and police information, drug houses are identified. On the first day, arrest warrants are executed for drug dealers. On the same day or shortly thereafter, a building inspection is conducted, cars are towed on the block, streets and alleys are cleaned, graffiti is removed, etc. On the second day, the CPD conducts Reverse Sting and/or Buy Bust Operations to arrest buyers associated with these locations. In subsequent days, the saturation phase is introduced. The targeted area is saturated with police, include SOS, TRU, Saturation teams, district tactical teams, or administrative personnel ("Closed Market"), to send a clear message that the problem has been aggressively addressed and the neighborhood has been reclaimed. The area is also saturated with CAPS volunteers ("wolf pack"), who begin to recruit local residents and community leaders for a block club initiative. The messages to the community include: (1) the neighborhood is now safer and you can use it without fear; (2) community participation in solving crime and preventing crime is absolutely essential; and (3) if you want to help out, get involved by attending a CAPS beat community meeting, joining a new block club, participating in a community march, or engage in many other activities to help maintain the area.

A key component of the TURF initiative is a working partnership of city agencies that holds third parties responsible for illegal activity on private property. The target is usually a negligent property owner rather than a drug dealer or user on the property. Orchestrated by the Bureau of Crime Strategy and Accountability, the TURF initiative also involves the CPD's Narcotic and Gang Investigations Section (Bureau of Investigative Services), the City's Department of Law, Department of Buildings, Streets and Sanitation, CAPS Office, and Department of Administrative Hearings. The City's Strategic Inspections Task Force (SITF), composed of inspectors from various City departments, inspects buildings for code violations. The city's Drug and Gang House Enforcement Section, created by the city's Department of Law, serves as the community prosecution unit for municipal code violations under the city's 1996 drug and gang house ordinance. Through resolution meetings with property owners, a solution is often found prior to fines and legal remedies. When the parties fail to reach an agreement, the case is scheduled for an administrative hearing or criminal court. Section 8-4-090 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, when enforced, allows penalties "if the owners have encouraged or permitted the criminal activity to occur." Enforcement actions can include: (1) vacating and boarding up the property for one year; (2) forced sale to a neutral third party; (3) fencing of a vacant property, and (4) fines up to \$50,000. Code violations by building owners have also been used as a vehicle to clean up liquor establishments and encourage participation in landlord training programs.

The latest (and most experimental) component of TURF involves stimulating private sector investment in low-income housing once the negligence problem has been corrected. This program is called "Adopt -a-Block." As Deputy Superintendent Byrne noted, "we want

companies to adopt a block" and "we want to give property back to the people who deserve it and care about the neighborhood." The CPD is working with the City to persuade private sector developers and real estate companies to join their neighborhood development team, using tax incentives and positive publicity to stimulate participation. As a final stage of TURF, the idea is to hold investment "block parties" where local residents and building owners (whose property needs repair) can meet with the City's Department of Housing, commercial banks, and home improvement stores. The City will provide information about how to keep property up to code; banks will provide low-interest loans, and home improvement stores will provide building materials and technical assistance.

Why should TURF be effective? Using civil remedies to clean up physical dilapidation, drug trafficking, and social disorder on private property is strongly supported by previous research (Green, Mazerolle & Roehl, 1998) and is consistent with broken windows theory.(Kelling & Coles, 1996; Skogan, 1990). Furthermore, the CPD and other city agencies have done an excellent job of working in partnership to coordinate services and make enforcement a reality. The benefits of code enforcement can be substantial. This approach is based on the well-documented assumption that turning a blind eye to code violations will encourage slum landlords and tenants' illegal activity. In contrast, enforcement against dealers, users, and property owners should increase deterrence. In fact, an evaluation of an earlier version of the Chicago program found that narcotics crime declined in the target areas when individual drug houses were cleaned up (Higgins & Coldren, 2000).

The City of Chicago prosecuted over 600 drug and gang house building cases per year in 2002 and 2003, and over 500 cases in 2004. The CPD and the TURF program, created in 2004, focused its efforts on 65 properties in 22 "Street Corner Conspiracies," resulting in 31 cases filed. The program is relatively small, but outcomes include agreements to vacate the property, sales to the Neighborhood Housing Services, forced sales, emergency board-ups, demolition, fines, and default judgments. The first priority of TURF is to sell the property to a new owner or to change the unacceptable behavior of the current owner.

Community Forums

The CPD began a series of citywide "community forums" to breakdown barriers and strengthen relations with diverse communities throughout the city. Starting with a "race-relations forum" in the spring of 2000 (involving primarily leaders in the African American community), the forum approach was expanded to the Arab and Muslim community in 2002 ("multi-cultural forum") following an abrupt rise in hate crimes after September 11, 2001. These meetings have been facilitated by Chuck Wexler of the Police Executive Research Forum, who typically asks two basic questions: (1) "How are the police doing?" and (2) "What can they do better?" Out of these citywide meetings came an improved understanding and some specific actions. These actions included a commitment to produce a series of "Courtesy and Demeanor" training videos that emphasized police officers should be respectful of all citizens and be respectful of specific religious traditions and practices. Streaming video technology allows all units and officers to be exposed to these training materials.

The success of the Citywide Forums led to the introduction of the "Neighborhood Forum" in 2002, replicated in each of Chicago's five police Areas. The format was essentially the same as the Citywide Forums, but with a greater focus on local concerns rather than organizational or department matters. Perhaps most relevant to the Department's current philosophy of policing, a Violence Forum was created in 2003 that involved the community in a problem solving process about violent crime on the City's west side (District 11). These meetings produced several law enforcement and community-based strategies for addressing violent crime. Out of these Violence meetings, for example, came a closer working relationship with the U.S. Attorney's Office and Project Safe Neighborhoods.

The Chicago Internet Project

This web-based survey system is designed to facilitate input and feedback from Chicago residents regarding neighborhood problems, local anti-crime initiatives, and assessments of local police, community, and partnership activities. The expectation is that a standardized system of geo-based survey data can be developed to "measure what matters" to the public within a community/problem oriented policing framework and that this system can provide the CPD and the public with useful information for planning, evaluation, and accountability within and across specific beats and districts. Feedback from ongoing geo-coded Internet resident surveys is expected to enhance beat-level problem solving, police-community partnerships, and joint accountability for public safety activity.

This developmental work has been a joint venture between the CPD and the University of Illinois at Chicago, funded by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. The initiative has progressed through several stages of research and development, beginning in 2002. In 2004, a field test in three beats was completed and this feedback was useful for making improvements to the program. The Chicago Internet Project has been sufficiently successful that the CPD has decided to expand this experimental project to include 50 Chicago beats during 2005, and the National Institute of Justice, in recognition of the potential utility for other jurisdictions across the nation, has funded UIC to evaluate this intervention.

VIII. Management Perceptions of CPD Effectiveness


To gain some sense of how senior executives within the CPD view the relative effectiveness of new management and operational initiatives, a questionnaire was administered to the 73 "exempt" command personnel who attended an exempt meeting in November of 2004. Respondents were asked, "In your opinion, how effective are the following CPD strategies or tactics for reducing public violence?" Response options were very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, not at all effective, and don't know.

Management Strategies

Figure 7 shows the top ranked management strategies for fighting public violence, each judged to be somewhat or very effective by at least 78 percent of the respondents. Receiving top honors were CLEAR (the new information technology initiative), DOC meetings, and Level 1

Deployment, each valued as effective by 90 percent of the exempt personnel. Level 2 Deployment and various accountability efforts were also judged to be very effective by most exempt personnel. The support for Level 1 Deployment suggests that the districts and their beat personnel (and not just Area or centralized special units) are playing a central role in combating violence.


Figure 7: Exempt Support for Management Strategies



Special Deployments

Figure 8 shows how the special deployments rank in the view of exempt personnel. Each of these was viewed as effective by at least 65 percent of the respondents. The Narcotics and Gang Investigation Section (NAGIS) topped the list with 97 percent judging it to be effective, followed closely by Area Gang and Tact Teams (91 percent) and Targeted Response Units (91 percent).

Figure 8: Exempt Support for Special Deployment




Programs, Strategies, and Tactics

Figure 9 shows the top ranked programs, strategies, and tactics of the current administration, each receiving at least 87 percent ratings of effectiveness. Topping the list is "Street Corner Conspiracies" with a 99 percent effectiveness rating, followed closely by directed patrol and vehicle impoundments, each at 98 percent. But Terry stop-and-frisks¹³, Investigative Alerts, gang contact cards, curfew enforcements, and dispersals at hot spots were all highly regarded.

¹³ "Terry stop-and-frisk" refers to the classic Terry v. Ohio (1968) case where the Supreme Court established the right of a police officer to stop and frisk someone for "reasonable suspicion" in the absence of facts that would establish "probable cause" for making a lawful arrest.


Figure 9: Exempt Support for Programs, Strategies, and Tactics



Community Partnerships

Figure 10 shows the top ranked community partnership strategies for dealing with public violence, each receiving rating of effectiveness from at least 46 percent of the respondents. The top effectiveness ratings were given to graffiti blasters (92 percent) and other city services to clean up neighborhoods (92 percent). A majority of the respondents also recognized the CAPS volunteers ("Wolfpacks") as an effective vehicle for revitalizing neighborhoods, as well as the partnership with Project Safe Neighborhoods (U.S. Attorney's Office), the superintendent's violence forums, and CAPS beat community meetings. Overall, however, the exempt personnel judgments about the effectiveness of community partnerships for fighting violence were consistently lower than the ratings assigned to CPD operational and tactical tools.

Figure 10: Exempt Support for Community Partnerships



IX. Homicide and Public Violence Outcomes

Official records clearly show substantial reductions in Chicago's homicide and public violence problem in 2004. Many police districts that recorded extremely high and sustained rates of public violence and homicide experienced dramatic declines from 2003 to 2004. District 11, one of the most violent districts in the city, recorded one of the largest decreases in homicides (56 percent) and the largest decrease for public violence with a firearm (22 percent). Additionally, public violence with a firearm declined 13 percent in the city as a whole and homicide is down 25 percent when comparing 2004 to 2003. But are these reductions related to increased police activity and enhanced and targeted deployment?

Some basic analyses were performed to test the hypothesis that increased enforcement activity at the district level between 2003 and 2004 (specifically the number of contact cards and hot spot dispersals) would be associated with a corresponding decrease in rates of homicide and public violence. The available evidence provides some support for this hypothesis. As shown in Table 4, districts that produced the largest increases in the number of contact cards during this

period demonstrated the largest declines in the rate of all public violence ($r = -.515, p < .01$) and the largest declines in the rate of public violence committed without a firearm ($r = -.614, p < .01$). Changes in hot spot dispersals showed a similar pattern, but the relationships were weaker and not statistically significant. The enforcement hypothesis was not supported when looking specifically at changes in homicide between 2003 and 2004. Districts that increased the number of contact cards and dispersals did not exhibit a corresponding decrease in homicides. Increases in the number of arrests at the district level were unrelated to changes in rates of violence, with the exception of homicide, where the relationship was positive ($r = .554, p < .01$; not shown). Here, the increase in arrest rates is probably a response to the increase in homicides rates rather than the other way around.

More analyses of these data are needed, but more data are also needed to provide a better test of this hypothesis. Specifically, data are needed within smaller geographic areas over a larger time period. Also, there is the real possibility that police activity as presently defined (for example, contact cards, dispersals, arrests, deployment to hot spots) is chasing known violence, as one would expect with this style of hot spots policing. If the intensity of enforcement picked up in 2004 in districts that were lagging in violence reduction, this could level the playing field across the city and mask relationships between police activity and violence. This illustrates the complexity of evaluating a moving target.

These initial analyses were limited in scope and need to be followed by a closer geographic analysis. Analyses need to account for population change and other major demographic shifts in the police districts. Additionally, targeted enforcement activities do not take place at the district level but rather in smaller geographic areas within a district (for example, often groups of beats within a district will be targeted). Future analyses will need to examine changes at the beat level or even block level to determine the specific impact of enhanced deployment. These analyses will also need to account for existing trends in crime patterns that are independent of any time-specific police interventions.

Table 4: Relationship between Enforcement Activity and Rates of Violence at the District Level¹⁴

		Homicides Rate	Public Violence Rate	Rate of Public Violence Committed with Firearms	Rate of Public Violence Committed without Firearms	Number of Driveby Shootings	Number of Contact Cards	Number of Hotspot Dispersals
Homicides Rate	Pearson Correlation	1	.325	.586(**)	-.058	.372	.099	-.094
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.113	.002	.783	.067	.638	.656
Public Violence Rate	Pearson Correlation	.325	1	.609(**)	.774(**)	-.010	-.515(**)	-.293
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.113	.	.001	.000	.961	.008	.155
Rate of Public Violence Committed with Firearms	Pearson Correlation	.586(**)	.609(**)	1	-.031	.405(*)	-.044	-.182
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.001	.	.883	.044	.833	.384
Rate of Public Violence Committed without Firearms	Pearson Correlation	-.058	.774(**)	-.031	1	-.337	-.614(**)	-.224
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.783	.000	.883	.	.100	.001	.281
Number of Driveby Shootings	Pearson Correlation	.372	-.010	.405(*)	-.337	1	.016	-.156
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.067	.961	.044	.100	.	.940	.456
Number of Contact Cards	Pearson Correlation	.099	-.515(**)	-.044	-.614(**)	.016	1	.437(*)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.638	.008	.833	.001	.940	.	.029
Number of Hotspot Dispersals	Pearson Correlation	-.094	-.293	-.182	-.224	-.156	.437(*)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.656	.155	.384	.281	.456	.029	.

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

N=25

¹⁴ Correlation coefficients indicate the relationship between change scores (2004-2003). Negative correlations were hypothesized, indicating that as district-level enforcement activity increased, rates of violence would decrease.

X. Conclusion

Assessing the Current Situation

When the final public violence tallies were made, 2004 turned out to be a very good year for the city of Chicago. One hundred and fifty-eight fewer homicides (25 percent decrease) in a single year is a dramatic change that calls for explanation. There is little doubt among close observers that the Chicago Police Department deserves considerable credit for this reduction, especially given the organization's single-minded, high-intensity focus on public violence and its commitment to new strategies and tactics. The CPD was aggressive in changing its style of management, its accountability process, its use of advanced information technology, its street-level enforcement activities, and its relationship with the community. Before jumping to any strong conclusions, however, several notes of caution and clarification are in order.

As social scientists, we want to acknowledge and discuss the difficulty of making simple statements about causality. Without a closer, more in-depth study of the Chicago Police Department's activities in relationship to crime patterns by time and location, any statements about cause-and-effect relationships must be cautious at best. If we can establish that hot spot policing is consistently associated with changes in criminal activity by time and area, then a stronger attribution of causality would be possible. A more comprehensive study would also look at a number of other factors, including: (1) whether enforcement has displaced criminal activity by location, modus operandi or type of crime; (2) whether competing external factors can reasonably account for the reductions; and (3) whether some CPD strategies and tactics are more plausible explanations for the observed changes in violence than others.

Although the Chicago Police Department's hot spots policing, targeted deployment, and enhanced activities were likely key contributors to the overall reduction of public violence and homicide, more data are needed to establish this causal relationship. Clearly, the department generated exponentially higher activity numbers like gun recoveries, hot spots dispersals, and contact cards, to name a few. But our preliminary analyses of data at the district level over the past two years are insufficient to make a convincing case, one way or the other, about the effectiveness of these particular strategies.

There is always the possibility that criminal activity has been dislocated or displaced in time, space, method or type of offense. In Chicago, aggressive enforcement of street activity may have moved some activity inside, down the block, or outside the city limits. More research is needed to study displacement effects (especially camera surveillance), but in Chicago, it would appear that preventative effects have exceeded any displacement effects because of the drop in virtually all categories of public violence citywide. The Chicago police have also monitored displacement of visible drug activity and anticipated the interpersonal conflicts that displacement can cause. As a result, they have followed the criminal activity to new locations with swift enforcement missions

In terms of competing external factors, macro-level economic or demographic forces (for example, poverty, unemployment, home ownership) can play a significant role in changing rates

of violent crime over a decade or more, as has been shown in Chicago (see Skogan et al, 2004). Consistent with this argument, national trends show a 55 percent drop in violent crime rates between 1993 and 2003 (Catalano, 2004) and in 2002, homicide rates for cities with a population of 1 million or more reached their lowest levels since 1976 (Fox & Zawitz, 2004). Thus, unspecified factors that contributed to the downward trend in violent crime across the nation may account for some of the recent decline observed in Chicago. Yet homicide rates seem to have stabilized in most cities since 1999, and in Chicago, the long-term pattern (and the presumed macro-level forces) cannot account for the very abrupt drop that occurred in 2004.

Other more plausible explanations should be considered, including local violence prevention initiatives (for example, Project CeaseFire and Project Safe Neighborhoods) that focus on some of the same high-crime neighborhoods as the department. Evaluations of these initiatives and their components are currently underway and will help to estimate their contribution to violence reduction in specific Chicago neighborhoods.

What is Working with the Chicago Police Department?

If we assume that new CPD initiatives did contribute to reductions in public violence in Chicago, this summary report begs the question, what particular components yielded the largest impact and how did it happen? In other words, why did they work and what processes were involved? Was it the deployment of special units than had the biggest effect? Was it the cameras? Was it the I-CLEAR information system? These are key questions because they have important implications for both sustaining the progress in Chicago (and doing so in the most efficient manner) and for possible replication in other cities. Unfortunately, our ability to decouple and isolate programmatic effects is limited. Nevertheless, theory, empirical evidence, and common sense can be useful for offering preliminary answers to these questions.

First, we must underscore the interdependence of certain CPD strategies. For example, I-CLEAR technology provides critical and timely information about locations, suspects, and circumstances that guide decisions about deployment, investigations, accountability, camera placement and other strategies and tactics. Therefore, the unique contribution of advances in information technology cannot be isolated from the programs they support. But without question, many current deployment operations would lack precision and timeliness without this new information system.

Perhaps the most striking change in the CPD's approach to violence is the new capacity to rapidly deploy large numbers of police officers to hot spot locations. Past research suggests that random patrols are ineffective, but that directed patrols and hot spot patrols can make a difference in violence prevention (Sherman et al., 1997; Weisburd & Eck, 2005). When uniformed officers are assigned to high-crime places or areas at peak times preventative benefits can be seen immediately. Police crackdowns (with large numbers of officers saturating the area) can also produce good results, but the results tend to be short-term and dissipate within a week of the officers' departure. With a sophisticated plan of deployment, one could hypothesize a sustained deterrent effect in hot spots, although this has yet to be demonstrated convincingly in any city.

Even within hot spot policing strategies, the types of enforcement that might have produced "the biggest bang for the buck" is uncertain. Was it the high-visibility patrols and saturations that sent a message to the community that crime and disorder are now under control? Was it the arrest and incapacitation of repeat violent offenders, who account for disproportionate number of incidents? Was it a weakening of violent gang organizations by cutting off their drug money? More in-depth analysis and data collection is needed to answer these questions.

When searching for enforcement strategies that might account for the precipitous drop in public violence in 2004, one approach is to identify police activities that changed significantly from previous years. Using this criterion, one salient candidate is the hot spot dispersal process -- making contact with youth at hot spot locations, recording information on contact cards, and requesting their dispersal. The central accountability process was used to beef up dispersal activity in 2003 and especially 2004, with sizable increases in the numbers. By breaking up and dispersing groups of gang members and high-risk individuals who congregated on the street, the department wanted to reduce the risk of escalating conflicts at these locations and drive-by shootings. Indeed, districts that showed the largest increase in contact cards from 2003 to 2004 also recorded the largest drops in public violence during this same period. Consistent with this hypothesis, the number of drive-by shootings in Chicago has dropped by 21 percent in 2004.¹⁵

Chicago has also pursued an integrated approach to criminal investigations around hot spots. Past research suggests that "reactive arrests" (after single incidents are reported) has little, if any, crime prevention benefit and some negative effects. In contrast, "proactive arrests" (focused on high-risk people, places, offenses, and times) can yield crime prevention dividends. The exception to this conclusion has been drug enforcement, where research indicates that cleaning up one location usually does little to change the number of markets or drug activity in the vicinity. (The effects of raiding drug houses, for example, typically decay within a week). The Chicago model, however, involves extensive follow-up work, including community mobilization via CAPS and city services. This comprehensive approach has the potential to make a big difference in the long-term prospects for the block, although longitudinal research is needed on this subject. (See Green Mazerolle & Roehl, 1998).

The Chicago model also focuses on organized gangs and attempts to cripple them by restricting the flow of drug money into the gang organization. In general, past research indicates that gang enforcement tactics have not been effective in other cities and that youth gangs are a stable feature of the urban landscape (Decker, 2002; Sherman et al., 1997). However, initiatives that focus on reducing violence and gun violence (as opposed to reducing gangs) have demonstrated some success (See Braga & Kennedy, 2002 -in Reed & Decker; Braga, 2004). The CPD closely monitors gangs and gang conflicts and seems to pursue a dual goal of stopping gangs from propagating and stopping them from committing violence. The Street Corner Conspiracies operation seeks to dismantle the gang structure, and does so more aggressively than past attempts. With equal intensity, using good street intelligence and real-time data from its warehouse, the CPD has responded rapidly to locations and individuals where gang retaliation is expected (something that was not possible in the past). Also, through directed patrols of hot spot locations and other tactics, gun seizures continue to be substantial -- 11,180 in 2004 alone.

¹⁵ Data obtained from the data warehouse using a method code entered by Detective Division.

Another criterion for estimating likely impact is the size or "dosage" of the intervention. Some interventions are simply not large enough alone to be plausible explanations for the reduction in citywide public violence. Chicago's surveillance cameras are one example. This strategy may hold considerable potential for preventing street crime in the future, but with only 30 cameras mounted in 2004 in selected locations, the "dosage of treatment" is probably too small to account for the large reductions in public violence throughout the city but may account for localized reductions. In the future, however, this initiative, along with technology to identify the direction of gun fire, should be evaluated for crime prevention and displacement effects, as well as public perceptions of safety, efficacy, and privacy.

Another criterion for assessing police operations is to consider their potential costs and benefits. A potential cost of deploying officers en masse to the most violent and problematic areas is that it leaves some of the "marginally violent" police districts with fewer officers and resources. A substantial number of police officers were reassigned, albeit temporarily, under the department's imperative to reduce public violence. Although the department has done an excellent job of allocating resources on the basis of gang and drugs activity, it is important to monitor police districts with moderate levels of public violence to see how they are impacted, if at all, by fewer officers.

Looking Ahead: Preserving Gains and Continuing Progress

The challenges that lie ahead on the road to making Chicago the safest large city in the United States are numerous. Gangs are believed to be more deeply entrenched in Chicago than other big cities, so the CPD must continue to employ a wide array of sophisticated and flexible responses. Prior research cautions against seeking to eliminate gangs (which is virtually impossible), but instead, encourages law enforcement to focus resources on reducing gun-related violence. The best success comes when police are deployed to high-risk places and high-risk times for enforcement and problem solving (Braga, 2004), and Chicago has done both. Absent the ability to permanently eliminate gangs or drug markets, the police can reduce public violence in specific locations through targeted response and conflict anticipation.

Sustaining these gains, however, will require serious planning to identify the most efficient deployment schemes for maximizing effects across a large number of hot spot locations. Research has shown that the residual deterrent effect from police crackdowns lasts only a few days or weeks (Sherman, 1990), so long-term prevention will require careful planning to schedule revisits to hot spots. In the field of psychology, behavioral research suggests that desired behavior is most likely to be sustained and generalized by a "variable interval" schedule of rewards or punishments. Translated to the present circumstances, we are suggesting that (1) timely redeployment to "old" hot spots is essential; and (2) the interval between redeployment of police officers to the hot spot should vary so as to be unknown to the users of the environment, and yet be systematic so that all important hot spots receive regular coverage.¹⁶ This may require

¹⁶ Extensive behavioral research indicates that reinforcement and punishment, when administered systematically, can strengthen or weaken a response. Schedules of reinforcement/punishment can be *continuous* (for example, occur every time the behavior occurs), but more likely they will be *intermittent*, occurring in either a *ratio schedule* (for example, every 5th response) or by *interval schedule* (for example, occurring after a certain time period, regardless of the number of responses). The intervals can be *fixed intervals* (occurring at determined, equal time periods, for

greater involvement of patrol officers and less reliance of special units. Also, deployment to the right locations at the right times is only the first step. What officers do after they are deployed, and how they do it, are equally important.

With regard to investigative work, Chicago has shown how advanced information technology, good street intelligence, solid undercover work, and information sharing with other agencies can be consolidated to quickly and accurately identify repeat violent offenders and problematic locations. The next logical step is to get more patrol officers involved in using the new I-CLEAR system and data warehouse so they too can identify local problems, pursue suspects, and even assist detectives in solving known crimes.

We now have considerable evidence from many cities that gains from drug busts and police crackdowns will be short-term if the police come and go with no follow-up plan for the hot spot. In addition to the redeployment of patrol and special units, the CPD now works with community volunteers and other City agencies to clean up the streets and houses on the block and mobilize community action. Narcotics investigations and enforcement around housing is now coordinated with City services, CAPS, TURF, and hopefully, private investors. These efforts are critical, and if sustained and expanded, should help to strengthen the preventative effect. Otherwise, hot spots policing is likely to have limited benefits and some costs for the community (For a critique of traditional hot spots policing, see Rosenbaum, in press).

Organizational Management Issues

The Chicago Police Department has made considerable progress with respect to communicating organizational goals and objectives to employees, holding units accountable for violence reduction objectives, coordinating resources across units, and deploying personnel more efficiently on the basis of hard data. Chicago is on its way to becoming a "learning organization" (Maguire, 2004; Senge, 1990) that is able to grow and adapt in response to changing internal and external environments.

In the 21st century, police departments that emerge as "learning organizations" recognize the extreme value of information. They are very efficient at collecting, cleaning, manipulating, analyzing, distributing, presenting, and responding to new information. With I-CLEAR, the CPD is on the cutting edge of information technology and is currently able to respond quickly to real-time data. The next step is to utilize this powerful system to achieve a deeper understanding of crime and disorder, so that proactive policing and preventative policing are routine. This will require a substantial investment in information managers and crime analysts who can manipulate large databases and have the skills to perform sophisticated analyses. This new information should result in empirically grounded tactical and strategic planning, which in turn, will stimulate changes in resource deployment within and across agencies. This type of data exploration must reach beyond the investigation of individual offenders (which is the typical police orientation to data) to document larger crime patterns and emerging trends. Street gangs, for example, are continuously changing their behavior in response to the police and each other,

example, every 7 days) or *variable intervals* (occurring at changing intervals, for example, 3 days, 7 days, 4 days). The latter is the least predictable to the target audience, and therefore, and would be expected to yield the strongest deterrent effect over time, all else being equal. But deterrence is a complex process with many variables.

so up-to-date information is essential. More importantly, changes in gang structure, function, and activities over time should be thoroughly studied if creative and effective countermeasures are to be developed. Detailed case studies of individual homicides can also be instructive if they explore the lives of the victims, offenders, and their social networks. (See Roehl et al., 2005). Detailed studies of neighborhoods can identify the interconnectedness of problems and correlates of violence. More generally, there is a pressing need to conduct more sophisticated analyses of the numerous problems that face urban neighborhoods so that the likelihood of solving them can be increased (Goldstein, 1990).

In the future, research and accountability functions will become increasingly critical to the success of information-guided, evidence-based policing. The objectives of the organization are best served by fully exploiting its large data warehouse. Also, I-CLEAR should be able to assist managers in monitoring and assessing personnel performance at the individual, unit, and geographic level, assuming more management reports can be generated. High-productivity can be rewarded and low-productivity (as well as abuse and corruption) can be identified and rectified. Ineffective tactics and strategies can be immediately identified, discontinued and replaced by others in the planning queue. The nature and extent of crime displacement can be monitored and corrections can be immediately introduced. The department must be careful, for example, that crime does not rise in neighborhoods that are not the focus of hot spots policing, but yet have crime problems brewing just below the radar screen. Learning organizations have built-in evaluation mechanisms at all levels to determine when initiatives are working, when they are not, and what corrections are necessary.

To achieve this level of organizational responsiveness, the department will need new forms of training at the senior management level to explore how various types of information can be exploited to strengthen the organization. At the operational level, there is a need to continuously monitor crime conditions through sophisticated statistical analyses and reports. To insure adequate staffing for these functions, however, senior management must carefully balance the need for more street-level presence against the growing need for management and support staff. Maximum efficiency and cost savings are most likely when police executives and supervisors are supported by the best and most timely information available about current operations and their relative effectiveness. In recent years, the information demands within police organizations have grown exponentially with advances in information technology, and for organizations to stay on the cutting edge, the number of skilled information managers will need to keep pace with this trend. The notion that automation can replace personnel is only true at the clerical level. The opposite is true at the management level because computers do not think and executives need thoughtful analysis. With more and better information input, but limited output, the CPD and other big cities risk becoming "constipated elephants."¹⁷

Finally, the most sophisticated learning organizations monitor their external environments to determine their level of success on all dimensions. Chicago has done a superb job of responding aggressively to the problem of public violence, but realizes that being responsive to other community concerns, such as quality of life issues is also important¹⁸.

¹⁷ We acknowledge our indebtedness to our colleague, Professor Mike Maltz at the University of Illinois at Chicago, for this term.

¹⁸ Only a few percent of all calls for service to the police are directly related to violent crime.

Meeting the diverse public safety needs of local residents is essential for building public support for police aggressive actions and securing their cooperation in criminal investigations. In the 21st century, residents expect and demand a police department that is visible, responds quickly to emergencies, is fair to all racial/ethnic groups, is respectful to individuals during encounters, is honest and transparent, is able to secure the public peace, and is effective in fighting crime, among other things. Research indicates, for example, that whether residents feel they have been treated fairly and respectfully during stops is a primary determinant of satisfaction with the police (Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Skogan, in press; Tyler, in press). Hence, professional police behavior during aggressive street-level enforcement is absolutely essential to prevent any rise in negative sentiment toward the police. Administrators must ask not only where are the officers deployed, but what are they doing and how are they doing it? The new administration has emphasized that Chicago's style of policing is "aggressive but not abusive." There is no evidence of any recent increase in public discontent or complaints of police misconduct, but regular measurement and monitoring is essential. The message from the CPD's early community forums was that "the Department needs to balance effective crime control strategies with an equal appreciation of how citizens are treated." (CPD, 2002, p. 4). This certainly remains true today.

To help monitor police-community relations and build stronger partnerships in problem solving, the CPD, in collaboration with the University of Illinois at Chicago, has introduced an experimental community Internet survey in 2005. The ongoing beat-level survey monitors public sentiment on a range of topics, from perceptions of crime and disorder in their beat to satisfaction with local police performance. This will allow the CPD to measure what matters to the public (using standard indicators) and insure that enforcement objectives are balanced with other community priorities.

Partnerships to Address Root Causes of Violence

The Chicago Police Department has gone to considerable lengths to deploy its own personnel wisely in an effort to reduce violent crime, but we must be cautious about expecting continued reductions or even sustaining the current reductions. The fundamental problem, which the CPD is quick to acknowledge, is that the root cause of violence have not been significantly altered, nor have the illegal markets that fuel the violence. The demand for, and availability of, illegal drugs and guns remain high. The number of high-risk individuals willing to provide these services and the number of youth gangs in Chicago remains relatively stable. Hence, to guarantee continued and substantial reductions in violence, metropolitan areas in general need to look beyond police resources to build a comprehensive strategy that calls upon the community, social service agencies, business, and government to play a more substantial role (Rosenbaum et al., 1998; Rosenbaum, 2002). Key issues such as affordable housing, educational reform, parks and recreation services for youth, family support services, health and mental health care, etc. must be addressed in an integrated fashion for high-risk communities. Prisoner reentry is a good example of the severity and complexity of the violence problem that must be addressed. More than half of all the ex-offenders released in Illinois each year return to Chicago (15,488 in 2001) and most face insurmountable barriers with respect to housing, drug treatment, and employment (La Vigne, Mamalian, Travis, & Visher, 2003). This reality leaves few options for ex-offenders other than returning to what they know best -- the streets and illegal activities. Hence, the reentry problem must be tackled head on, so that the CPD's effort to reduce violent crime in Chicago

does not reach a wall.¹⁹ We believe that a multi-agency partnership at the city and/or state level is needed to develop and implement a 10-year strategic violence prevention plan.

At the community and neighborhood level, the CPD has shown a commitment to help build a community's capacity to fight violence. CAPS marches, rallies and community meetings are praiseworthy examples. CPD has also made some strides in building partnership with social service, educational, business and government agencies to fight violence in particular communities, such as District 11 violence forums and the West Haven Security Initiative. The TURF and Adopt-a-Block initiatives to clean up housing and solicit private investment in targeted blocks are also taking off.

Notwithstanding the immediate efficacy of intense and concentrated police enforcement, we must be mindful of the fact that neighborhood safety is maintained primary by voluntary social controls among local residents themselves. Hence, a primary objective should be to strengthen the community's capacity to exercise informal social control whenever and wherever possible so that high-risk neighborhoods can become more self-regulating and less dependent on the formal social control of the police and other government agencies. The police certainly play a critical role, but other organizations and agencies must also step up and accept their roles and responsibilities for the prevention of violence. This is not a new message. Responding to the first wave of violent crime in modern times, President Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice underscored this problem:

"While this report has concentrated on recommendations for action by governments, the Commission is convinced that government actions will not be enough. Crime is a social problem that is interwoven with almost every aspect of American life...Controlling crime is the business of every American institution. Controlling crime is the business of every American. (President's Commission, 1967, p. xi).

¹⁹ The mayor's office has been proactive in this area by hiring a full-time reentry specialist.

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Appendix A. Changes in Homicide, Public Violence, and Police Activity by Police District

Percent change from 2003 to 2004

District	OUTCOMES					ACTIVITIES					CLEARANCES	
	homicide	PV with Firearms	PV nonfirearms incidents	PV incidents	Drive by shootings	contact cards 03-04	Hotspot Dispersal Orders	Arrests for Aggravated Assault	Arrests for Aggravated Battery	Arrests for Unlawful use of a weapon	PV with Firearms clearances	All PV clearances
1	0%	-9%	-4%	-5%	-50%	136%	49%	13%	-12%	-8%	-55%	-10%
2	5%	-12%	-12%	-12%	113%	326%	9%	0%	26%	-10%	14%	-5%
3	-6%	-11%	8%	1%	-32%	48%	55%	3%	23%	-5%	0%	14%
4	-33%	-11%	0%	-5%	-43%	287%	202%	-2%	20%	11%	0%	0%
5	-51%	-15%	3%	-5%	-43%	54%	-14%	11%	9%	-7%	-19%	8%
6	10%	-19%	2%	-7%	-68%	228%	208%	28%	12%	-2%	-13%	6%
7	-8%	-10%	-5%	-7%	4%	167%	250%	3%	18%	17%	6%	6%
8	0%	-14%	3%	-4%	-9%	157%	-7%	-4%	-3%	7%	-12%	-3%
9	-48%	-11%	-6%	-8%	6%	143%	105%	-4%	1%	17%	-14%	3%
10	-20%	-18%	-13%	-15%	-24%	221%	490%	6%	16%	23%	-5%	-10%
11	-56%	-22%	-2%	-10%	-22%	95%	8%	-7%	-29%	-12%	-38%	-14%
12	-7%	-3%	-24%	-17%	-39%	247%	-25%	-16%	3%	11%	31%	-13%
13	-56%	-20%	12%	-1%	-55%	94%	1%	-19%	-16%	-41%	-12%	12%
14	-45%	-19%	-17%	-18%	-17%	197%	57%	-33%	-23%	-30%	-37%	-23%
15	-32%	-3%	-8%	-6%	-26%	261%	42%	31%	29%	-1%	-5%	-2%
16	300%	-16%	-2%	-5%	0%	272%	n/c	11%	-25%	43%	-24%	-4%
17	-17%	-20%	-2%	-8%	-38%	105%	-23%	-19%	-15%	-12%	-14%	-5%
18	-33%	-6%	-7%	-7%	0%	116%	-8%	-20%	28%	11%	-28%	-11%
19	-67%	13%	1%	4%	-100%	116%	-4%	-17%	58%	-13%	-29%	-9%
20	-75%	-8%	-4%	-5%	100%	200%	n/c	-17%	-43%	35%	-20%	-11%
21	150%	-13%	7%	0%	-50%	243%	-17%	-2%	16%	-33%	-13%	-1%
22	-35%	-5%	-7%	-6%	0%	79%	61%	23%	28%	-4%	9%	10%
23	-33%	-4%	-10%	-9%	0%	313%	-4%	-23%	15%	7%	29%	-18%
24	13%	-15%	4%	-1%	-50%	97%	-20%	-16%	-6%	-28%	-28%	-18%
25	0%	-18%	-9%	-12%	41%	199%	164%	-14%	8%	2%	-19%	-10%
City Total	-25%	-13%	-4%	-7%	-21%	144%	51%	-2%	5%	0%	-13%	-3%

PV - Public Violence
n/c - not calculated