

The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project in Chicago

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## Chapter 1

### Introduction and Review of Past Gang Programs

This book is about the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project, which was based on the idea that the gang problem is defined not only by the delinquent or criminal behaviors of gangs and gang members but also by what the community institutions do or do not do to prevent and control the problem.<sup>1</sup> Certain youth and the community together – including its component parts, particularly family, police, schools, youth agencies, probation, churches and neighborhood organizations and political administrations as well as larger social, economic and cultural factors – are responsible for the creation and intensification of the problem.

The model proposes that particular or single-type strategies to deal with the problem, whether suppression, social intervention, provision of special education and job opportunities, and neighborhood or community mobilization are not sufficient to prevent or reduce the problem. An interrelated, balanced and community-based set of these strategies is required by police, youth agencies, schools and employers, probation, churches, neighborhood groups and others. Furthermore, a special structure of these agencies and community groups must be developed to focus and implement these strategies toward target youth in gang-problem communities.

The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project was born at a time of gang-problem crisis (particularly turf-based gang violence) in certain Chicago neighborhoods in the early

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<sup>1</sup> Spergel, Irving A. 1995. *The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach*. New York: Oxford University Press. See also, Spergel, Grossman, Wa. 1999 (March), “Reducing Youth Gang Violence in Urban Areas: One Community’s Effort;” Spergel, Wa. 2000 (August), “Combating Gang Violence in Chicago’s Little Village Neighborhood;” Spergel, Wa. 2000 (August), “Outcomes of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project;” I. Spergel, Wa, Choi, Grossman, Jacob, A. Spergel, Barrios. 2000 (September), “Evaluation of the Gang Violence Reduction Project in Little Village.”

1990s. A new city administration and some leaders of criminal justice agencies were concerned that traditional approaches alone, especially police suppression and incarceration, were not adequate to address the problem of gang violence, and thought perhaps a more comprehensive or combined institutional community-based approach might be worth trying. The pilot gang program that evolved built on and modified previous gang-program approaches. It emphasized the interrelationship of outreach youth services and suppression in a community-based approach.

Youth gangs, gang-involved youth, and gang problems have been present in almost all societies, particularly in large urban centers during times of rapid social and economic change and community disorganization. American society and its urban centers did not invent gangs. African-American and Latino youth did not originate delinquent or criminal gang behavior in the United States. Youth gangs and their behaviors are historical, international social and cultural phenomena, arising at local-community levels under conditions of rapid social change, population movement, and the segregation of low-income minority racial and ethnic groups. The gang problem is often associated with adult criminal structures and the development of political movements (Asbury 1971; Hobsbawm 1963).

Currently, gangs of various types have been identified in the following countries: the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, Thailand, Korea, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Phillipines, Laos, Russia, Israel, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Pakistan, India, Myanmar (formerly Burma), Albania, Serbia, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, Russia, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Poland, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Mexico, El Salvador, Columbia, Brazil, etc. (Grennan, Britz, Rush, Barker 1999; Klein 1995).

Gang problems have radically increased or spread across local communities in the United States and other societies, including developed and developing countries, in recent decades. Youth gangs are now larger, better organized than they have been traditionally, and may be becoming significant institutions in their own right, sometimes related to established adult criminal structures or radical political movements. Gang youth can be engaged in a range of serious criminal activities, violence and drug dealing, as well as minor crimes and status offenses, over short or long periods of time. Not all gang members may be offenders or have arrest records. The great majority of gang youth, particularly in the United States, seem to mature and age out of gang status, gang relationships, and serious crime in their late teens or twenties.

The youth-gang problem is mainly an adolescent and young-adult social problem of males, 12 to 24 years old, resulting from a cumulation and interaction of failures of family support, school socialization, job-market opportunities, and public policy to facilitate the transition of certain vulnerable youth to conventional adult roles as defined by the local community and larger society. Youth gangs and the subcultures they evolve are a means for particular youth to achieve a personal identity and social status, develop economic resources, resolve personal problems, find peer support, and for sheer physical excitement.

#### American Youth-Gang Program Experience

Youth gangs have existed in slums and ports-of-entry areas in urban centers on the East Coast of the United States at least since the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (if not earlier) (Hyman 1984). The roots of contemporary outreach to street youth are found in the efforts of charitable

and religious organizations, which attempted to contact “young roughs” and “vagabond” youth on the street through “boys’ meetings.” Mission workers in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century hoped to persuade such youth to change their ways. These early “efforts to combat delinquency through moral suasion took place outside the physical structures of agencies” (Spergel 1964; Brace 1982).

Boys’-Club and YMCA workers occasionally recruited street youth to their organized agency programs in the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but it was not until the Chicago Area Project in the 1930s and 1940s that systematic “curbstone” counseling as part of a neighborhood-development approach was used to address the youth or gang delinquency problem. The Chicago Area Project, located in low-income communities (often of newcomers), stressed the autonomy of local residents in planning and operating programs focused on neighborhood improvement, along with delinquency control and youth socialization. Programming for youth was regarded as a device to enlist the participation of local residents in cohering and empowering local community efforts. The important feature that distinguished the Chicago Area Project from established social-agency approaches to the delinquency problem was its emphasis on commitment and activity by indigenous residents and local groups, rather than professional social-agency workers, in dealing with difficult neighborhood youth.

Local adults, including ex-convicts from the neighborhood, went out to the streets to counsel delinquent youth who could identify with these “curbstone counselors,” many of whom might earlier have been members of the same delinquent groups. “Curbstone counselors,” now law-abiding citizens, could effectively advise the boys in local language and manner to pursue paths to appropriate legitimate behaviors. The “curbstone counselors” mediated and advocated

for youth with school officials if they were truant or had conduct problems, with police if they were arrested, and with court officials and probation officers. They were vigorous in their efforts to get representatives of bureaucratic “outside” institutions to better understand neighborhood youth and respond to their special interests and problems (Schlossman, Sedlak 1983).

Clifford Shaw, who founded the Chicago Area Project and developed its structure, emphasized local community responsibility for addressing the delinquency problem. However, he did not address external citywide, governmental, and commercial factors that might have created conditions responsible for local problems. The Chicago Area Project was designed for gradual civic improvement through local citizen-group social action. It was not designed to create organized pressures on external agencies to modify their rules and policies significantly (Snodgrass1975). Saul Alinsky, one of the early Chicago Area Project workers, would later redefine and refocus Shaw’s approach by building broader local community coalitions as well as local-citizen cohesion and power in order to attack and negotiate with outside institutions responsible for neighborhood social and economic problems, including delinquency (Alinsky 1945).

### Traditional Youth-Gang Work

World War II brought population waves from the southern United States, Mexico and Puerto Rico to the factories of the North to sustain the war effort. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, attention was again directed to youth delinquency. Low-income families, schools, and established social agencies could not adequately meet the socialization needs of male youth,



many of whom were children of the newcomer minority populations. Some African-American and Latino youth, who were not part of established youth programs or accepting of traditional schooling approaches, formed delinquent street groups. Youth gang delinquency, still largely unrelated to adult criminal structures, was characterized by intergang fighting. Those in fighting gangs were perceived as a threat to civil order and to established local neighborhood or citywide interests. Traditional youth agencies and local schools were not able to attract such youth to their programs.

A series of youth-outreach programs were established by city welfare councils, statewide youth boards, and county probation departments, especially in New York and Los Angeles, to reach out to suspected antisocial or warring youth gangs. Detached workers (also known as street gang workers, street workers, or outreach workers) were recruited to establish relationships and convert youth gangs to social groups. Mainly male detached workers operated alone on the streets, in relative isolation from established or structured youth-agency programs. The workers were recruited from colleges and universities, a few were former gang members, most were not indigenous to the particular gang communities in which they worked (Klein 1965, 1968, 1971; New York City Youth Board 1960; Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago 1960). A few female workers were also assigned to female (or “deb”) groups, usually affiliated with male gangs.

The youth outreach workers were described as independent, self-assured, charismatic, caring and socially committed. They were rebellious but benign, and identified with the personal problems and struggles of gang youth. They had “little patience with the society and the community institutions which seemed to neglect” gang youth (Bernstein 1964). At first, the

various agencies sponsoring the youth outreach workers sought to “preserve the independence of the street workers” (Kobrin 1982).

“The street worker is an agency worker on the streets who is striving to help the delinquent gang to change its pattern of behavior. He is on the streets of the neighborhood at odd hours of the day or night. He has little immediate structure or support such as an office, regular hours, guidance from colleagues or supervisors. He belongs to two worlds. He is [or was] of the delinquent group and its subculture, but also of the world of respectable and conforming people. He tries on the one hand to change the delinquent, and on the other the people and institutions which have in large measure produced him” (Spergel 1966).

“A detached worker (gang worker, street worker, street-club worker) is an individual, usually with a streetwise orientation, who is assigned to one or more street gangs. His modus operandi differs from that of the usual agency worker in that his primary task is to attach himself to the delinquent gang where and as it exists – on a street corner, on the playground, in a garage, at a hamburger stand, or in any other spot, where boys seem to congregate” (Klein 1965).

The Group Guidance program of the Los Angeles County Probation Department, concerned with the wartime “zoot suit” problem, perceived it as a gang problem, and attempted through use of detached workers in the late 1940s and 1950s to reduce “gang acts” by 1) identifying street groups and their members who were oriented to delinquent gang activity; 2)

developing a group-counseling relationship with them and their parents to aid them in adjusting to community standards; 3) reducing the isolation of these youth and their parents from established mainstream institutions; and 4) promoting better understanding and cooperation among citizens and established agencies in the community in addressing the problem (Los Angeles County Probation Department, 1982).

The New York City Youth Board created the Council of Social and Athletic Clubs, comprising Youth Board gang workers who were expected to establish a special relationship with warring gangs. The workers were to help modify the gangs' group antisocial attitudes and behaviors, persuade them to have friendlier relations with other street gangs, increase democratic participation within the gang, improve the social adjustment of individual gang members and induce better relations with neighborhood residents. Street-gang work became a specialized independent program of work with street groups, unrelated to other community or agency programs, which took responsibility for organizing or cohering the community around more general delinquency issues (New York City Youth Board 1960).

The New York City Youth Board gang worker viewed the gang as a "natural neighborhood group," whose activities were not entirely negative or criminal. This natural street group was assumed to provide adolescents with opportunities for "positive youth development." The street gang could be "reached," and it was expected that the group and its members would respond to "sympathy, acceptance, affection, and understanding" (when provided by a street worker with the right abilities) and would grow up to be conventional socialized youth (New York City Youth Board 1960; Shireman 1958; Roth 1961).

Social-work ideology and professional youthwork supervisors guided the development of

the specialized youth-gang projects of the 1950s and 1960s. The “curbstone” worker, as one of several elements of a grassroots community approach pioneered by the Chicago Area Project, was not adopted. The gang worker (or street worker) of this period did not operate within a framework of accountability to local citizens or local agencies. Also, the focus of the gang worker was more on group work than individual youth counseling. Little attention was paid to contacts with family or modifying established youth-agency or school approaches to delinquent youth. A social worker and director of the Mid-City Project in Boston described street work as a “professional service to groups ... even though the worker may have a number of individual contacts with the families, essentially he is involved in and working with the interaction and forces within the group ... The type of behavior that responds most readily ... is public group behavior – the behavior of the football team, participation in gang fights and group vandalism” (Austen 1957).

Alex Norman, a senior staff member of Special Service for Groups in Los Angeles, also focused on the group method, but did not see it as a direct means to break-up of the gang.

“Because the gang acts as a source of delinquency for its members, Special Service for Groups attempts to use the group process to modify behavior to effect change, and enable the discontinuance of the antisocial group associates ... At the initial stage of the investigation, the worker’s goal is to establish a trust relationship with these youth who are suspicious, mistrustful, and hostile toward adults and other ‘outsiders’ ... After the group accepts service, weekly meetings are set up utilizing facilities which are available ... Groups tend to disintegrate ...

the break-up must be a natural process ... As a supplement to the work being done with the groups, there are contacts with individual members around specific problems (Norman 1963).

By the early 1960s it was apparent that youth gangs were more prevalent, probably more delinquent, integral features of certain urban environments, and more difficult to deal with than had been previously estimated. A changing economy made it difficult for older youth who had limited education to leave the gang, find jobs and become socially-acceptable adults. Fewer factory and unskilled jobs were available. Gangs became larger, more enduring, and somewhat better organized. Agencies formerly interested in outreach youth-gang work now turned their attention to other types of troubled youth and their families, including status offenders (particularly runaways) who were generally less violent. Nevertheless, some Boys Clubs, YMCAs, youth agencies and Settlement Houses continued outreach efforts with youth not in their programs (Carney, Mattick, Calloway 1965). They emphasized work with youth not affiliated with agencies who may or may not have been gang members. Street workers were “extension workers,” functioning to bring more street youth into existing youth-agency social and recreational programs. Outposts and decentralized agency programs were established in isolated, low-income housing projects (Mattick, Caplan 1962; Doty, Mattick 1965).

The extension worker (Cooper 1967) in the youth-agency’s area focused on the development of personal “influence relationships” with “significant numbers of the target [unaffiliated youth] population.” The modified street-gang worker approach was expected to result in a measurable reduction of area delinquency rates, and “make a positive difference in the

behavior of the youngsters residing in the action areas” (Doty, Mattick 1965; Caplan, Deshaies, Suttles, Mattick 1967; *New York Times* 1994). Extension workers also utilized leaders of the gangs or street groups as part-time workers, to influence other youth toward more conforming behavior. The street-gang or street-group leaders became part-time consultants and youth assistants to the full-time extension workers.

Researchers conducted evaluations of several traditional street-gang and extension-work programs in Los Angeles, Boston, and Chicago in the late 1950s and early 1960s, perhaps with insufficient research design by standards today, and concluded that the programs were ineffective. The programs were said to emphasize group work and/or recreational activities. Malcolm Klein claimed that such programs cohered antisocial youth groups, and contributed to an increase in delinquency. He recommended that such programs be abandoned. However, the claim that such programs directly increased gang cohesion and delinquency may have been exaggerated. Klein developed a concept of “value transformation,” which focused on a broad range of group activities but paid limited attention to individual counseling or other youth-worker interventions. He equated “value transformation” with group activities conducted by the youth workers. Based on his evaluation of the Group Guidance Project (Klein 1968) and the Ladino Hills Project (Klein 1971), he concluded that detached work focused on the gang was ineffective. However, he provided evidence that de-cohering the gang did not reduce individual-youth delinquency rates.

While Klein observed that club meetings and group programming created group cohesion, he also provided evidence that street workers in fact were not spending significant-enough time with youth gang members to have influenced them. Klein did not sufficiently

observe detached-worker efforts with individual youth in work projects, job placement, or through intensive counseling contacts and did not provide evidence for their effectiveness or ineffectiveness (Klein 1968, 1971; Youth for Service 1963).

Klein concluded that “group programming for gang boys serves to increase gang size and cohesiveness ... there was good reason to doubt the desirability of continuing such programs or starting new ones ...” (Klein 1969). Joan Moore, another gang researcher and observer of gang programs in Los Angeles during the same period, challenged this conclusion, or at least lamented its consequences. She commented that Klein’s recommendation “was taken as in injunction by Los Angeles policy makers to end gang programs. It was espoused with special enthusiasm by police and sheriffs, who were increasingly successful in persuading policymakers to substitute beefed-up police gang squads ...” (Moore 1991).

### The Community Paradigm

Traditional youth-agency outreach programs to delinquent groups or gangs were largely abandoned by the early 1960s. At the same time, there was a shift in ideology regarding the causes of urban problems (including delinquency) which occurred in association with major social movements in American society. The Civil Rights movement, urban riots, and federal legislation to address poverty through community-action programs contributed to a structural, rather than an individual-youth or small-group approach to addressing the delinquent gang problem. Street (or detached) workers were still available, but were now expected to be elements of local community-agency and larger institutional change, particularly through referral of low-income minority-group youth to “world of education” (street academies), “world of

work” (manpower training and job corps) and a broader range of community-based services to help them “make it” in the wider, legitimate world (Bibb 1967).

Street-work practice remained focused on reducing intergang youth violence, although the detached worker was now integrated with a community-service system, and more available to connect youth to organizations such as the “Youth Jobs Center,” the “Youth Services Corps,” schools and juvenile courts. Mobilization for Youth in New York developed a network of agencies, schools, employment and citizen (action) groups which also included a unit of street workers (Mobilization for Youth, Inc. 1961). Access to legitimate opportunities were now available. The expectation was that now gang youth would not have to use conflict behavior or illegal opportunities to achieve social and/or economic status (Cloward, Ohlin 1960; Coleman 1974). Nevertheless, street workers continued their traditional practice of group work, recreation and occasional individual-youth counseling, but with little direct impact on existing criminal-justice agencies.

A major component of the Mid-City Project in Boston, a community-wide approach, was the detached workers who emphasized involving youth in formal club meetings, athletic contests, dances, and fund-raising activities, rather than provision of access to social and economic opportunities for gang youth. The Mid-City Project’s “total community” approach did not facilitate community institutional change, strengthen local citizen groups, or encourage cooperation among professional organizations. Criminal-justice elements, especially the police, were not significantly involved in collaboration with street workers. Miller’s evaluation of the project was that it did not reduce delinquent-behavior arrests or court appearances of program youth. However, Miller’s extensive evaluation studies did not address the effects of specific



services provided to youth, and the results these service patterns produced (Miller 1962).

One of the most egregious failures of the “total community” approach was the Youth Manpower Project of The Woodlawn Organization (TWO) in Chicago, Illinois in the mid-1960s (Spergel 1972). A grassroots organization with a reputation for effective, militant, Alinsky-style organizing, TWO was selected by the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity to receive funds to address burgeoning gang-violence problems in the Woodlawn area, a community transitioning from a mainly-white to an all-Black lower-income population. The project was to provide training, jobs, educational opportunities and mediation efforts directed to and through two major warring Chicago Southside gangs. Collaborators with, or advisors to, the project were the Chicago Urban League, the Xerox Corporation, the First Presbyterian Church and selected faculty of the University of Chicago. The goal of the project was to reduce gang conflict and crime rates, and minimize the potential for urban riots, presumably by low-income alienated youth, including gang members. Job training centers were established in the territories of each of the two gang constellations – the Blackstone Rangers (later to be known as the Black P. Stone Nation and the El Rukns) and the Devils’ Disciples (later to be known as the Black Disciples and the Black Gangster Disciples).

The project, however, developed a variety of objectives which undercut its goals and contributed to its failure. TWO wanted to integrate the gangs as equals into its comprehensive local community-organizing efforts. TWO was also engaged at the time in efforts to represent the interests of the residents and organizations of Woodlawn, particularly those interests opposed to Chicago’s city government, i.e., the Board of Education and Chicago’s Planning Department. Further, the minister of the First Presbyterian Church in Woodlawn was independently interested

(separately from the efforts of TWO) in addressing the gang problem through developing the leaders of the Blackstone Rangers into community leaders.

Gang leaders were the key staff of the training centers. Only a small TWO professional staff of two or three was available to conduct or supervise project operations, which targeted 600 gang youth, 16 to 21 years of age. The gangs did not accept the purpose of the project or substantially participate in the programs of the training centers. Training time at the centers was used to assess and plan ongoing gang organizational and criminal activities. Gang leaders collected the weekly “stipends” from youth who attended (or did not attend) the training sessions. TWO and the minister may not have sufficiently attended to the illegitimate activities of gang leadership in the training centers. The objectives of TWO and those of the First Presbyterian Church were attacked by the Chicago Police Department. A great deal of community and media controversy resulted. Police and local community-resident complaints, in addition to local and national inter-organizational and political conflicts, led to federal-agency, congressional and state criminal investigations, and termination of the project at the end of its first year of operations.

Few youth were trained for or obtained legitimate jobs. Area crime rates did not change. In fact, the project and reactions to it contributed to better organization of the two gangs. One of the gangs developed a complex corporate structure which became a model for other gangs in the city and other parts of the country. Leaders of the El Rukns were later indicted for a series of crimes, including major drug operations and killings. Key gang leaders were imprisoned for long terms, or killed in internal or intergang rivalries. Nevertheless, the two gangs continued to grow in size and influence, and spread to other cities (Spergel 1969, 1972, 1995).

The first “total community”-oriented project to implement a comprehensive program including youth-agency, community-group and justice-system elements, while focusing on the interests and needs of both youth and the community, was the Crisis Intervention Network (CIN) formed in Philadelphia in 1975. The goals and objectives of the team of CIN street workers and community organizers were “to lower the incidents of youth disputes [gang fighting] in the city through dispute-resolution techniques, follow-up counseling with individual youth and their families and by strengthening community organization, formally and informally” (Swans 1981; Darden, Peinsley, Digre 1985). The CIN program utilized a network of specialists from various organizations, including city probation and local neighborhood associations.

The CIN crisis team comprised street workers who were mainly former gang members from the same gang-problem community areas. The workers patrolled the crisis areas on a twenty-four-hour basis. An important component of the program was parent councils, which were “established as both a forum for information sharing and a mobilizer of parents to reduce gang-related incidents” (Ibid). A Philadelphia adult probation unit was associated with CIN to target and closely supervise young adult gang leaders. Less closely linked to the program were the city schools and the Philadelphia Police Department. Other local community groups and agencies also developed programs to reduce gang violence, and were at least partially associated with CIN (e.g., the House of Umoja) (Fattah 1987).

Gang homicides decreased sharply during the middle and late 1970s, although the drug problem seemed to increase just as sharply. Various agencies, including CIN, claimed credit for the reduction of gang homicides. Exactly who or what was specifically responsible for the reduction in gang violence was not clear. A formal evaluation of the structure, process and

impact of CIN was not conducted (Crisis Intervention Network 1981). One gang researcher charged that a change in Philadelphia Police statistical recording procedures may have accounted for some of the violence reduction (Miller 1982).

### Specialized Gang Suppression Approaches

James Short observed almost two decades ago that “the behaviors of law enforcement officers and court officials and factors in other institutions and the relationships among these actors and systems are critical to the understanding of both etiology and controls of crime and delinquency” (Short 1985). This cannot be said more truly than in reference to gang unit police officers.

Specialized gang units originated in larger urban areas (particularly Los Angeles and Chicago) in the 1960s in response to an increase in gang violence which traditional youth-division police, juvenile court, and juvenile probation officers seemed unable to handle. The police were the first criminal-justice agency to deal with the gang problem through units of officers, specially trained with special procedures to target youth gangs. They provided models of approaches to suppress gangs and gang members which were later adapted by prosecution, probation, corrections, and special school officers, and further sanctioned by city ordinances, state laws, and public opinion.

Urban disorders in the 1960s impelled police departments to focus on control of gangs and other illegitimate or radical groups that threatened local order and political and business interests. The gang crime unit of the Chicago Police Department was originally formed through

the reassignment of some Youth Division officers to suppress the behavior of gangs on the south side of Chicago, particularly those involved in the TWO Youth Manpower Project (see above).

The gang problem required attention in other parts of Chicago. The Chicago Gang Unit rapidly expanded in size (and purpose – also investigating liberal and left-wing organizations). They comprised a headquarters, administrative and intelligence units and three major subunits in the western, southern and northern areas of Chicago. Gangs continued to grow in size, threat, and influence in various urban centers, as did police gang units, who devised new methods to identify, track, harass, and break up gangs in order to eliminate the problem. Gang units attracted tough, adventurous, pro-active officers operating in plain clothes and unmarked cars. Gang youth were considered evil and remorseless in their criminal activities, and not worthy of civil treatment. They were identified, photographed, and recorded in gang books. Arrests were now based on a range of special gang-motivated or gang-related charges. Minority youth, particularly African-American and Hispanic, located in ghetto communities were especially prone to be labeled gang youth, subjected to increased surveillance and charged with gang offenses. Names of youth on gang lists were not readily expunged.

Klein (1995) has described the typical gang “hard” suppression activities of specialized gang police, probation, prosecution, corrections and school officers. According to Klein, the essence of gang-youth suppression has been the punishment, control and separation of gang youth from normal criminal-justice procedures and institutional arrangements for dealing with most youth who transgress civic norms and criminal laws.

Police gang units, vertical gang prosecution, probation gang units, and school resource officers have developed various surveillance and information systems and special control

procedures that have often been an effective means to control gang behaviors, particularly violence and a range of nuisance behaviors. Focus has been on protecting citizens (sometimes including gang youth themselves) from a series of violent encounters, while punishing youth who commit or are suspected of committing such behaviors.

However, low priority is given to communication, understanding, or prevention of the complex factors which induce youth to join gangs and participate in gang behavior. Gang-unit officers focus single-mindedly on gang activities such as street loitering, graffiti, disorderly conduct, fighting, drug possession and sale. They aggressively stop and search gang youth (and sometimes non-gang youth) on street corners, in cars, school yards, parks, beaches, randomly sweep them into paddy wagons and detention facilities, charging them with a range of offenses which are often dismissed at court arraignment.

Such procedures may result inadvertently or deliberately in increased hostility to the police, stronger commitment by youth to the gang, and an increase in law-violating behavior. Gang police tend to sweep up opposing gang members in the same paddy wagons, creating animosity and further rationale for attacking members of opposing gangs. Charges for loitering and minor offenses are quickly dismissed in court. Gang youth develop reputations for “beating the rap.” Gang police have been known to deliberately drop off youth from one gang in opposing gang territories (and then watching or arresting gang youth for the fights that ensue); to mark out gang graffiti and replace it with other gang markings; and infrequently to engage in a variety of illegal practices, sometimes in collaboration with gang youth, e.g., protecting or encouraging drug deals.

City ordinances and state laws have widened the range of punishable behaviors by gang

youth. State law may classify gangs as terrorist organizations. Certain offenses committed by gang youth require enhanced punishments. Courts tend to deny diversion and rehabilitation services to gang youth, or deny juvenile-court processing and generally refer them to adult court.

### More Complex Cross-Institutional Approaches

The increase in the numbers and memberships of gangs in the 1980s and 1990s was associated with rapid population movement, new waves of immigration, technological change, and growing segregation of low-income Latinos and African-Americans in certain communities in city and suburban areas. Youth gangs developed in the suburbs, in medium and smaller-sized cities, on Indian reservations, and in rural areas. Gang violence grew more lethal. Gang youth were increasingly selling drugs, usually small quantities. However, entrepreneurial drug gangs also developed. The gang drug-problem escalated more rapidly than intergang violence in most communities. Communities grew more fearful and less tolerant of gangs and gang youth.

Government leaders continued to declare enhanced war on gangs, particularly on gangs in low-income minority areas. Increasingly, the police, schools, and community groups, while primarily committed to suppression, nevertheless became more involved in gang prevention and community-mobilization to counter gang activities. Traditional detached-worker or street-worker programs continued to exist, but now in even more ambiguous relationship to other programs and agencies concerned with the gang problem.

Boston has probably made the most extensive cross-agency efforts to deal with the juvenile violence problem, including juvenile gang violence. A variety of organizations have

developed programs to address the gun violence problem. Social service agencies concerned with youth violence continue to use street workers to perform still somewhat traditional outreach group-oriented tasks, contacting “kids who hung with crews [i.e., gangs], dealt drugs, suffered from and perpetrated violence.” Street workers also assist youth with employment, social services, dispute resolution, and youth participation in a “Peace League” of “gang-on-gang” basketball games held in neutral sites (Piel, Kennedy, Braga 2000). Probation officers have been on the streets in partnership with a special group of “Youth Violence Cease Fire [police] Officers” in “Operation Night Light.”

The various personnel in the Boston “Cease Fire” programs apparently cooperated well with each other. Street workers, probation, and police were in periodic face-to-face street contact with ministers of the “Ten Point Coalition” – an activist Black clergy walking the streets late into the night. Teachers and mental-health workers taught violence prevention in the schools. “What emerged in Boston in the early 1990s was an extensive network of front-line practitioners with a mix of capacities who were well-informed about what was happening in the streets” (Ibid).

The Boston Cease Fire programs were not based on an “anti-gang strategy.” Youth homicides sharply declined, but the decline “cannot be attributed to a cessation of gangs or gang activities” (Ibid). Evaluators of the Boston effort also could not attribute the decline in youth homicides to any particular program component. The success of the “Boston Gun Project,” according to evaluators, was that it “involved multiple agencies and the community and substantial investments in analysis, coordination and implementation” (Ibid). But supply-side deterrent gun-control efforts apparently did nothing to reduce “the existing stockpile .... of guns



held by gang members in Boston which was still held when violence reached its new low equilibrium” (Ibid). The principal impact therefore was certainly a “demand-side deterrence-based effort rather than a supply-side effect” (Ibid). Youth and adults were apparently not using the guns that they had. The Boston programs emphasized deterrence of violence, but not necessarily youth-development or institutional-change factors that might have contributed to a reduction of the causes of the violence or the gang problem.

The Chicago Cease-Fire program in several neighborhoods, somewhat modeled after the Boston approach but not as inclusive of the approaches of different types of organizations, is currently operating under the aegis of a coalition from the University of Illinois-Chicago and several local agencies and churches. Its efforts to attack gun violence are separate from those of the Chicago Police Department. Chicago has remained resistant to criminal-justice and social-agency collaboration, although community-based efforts and traditional streetwork programs continue on their own to address the gang problem. Chicago law-enforcement approaches, despite the presence of a community-policing component, remain largely suppression-oriented.

A recent interagency collaborative program in Los Angeles – the BRIDGES program, which involved contracts with 26 of the city’s middle schools where gang activity is highest – relied heavily on the use of streetworkers. A detached worker was assigned to each of the schools, with a case load of 30 clients (gang-involved or gang-crime youth in school, and living within a 2.5 mile radius of the school). The workers perform a mix of tasks – counseling and negotiating truces as well as gathering information about gang problems. The approach focuses on the use of indigenous personnel, mostly former gang members. The Association of Community-Based Gang Intervention Workers has formed in Los Angeles county. Of its 198

members, representing 56 agencies in the Los Angeles Area, “approximately 70% ... are ex-gang members and a majority of these may have criminal records” (Meyers 2000).

The recent efforts and problems of one grassroots program in the Robert Taylor Homes housing project in Chicago in the early 1990s were reminiscent of the flawed TWO Youth Manpower Project of the 1960s. The director of a community center in the Homes began to meet privately with gang leaders to recruit their participation in activities to reduce gang conflict. While there was some reduction of intergang conflict over a short period of time, the problems of drug trafficking were not addressed. (Tenants in the housing project were vulnerable on Public Aid “check day” to the blandishments – or intimidation – of gang drug dealers to purchase drugs.) The community center also sponsored meetings between project tenants and gang leaders to encourage gang members to assist with trash pick-up, hallway cleaning, curbing of public drinking, etc. (Venkatesh 2000).

The community-center director and local tenant group failed to curb the development and expansion of the gang’s criminal-gain activities (such as drug-trafficking) which were regarded by some as more destructive and corrupting than gang violence – although the two problems were not entirely separate. Venkatesh’s conclusion was that with the expansion of the local gang’s influence across public housing projects in Chicago, and even across other cities and states, the gang was “locally ... a social and economic enterprise that met particular needs of gang members [but that] ... regionally it was an organized crime enterprise, whose leaders paid little attention to non-economic and non-criminal activity” (Ibid).

We note also the continuing, but spasmodic, efforts by academics, former gang leaders, local political aspirants, and a few minority group leaders to reform gangs and include them as

visible social organizations concerned with and part of a wider civic movement, advocating improved services and institutional reforms on behalf of low-income minority populations in ghetto areas. Probably a major contribution of these efforts has been the evolution of informal support groups to meet the myriad and often critical personal, social, and economic needs of gang youth, and older and former gang affiliated members (see Kontos, Brotherton, Barrios 2003). These activities of the reform gang associations, particularly activities of a political nature, are closely observed with suspicion by key police gang units.

In sum, nearly all of the gang programs since the 1950s have utilized some form of traditional street-worker approach focused on the reduction of gang violence through changing gang structure and dynamics, mediation between gangs to reduce intergang conflict, occasional youth counseling and job referral, and variable collaboration with community groups, but with no contact and only limited collaboration with the criminal-justice system, particularly law enforcement. While there has been some collaboration among social and educational agencies and law-enforcement deterrence programs, there has been no integration of efforts across these organizations aimed at youth development and institutional change for purposes of both community protection from, and social development of, targeted gang members.

There remain significant differences among policy makers, agency administrators, criminologists and politicians as to what gang-control methods work, and which personnel can effectively deliver controls. Some gang experts, politicians and gang researchers believe that former gang members – even active gang members – are essential to successful gang-control and gang-prevention programs. Hagedorn (1988) lists as a first principle for gang-program reform that “gang members must participate as consultants in developing new programs.” Bursik and

Grasmick (1993) recommend “the recruitment of gang members as core members of locally based gang prevention programs.” Bartollas is more specific; he suggests that “gang-member volunteers serve as disciplinary monitors within community schools” (Curry 1995). However, other gang researchers, such as Klein (1971), Miller (1962), Spergel (1995) and Venkatesh (2000) question primary reliance on former or active gang members to control gang-member delinquency and crime. They emphasize the limitations of gang or former gang members, particularly since their legitimate authority is limited, and they are at risk of over-identifying with gang youth criminal-interests, norms, and values. The latter authors and others implicitly or explicitly support the necessity of modified suppression strategies, juxtaposed and integrated with social-opportunity strategies.

It was not until the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project that a structural relationship of street workers, police, probation, and representatives of other community groups was established for purposes of integrated suppression and social intervention through a team arrangement to address the gang-violence problem. A functional, integrated, inter-institutional community approach evolved over a five-year period, 1992-1997, the purpose of which was to reduce violence between two major gang constellations, the Latin Kings and Two Six. The Little Village Project required a shift in the detached worker’s role – to collaborate in a control approach – and also a shift, albeit limited, in law enforcement’s role – to collaborate in some form of social intervention to address the gang problem.

The Little Village Project was a test of a complex approach based on the integration of a set of specialized strategies, often considered contradictory or mutually exclusive. The approach did not seek to eliminate gangs or even the gang problem, but to significantly reduce it. The

Project was only indirectly and partially expected to modify the causal aspects of the gang problem which was a product of larger societal and community forces including population movement, poverty, racism, segregation, and family disorganization as well as defective public policies. The Project was also an attempt to show, through research and evaluation, how it created a structure and process to achieve an integrated community-based approach, and to what extent it achieved its purpose.

### Evaluation Issues

In the past, models of gang-intervention programs were not clearly developed or adequately tested. Key questions remained about the effectiveness of gang projects, and especially about the roles of detached gang (or community) youth workers, criminal-justice, social-agency and community-group personnel and strategies for addressing the youth-gang problem. Policy and program questions still include:

- What is the primary concern about the specific gang problem that needs to be addressed?
- How closely should criminal-justice agencies be involved with youth agencies and community groups (let alone former gang members) in addressing the gang problem?
- Who should take primary responsibility for developing and conducting an interagency, community-wide and grassroots approach to the problem?
- Are former gang members effective in dealing with gangs?
- Should community youth workers be professionals and, if so, should they come from the gang neighborhoods?
- Can schools be engaged in interagency programs other than “zero tolerance,” suspension,

and expulsion practices in dealing with gang youth?

- Can effective job training programs and jobs be targeted to gang youth?
- Is counseling and/or suppression effective with gang youth and if so, under what conditions?

Research Design. Gang program evaluations generally have not been adequately designed or implemented. They have not addressed the range of characteristics of youth in gang programs, and have not specified them in terms of demographic, family, gang, social-space, and criminal-background factors. The need to make use of varied procedures for gathering data from multiple sources (e.g., police and gang-member self-reports) has not been accepted. Particular program services or strategies and worker activities with specific youth have, surprisingly, not been described. Appropriate comparison groups have not been used. Multivariate analyses of the interrelationship of critical variables have not been provided. Findings on the relation between what street workers do with individual youth, and with what results have not been developed (Schubert, Richardson 1976; Sivilli, Yin, Nugent 1995; Eccles, Grootman 2002).

Sampling. There are many issues related to who and how a sample of gang youth (program and comparison) are to be selected for inclusion in the gang program as well as in the evaluation of the program: who is a gang member, based on what definition?; what is the specific nature of the crime or criminal pattern of the gang member included in the program?; how representative are program gang youth of the community's gang population?; how representative of the evaluation youth-sample are the program youth?; how equivalent – based on key demographic,

gang-membership, gang-identification, and prior-arrest histories – are youth in the program and comparison groups? There is a tendency in gang program evaluations to select less-delinquent comparison youth, since more equivalent or serious-delinquent comparison youth may not be “knowable” or accessible to the researcher. There are many types of problems connected with answering these questions.

Analysis. Many gang-program evaluations in fact do not validly determine whether the gang programs have succeeded in reducing gang crime (Berleman 1969; Berleman, Seaberg, Steinberg 1972). Gang program evaluations have been characterized by weak research design, sampling of youth who are not gang members (or gang members who are not delinquent) and by inadequate data-collection methods. Only gross measures of change in patterns of delinquency, and sometimes of serious crime such as homicides, have been used. Change in types or configurations of crime usually have not been assessed. Multivariate analyses have often been conducted without controls for the possibility that there may be different types of gang offenders for whom different worker-strategies may be more or less effective. Differential organization and community effects which contribute to individual program-youth outcome have not been explored.

The present examination of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project addresses many of these complex issues of gang-program development, operation and evaluation. Program and comparison youth characteristics have been reasonably well matched, and any differences have been controlled. A range of carefully constructed measures of police-arrest and self-report data is available. The influence of important intervening variables – such as changes in gang

membership, school, job, and community factors – have been introduced into the analysis. We inquire into the specifics of the community youth worker’s activities and strategies, and their relation to outcomes for particular types of gang youth. Also, we take special pains to describe the origin, structure and development of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project, factors which may have determined the success or failure not only of the program but of its institutionalization in Chicago.



## Chapter 2

### Project Formation

The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project was part of a theoretically-informed demonstration to address the youth gang problem in comprehensive strategy and community-based terms. It followed an earlier gang-program model based on single-type strategies – outreach youth work or police suppression. The comprehensive gang-program model was developed by the principal investigator and associates in the course of the “Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention Research and Development Program,” sponsored by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice (1987-1991). The model was based on a set of interrelated strategies: 1) community mobilization; 2) social intervention; 3) provision of social opportunities; 4) suppression or socialized control; and 5) organizational change and development. The strategies were elaborated in twelve technical assistance manuals, each providing rationales and recommending policies and practices for different organizations or institutions addressing (or that might address) the gang problem, e.g., police, probation, youth agencies, schools, businesses (Spergel, Chance 1992).

The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project was sponsored by the Chicago Police Department, and funded by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority through a block grant from the U.S. Department of Justice. What distinguished the Project was its police department sponsorship envisioning the collaboration of the criminal justice system, youth service agencies, and grassroots groups. Outreach youth workers (mainly former gang leaders of local gangs) and residents of Little Village were to be key elements in this local, community-based project. Research was also uniquely and highly integrated into Project operations.

Assessment, planning and evaluation were to be major components of program development of the Chicago Police Department and the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority.

Extensive data systems describing, mapping and analyzing gang crime in Chicago on a local-community basis were to be made accessible to the Project for program-development and research purposes.

These unique elements, however, must be considered within the context of Chicago's gang tradition, political structure and a general historical perspective of gang intervention and control programs and research. Chicago has been one of the major, if not the major, center for the study of delinquency and gangs, and for experimental gang programs, in the United States. Chicago's gang problem has been persistent and serious for a very long time, more than a century. In recent decades, along with Los Angeles, it largely accounted for, or served as a model for, the evolving character and "spread" of gang problems throughout the country, particularly in smaller cities, towns, and rural areas, and even on Indian reservations, in the United States.

### Genesis of the Little Village Project

In the spring of 1992, a series of events occurred in Chicago government and among criminal-justice agencies in Chicago and Cook County which made possible the development of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project. A new mayor was elected. The new mayor, Richard M. Daley, appointed Matthew Rodriguez as the new Police Superintendent. Changes gradually followed in the structure and direction of the Chicago Police Department (CPD). Barbara MacDonald, Associate Director of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority

(ICJIA) – the state’s criminal justice planning agency – was appointed director of the Research and Development Division of the CPD under Deputy Superintendent Charles Ramsey, with major responsibility for creation of the community-policing program. Nancy Martin, formerly an Assistant State’s Attorney in Illinois, became the director of the Cook County Adult Probation Department with interest in the gang problem.

The ICJIA received a four-year grant from the U.S. Justice Department’s Violence in Urban Areas Program in 1992. One million dollars was to be allocated to the Chicago Police Department, half to address the problem of domestic violence and half to address the gang-violence problem. Dr. Candice Kane, who replaced Barbara MacDonald at the ICJIA, was responsible for the application to the federal government and for the distribution of these funds when the application was approved. Dr. Kane had been closely involved with the development of the OJJDP Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention Program and later the Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program. In early 1992, she contacted Professor Spergel, requesting a concept paper for a pilot project to address the gang-violence portion of one federal grant in Chicago.

Also, the commander of Chicago Police Department’s Gang Crime Unit, Robert Dart, who participated earlier in the development of the OJJDP comprehensive community model, was interested in its adaptation in Chicago. Gang homicides had reached an all time peak in certain Chicago inner-city communities. He provided statistics of gang crime and aided in the selection of possible local sites. However, the effectiveness of the Gang Crime Unit was challenged in a report to the CPD by Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, a consulting firm which recommended the downsizing and decentralization of the gang unit’s enforcement operations. The Department of

Human Services (DHS) was terminating its Crisis Intervention Network program because it had run into a series of gang-staff disciplinary and interagency problems related to the program.

Nevertheless it was expected that DHS would remain interested in the gang problem.

The concept paper Professor Spergel submitted to ICJIA (Dr. Kane) and the CPD (B. MacDonald) was well received. The Research and Development (R&D) division of the Chicago Police Department was to directly administer the project. The Gang Crime Unit, the Chicago Department of Human Services and the Adult Probation Department were expected to be key operational components in a coordinated interagency approach. Data on gang crime was to be supplied by Commander Dart's unit and by Dr. Carolyn Block of the Early Warning System of ICJIA, who had an established reputation for the collection and refinement of CPD gang-crime data on a community, gang, gang-offender, and gang-victim basis. One restriction of the grant was that the Gang Violence Reduction Project had to be targeted to youth and young adults 17 to 24 years of age in a community where serious gang violence was prevalent. A local community advisory group was also to be established. Originally, Professor Spergel was to assist the R&D division and the Gang Unit in the development of the Project, but not to play a program-operational role. He was also to receive a separate contract from ICJIA to evaluate the Project.

In February 1992, before certain organizational changes occurred, the original concept paper was submitted for an initial one-year period of Project operations:

I. Introduction

A pilot gang violence reduction project is to be developed in a high gang-crime sector of an Hispanic community. Objectives are the reduction of violent gang crime, in particular gang-motivated homicides, and felony batteries and assaults in comparison with similar areas of the city. One hundred hardcore violent gang offenders 17 to 24 years of age are to be targeted in an interagency and community collaborative approach.

The project calls for the development of community mobilization effort under the leadership of the Gang Crime Unit of the Chicago Police Department, in collaboration with the Gang Unit of the Cook County Adult Probation Department and the Chicago Intervention Network of the Chicago Department of Human Services. Close cooperation with a variety of local-community-based agencies and grassroots groups, including former gang members is expected. In due course additional collaboration with training and educational institutions and business organizations is anticipated. The University of Chicago, through Professor Spergel and two graduate students, is to assist in the development of the project.

## II Statement of the Problem

The project recognizes the rise and spread of gang violence (and sometimes related drug trafficking) in various communities of Chicago. Gang homicides escalated in the 1980s and reached a record pace in 1990 and 1991, with over 130 gang homicides in 1991. The rate of gang homicides is particularly high among older adolescents and young adults in certain lower socioeconomic Hispanic communities, although it is also high in certain inner-city African-American communities.

The project design assumes that the key causes of the criminal youth gang problem, especially gang violence, are a combination of social disorganization and poverty. The gang violence problem is viewed as a direct result of personal, family, group, organizational and disorganizational factors that interact with a lack of legitimate social opportunities [see Figure 1]. More specifically the problem is produced by weakness of family structure, the fragmentation and lack of influence of social-control and social-support institutions, and the lack of adequate educational, training, and job opportunities for high risk youth. The gang in many instances has become an alternate criminal socializing institution serving increasingly to alienate certain youth from mainstream norms and values.

## III Goals and Objectives

The goal of the project is to reduce gang violence, especially gang homicide, and felony gang-motivated battery and assault in the target area compared with similar areas in the city. In other words, either a significant decrease or a lower rate of increase in the gang violence problem is anticipated at the end of the twelve-month test period relative to a prior period compared to changes in the gang problem in comparable areas over the same time period. At least 100 hardcore, violent or potentially violent gang youth will be targeted over the test period. At least 50 of these youth should have received intensive collaborative services or attention from the project team and associated community-based agencies and grassroots groups.

#### IV Program Strategy

The strategy to achieve goals and objectives is based mainly on concepts of community mobilization, outreach services, opportunities provision, and suppression. Community mobilization refers to the collaboration and integration of efforts of law enforcement and the criminal justice agencies with those of community-based human service agencies, grass-roots organizations and local citizens. The provision of social opportunities depends on the availability and successful use of training, education and jobs for those gang members at greatest risk of committing gang-motivated violent offenses. The strategy targets 17 to 24-year-old youth who need both to be constrained and at the same time supported in efforts to be integrated into mainstream society.

It is also important to indicate what the approach does not attempt and what the limits of the program will be. The project is not – at this time – a gang-prevention or early-intervention program directed to younger youth. It is not anticipated that the general crime problem, including drug trafficking and property crime, will necessarily be affected by the program. The project is not a basis for a general social or community development process to address a variety of basic inner-city problems such as slum housing, homelessness, unemployment, racism, school dropout, drug use, AIDS, and teenage pregnancy, except as these problems can be directly related to the problem of gang violence.

Furthermore, the project strategy assumes that gang violence problems vary with certain cultural, social, economic, and ecological factors in particular communities. Therefore, an approach must be fashioned to meet the distinctive characteristics and needs of the particular community.

The project will target a sector of a particular high gang-crime Hispanic community, specific gangs, and gang youth most frequently engaged or likely to be engaged in gang-motivated violence. A process of community problem and resource assessment, planning, project organization, and collaborative staff training will precede the actual initiation of field operations. The entire project will be under the administration of the Gang Crime Unit of the Chicago Police Department, since this unit has the longest and most intense experience, current expertise, and responsibility for dealing with the gang problem. The proposed strategy represents an elaboration and extension of the gang unit's approach, which has now become even more responsive to community interests and needs and more closely interrelated with other criminal justice, community-based and grass-roots efforts to control and reduce the problem.

In the preliminary period of project development, the Gang Unit of Cook County Adult Probation and the Chicago Intervention Network of the Chicago Department of Human Services are expected to play key collaborative roles. In

the shortest order feasible, it is anticipated that other institutions such as schools, gang prosecutors, employers and training facilities as well as other human-service and grassroots organizations will also play important roles. In any case, from the start, local community groups and citizens will participate in significant policy-advising aspects and operational activities of the project. The project ideally should be independent of police, probation and other agency routine operations and located directly in the target area of field operations.

### Police

The gang unit will be administratively responsible for the project, including intra-department coordination of efforts (patrol, narcotics, robbery, neighborhood relations, etc.), leadership in the development of coordinated efforts with other justice-system, community-based-agency, and grass-roots activities. It will especially coordinate intelligence, investigation, training, and community outreach functions. This will require the development of appropriate procedures for interagency and community data sharing, police operations, and collaborative programming.

The project administrator will be accountable to the Commander of the Gang Crime Unit. He will be a full-time senior officer of the unit assisted by at least four full-time unit officers detailed to the project to carry out a range of duties consistent both with gang-crime-unit and project policies and procedures. In essence, the police role in the project will be community policing as it targets the gang violence problem in an outreach, flexible and comprehensive manner.

### Probation

A probation coordinator and at least three-full-time probation officers will be assigned to the project to provide probation services and community outreach to targeted gang youth already on probation, in collaboration with the police, Chicago Intervention Network, and local community groups. Special concern will be with data sharing and intensive probation, including the development of both control and social-support mechanisms, for targeted probation youth. Probation staff will be located in the project office and work out of it as part of the project team.

### Chicago Intervention Network

A Chicago Intervention Network (CIN) coordinator and three full-time staff will be available to provide outreach, mediation, and crisis intervention services to targeted gangs and gang youth, collaborate with other project team members and with various local community organizations to control the gang problem, focused especially on the reduction of gang violence by older adolescents and young adults. CIN workers will be expected to share data that bears on the gang violence problem, provide social development alternatives to target gang youth, organize local community citizen involvement, as well as collaborate with justice system officials. Such collaboration should not jeopardize the overall relationship that CIN workers develop with gang and their members. The role of the worker should be more focused, control-oriented, and community organizational than it has been in traditional street work with youth gangs.

### Community Advisory Group

A group of representatives of local agencies, community organizations, and residents including former gang members will be formed to advise and consult with the project staff on the development of programs. Various members of the Advisory Group will be integrally involved in specific activities of gang control, social support, and provision of social opportunities. Regular meetings will be convened to discuss project issues and activities.

### The University of Chicago

Project development and operations are expected to be facilitated by Professor Spergel and two graduate students. Their functions will include aiding the flow of communication among project team members, assisting component staff members with the implementation of selected activities, especially as related to social intervention and neighborhood organizing around the gang problem. The University of Chicago group will also document project activities, especially the process of networking and community mobilization.

Professor Spergel's duties will be the provision of advice and consultation in overall program development, training, and troubleshooting. It is anticipated that the activities of the University of Chicago group will be phased out at the end of the first year and as the project develops an effective set of field operations.

### Schedule of Field Activities/Performances Indicators:

#### April-June 1992

- A. Organizational Development
  - a. Training
  - b. Development of common interagency data system
  - c. Information sharing procedures
  - d. Procedures for field operations
- B. Community Problem and Resources Assessment
- C. Advisory Committee Development

#### June 1992-March 1993

- D. Field Operations
  - a. Law enforcement
  - b. Supervision of gang youth
  - c. Social intervention: Crisis intervention
  - d. Community organizing
  - e. Development of training, remedial education, job opportunities
  - f. Weekly crisis staff meetings
  - g. Monthly Advisory Committee meetings.

A further specification of the role of The University of Chicago was submitted in March 1992 as follows:

The activities or performance indicators of the action-research team from the School of



Social Service Administration will be: 1) Facilitation of local community organization and local agency collaboration in the implementation and further development of project goals and objectives; 2) Conduct of a Community Assessment Survey; 3) Training of, and consultation to, project staff; 4) Data collection and analysis pertaining to critical interagency and community events relevant to the gang problem; and 5) Development of a set of policies and procedures to be derived in the course of the implementation of the project.

### Performance Indicators

1. Facilitation of local community organization and local agency cooperation with Project goals and objectives. Professor Spergel and his staff will a) assist project administrators and staff to develop consensus on goals and objectives and appropriate implementation procedures; b) contact all key agencies, organizations and community groups in or near the target area, including churches, business groups, civic and political groups (and possibly gang influentials) to explain the purpose and scope of the project and elicit cooperation and participation in implementing its goals and objectives; c) assist Project administrator and staff in the development of contacts, relationships, and cooperative activities with local agencies and community groups, e.g., graffiti expunging, parent patrols, volunteer mentoring, job development, recreation, anti-gang training and counseling, etc.; d) assist in the development of the basis for a community Advisory Group to the Project; e) assist in the mediation of possible disputes among agencies, community organizations and community groups as they affect Project development.

2. Conduct of a Community Assessment Survey. A stratified random sample (n=300) of both residents and businesses, agencies, and other institutions in the target and comparison area(s) will be conducted in May and June 1992 to assess the gang problem and local target area resources available to deal with it, and initiate a process in the target area whereby community representatives can participate in and affect the Project's activities. Heads or representatives of households, businesses, and agencies will be interviewed through an hour-long survey instrument covering such topics as perceived nature, scope, and seriousness of the gang problem in the target area(s) and the surrounding community; direct experience by the interviewee, other household, business, or agency members, with the gang problem as victim or offender in the past six months; opinions about organizational and community activities that are perceived to be effective in dealing with the problem; perceptions of what more needs to be done; community participation experience addressed to the problem or other community issues; willingness and availability to participate in various possible Project-sponsored activities; demographic and socio-economic data of the interviewee.

The survey will be administered at Time I as well as Time II, twelve months after the start of Project field operations or first set of interviews, approximately to the same panel of persons in the original comparison communities.

### 3. Training and consultation to Project Staff.

A series of training and consultation sessions will be conducted for staff to: a) make available recent research and program findings in the field; b) assist in the development of consensus on Project goals and objectives among staff, including Police, Probation, and CIN and/or other types of members of the Project team; assist in the development of appropriate

policies and procedures which affect cross-agency team member operations; d) provide training in community relations, organizing, and interagency relationships in respect to the gang problem; and e) to assist in the development of outreach, social control and service activity to targeted gang youth and their families including gang crisis intervention, intergang communication and mediation and supervision of personnel from different agencies.

4. Data collection and analysis as they pertain to critical interagency and community gang problem events.

The University of Chicago staff will assist in the development of a) appropriate data recording instruments, particularly affecting the Project interagency and community collaborative process; summary case histories of successful Project interagency and community collaboration efforts in the prevention and control of gang violence in the targeted area; c) histories and analyses of social-intervention and social-opportunity efforts to control targeted gang members likely to engage in gang violence; and d) summaries of the minutes of community advisory committee meetings.

5. Development of a set of policies and procedures derived from implementation of the Project.

The University of Chicago staff will assist the Project administrator to develop a set of written policies and procedures which will be appropriate to the successful implementation of Project goals and objectives. Two categories of guidelines will be of special importance: a) those which bear on Project interagency collaboration and b) those which facilitate successful Project staff-community involvement. Specific processes, steps, and staff roles and responsibilities will be identified.<sup>1</sup>

In discussion with the Gang Crime Unit, a high gang-violence community was targeted, but not necessarily a community with high rates of drug-related gang crime. Police districts in Chicago that had the Hispanic communities with the highest rate of gang violence were Humboldt Park on the north side, and Little Village on the south side. The gangs in Little Village, however, were less involved in drug-related gang crime than the gangs in Humboldt Park. It was generally agreed that the drug problem was more complex and more resistive to social planning, community mobilization, services and job opportunities than the gang violence

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<sup>1</sup> A description and analysis of what the different workers do and the effect of their efforts on program youth was not indicated in the initial proposal. Emphasis was on getting agencies and community groups and their workers to participate together in program development.

problem, and that the model would have a better chance of success reducing gang violence than drug-related gang crime, particularly since this would be our first try at applying the model.

The Little Village community comprised six police beats in the 10<sup>th</sup> police district. It was five miles southwest of Chicago's Loop, the city's major business district. Formerly a community populated by first- and second-generation Middle-European residents, it was (in the past twenty years) increasingly a settled community, approximately 90% Mexican and Mexican-American, and of somewhat higher income than the northern sector of the 10<sup>th</sup> district. The northern sector was an African-American community, part of a major swath of low-income, high-rise segregated African-American communities, extending from the central city business area to the western limits of the city. Little Village was a community of working class families with bungalow homes on its west side, and lower-income residents in three and four-storey tenements on its east side. It had well-established Catholic churches, a thriving business strip, and major hospital and university complexes nearby. The families were large with many children and adolescents. The community was also in transition. Latino families were moving in and out of the area from and to other parts of the city, suburbs, other parts of Illinois, the southern states (especially Texas), and Mexico. The United States Census had reported a population of only 60, 829 in 1989; 30% of its total 100,00 population was estimated to be undocumented in 1992.

The model called for a team approach that employed a set of interrelated strategies – community mobilization, social intervention or youth outreach, provision of social opportunities, suppression, organizational change and development. A team approach was to involve close collaboration among police, probation, outreach youth workers, and a community-organization

component. The expectation was that leadership and coordination of the Project would come from the police department. Funding for the Project would come from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Justice Department's Federal Violence in Urban Areas Program, administered by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (ICJIA), then directly to the Chicago Police Department (CPD), which would subcontract with the Cook County Adult Probation Department (CCAPD), the Department of Human Services (DHS), and The University of Chicago (UC).

From the start, an assumption was that the Gang Violence Reduction Project (specifically targeted to the gang problem), if successful, could be integrated into the community-policing initiative being planned by the City. Community policing did not get off the ground in District 10, one of the original five test sites, until approximately six months after the start of the Gang Violence Reduction Project. Community policing was to prove to be a more complex and difficult undertaking than the CPD originally expected. It took up the bulk of the CPD's Research and Development division's energies, and consequently limited CPD's interest in, guidance, and administration of the Project, particularly after community policing went citywide about a year after the Little Village Project was undertaken. The Little Village Project was a small addition or peripheral project that the CPD did not pay much attention to.

### Modifying the Plan

The components of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project were modified almost before the Project began. The CPD Gang Crime Unit was reorganized and downsized, and its function confined to intelligence. The Gang Crime Unit's enforcement duties were

diffused and taken over by the Patrol Division, particularly its tactical unit, which also was given responsibility for partially implementing the Project. Two full-time officers from the 10<sup>th</sup> District tactical unit and two part-time Neighborhood Relations officers, including a sergeant, were assigned to the Project, replacing the Gang Crime Unit officers originally assigned. The director of CCAPD agreed to provide a unit of three full-time probation officers and a supervisor. The Chicago Department of Human Services originally planned to provide outreach youth-worker services, but shifted its focus (after problems with its now highly-favored recreation outreach program) to delinquency prevention in elementary and junior high schools. It was no longer interested in a street-worker approach to gangs, or the Little Village Project. Perhaps most important for purposes of overall Project development, it was not clear who the Project's police coordinator or leader of the Project would be in Little Village, i.e., who would take day-to-day responsibility for the development, coordination and running of the program. The Commander of the Gang Crime Unit had resigned.

Professor Spergel, who designed the original Little Village proposal, believed strongly that a critical Project component had to be the use of outreach youth workers to contact and provide services to targeted gang members on the street, but that they also had to collaborate closely with the tactical or gang unit officers for purposes of control and community protection. This joint approach would prevent or contain interagency and community conflicts in respect to the gang problem by joining the two traditional but oppositional approaches to the gang problem – outreach youth service and police suppression. In the past these two approaches had often been politicized, impeding effective programming. A team approach would not only employ interrelated strategies of suppression and social intervention, but also make it possible to provide

social opportunities and mobilize community interests and resources. However, an immediate operational problem in the modified design was the selection of an agency to replace the Department of Human Service to provide outreach gang service. This would not be easy.

A variety of youth-serving organizations were already present in Little Village: three Boys and Girls Clubs, Latino Youth (a comprehensive youth-service agency), the Chicago Park Department's Piotrowski Recreation Center, and several churches with gyms and youth programs. However, none of the organizations had outreach workers and their programs were not directed to hard-core gang youth. None worked in close alliance with the 10<sup>th</sup> District police around the gang problem. Several citywide agencies – BUILD, Chicago Commons, and the YMCA – had experience with recreation-oriented outreach youth work programs. However, these agencies now preferred to work with younger youth and were reluctant to collaborate closely with the Chicago Police Department.

Unwilling to modify a basic element of the model, Professor Spergel volunteered the School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, to replace the Department of Human Services. He had a history of outreach work experience with youth gangs at various levels – direct service, supervision, administration, and consultation. He proposed creating an outreach-youth worker component operated through the School of Social Service Administration. This idea was acceptable to the CPD, and the ICJIA, as well as to the UC, at least for a year. The possibility of involving the DHS, or persuading one of the local youth agencies to adapt the model within that period still existed. It was important to get the Project underway as soon as possible. The organizational and political context was fluid and Professor Spergel believed the model had to be initiated and tested with whatever critical components were

available while opportunity existed.

The R&D Unit of the CPD was deeply involved in a process of departmental reorganization, particularly in relation to community policing. Also, the local District 10 Commander, who presumably was to have some operational oversight of the Project, was retiring. The replacement Area Commander (who himself stayed in his position for only a few weeks) and the Chief of Patrol expressed a willingness to support the Project, but no clear decision was made as to who was to be directly responsible for the conduct and coordination of Project operations. It appeared that only the R&D liaison to the Project, Lieutenant Chomiak, and Professor Spergel were significantly committed to the Project and prepared to invest in the early day-to-day development of the Project. Police administrators at different police and probation departmental levels were not clear about their specific responsibilities to the Project, i.e., who should be doing what. In small steps, by default Professor Spergel was soon to become (unofficially) responsible for getting the Project off the ground, and even coordinating its components as time went on.

Lieutenant Chomiak seemed to have a solid grasp of the Project concept. He was clearly aware of the importance of developing Project relationships at different levels within and between the police department and its subcontractees, the CCAPD and the UC. A large-scale community-policing project was being planned, separate from the pilot gang project. Its focus would not be gang control, but development of community support for general crime prevention and control by the police department, as well as more efficient city services. Unfortunately, as the Project developed, Lieutenant Chomiak transferred out of R&D back to patrol duty before the end of the first year. He insisted the Project idea required the active, purposeful and

collective involvement of police, community, and community youth workers in the control and prevention of gang crime. The Project should be an example of community policing in the fullest sense of the term. His views were not shared by leaders of the Department.


The lack of adequate police-administration interest and assignment of a senior officer to take specific responsibility for the development of the Project was evident from the start of Project operations. The CPD offered a nominal but limited degree of support, combined with a cautious wait-and-see attitude. The Department had a history of lack of trust and skepticism about the value of outreach workers. The prevailing view was that gang workers were essentially gang members. There was no history of collaboration between police and adult probation in regard to the gang problem. Also, the current reality was that too many departmental changes, new ideas and procedures were confronting administrative and grassroots police officers (particularly in regard to planning and implementing community policing) for them to pay attention to the Little Village Project. To what extent the Mayor's office supported the Project was also a question. Fighting the gang problem through increased police suppression was a prime device used by the Mayor to coalesce political support from developing and economically-fractured and antagonistic African-American, Hispanic and white communities.

There was almost no formal beginning to the Project. The contract between the ICJIA and CPD was that the program get off the ground in July, 1992. Not only the Gang Violence Reduction Project but the Domestic Violence Project were listed in the CPD proposal submitted to ICJIA. However, there was no operational connection between the two projects, which were located in different parts of the city and assigned to different police Commanders. The two programs were planned, developed and conducted completely in isolation from each other.



The lack of clarity about structure in the GVRP did not slow its early development, but later presented obstacles to its full development and institutionalization. The Project did not begin in an orderly or carefully-considered fashion. Key Project-related officials from the CPD, the CCAPD, the UC, the ICJIA, and other local and citywide public and nonprofit agencies concerned with the gang problem did not meet early with each other to develop a specific, coordinated plan of action. Operational personnel selected for the Project were assigned, but not trained how to collaborate with each other. The Project jumped quickly from a general idea into action, with limited specification of goals, objectives, problem-assessment, structure, or formulation of a set of tasks to be accomplished. The first orders of business for Professor Spergel, as the default Project Coordinator, were to develop a staff, assess the gang problem, contact gang youth, develop working contacts with police, probation and the community, and in the process, to the extent possible, create a steering committee or advisory group structure – many tall orders in one.

Figure 2.1  
Youth Gang Crime: A Theoretical Framework



## Chapter 3

### Entering the Field

By late June and July 1992, it was clear that the Gang Violence Reduction Project would be undertaken – although funding arrangements for the Project were not officially consummated until March 1993. While the contract with the UC in draft form, developed by Lt. Chomiak, stated that the beginning date of the Project was July, Professor Spergel's preparation began earlier. As Project Coordinator, he would have to engage immediately in various sets of interrelated tasks: hiring and orienting staff; structuring the Project; carrying out preliminary contacts with gang influentials and street gang members; establishing preliminary working relationships with key police and probation administrators as well as with Project street-level personnel; contacting local community organizations and youth agencies; and drafting community and individual gang-member research surveys. Also, as sole source evaluator, he had to begin gathering data systematically, as soon as possible.

Staff Hiring. The Project Coordinator had already been in touch with R. C., who was to become for a time the assistant director responsible for the development of Project youth-work and community-organization components. He had been helpful to the Coordinator in the implementation of an earlier project, CRISP, on Chicago's north side in 1983 and 1984. R. C. was a peripheral member of a gang in his youth and still had connections with leaders in various street gangs, some of whom were still in jail. He had obtained a college degree, headed an American Friends Service Committee project in Humboldt Park in the early 1980s, was a consultant to alternative education programs, and in 1992 was completing a stint as housing

assistant to Alderman Guttierrez, who was soon to be elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from the first mainly Hispanic congressional district in Chicago. The district included the Mexican-American communities on the near south side and the mainly Puerto Rican communities on the near north side. R. C. was interested in the Project concept and seemed well qualified for a job requiring diverse talents.

R. C. thought he could be helpful in various ways, especially in contacting gang influentials on the south side and organizing the community to support the Project. One of the Coordinator's early Project-related contacts with R. C. was at Alderman Guttierrez's office, for whom he still worked. They spoke briefly to Alderman Guttierrez, who already knew about the planned project. He wished them well and offered help that he could manage. At the office, the Coordinator and R. C. also met with the Chief of Patrol and the departing 10<sup>th</sup> District Commander, who was being transferred to the Police Training Academy. They were in the Alderman's office for political purposes, perhaps related to the forthcoming November elections in which Guttierrez was running for the U.S. Congress. Both Hispanic administrative police department officers were friendly and knew about plans for the Project.

The main reason for the Coordinator's visit to the Alderman's office was to arrange for R.C. to join the Project staff, at first as a volunteer and then two weeks later as a full-time staff member when the Project's contract was to begin. R.C. agreed about the importance of getting into the field to contact agencies and community organizations, and especially to begin to assess the nature of the gang problem and make contacts with key gang influentials on the streets. The Coordinator already knew, based on information from Commander Dart, that the Project needed to work with the two major gang constellations, the Latin Kings and the Two Six, who were

responsible for 75% of the heavy violence (gang homicide, aggravated batteries, and aggravated assaults) in Little Village.

It was critically important to obtain staff who could help with street gang contacts. Despite R. C.'s work with the Alderman and his gang contacts on the north side, he had no direct contacts with gang leadership in Little Village. However, there were two young men who had formerly been highly influential in work with gangs as part of the earlier project on the north side who might be interested in helping make initial gang contacts in Little Village. J. R., in his late 20s, had been one of the original organizers of the Spanish Cobras but was now a contractor and no longer involved in street gang activities. He had been one of the key street gang workers on the CRISP project that the Coordinator conducted about eight years earlier. Although there were no Spanish Cobras in Little Village, the Two Six were members of the same coalition of gangs – the Folks – as the Spanish Cobras.

X. A., a young man in his mid 30s who was employed in Chicago's Traffic Department had formerly been a General and Enforcer in the Latin Kings' Humboldt Park section. The Latin Kings were a constituent gang in the larger gang coalition of the People. X. A. was familiar with the CRISP project, but not directly involved. Although he was not directly connected with the south side Latin Kings, he knew some of the leaders from his contacts with them in prison. Both J. R. and X. A., although they had full time jobs, were interested in volunteering to help out for a few months until staff were hired. Both agreed to work 20 hours per week as part time outreach youth workers.

Although from opposing gang coalitions, J. R. and X. A. knew each other and got along well. They also both knew several of the Gang Crime street officers who were to be initially

involved in the Project and believed they would have no problem getting along with them. X. A. took his street work position seriously. He was quickly able to make contacts with key Latin Kings, but J. R. had some difficulty making contacts with the Two Six. The job was a lark for him.

R. C., X. A., and J. R. took the major responsibility for making initial contacts with gang youth, mainly through direct “walk-ups” to clusters of gang youth on the various streets. The Project Coordinator’s own tours of the neighborhood and contacts with gang youth or gang leadership came a little later, usually in the company of R. C.

The Coordinator was able to recruit the first full-time worker for the Two Six in October, and a full-time worker for the Latin Kings in November 1992. Recruitment of the Two Six worker, A. T., was fortuitous. R. C. and the Coordinator were visiting the director of Latino Youth, the major youth agency in the area, to acquaint him with the purpose and nature of the GVRP and solicit his support. In the course of a casual conversation with the job-placement counselor, she mentioned her nephew, just honorably discharged after serving in the Army in the Gulf War, was looking for a job. The Coordinator arranged to meet him.

A. T. was a tall, voluble, forthcoming young man who was looking for a job as a bricklayer, which he was having trouble finding. He also stated that he had held a high position, Lieutenant Governor in the Two Six, before moving out of the area and joining the Army. He said he still knew many of the senior members of the Two Six and was very interested in the Project and in joining the team. He seemed particularly qualified because he had been a sergeant in the military police during the Gulf War and was interested later in getting a job in a security firm.

X. A. helped recruit R. M., a young man in his thirties with gang facial and back tattoos who claimed still to be influential in the Latin Kings. He had served two extensive sentences for gang aggravated battery. He had recently completed two years of community college, had some prior factory work experience and was interested in clerical work. He had grown up in Little Village, knew most of the gang sections, and had been helpful to X. A. in getting various factions to accept the idea of the Project. The Coordinator and R. C. were aware of the risks he would be taking in hiring R. M., since it was clear he was still identified with gang values, although he claimed no longer to be an active gang member. However, he had access to many of the leaders of the Latin Kings, the better organized and more violent of the two gangs in the area. The Kings had a reputation for being especially suspicious of and hostile to outsiders.

About a half dozen other applicants were interviewed for outreach youth worker positions. Two of the Department of Human Services (formerly CIN) workers expressed interest, but they were more interested in recreational activities, did not know gangs in Little Village, and were reluctant to collaborate with police officers. Other applicants either had little relevant experience or refused the jobs once they understood they would be operating (often on their own) on the streets with violent gang youth. Additional workers, part time and full time, were not hired until several months later.

The Coordinator employed two graduate students in the School of Social Service Administration to be part-time research assistants. They were to conduct the baseline gang-member interviews, assist outreach youth workers with the development of field-activity recording procedures, and provide information to them about referrals of youth for agency services. The Coordinator wanted to develop a model of work for the street workers as well as a

pattern of communication between workers assigned to opposing gangs, before moving ahead with other hires and staff meetings with Project police and probation officers who were yet to be assigned to the Project. The first operational requirement for the Coordinator and streetwork staff was to develop a common understanding of the current gang situation in the community, and then determine what could be the best way to proceed in contacting key gang youth.

### Initial Field Contacts with Gang Members

The purpose of the field contacts by the staff at the start of Project was to discover who the gang members were, particularly those who were influential or “called the shots” in regard to key gang activities. It was also important to get to know those youth on the street who could influence others to accept the Project. The staff were entering the life space of these youth to understand their concerns, what they were doing and why, and perhaps to influence their attitudes and behaviors. We needed to find out where the various sections of the gang were located; in particular, the youth who were heavily involved in violent gang activity. They would be in the groups to be focused on.

Our focus was not on modifying gang structures in the near or possibly the long term. We planned to target, control, and redirect the violence-prone youth, in particular the cliques of the various gang systems of the Latin Kings and Two Six in Little Village. We were primarily interested in the “shooters,” not in the drug dealers. While we needed to relate to clique and gang structures, our focus would be on individual youth and their network of relationships beyond the gang as well.

The first task of the Project street-work staff was to interpret what the Project’s purpose



and the worker's roles would be. It was hoped that there would be some exchange of ideas, some building of positive relationships between the Project and the gang members, as well as gaining clarity about the role of the youth workers as part of a Project team. The initial contacts of the youth workers with the gang members could set a positive pattern for later contacts with target youth of the police, community residents, and other agencies. A set of relationships could be forged that could later be generalized and result not only in better control of gang violent activity, but also better commitment by specific gang youth to the role of conventional citizens of the community.

The community youth workers had no trouble contacting members of the two gangs. The gangs were omnipresent, identified in different sections of the community, in varying age groups, sizes, and involvement in various types and degrees of crime. Generally, in the Latin King territory active gang members were older, more aggressive, identified with their gang section and more organized. In the Two Six territory gang members were younger, more property-crime oriented and in smaller, more diffuse groupings.

As the outreach workers began their field contacts, the Latin Kings were more antagonistic and suspicious of the Project than the Two Six, who were more articulate, "charming," but also more elusive and indecisive. The Latin Kings had an "us against the rest of the world" attitude: they were more pessimistic about any changes that could affect them for the better. The Two Six and their leaders expressed a need and willingness to reduce gang violence, but were less reliable in their statements and predictable in their activities. Their leadership was less clearly defined.

The youth workers, as well as R. C. and the Project Coordinator were on the streets

mainly in the late afternoon, night and early morning hours, seven days a week. Based on their collective field notes, in the first five weeks of field contacts with gang sections and their membership (between the third week in August and the last week in September, 1992), staff counted 202 Latin Kings in thirty cliques or groupings on the street, an average of seven youth per group. They counted 110 Two Six in twenty-five groups for an average of a little more than four youth per group or gathering. The Latin Kings were located in at least ten different street locations. The Two Six were located in at least fifteen street locations.

The first weeks of street contact were exploratory. The Coordinator and the street workers explained the purpose, structure, and process of the Project, emphasizing the objectives of helping to reduce gang violence, getting youth back to school, referring them for job training, and placing them on jobs. Youth workers mentioned the direct participation of police and probation on the Project. They were part of a team which wanted to protect local citizens as well as gang members from injury. However, the Coordinator and street workers did not emphasize the suppression role of the police and probation staff in the Project.

The following are extracts from initial activity records of workers with both gangs during the first six months of the Project:

### Two Six

August 26 – met with D., leader of one of the Two Six street sections to explain our program. D. was receptive but kept his distance. He mentioned that his brother had been shot recently.

August 29 – met with the A. brothers. They were “cool and distant,” but promised to talk

to other gang members just out of jail to get their opinions.

September 4 – met with six members of 31<sup>st</sup> and Kildare. They complained they were locked out of Pietrowski Park recreation center because they are gang members.

September 10 – met with fourteen members, 20-26 years of age (this was the oldest grouping of the Two Six that we encountered). They were part of the “Dark Side” section of the Two Six. A key leader, M., was “negative” to the Project. (This group or faction would prove to be the most violent, criminal, and resistive of the Two Six sections to the Project. They were heavily engaged in drug-dealing activities, also extremely violent in protection of their drug activities.)

November 7, 10:30 PM. I was talking to some guys and girls. I find that the girls do a lot of fighting. One of the girls had a black eye. She had been fighting one of the Two Six guys from 38<sup>th</sup> Street.

November 10, 6:00 PM. I started the day at 4:00 PM and met with two guys who run the block. They told me that the Kings from Lawndale are in the neighborhood a lot... As I was on the street with them, two cars with Kings passed by. The guys and I went to one of their houses. They were going to get some money to buy guns. In response, I suggested we play some basketball, then we talked about the invasions by the Kings.

November 10, 10:00 PM. We met five guys at 28<sup>th</sup> and Komensky. They were between 15 and 18 years old. They said they had just fought one King and two Vice Lords. They shot at them and the car crashed. They ran up to the car and had a fist fight. They said one of the Kings ran down 26<sup>th</sup> Street (Two Six territory). He had blood on his face and hands. A few minutes later when I was alone, I beeped R. (one of the Project police) and mentioned the incident to

him.

November 12, 7:00 PM. The 16-year-old told me that his girlfriend is pregnant. I called some people. I gave him phone numbers to call. We went to his girlfriend's house and then to a doctor who showed them where the building was for WIC (Women, Infants and Children) food aid program.

November 13. I drove up to see D. in Pontiac, Illinois who is the overall leader of the Two Six. He is in prison with two life sentences. We talked about the program and what I would do for the guys; also what he could do to help me with them. He said that he likes the program, especially since it uses ex-gang members. He asked what we can do for the girls. I told him we were still trying to figure out if we had the money to hire a worker for the girls.

December 21, 10:00 PM. H., a new gang member, beeped me; so I went to his house to talk to his dad. I told him about the program, and what I was doing to help his son.

At 9:30 PM, J. from Keeler beeped me, and told me about the guy who shot T. (King). I called G. and R. (Project police) and relayed the information. R. in turn told me about a kid who needs a job and wants to talk to a youth worker. I went over to talk to the kid until about 11:00 PM, then I went home.

### Latin Kings

August 27 – met with “Big Mama.” She was about 32 to 35 years of age. She had a long history with the Latin Queens. Her two sons, aged 18 and 20 years, were also Latin Kings. She wanted them to return to school and get their GEDs.

September 3 – met with Little Z, a.k.a. “Froggy.” He was reported to be influential with

three of the sections. He agreed that there was too much violence in the neighborhood and would like to get off the streets, maybe into some job training. He has a court case pending.

September 11 – met with R. M. again. (He would end up as one of our community youth workers). He volunteered to talk to other Latin Kings to get their support for the Project. There were about twenty members in the group, ranging in age from about 16 years to 19 years; they are positive to the idea of the Project working with them, but one of them asked “How do we know you’re ‘for real?’ ”

November 4, 8:00 PM. We had a general conversation with five youth, ages 14-16, at Trumbull and 25<sup>th</sup>. None are in school or working. They deal small amounts of grass to make some money.

November 5, 6:35 PM. I met with two Kings at 26<sup>th</sup> and Kedzie. We discussed racial tensions at Farragut High School. They discussed the probability of the Kings calling an amnesty with the Black Gangster Disciples who were also at Farragut, but they could not make a decision until they talked with the King higher ups.

November 6, 6:30 PM. I observed eight Kings, 15 to 19 years old, throwing bottles and bricks at a vehicle known to be owned by a Two Sixer from Keeler. When we approached, they were upset because we were present. We talked two of the potential shooters out of “going down” to Keeler and retaliating.

November 21, 9:00 PM. We talked with more Latin Kings, 15-17 years of age. No police were nearby. They were bored. All were hanging out consuming alcohol, leaning over the hoods of cars, waiting for Two Sixers to come cruising along.

November 25, 10:00 PM. Fifteen Latin Kings, ages 15-23, were hanging out at the gas

station intimidating local citizens. We asked them to leave before the police arrived.

December 12, 1:00 - 3:00 AM. I heard shots at 25<sup>th</sup> and Trumbull. I went over and found fourteen youths (17 to 27 years) around a gray-colored vehicle with one headlight on in the middle of the street. The driver and the passenger seemed drunk. The Latin Kings approached the car and recognized the passenger as Two Six and shouted "Flakes." The Two Sixers opened up seven times with a .380 handgun. They drove off. No one seemed to be hurt.

December 22, 7:20 PM. I observed twelve youths (18 to 21) fighting amongst themselves. One youth accused another of being a "wicky head." I broke up the fight and suggested that they cruise because the police were coming. They left.

December 24, 1:30 PM. I drove to 21<sup>st</sup> and California. Paid my respects to the mother of the youth who was killed the previous Saturday night. Later called I. and R.C. to ask for outside assistance so that Kings at the youth's wake the following night would not be harassed by Two Sixers.

December 26, 5:47 PM. S. and L. R. (gang members) approached me asking for help to get back in school and jobs.

In the course of repeated contacts with gang youth in the next several weeks, a preliminary acceptance of the purpose of the Project and community youth workers was established, particularly in respect to the school and job opportunities. Contacts between youth workers and gang youth were more relaxed. Gang youth provided information about gang situations more freely. They began to approach the community youth workers with various requests for help, especially jobs. Communication by youth workers with other members of the

Project team, particularly police, began to occur.

In the period through the end of October, nine youth requested help with returning to school (mainly Farragut) and the same number of gang youth asked for help with jobs. About half of the requests came from hardcore “gang bangers.” One of the Latino workers helped two of the youth get back to school.

In the first months of operation, there was a high level of interracial hostility between the African-American and Latino youth who were attending Farragut High School (the Latino youth were almost all members of the Latin Kings). One observable reason for this was that the African-American youth were “harassing their girls.” The African-American youth were largely represented by Black Gangster Disciples who lived mainly just north of Little Village. The different gangs did not want to fight each other. The Latin King youth worker advised the Latin Kings and the Gangster Disciples to cool it before they were expelled. Parent meetings were also conducted. A new Principal was installed. Peace was restored. There was little interracial hostility involving gang youth in the course of the remaining years of the Project.

In another field situation, a Two Six worker was able to mediate a dispute between nine Two Six youth and an Ambrose youth who lived in Pilsen, the next community over. He was visiting his girlfriend, and a minor confrontation between the two gangs was possible, although the two gangs were brother clubs. A second Two Six worker, recently hired, was able to assist a gang youth find lodging at an emergency shelter. He helped the girlfriend of a target gang youth find day care for one of her children. The neighbors and even the gang youth in the Two Six territory were complaining about the unsightliness of the street. The worker planned a graffiti-expunging project with one of the Two Six sections.

### Developing the Roles and Responsibilities of the Youth Workers

An early and continuing concern of the youth workers was their inability to respond to gang members requests for jobs, or referrals to agencies for jobs. The workers were not yet knowledgeable about resources or agencies that could be helpful in identifying jobs. R. C., the Assistant Project Director, promised that he could provide jobs for several of the youth, but this did not materialize and was a source of embarrassment to him, as well as to the other workers. More and better efforts in job preparation and placement would be needed. The leaders of a Latin King group said that they were putting the youth workers and the Project on “probation,” waiting to see evidence of real job assistance.

It was important to orient staff to the distinctive character of the Project, the roles that outreach community youth workers would have to play and the obstacles they would encounter. An objective for the workers was to make contact with the gang youth based on the goals and objectives of the Project, which had to be articulated, specified, and respecified again and again over the first months.

The target youth were to be gang members who were shooters, hardcore, or influentials. We were not primarily concerned with peripheral youth, non-gang youth, non-violent gang youth, or even family members, except as they were integrally involved in the life space of our target youth and contributed directly or indirectly to their violent behavior. At the start of the Project we were not primarily interested in certain types of non-violent delinquent behavior by gang youth, for example, truancy and graffiti. As time went on, we took a more holistic view of the nature and causes of gang violence. Gang youth, 13 or 14 years of age, hanging out on the streets in groups during school hours, could contribute to drug use, graffiti, or laying in wait for



enemy gang youth to invade their turf. Graffiti was directly related to the encouragement of gang violence. Graffiti was often a means of advertizing the gang members' own sections as well as challenging opposing gang members. Members of both gangs repeatedly penetrated each other's territory to put up their own gang icons and mark out existing gang graffiti.

The question of who target program youth were had to be resolved early. Target youth did not register for the program, nor were they referred through existing agencies. The youth workers determined which youth were to be in the program and receive services or special controls. The youth workers were directed to target only those youth who clearly gave evidence of repeated acts of violence or incitement of others to gang violence. Since the youth workers tended to meet gang members in groups on the street, this was no easy matter. Many of the youth did not have reputations as shooters. Some were primarily interested in drug selling, partying, or simply hanging around. Youth workers did not readily make these discriminations at first, arguing that all gang youth had the potential for violence by virtue of the tradition of violence of the gangs and the general readiness of gang members to respond to incursions of opposing gang members in their turf. However, youth workers were fairly quickly able to identify those youth who were particularly aggressive, ready to go on drivebys or just cruise opposing gang member turf.

Youth workers were initially instructed to engage in a minimum of group activities, particularly athletic events, so as not to further cohere and possibly reinforce particular clique violence norms. The target youth, once agreed upon, were to receive special individualized attention – counseling, job or school placement, and also surveillance by other members of the Project team, police and probation, particularly if the youth was on probation. Focus was to be

on individual contact with gang youth, encouraging participation in non-gang contexts and mainstream activities. We modified this approach somewhat over time, in recognition of the high degree of gang organization, general gang cohesion, and the strength of the gang culture in Little Village. At the same time, we emphasized certain clique or large-group activities, particularly group discussions or athletic activities, often across opposing gangs and with Project team members present (police, probation, and youth workers together).

A key responsibility of the youth workers was to the Project team. Communication and contact with police and probation were basic elements of their job. Information about gang events that were likely to result in violence, and identification of target youth for special attention in regard to social-development as well as control issues, was to be shared. Youth workers were to be responsive to police requests for information about these youth, where they hung out, and the nature of activities of their gang sections, before as well as after violent acts occurred. Youth-worker sharing of information did not necessarily extend to providing information to Project police and probation about all forms of crime (usually less serious) in which target youth participated. However, information about violence had to be transmitted to all Project members, including other youth workers, Project police and probation officers, openly at team staff meetings as well as individually (formally and informally) before or after staff meetings and/or by telephone at almost any time of the day or night. Information about other kinds of crime, such as burglary, robberies, or drug selling in which gang youth were involved might also be transmitted to Project members. Much depended on the degree of comfort and trust that community youth workers developed with other members of the team, especially law enforcement. The youth workers, however, were required to be clear that their role was not that

of an undercover policeman. As a member of the team their primary activity was social intervention, but it was also assisting other members of the team to do their respective jobs related to Project purposes.

The youth worker role had to be understood as that of a social agent. He was not to be regarded primarily as an aid to Project police in arresting (or to probation officers in violating) a gang youth except as it contributed to violence-prevention or control – of benefit to both the youth and the community. The Project police and probation officers were also expected to aid youth workers in the fulfilment of their role. The police and probation officers would have to be respectful of the important role of the youth worker. Project police were expected to provide a certain degree of social advice, and referral of program target youth to Project youth workers for social assistance with school problems and job placement. Some of these team tasks could be handled directly between team members, as well as indirectly through the community youth work supervisor, Project police sergeant or probation supervisor.

The community youth workers were to a large extent on their own in the field. Weekly planning schedules were required for youth-worker accountability and administration purposes, and they were maintained throughout the Project. Accountability of what they were doing was also achieved through other procedures such as response to beeper calls by the youth worker Supervisor on a daily basis, direct field contacts with the Supervisor (usually at least once per day), attendance at weekly community worker meetings, weekly and bi-weekly Project team meetings, as well as completion of weekly time cards.

Originally, youth workers were expected to prepare weekly work plans, keep daily logs of their activities, and complete crisis reports as well as monthly summaries of progress with

individual youth. The completion of record forms, however, proved to be a problem. The youth workers tended to have only completed high school or had GEDs. They were not diligent in their record keeping. Weekly debriefings of youth workers by a Project administrative assistant proved to be useful. Youth workers, as well as Project police, probation officers, and the neighborhood organizer were interviewed by field researchers on an annual basis to summarize their specific efforts with each target youth, and with what specific results. Annual interviews of target youth also provided evidence of worker accountability as well as further information about the youth's response to program services and his social progress.

The role of the youth worker in the community had to be protected. They were provided with letters of identity in which their functions were described, particularly since they were required to be in the company of gang youth on the street and were prone to be questioned or harassed by police. At the end of the first year, photo I.D.s were also provided. Efforts to introduce and legitimize the role of youth workers to district police officers at police roll calls were only partially successful, since some of the youth workers were known as suspects and arrestees before the Project began. However, many of the problems of youth-worker harassment by police generally in the district were overcome in the course of the Project with the aid of Project police, administrators, and special meetings between youth workers and the tactical gang police units in the district.

Also, because of the many indiscriminate shootings occurring between members of the two gangs throughout Little Village, protective vests were provided to youth workers. The vests were not worn regularly, particularly in the latter years of the Project, as violence seemed to abate. While several workers claimed near misses, no worker was ever shot. The youth workers

used their own cars in their work, but there were a half-dozen instances of damage to worker cars in the crossfire of bottle or brick throwing by opposing gang members. In two instances car windows were shattered by bullets gone astray, but the workers were not injured.

All youth workers were supplied with beepers. The field supervisor and assistant supervisor of youth workers were supplied with cell phones. Beepers were occasionally lost or damaged, and use of cell phones had to be carefully monitored so that only business or emergency calls were made. Youth workers were required to be on the street at night, on weekends and during times of gang crises. They had no official office space, except for meetings at the local probation office in Little Village, or at the University of Chicago, which was located about six miles southeast of Little Village. Youth workers were expected to be on the streets or use local community facilities, such as churches, park department recreation centers, or youth agencies, for meeting with youth for group recreational purposes.

### Law Enforcement and Probation as Part of the Project

Police. Contacts and collaboration with law enforcement developed at different bureaucratic levels and with varying effect over time. The CPD were fiscally and administratively responsible for the Project. Primary contact with District 10 police in Little Village was facilitated by Lt. Chomiak, who introduced the Project Coordinator and R. C. to the 10<sup>th</sup> District Commander. The Neighborhood Relations sergeant was assigned to be the half-time coordinator of the Project, but was given primary responsibility for the development for community policing in the District. A quarter-time police clerical assistant in addition to the two new, young gang

tactical officers were assigned full time to the Project. Earlier, two veteran tactical officers in the District had been offered the assignment, but refused to be “kiddy cops.”

The headquarter and area officers of the Gang Crime Unit were still interested in the Project and were helpful in providing orienting information about gangs and gang problems in the area. Two veteran gang crime officers from the central Gang Crime Unit, as it was in process of reorganization, were also initially assigned to the Project and then withdrawn by the end of the year. Their relationship was directly with the Project Coordinator and R. C., not with the local District Commander or the two local District tactical officers assigned to the Project. There was obviously a lack of coordination within the police department in relation to GVRP. This was due to the major reorganization of the police department, particularly the downsizing of the Gang Crime Unit and the transfer of the not-terribly visible Project to the Patrol division in the first months of the Project.

Meanwhile, the Project tactical officers, the part-time sergeant, and the clerical officer, had begun to meet with youth workers, the Coordinator and R. C., usually at the School of Social Service Administration and at District 10. Sergeant P. was not clear about his role. At first he was not sure that he would directly supervise the two Project tactical officers. They were still attending District 10 tactical unit meetings and relating closely to the tactical lieutenant. In due course an arrangement was made whereby the two tactical officers would report regularly to the sergeant. The Neighborhood Relations sergeant would receive weekly and monthly reports from the tactical officers of Project operations, particularly involving the youth-work component. To what extent the sergeant would be responsible for the Project team as such was never made clear. The sergeant was reluctant to be responsible for youth-worker activities. Probation officers were

not yet on board, and the sergeant deferred to the Project Coordinator to conduct the early meetings. Also, decisions about the scope of Project activity in the District – which beats in the 10<sup>th</sup> District would be targeted by the Project, the nature of specific contacts between Project police and especially the scope of information to be exchanged with Project youth workers – were not specified. The Research and Development office, downtown, had not prepared the 10<sup>th</sup> District officers for what they were to do.

Nevertheless, relations between the two Project police officers and the youth workers were remarkably positive from the start. Part of this could be because the officers were plainclothes officers, young, with limited experience in the Department, and new to the District. They were interested in the Project and quickly subscribed to the purpose of the Project. They were also pleased to be detached from the tactical unit, free to move around the area and not have to make a certain quota of arrests each day. They were together in their vehicle (not a squad car), on their own with no superior officer clearly supervising them. They almost immediately requested help from the youth workers in identifying gangs, gang locations, and particular gang members. Because they were new, and for status reasons they were not comfortable in acquiring such information directly from the District or central Gang Crime Unit officers still present, who knew gangs in the area.

The Project police officers established direct lines of communication with the youth workers. Together, they met with the members from one section of the Two Six, then with an equal number of members from a section of the Latin Kings. Unexpectedly, positive relations with gang members were quickly established. R. C., the Supervisor of the youth workers, noted that “the gang members developed good respect” for the two officers because they are “not

disrespecting” the gang members. The officers, however, soon began to “feel that the gang members are getting too friendly and making us look bad to the other officers.”

The problem of Project police over-identification with youth workers or with gang members was never serious. Gang and law-enforcement cultures were highly antagonistic to each other in Little Village. At the time the Project began operations, the District police were upset because a Latin King had “put a gun to the head of an ‘off duty’ police officer.” This older Latin King was a drug dealer. The District police were opposed to any “soft” approach to gang youth. Nevertheless, positive and useful relations between the Project tactical officers and the youth workers continued to develop. Youth workers informed Project officers to expect retaliation by one unit of the Two Six against Latin Kings at a particular location. In turn, the Project police informed the youth workers about a pattern of stick-ups by Latin Kings that was occurring against innocent citizens on Sunday mornings: “the King offenders blocked off the street, pulling people right out of their cars.” The Project officers asked the youth workers to notify them if any of these types of incidents occurred in which Kings might be involved.

Early in the Project, the assigned police officers suggested that Latin King workers “concentrate on one section of the hardcore Kings at 27<sup>th</sup> and Trumbull.” The youth in this section were 15 to 18 years old. “They’re crazy and no one has been able to do much with them.” Also, in a discussion with youth workers about lack of job resources for gang members, they mentioned a particular administrator at a local trades high school they knew might be helpful with getting youth into training programs at the school.

Despite such progress, the Project team concept, including relations between police and youth workers, did not develop smoothly. After the first flush of collaboration, Project police



complained they were not getting as much information as they wanted from the youth workers about what was happening on the street. The youth workers were still ambivalent about working with the police and preferred not to have too many meetings with them. They said that meeting with Project police at the biweekly staff meetings was sufficient to exchange field information. There were also tensions between the 10<sup>th</sup> District police and the old Gang Crime Unit officers originally assigned to the Project and still in the area.

The two original Gang Crime Unit officers attached to the Project, but not yet assigned to the Organized Crime Unit, continued to show up at the biweekly staff meetings to obtain clarifying information about youth-gang activities that youth workers apparently knew something about. The Project police also sought information about particular gang members in the District that the Organized Crime officers “keep in their little personal notebooks.” The request was coldly refused. The Neighborhood Relations sergeant became upset and had to “pull rank” on the Organized Crime officers, ordering them to turn over such information, which they still refused to do. Subsequently, the Organized Crime Unit officers stopped coming to meetings, apparently under pressure from the Patrol Division and orders of the Deputy Superintendent. Cooperation of administrative officers in the Organized Crime Unit with the Project also ceased.

Probation. It was also not clear at the start what the role of adult probation would be in the Project, and which specific probation officers would be assigned to be part of the team and what they would be doing. Initial contacts by the Project Coordinator were mainly with the deputy and assistant Adult Probation department chiefs. The Cook County Department of Adult

Probation would be contributing three or four full time staff. CCAPD would be using the probation officers also to establish a local or decentralized gang probation unit. Probation had also volunteered use of one of their office meeting rooms at the main office of the CCAPD until the local office was set up.

Administrators of the CCAPD were most interested in developing a formal working relationship with the Chicago Police Department around the gang problem. Such a relationship had apparently not been established. The tactical officer assigned to the Project indicated that they had no experience working with probation. The Project Neighborhood Relations sergeant claimed that he hadn't had contact with the CCAPD in his 18 years on the police force. The probation administrators were intent on demonstrating a special approach to gang youth who were presently in their regular case load, with no special program for them. However, it was not until December 1992 that face-to-face contacts between the Project probation supervisor and Project police officers began to occur.

At a December 17, 1992 Project team meeting, the deputy chief of CCDAP was in attendance and stated that a unit of three probation officers and a supervisor would shortly be assigned to the Project. The probation officers would be undergoing weapons training first. A key responsibility of probation would be to get the criminal court judges to place "special conditions" on probation youth identified by Project personnel as gang members. This did not occur, however, since most targeted youth – although with extensive arrest, priors and confinement histories – were not necessarily currently on probation. The probation officers would struggle in the future to develop a large enough caseload of program youth who were currently on probation. The deputy chief of CCDAP who was especially interested and

supportive of the Project suddenly resigned to take a position in another county. The role of probation officers and to other team members had yet to be developed.

The first probation supervisor appointed to the Project emphasized the law-enforcement aspect of probation. He said that the Probation officers in the unit would be on the street at least two nights per week and focus on “passive interdiction,” i.e., checking names and supervising probation youth. The probation officers would call on the Project police, when necessary, to make arrests. Project gang probationers would be placed on home confinement, intensive probation, and under special court conditions (as requested by the probation officers and so approved by the court). Information would be exchanged on a need basis with police, but probation officers would not provide any information to the youth workers about program youth on probation.

At the Project team meeting later in December 1992, the Project Coordinator again suggested sharing the names of gang youth that each of the components of the Project team were targeting. Each of the workers seemed to be targeting his own caseload, not necessarily known to other members of the team. Everyone readily agreed to come to the meeting in two weeks with a list. Such lists were provided by youth workers, and to some extent by the Project police but not by the probation officers. A major problem was apparent in probation officers’ sharing of information with Project youth workers, some of whom had arrest and prison records. The problem was less serious with the police. The commitment of the CCDAP to have its probation officers share information with the youth workers would take special top-level administrative involvement and the development of trust among team members.

The Project Coordinator noted in his December monthly report to the Chicago Police

Department: “it appears critically important to create appropriate channels of communication and to systematically exchange information across various staff levels of the participating administrative agencies – supervisory and street staff levels. This should be facilitated by the leadership of the Chicago Police Department, in respect to this particular Project.” The issue of more general interagency coordination in respect to the Project was not raised. Such coordination never developed during the course of the Project.

### Community Contacts and Community Organization

A critical component of the Project was community mobilization, i.e., the involvement, support, and guidance of key organizations, resident groups, and residents in the development of the Project. Community mobilization was a complex idea and suggested a set of strategies and tactics by Project personnel that would serve to build community capacity in regard to addressing the gang problem. Basic assumptions were: that the gang problem existed and/or grew worse when organizations and local citizens did not accept the existence of a problem, when organizations used the problem primarily to meet their own organizational interests, and/or when they refused to collaborate with each other in developing a common or comprehensive approach to the problem; and that these patterns had to be changed if the Project was to be successful.

From a community-mobilization perspective, a Project objective was to contact all key organizations, citizen groups, and local residents concerned with and/or affected by the gang problem, describe the Little Village Project, and enlist their support, advice and (hopefully) direction. More specifically, we wanted to build an advisory group, a kind of board, that would

contribute to the development of the Project and sustain the Project or the approach over the long term. Project staff were also interested in discovering the resources and services that were available in Little Village, and that could be used on behalf of gang youth. There was interest in building a network of organizations which would not only support the Project, but could develop and directly provide services to hardcore gang youth.

The first order of business was to contact a variety of local organizations, obtain their views and experiences about the scope of the problem and explore possible areas of collaboration. There were two Boys and Girls Clubs within the program area, and one immediately outside of it. Each of the clubs served gang youth, mainly young teens or pre-adolescents. None of the programs had an outreach component or was specifically interested in gang youth. Most gang problems presumably occurred outside the clubs. One of the clubs was willing to provide service to the target gang youth we referred, but would require extra resources to hire and pay for staff. Each of the clubs supported the Project concept, but because of limited resources (i.e., not enough or insufficiently-qualified staff) could not be of much assistance. The idea of an advisory, coordinating committee or council, however, appealed to the directors of the Boys and Girls Clubs.

Project staff contacts with the Park Department recreation center located in the Two Six area of the community proved fruitful. The recreation center had excellent facilities, and the director was interested in service to the broader community, including gang youth, so long as the youth behaved themselves in the building and on its grounds. Many of the Two Six had already been “kicked out” of the center. The possibility of the Park Department making a gym in the Center available to the Project on certain nights was explored. This would require some

payment to Center staff for maintenance and general supervision, as well as a warrantee that the Project would use its staff, including the Project police, to maintain order. The Two Six also pressured the Project staff to assist them in making use of the gym for basketball games. The arrangement by the Project to use the Park Department was made. All conditions were agreed to.

Contacts with churches, including local priests and ministers, were productive. Some of the parish priests were friendly, but not particularly interested in the Project, including one priest who would shortly become the bishop of Catholic churches for the Latino community. Two other priests of large Catholic churches, one in Latin King and the other in Two Six territory, were very interested and promised cooperation with the Project. The Project Coordinator had already developed a relationship with one of the priests in the course of completing a gang project on the north side of the city several years earlier when that priest, now in Little Village, was serving there. Both priests were deeply concerned with gang violence, the disruption of families, and especially having to bury so many young people. The two priests quickly volunteered gym and meeting facilities for the Project. They proved to be a mainstay of the Project's effort to develop a neighborhood advisory group. One evangelical protestant minister was also very interested in the program and quickly offered to make space available for a planned GED class for the Latin Kings. He would later be one of two key organizers in the formation of the local advisory group, Neighbors Against Gang Violence (NAGV). He and another evangelical minister located outside of the city would be helpful in locating additional gym facilities in the years ahead.

Contacts were also made with administrators of the only high school in the area. The

principal quickly solicited the assistance of Project youth workers to orient teachers about the gang problem and inform them as to ideas that would be effective in dealing with gang youth. The youth workers were almost immediately called on to assist school security personnel to control violence occurring between the gangs, both inside and immediately outside the high school building. One problem was that the school was not able to assure the safety of the few Two Six youth attending the school, which was located in the heart of Latin King turf. Most Two Six had to attend high school outside of Little Village.

Contacts were made with a variety of other organizations, local hospitals, a major non-profit youth and family agency, the local office of the Department of Human Services, the local Chamber of Commerce, the area mental health center and other local and citywide organizations located in the community. Several job training and placement agencies expressed a willingness to accept referrals of program youth. One job-placement agency, Suburban Job-Link Corp., with an office in the area, was interested in recruiting persons for low-level factory jobs in the suburbs. Suburban Job-Link would later become a regular member of NAGV when it formed.

One of three aldermen whose districts cut through Little Village expressed strong interest in the Project. He was a young man in his thirties, concerned with many aspects of social reform and improvement of living conditions in Little Village. He had been a fringe member of the Latin Kings in his youth. His aldermanic district was located in the Two Six area of the community. He knew many of the families and was deeply troubled about the gang problem. He offered to use of his network of block clubs to stimulate residents to become active about the problem. He would also become a member of NAGV in the years ahead.

We spoke with both the citywide leader and the local organizer of the United

Neighborhood Organization (UNO), the strongest citywide Latino organization in the city, with a local organizer responsible for both Little Village and Pilsen through a local office of the organization called The Alliance for Community Excellence (ACE). R. C. was a friend of UNO's citywide director, but a meeting with him at his downtown office did not prove productive. He was mainly interested in issues of housing, schools and jobs. His solution for the general crime problem was simply stronger law enforcement, particularly through use of a series of mobile police substations in Little Village. The Mayor would ultimately appoint the UNO director alderman for the eastern part of Little Village. The three aldermen in Little Village had little common interest in a variety of problems, including the pervasive gang problem. Two were strictly beholden to the Chicago Democratic Party's machine.

The local Little Village/Pilsen UNO organizer (the Director of ACE.) was interested in the Project and attended a community organizational meeting with some of the local priests. However, he made no offers of specific cooperation or support for the Project. He was primarily interested in knowing what was going on. He had strong political interests and would run in the Democratic primary for Alderman in the next two years, competing with the present young social-reform alderman, who was associated with the Project.

R. C. was able to arrange for Project staff to attend the monthly meeting of ACE downtown. This local UNO organization included eighteen Little Village and Pilsen organizations, churches, business organizations, social agencies, and representatives of schools, banks, and the police District 10 Neighborhood Relations Unit. Again, primary and exclusive interest of the group was in housing, schools and business improvement, not in addressing the gang problem. The focus of the meetings in the months ahead was in school construction and



improving the image of the community.

Finally, the Project met M. L. G., a community activist who was present at one of the early ACE meetings. M. L. G. was closely associated with several of the local Catholic churches, was interested in school construction, and also in the gang problem. She had been a member of a gang in her youth and knew many of the families, especially in the Two Six area. She was a paid youth consultant for one of the national youth agencies particularly concerned with alternative education and job training. Both she and R. C. were active in citywide alternative-school issues. She would become the central figure in the development of NAGV, and also a part-time Project neighborhood organizer. At the invitation of the Project Coordinator, she and Reverend C. of the evangelical Christian church attended one of the early team meetings at the central probation headquarters and offered their support to the Project. At the time, Project probation, police, and youth workers were preoccupied with developing relationships with each other and did not entirely welcome the presence of the two at that meeting.

### The Evaluation Component

Many aspects of the Project were developing simultaneously: the outreach youth work component, team building, community resource-access for Program youth and community organization, as well as structuring the appropriate police and probation agency administrative context for Project operations and development. Process and outcome evaluation procedures were also being built into the Project's program. Lt. Chomiak was interested in the effects of the program on community perceptions of the gang problem, and requested a baseline community

survey. The request was possibly related to general CPD planning for a pilot of a citywide community-policing program. The University of Chicago research staff developed a community survey of the gang problem as perceived by residents and organizations, focused on Little Village and Pilsen (the adjoining community). Pilsen was in the 12<sup>th</sup> District, and was an excellent comparison area, having a similar population and serious gang problem, but with almost no overlap of gangs with those in Little Village.

The University of Chicago research staff planned to carry out a baseline community survey of residents and local organizations, and repeat the survey two years later to measure changes in perception about the gang problem and also views of the possible impact of the Project. The research group was also preparing to interview gang youth in the program, as well as assess aggregate-level gang and non-gang crime in the program and in the comparison areas. The Gang Crime Unit officers at central police headquarters – who were still functioning and knew the gang problem in the 10<sup>th</sup> District (Little Village) and the 12<sup>th</sup> District (Pilsen) – provided maps of gang locations and gang incident reports. The location of gang incidents was further substantiated by data from the Early Warning System of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. Dr. Carolyn Block and her staff were particularly helpful in this regard and continued to provide various types of gang data during the course of the Project.

The research assistants visited agencies, businesses, and particular streets to obtain further information on gang hangouts, graffiti concentrations, and specific gang problems. The Project youth workers assisted with this process in Little Village, but not in Pilsen. A local Pilsen neighborhood organization offered lists of various organizations and key persons to contact for the community survey. The police Neighborhood Relations sergeants in the 10<sup>th</sup> and

12<sup>th</sup> Districts, along with various youth agencies in both communities, also assisted in pinpointing particular streets where citizens should be interviewed. The survey instrument and sampling design were constructed in the first months of the program, but it would take six months into 1993 to collect the Time-I survey data. All Project administrative and street-level staff, as well as key community members (who would later comprise NAGV) and the Pilsen organization director reviewed and approved the survey questions.

A second procedure, essential for measuring program impact in both the short and long term, was the collection of aggregate-level gang and non-gang crime data in Little Village and in comparable Latino gang-violence areas in the city over time. Data on a series of 21 violent, property and drug incidents/offenses were already being collected by the Chicago Police Department's crime analysis section. With assistance from Lt. Chomiak, six comparable police Districts and approximately fifty beats in these Districts were selected. Historical data back to 1987 were supplied, as well as current gang and non-gang data on a monthly basis. These data and reports were circulated to Project staff and were extraordinarily useful initially in assessing various components of the gang problem in Little Village, and then in analyzing how patterns changed in Little Village compared to other areas over time. The integration of research and program activities was a constant from the very start of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Program.

Planning for the third research component, the Individual Gang Member Survey, began in late Fall and early Winter of 1992-1993. The Individual Gang Member Survey was to be administered to all youth who were targeted, and who were to be identified as entering the program at three different periods during the course of the five-year Project. The findings of the

Gang Member Survey served both program as well as research purposes. The gang-member interviews were a way of emphasizing the purpose of the program to targeted youth. It was a means to elicit information about problem areas for purposes of program development, as well to measure progress and why changes occurred in deviant behavior. The interviews were conducted by research assistants, many hired from the local community as well as from local colleges. Only aggregate-level data and general impressions derived from the interviews were shared with program staff. Each youth was paid \$20 for each one-hour interview, for which informed consents were obtained from the youth, and from the parent(s) of youth who were juveniles. The process of obtaining interviews depended heavily on the positive relationship established by the youth workers with the targeted youth.

Only Little Village program youth were interviewed, since funds were not available to select a comparison group from Pilsen or Little Village. A non-program comparison group, however, was later created based on information about gang youth who were arrested with the program youth but not served by the Project. We describe research methods and findings in later chapters.

## Chapter 4

### Organizational Change and Team Development

The first order of delivery of program service was to create a collaborative pattern of interaction among the staff of the agencies which agreed to be partners in the Project. In this chapter, we examine issues of teamwork and coordination, primarily at the Project-worker level, especially the development of effective patterns of information exchange, service and territorial boundaries, team collaboration, and institutional-relationship problems. Our focus is on the interface of worker activities, rather than on the interrelationship of policy and administrative matters. The policy context for the development of the Project was nebulous at the beginning and was never satisfactorily clarified. Administrative support structure did evolve sufficiently to support Project staff at the pilot demonstration level.

### Coordination

The immediate purpose of the Project was to join, shape, and interrelate a variety of agency strategies at the operational level. These strategies traditionally had operated separately and sometimes in opposition to each other in low-income, marginal areas of major cities (including Chicago's Little Village). The Project sought primarily to address the gang problem at the individual-youth level in the gang context – through coordinated functions of street-level staff from relevant organizations, particularly police, youth agencies, probation, and also to a lesser extent from churches and neighborhood groups – in order to deal consistently with hardcore gang youth. The key objective was to build close relationships among staff on the team. They would have to become less specialized in their traditional agency-worker roles and

ideologies as they interacted and worked interdependently with other team members. Workers would have to better understand, accept, and complement the roles of other staff members in a common purpose – gang violence reduction. The traditional attitudes and procedures of the different types of staff would have to be meshed for the purpose of achieving collectively defined objectives of the team.

### Building the Team Structure

After meeting with those workers who were to be on the Project team and accompanying them separately on their initial tours of duty in the area, the Project Coordinator felt it was important that police, probation, and community youth workers meet together on a regular basis. The model of work was not to be each set of workers doing his or her own traditional agency-determined work or “thing” entirely in isolation from (or even in parallel with) that of other members of the team. Coordination was not to occur simply through interagency line-staff relationships from worker to supervisor, then across agency supervisors and then down to the respective workers. Direct and reciprocal relationships among team members had to develop to meet particular gang-problem situations in the field, still within the general parameters of their respective agency roles.

The location of an office and a common meeting place was expected to be an important way to facilitate team interactions and a common Project identity. The two police tactical officers were interested in more room to keep notes and records, with access to a computer which they did not currently have. Probation officers also wanted and expected to have a decentralized probation office somewhere in Little Village, preferably in neutral gang territory

that would be accessible to probationers and program youth from both gangs. There was little interest in meeting at the 10<sup>th</sup> District police building, which was first offered. It was an old and forbidding structure with insufficient space even for existing police operations. The community youth workers were especially resistive to meeting at the 10<sup>th</sup> District station. Most of the youth workers were well known to the police, since they had been arrested or detained there at earlier times. The Project Coordinator was also reluctant to establish a separate place for youth workers to meet to carry out traditional counseling or recreational activity. He wanted to avoid temptations of gang youth to “hang out” or take over such a facility.

The early meetings of Project staff took place beginning in November 1992 at probation headquarters just outside of Little Village, where a meeting room was made available. These first meetings were frequently attended by administrators of various agencies as well as Project operational staff. Initial agenda items were discussions of the nature of the Project and how different staff would relate to each other. Attendees included the District 10 police sergeant; the police clerk; the two assigned tactical officers, as well as the two originally-assigned Gang Crime Unit officers; a District 10 lieutenant; the three Project probation officers; their supervisor, and two or three probation administrators; three community youth workers; R. C. and the Project Coordinator. On occasion an assistant State’s Attorney and two community representatives – M.L.G. (the community activist) and Reverend C. (the Evangelical minister) – attended early meetings as well.

In due course, CCADP would locate its decentralized office and meeting place deep in Latin King territory, along a major avenue. Only Latin Kings came to their office, mainly for required contacts with probation officers. Two Six who were on probation usually contacted

their probation officers at probation headquarters in the main criminal court building just outside of Little Village. Two Six community youth workers were hesitant at first to meet at the decentralized probation office, although no serious confrontations ever occurred with Latin King youth. Eventually, both Two Six and Latin King youth workers began to regularly attend meetings at the local probation office.

Information Exchange. The key element in the development of the team structure was the exchange of information about the gang problem in Little Village. This was of special interest to the youth workers and Gang Crime Unit officers in the first team meetings at the main adult probation office. In the early meetings, they only had some knowledge of gangs and key gang influentials or hardcore members in the area. They wanted to be brought up to date on what the current gang situation was, and the Gang Crime Unit officers were particularly interested in tracking specific gang members. The two new tactical officers assigned to the Project were eager to learn as much as possible about gangs in Little Village, but as yet had little contact with gang youth. They had no specialized prior experience with gang crime. The probation officers were also new to the area (with the exception of one officer who had grown up in Little Village) and had only general familiarity with gangs, mainly in the suburbs. The youth workers were centrally important at these first meetings in terms of their current knowledge of gang activities and specific targeted gang youth. While they knew of activities of various gangs and gang members, they were suspicious and distrustful of police, and to a lesser extent of probation. In these first meetings they were reluctant to engage in meaningful discussion. They sat the rear of the main probation office conference room, listening and observing. When asked specific



questions by the Gang Crime Unit officers, they tended to give generalized or evasive answers. They preferred not to refer to specific gang youth. Participants at these meetings seemed to be talking past each other.

At the first meetings, the Project Coordinator explained what the key Project objectives were. A first task was to determine an appropriate format and set of procedures for sharing information conducive to achieving the goal of gang violence reduction. This had to be achieved, he explained, through:

- Team members targeting those same gang youth, 17 to 24 years of age, responsible for major gang violence in Little Village;
- Developing a proactive, common, yet differentiated approach to the prevention and control of gang violence through appropriate interrelated measures of suppression, social support, and provision of social opportunities to the targeted youth;
- Coordination of Project staff-member efforts through communication with each other at staff meetings and otherwise;
- Participation in community mobilization, including the development of a community advisory structure.

To achieve these objectives, we would have to: 1) develop procedures for identifying those gang youth currently engaged in serious gang violence, as well as those who were influential in stimulating or creating such violence; 2) verify that such information was correct through at least one other source to be sure that such youth were properly eligible to receive control and social services; 3) take special care, at first, not to identify or select wannabe,

peripheral, or associate gang members, especially those who engaged primarily in non-violent crimes, whether gang or non-gang motivated (mainly property crimes – we were not sure initially to what extent target violent gang youth were also engaged in major drug operations); and 4) periodically review the status of target youth in order to appropriately modify, expand or reduce services and/or controls for those youth.

The desire of the staff after the first meetings was to begin discussion of the specific gang members who would be targeted for the program. The police, especially the two Gang Crime Unit officers, were most interested in such information, but for suppression purposes only. The Project Coordinator repeatedly reminded the group that they had to target the hardcore gang members for social-intervention purposes, e.g. counseling, provision of social opportunities, as well as for surveillance and arrest. Although the Project targeted hardcore gang youth, this did not mean they would only be subject to suppression. Many of these youth would have reached a point in their gang careers when they were ready to change their behavior. R.C. indicated that targeting specific gang youth would not be simple. Some gang members who did not have arrest or prison records might still be shooters. One of the youth workers added that all gang youth were potential shooters. R.C. said it was important to carefully assess each youth.

As Gang Crime Unit officers and youth workers engaged in exchanging “war stories,” i.e., special events in local gang history, particularly prominent gang shootings, a certain communication barrier seemed to be broken. One of the youth workers suddenly mentioned that the annual three-day Christmas meeting of the Latin Kings was recently held in Little Village. It was considered a holy week meeting at which members and leaders of the Latin Kings from throughout Chicago and from cities and states nearby took part. The youth worker said the

meetings involved partying and discussions of plans for the future. This information was an “eye-opener” for the Gang Crime Unit officers. Whether the information was true or verifiable was unclear.

A problem of communication arose when the Project tactical police requested help in associating real names and the nicknames of street gang members. The tactical officers had obtained names of gang members from District 10 arrest reports but could not associate them with the street names, or nicknames used in the discussion between the Gang Crime Unit officers and youth workers. The youth workers were hesitant or unable to reveal the connection between street and real names. The youth workers often did not know the family or real names of gang youth. The Gang Crime Unit officers knew both, but refused to reveal the information they possessed. As suggested in the previous chapters, this refusal immediately was a source of tension between the two sets of police officers. Nevertheless, all of the participants agreed to make lists of gang members they viewed as target youth, whether by real or street name, which they would share at the next meeting.

In mid-January 1993 the youth-work staff provided a list of approximately 45 street names of gang members they were already working with. The tactical officers reported 10 real names of youth derived from recent arrest reports, whom they were attempting to target. The Gang Crime Unit officers said they were still working on the list. They, the tactical officers and the youth workers were partially successful in relating street and real names. However, the probation supervisor suddenly announced he could not provide names of youth on probation from Little Village who might be gang members. This information was strictly confidential, and he did not plan to reveal it.

This statement puzzled the rest of the Project team. The local Project tactical officers were particularly uncomfortable with this decision. The Coordinator raised the question of how they could work together as a team if all the team members did not know who each member was working with. In the long term, it was essential to share information about particular youth if a basic objective of the Project was to be achieved. He suggested that information about particular youth possessed by police and community youth workers would be useful to probation officers in their decision-making about services or violations. The probation supervisor was adamant in his refusal. After the meeting, the Project Coordinator spoke to the CPD liaison, Lt. Chomiak, and then to the deputy director of CCADP. The Coordinator proposed a preliminary step around the impasse: 1) the University of Chicago component of youth workers would continue to submit updated lists of gang members and in return would expect to receive verification that particular youth were currently probationers; 2) the youth workers would regard such verification information as confidential, to be used strictly as an aid in their social intervention, control and opportunity-provision efforts. The information received would not be used or exchanged with any youth or agency persons outside of the Project team.

The deputy director could not make a final decision. However, at a later meeting with the Coordinator, the ICJIA executive director, and the police lieutenant, arranged by the Director of the Cook County Adult Probation Department, the Director said she would not rigidly adhere to the general policy that information about probationers would not be shared without a court order. She indicated that the department had a “statutory” obligation to maintain a degree of confidentiality regarding “particular types of information.” She had no objection to such information being shared with the Coordinator of the Project, and it would be at his discretion to

share such information with youth workers. Information would be more directly shared as necessary with the police.

Over the next months and years the issue was resolved. Information was shared about the target youth with the tactical police, and carefully and directly – but selectively – with youth workers. The initial fear that such information would find its way to gang members was not realized. Only specific types of information – usually probation status, recent offense charge and present criminal court status of the target youth – were shared at first. Later, as confidence and trust among the various Project team members grew, a great deal of criminal history, youth-behavioral and family-background information was also shared.

Youth workers increasingly provided information about gangs and shooters, the location of “hot spots,” and expected places and times of violent confrontation between gangs, and drug sales in the community. They assisted Project police in solving several homicides by revealing who the actual shooters and non-involved gang members were. They also helped gang members show up for probation appointments, and requested special kinds of help that probation officers could provide. On one occasion the probation supervisor requested information from the youth workers as to how a specific program youth could get out of a particular gang without punishment. The youth’s assigned worker assisted by contacting several senior members of the gang for such permission. Youth workers alerted probation officers to gang youth on regular probation in other counties, who were then transferred to Little Village’s special gang probation caseloads. Probation and police began to inform youth workers about gang youth from the Latin Kings and Two Six not known to them who were arrested and placed on probation and who should be targeted for services. Problems in exchange of information which occurred early in

the development of the Project were substantially resolved at the end of the first year of program operations.

One major obstacle to communication was internal to the youth-worker component. Youth workers did not at first share information with other youth-outreach staff, particularly those who worked with opposing gangs, or even with workers assigned to sections of the same gang. The youth workers were not professionally trained and had little or no prior youth-agency experience. They were highly individualistic and some still partially identified with their earlier gang experience and allegiance. In the early phase of operations the youth workers tended to act somewhat in competition with each other for status. There was insufficient communication with each other about field events and collaboration. For example, when Latin Kings or Two Six gang members attacked each other, the assigned workers attempted to deal solely with the conflict on their own, rather than on a team basis. Information about intergang problems was initially shared through the field supervisor; with increased frequency it was shared at particular youth-work staff meetings (usually held weekly at the School of Social Service Administration), and then gradually and sometimes selectively with police and probation team members.

Nevertheless, two of the youth workers, still overly identified with gang youth, remained for many months opposed to the idea of working closely with police and thereby possibly contributing to the arrest of gang members. They continued to provide only limited information about gang youth engaged in serious crime, mainly drug dealing. They did not want to be accused of being “tricks.” Over time, a variety of means were established whereby information to police and probation could be revealed indirectly without likely threat to the workers. Youth workers slowly changed under continuing supervisory and administrative pressures. They used

beepers and phones to communicate with other team members. Meetings with Project police were sometimes held outside of the Little Village area. A great deal of information was communicated about particular youth and field situations before and after as well as during team meetings.

An attempt to develop a degree of cooperation and open communication between one resistant youth worker and the police was not successful. The worker had to be terminated. A reverse situation also occurred in which the youth worker was communicating too much information (or not carefully enough) to Project police. The youth worker wanted to become a police officer. He associated openly in the field with Project police. He contributed to a significant number of arrests of gang youth, particularly around drug-dealing situations. His role in the arrests of Two Six youth was discovered and he was directly threatened by key members of the highly criminal section of the Two Six. He had become overly identified with the role of police officer and insufficiently involved in providing outreach social services. He too had to be terminated from the Project.

### Boundary Issues

Boundaries and limits as to the nature, scope, and even the location of services and contacts had to be established. This was related in part to the function of the various workers from the component agencies of the Project. It was due also to the scope of the serious gang problem in Little Village. We had decided to concentrate on the two most violent gangs and their key members. We did not have the resources to address less-violent gangs in Little Village, or less-violent gang members in the target gangs. We also could not do anything about gangs

from outside the community who invaded Latin King or Two Six turf.

Perhaps the most serious boundary problem was that while the Latin Kings and Two Six confined most of their gang crime activity to Little Village, members of the two gangs at times committed crimes outside the area. Reduction in area rates of serious gang violence, as well as of targeted individuals and gangs, were the key objectives. Project staff generally could not operate outside the 10<sup>th</sup> District. Based on limited resources and agency-area boundaries, some of the staff (e.g., Project police) could not initially extend their efforts to all of the beats of the 10<sup>th</sup> District. They also could not directly leave Little Village to intercept Latin Kings or Two Six engaging in criminal gang activities who traveled to the south or north sides of Chicago and to suburbs such as Berwyn and Cicero. However, they could collaborate with the sheriff's department and local suburban police in the provision of information about serious criminal activity by target gangs and gang members in Little Village.

Project probation officers were also limited by another type of boundary problem. CCDAP was less clear about the territorial focus of probation officers on the Project than were the police or youth workers, at least during the first year of operations. Project probation officers were assigned to address the gang problem in both the Little Village and Pilsen communities. Probation administrators were not clear initially that Pilsen was a "control" area, and not to receive attention for research-education purposes. Project probation officers, furthermore, had to deal with both gang and non-gang youth who had been placed on probation. They tended to concentrate on drug dealers on probation. Many of the criminal court judges did not understand the nature and scope of the Project and assigned the Little Village probation officers whatever probationers they wished. Further, the probation officers were highly individual-case oriented



rather than gang-system oriented.

In one sense, the youth workers had greater boundary latitude than the other types of Project workers. They occasionally accompanied gang youth when they played basketball or football in other communities. They were more likely to be aware of gang tensions and gang activities that occurred outside the area that could affect target youth in Little Village, although they usually did not have substantial knowledge of the gangs and gang youth outside the area. Nevertheless, their focus of activity had to be Little Village. Fights between the Latin Kings, Two Six and occasionally other gangs occurred both inside and outside of Little Village. The youth workers also were required not to focus on such gangs as the Two-Two Boys, the Satan Disciples, Latin Disciples, Black Gangster Disciples and Vice Lords, whose members occasionally penetrated the target area and fought the Latin Kings and Two Six. The best the youth workers could do was communicate these happenings to Project police, who then might directly address violence by other gangs from outside or inside the community, or alert police in other Districts.

A constraint of the coordinated team approach was that the different types of team members did not necessarily contact the same target youth. Project probation officers did not have jurisdiction over gang youth who were not on probation. The most serious gang offenders were often not on probation, but often on parole. Many serious gang offenders had not yet been caught. Project police and community youth workers were better able to move about the community to target gang crime offenders, whether on probation or not. In addition, only certain sections or branches of the Latin Kings and Two Six in Little Village were contacted by Project workers. Despite extensive knowledge by Project staff about gang members and gang situations,

not all activities or operations of gang youth in the target gangs were necessarily known to youth workers or Project police. Activities of gangs, gang membership, and gang incidents were fluid and not entirely predictable. Information about gang activity was never complete. Further, while priority effort was directed to the most violence-prone sections and particular youth in the target gangs, there were sections that were resistive to the Project. Youth workers had to be accepted by at least a few key members in each of the targeted sections, but satisfactory relationships were not always established or maintained with one or two of the most violent gang sections and some of the most violent youth.

A limitation for community youth workers was relating to the violent gang youth on the streets. Youth workers had to relate to groups of youth, many of whom were non-targeted, who also hung out on the streets and participated in many of the same activities. The youth worker also did not have sufficient time to attend to the varied interests and needs of hardcore youth. The youth workers were required not to focus on recreation and group activities. Instead they were encouraged to enable youth agencies, schools and churches in the community to open their facilities to gang youth for various activities. Youth workers could assist with supervision of some of these activities. They had to focus on gang problems which might spill out to the streets, not on internal organizational patterns which might have contributed to the gang problem.

There were limits to the collaboration or cooperation that Project staff could experience with other significant agency personnel concerned with the gang problem. A persistent constraint was the antagonistic actions of overzealous police officers from the District. Some of the officers came to know target youth and community youth workers and deliberately engaged

in harassing them, without legitimate rationale. This problem was mitigated over time by the influence of Project tactical officers, the Project police sergeant, and by the support of the District Commander for the Project. Nevertheless, it remained a problem throughout the life of the Project, particularly as new police officers who were not usually familiar with the Project were periodically transferred to the District for special “sweep activities.” Also, personnel of youth agencies, school and churches were burdened with their own internal organizational problems, with little energy left for addressing issues outside.

### Team Collaboration

Over time, workers of the four component organizations represented on the Project team (now including the NAGV organizer) were in continual touch with each other and generally coordinated their actions around targeted gang, gang-individual, and gang-crime concerns. They were in close touch with each other through scheduled weekly or biweekly meetings, as well as through phone and individual field contacts around emergency gang-violence and serious gang-crime situations – which occurred or were about to occur. Contacts were made about youth requiring special attention, e.g., more information to provide a service, make a job referral, or to achieve a successful arrest. Frequent interaction took place, especially between the Project tactical officers and the youth workers. The various field workers often had to take action quickly and contact each other directly. Each of the types of worker – police, probation, community youth workers, the NAGV neighborhood organizer – exercised a great deal of discretion as to information sought or exchanged, decisions to be made and actions to be taken about specific unscheduled events or field problems.

Interrelated activity by Project personnel in respect to a particular youth or field situation might occur. For example, after a police arrest or a probation violation, the youth worker and/or the NAGV representative might visit the youth on the street, or the home of a particular shooter to warn the youth or his family about the consequences if the youth continued his pattern of behavior. The youth worker would visit the home of a youth after a shooting to explain why the youth was in jail and indicate the likely course of events for the youth. These visits involved various Project personnel and were carefully planned.

Based on the exchange of views among team members, decisions were made that certain target youth would receive extra services or attention, including counseling, school or job assistance, surveillance, and intensive probation during gang crisis situations. These youth were specially targeted based on collective worker analysis of their participation in certain field situations. Some youth received extra attention based on the advice of other gang members, particularly when the actions became at times too violent even for their gang sections to tolerate. Usually, these special youth tended to engage in violent activity or were highly influential in the creation of violent situations at crisis periods.

Such extra Project attention resulted in no negative repercussions from the gang or the specially targeted gang youth. Sometimes the youth expressed gratitude or relief to a worker. One youth indicated that he should have been more closely supervised by probation and that he expected to serve time in jail and would plan to withdraw from the gang. On another occasion, a probation officer and youth worker working together contributed directly to a youth's incarceration. R.C. and a Project probation supervisor went to court to request that they youth be adjudicated in violation of his probation. He was constantly high on drugs and shooting at police

cars. The judge accepted the recommendation. The youth was returned to complete the rest of his six-month probation at a state correctional institution. The youth worker visited him several times in the institution, and helped him complete his preparation for a GED. When the youth was released, he no longer hung out with the gang in the community.

Such collaboration occurred despite different views by the various team members about the reasons gangs and gang members did what they did, and preferences about how to control or help them. For example, youth workers tended to believe that gang members were personally “messed up;” their activities were unpredictable and they needed help. Police and probation believed that certain gang members were simply “cold killers” and as much information as possible about the youth and his activities had to be accumulated in order to put him away. Youth workers believed that while accumulation of information about the youth was important, the most important factor in preventing or curtailing the youth’s potential for gang crime was the development of a positive relationship with the youth, and counseling and mainstreaming the youth through more effective school and job experiences.

The different types of workers could be frustrated with the Project approach. The tactical police officers complained at one point that some of their positive efforts towards gang youth were not successful. Some of the gang youth, even after they were referred to youth workers and indirectly helped to obtain jobs, were still on the streets. Jobs did not necessarily keep “gang bangers” away from the streets. The jobs simply meant that the youth had more money to buy guns or bullets. Project police began deciding to lock up Project gang youth, but then complained that gang members who became too friendly to them were “getting an attitude.”

Youth workers and NAGV members were somewhat competitive. They often worked

with the same youth, then disagreed about what to do. They stopped communicating with each other. Over a period of time there was a sense that the same service was being provided, and that ownership of the social-service relationship should belong to one or the other of the workers. Project administration and youth-worker supervisory efforts to reconcile these differences were not always successful.

At one time, the tactical officers complained that probation officers were not doing their job. A youth was on general probation, and the Project police requested that he be transferred to the Little Village probation gang unit. The probation supervisor agreed and put through the request, but delays occurred in the transfer process. The gang youth became involved in a gang homicide. The tactical officers insisted that if the youth had received intensive supervision by probation when they requested it, the homicide would not have occurred.

One of the youth workers alerted the tactical police to the presence of particular drug houses. One drug house was subsequently closed down, but now the youth worker requested that the tactical officers no longer hang around the gym, because the gang members had become very angry over losing the drug house and several recent gang “sweeps” and harassments. The gang members knew that the youth worker and the tactical officers were in touch with each other as members of the Gang Violence Reduction Project team. The youth worker was receiving negative vibes from gang members, and some of the youth were charging him with being a “trick.” Team relationships were not always easy to manage.

#### Institutional Relationship Problems

Structural deficiencies in the development of the Project continued. Project police and

probation remained relatively isolated from their agency administrators. Policies and procedures to support the work of police and probation on the Project were not quickly or adequately developed. The youth worker was also relatively isolated from existing local community youth agency staffs and programs. NAGV was a small ad hoc organization formed as a result of the GVRP effort, but was unrelated to any large agency or community organization in Little Village. The nature and consequences of the lack of established broad organizational and interagency support interfered with the full development of the Project.

While several of the justice agencies in Cook County were interested and occasionally sent observers to the Project's weekly and bi-weekly meetings, few were willing to exchange information about particular youth or to collaborate in joint initiatives with the Project. Representatives of the State's Attorney's Office, particularly its juvenile section, the FBI, DEA, and the juvenile section of the Department of Corrections, were interested in the Project and called on members of the team for information about local gangs and gang youth of interest to them. No reciprocal arrangements were made, however. Efforts to involve juvenile probation, juvenile court services, the Board of Education social services unit and local area elementary and middle schools in the Project's work, especially in exchange of information, did not develop.

The general lack of communication and coordination across the local criminal justice agencies represented a major contextual problem which affected Project operations. For example, Cook County adult and juvenile probation departments did not generally share information about different youth from the same family served in the Project. The Project adult probation officer could not obtain information from the Cook County juvenile probation officer about the youth's younger brother (also in the Project) or family functioning. Information about

the father, in a federal penitentiary, was also not forthcoming. The Project's approach to coordination and information sharing, despite efforts to interrelate a variety of community and justice-agency program interests around the gang problem, was only partially effective. Interagency mobilization in regard to interests and concerns over Project youth was not sufficiently achieved.



## Chapter 5

### Social Intervention: Outreach Youth Work

The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project tested a complex and team-integrated (but not yet comprehensive) approach to the gang problem in a chronic and serious gang-problem community context. The strategies of social intervention and suppression were interrelated, with a focus on older youth, at least initially. The approach depended heavily on outreach or community youth-work activities, in addition to police, probation, and community organization through a team arrangement. A distinctive characteristic of the Project was its closeness to the grassroots community and the gangs contacted. The outreach youth workers were from the community, and at an earlier time had been members and influentials in the particular gangs to which they were now assigned. The use of such workers made for a rapid entry into the gang world and easy targeting of hardcore gang youth by the Project team. But it also created a variety of problems.

In the following discussion we identify characteristics of the roles of the outreach youth workers, within the Project framework, and of their relationship to other team members and the Little Village community. The purpose of the Project was to reduce serious gang-motivated violence; in particular, homicides, aggravated batteries, and aggravated assaults at the individual gang-member, gang, and Little Village community level. This was to be done first by concentrating on hardcore gang members, leaders, shooters, and influentials, 17 to 24 years of age, in two gang constellations, the Latin Kings and the Two Six. These youth were responsible for the large majority of gang violence in Little Village. Focus was later to be on 14- to 16-year-olds who were already becoming serious gang offenders. The targeted youth and their

gangs were to be provided outreach and referral for various services, social opportunities (education and jobs), monitoring and a range of controls. Mobilization of local community resources on behalf of these youth was also considered essential.

The strategy of provision of social opportunities, i.e., resources and access to jobs and educational programs, was to be implemented through the efforts of the youth workers, Neighbors Against Gang Violence (NAGV) board members, and Project administrators. It was not until the last year of the Project that the role of the Job Developer was established to secure job and training opportunities and assist youth to make use of them.

#### The Outreach Youth Worker Role

The youth worker was expected to:

1. Establish contact and positive working relationships with youth in gang hang-outs and on the streets of Little Village.
2. Assess and determine (with the aid of fellow team members) who the hard-core gang youth were that the Project should target.
3. Communicate the purpose and scope of the Project to selected gang youth and their peers on the streets, as well as to their parents, local residents and to representatives of agencies and community groups. Special emphasis was on communicating the interrelated strategies of social intervention, opportunities provision and suppression, i.e., socialized control.
4. Provide crisis intervention, ongoing advice, brief counseling, and referral for services and opportunities mainly to targeted gang youth, but also occasionally to selected gang peers,

siblings and parents of targeted youth.

5. Provide information about impending gang crises and problems to team members, especially police.
6. Assist police and probation to carry out their respective law-enforcement, community-protection, and crime-prevention functions.
7. Mediate (but more likely prevent) gang fights through collaboration with other team members.
8. Assist in the development of local resources, especially educational and job opportunities, for targeted youth.
9. Provide access to local social and recreational facilities and, on a limited basis, organize and conduct recreational or sports activities for targeted gang youth, as a means to implement other key Project objectives.
10. Assist with Project-related efforts of community mobilization, particularly at the local grassroots level.
11. Participate in and aid the Project evaluation process.
12. Participate in staff development to improve skills and also learn how not to over-identify with gangs or police or probation, i.e., to learn to be effective outreach youth workers.

Of special importance was that the youth worker establish positive working relationships with gang youth, with due regard for the protection and safety of community – residents, business and property owners, and others. The youth worker was to do as much as possible to reduce the influence of gang structure and the local gang tradition of intergang conflict, assisting

target youth to disassociate themselves from the gang and its criminal activities in as rapid and realistic a manner as possible. The worker was to be guided by a moral ethic, i.e., not to accept the legitimacy of criminal gang behavior or regard the gang as necessary for the development or survival of youth, even in a chronic gang problem area such as Little Village.

The youth worker's role was complex (as was that of the police officer, the probation officer, and the neighborhood organizer) in this approach. He had to know and understand that gangs vary in tradition, structure, leadership, cohesiveness, and patterns of behavior (legitimate and illegitimate) and that these elements change over time. Certain gangs, sections of the gang, and individual gang members might be more or less involved in violence and serious criminal behavior depending on different gang structures and processes and member-developmental stages. These differences needed to be taken into consideration in planning contacts and activities with gangs and individual members.

The youth worker in Little Village was to operate on the assumption that gangs or sections of gangs were not necessarily highly structured. Leadership and membership characteristics were fluid and variable. Gang behavior was to be viewed not only as a product of gang structure and process, but also of individual gang-member predisposition and personal problems at particular times and places. Individual member and gang problems and ways to modify them were related to family, school or girlfriend pressures, the prevalence of gangs and gang disputes in and across neighborhoods, the availability of legal and illegal opportunities for income and status, local neighborhood culture, social and political processes and programs, and police suppression tactics. All of these factors and others had to be considered in the assessment of the gang problem and the determination of how the youth worker was to proceed.

Most of the outreach youth workers in the Little Village Project were in their twenties, some in their early thirties, limited by education and legitimate work experience, influenced by family ties to and socialization in the local community, especially by prior history as an influential gang member. The youth worker may not have achieved a fully adequate transition to the conventional world. A series of procedures had to be fashioned to obtain the most productive and effective Project-related effort from the youth worker. The youth worker's job required that he maintain (but operate at different levels of) contact and relationships with gang members, within the framework of Project objectives and program means. The role of the outreach youth worker was marginal and vulnerable. It had to be carefully structured, supported and protected because the youth worker had to tread carefully in two worlds. He was highly vulnerable to suspicion, distrust, abuse or even attack from either the gang or police and probation officers.

Framework for the implementation of the youth worker's role:

1. His hours of work should be flexible. Generally the youth worker should be in the field late afternoon and evenings from 4 PM to 12 Midnight, and work at least one weekend evening (Saturday or Sunday) per week. He should be available, if necessary, in the morning to go to court and to advise gang youth and their parents on court procedures, provide information to the court on the youth's adjustment, and also advocate on the youth's behalf. At times, he might have to visit a school official or transport the youth to a job interview in the morning. During crisis periods, he might need to work longer days, well into the early morning hours.
2. The youth worker should generally confine his work to a particular neighborhood

where the youth and gangs to which he is assigned are located. However, gang incidents or events also occur outside the neighborhood, and the worker should be prepared to intervene in or prevent some of these incidents or attend some special events relevant to Project purposes, e.g., meeting with a gang member outside the area; attending a wake, a gang member's family celebration, or a special outing of gang youth at the beach. Nevertheless, he needed to take special precaution when in a gang neighborhood where he had reason to believe he might be attacked.

3. The primary objective of the worker is to reduce gang violence and serious crime in the gang-demarcated area where he is assigned. Contrary to claims of the police, youth workers themselves, gang members, and even some researchers, youth-gang criminal behavior was still regarded as largely neighborhood or turf-based. Once the youth or his gang left the confines of the traditional neighborhood, another set of gang purposes, dynamics and structures evolved, which needed to be carefully assessed to determine to what extent the youth worker would operate outside the area.
4. A system for assigning youth workers to specific gang factions to target gang-involved and highly-at-risk youth should be devised. Youth workers should probably not be assigned to contact and serve more than 20 or 30 active gang youth over a three or four month period. Contacts with many of the parents/families and girlfriends are also required. Frequency and intensity of contacts with youth will vary, based on the understanding that gang youth may become less active and require a lower intensity of contact or service over time,

while others become more active and require a greater intensity of contact.

5. The worker's contacts should be with factions and youth who are most involved or at high risk for violent behavior. The worker should not necessarily contact only those groups or individuals who are most responsive to worker efforts. A variety of techniques is required to "reach out" to the more difficult or "harder-to-reach" youth (more fully discussed later in this and following chapters).
6. Outreach youth workers should be in regular, often daily contact with the youth-work Supervisor, other youth workers, and members of the Project team. The youth worker's direct exchange of information with police and probation is essential, especially in respect to prevention and control of violent incidents, as well as his plans for social intervention with specific gang youth.
7. Systematic assessment of field situations, especially involving targeted youth, should occur at regularly-scheduled, overall-team as well as youth-worker staff meetings.
8. Rosters and discussions of gang youth and their possible associations with other gang youth should be updated on a team basis every three or four months. Not all violent gang youth committing crimes are necessarily known to the police. Youth workers might also not know all of the gang youth served by other team staff, and who should be targeted. Not all gang youth are necessarily known to probation or the neighborhood organizer.
9. Means are also required to record significant contacts by team members with gang youth served by the Project. For those youth workers with limited

educational background or ability to fill out forms, weekly debriefing sessions with research assistants or office staff members are required. It is critically important to obtain a record of what youth workers are doing with what gang youth in relation to what gang situations and with what effect. Such information should be available for monitoring worker efforts, gang-member and program-strategy assessment, and ultimately for Project effectiveness and evaluation purposes. Such documentation might also be important for community interagency-relationship purposes.

10. A variety of aids and constraints are necessary to assist youth workers with their job and to hold them accountable for achieving Project objectives:

- Beepers were provided to all workers, and cell phones to senior workers.
- The youth worker had to use his own vehicle to make contacts and provide services to program youth.
- Legitimate program-related expenses were to be documented and reimbursed, e.g., youth worker transportation costs (based on mileage), damage to their vehicles with receipts for repairs, work-related phone calls. Reimbursement to youth workers for food and entertainment with program youth was generally to be avoided, except when a supervisor was involved and/or at crisis times.
- Photo I.D.s were provided indicating the youth worker's affiliation with the Project and the University of Chicago. This was essential especially to prevent and resolve problems that might arise if youth workers "hanging



out” with gang youth on the streets or for Project purposes were “picked up” or harassed by police.

- Medical, accident and life insurance coverage were provided for youth workers employed 20 hours or more per week.
- Protective vests were also available and encouraged for youth workers to use, particularly where and when driveby shootings and car ramming were expected.
- Practices such as dating girlfriends of gang members, providing temporary shelter to gang youth in the worker’s home, letting a gang member use a worker’s car, etc., were to be avoided.
- A variety of administrative devices was established to assure that the youth worker was in the field and doing his job, attending staff meetings, completing reports or debriefings, and providing adequate documentation for expense accounts. Some of these activities had to be artfully arranged, e.g., scheduling youth worker staff meetings or field activity debriefings at times when and where weekly/biweekly paychecks were to be picked up.

### Field Assessment

Outreach youth workers were not only present on the streets of Little Village during assigned work hours but at other times as well, since most lived or had friends and family in the community. They knew the “hot” or “turf” areas where conflicts were likely to occur. The workers could easily hang out because of their relationships with gang youth in the particular

areas. They were able to inconspicuously observe a great deal of activity and/or have access to information that served law-enforcement or social-control as well as social-intervention purposes. This situation of almost round-the-clock access to street information was the basis for diagnosing gang situations. Drivebys, factional disputes, inter-gang fights, plans and preparations for fights, graffiti forays, torching of opposing gang members' property (especially vehicles), sporadic non-gang related batteries, robberies and other criminal occurrences were known to the youth workers, almost as soon as they occurred or were rumored in the community. Street information traveled fast, but often it was not sufficiently accurate and had to be checked out, often with the aid of the Project police and other youth workers.

The types of information had implications for what actions might be taken by youth workers or the police separately, and what action was most appropriate for the Project team as a whole to take. Graffiti raids were frequently conducted in enemy gang territory; sometimes they occurred in the territory of another faction of the same gang, particularly among younger youth cliques seeking to develop or enhance reputations with minimal risk. The raids usually involved gang members defacing opposing gang emblems on a fence or side of a building and marking the gang's or faction's own emblem and the artist's own street name. Such graffiti activity was more often taken as a provocation or a cause of retaliatory shooting raids by opposing gang members than as simply a cause for counter-graffiti-marking excursions.

Violence between or within factions of the same gang was less lethal than across gangs, and did not usually involve the use of guns. The intragang conflicts could involve fists, rock or brick and bottle throwing and occasionally knifings. The cause of such more-limited fights, whether on the streets, at parties, or a chance encounter at a party for example, could be disputes

over a girlfriend, antagonisms between individual gang members, attempts to punish individual gang members within or across factions for a general gang rule violation. The fights resulted normally in minor bruises or injuries, although such internal gang faction or cross-faction or branch fights could occasionally result in homicides.

Of greater attention and concern to Project workers were the more serious incidents involving invasions by members of a particular faction of a gang into the territory of a particular faction of the opposing gang. Car ramming, walk-up, bicycle or drive-by shootings were common and might occur several times a week. Gang members were usually on guard at the end of the streets at night, anticipating and ready to counter opposing gang invasions. The attacks or counter attacks could also be against non-gang youth mistaken for gang members. The attacks usually resulted in insults, minor injury, or property damage. The youth worker who happened to be on the scene could make an assessment, important for the prevention of further gang attacks:

Robert the youth worker noted in his debriefing that three carloads of Latin Kings were cruising their own neighborhood around 25<sup>th</sup> and Trumbull late one night. They suddenly stopped and busted out the windows of a reputed Two-Six girl's car; she lived in the Latin King neighborhood and was in the car with two other persons. The windows were tinted and the Latin Kings may have thought that Two-Six males were also in the car. The worker heard the attacking youths shout "King Love". The worker expected the Two-Six to retaliate within the next day or two.

On another occasion a Two Six worker:

reported that he saw the Latin Kings come into the Two Six neighborhood in order to shoot at the Komensky faction; however, the Two Six group were anticipating their arrival and shot first. No one was hurt, so far as the worker could tell.

While most inter-gang fights involved gangs and youth of the same ethnic or racial background and usually from an adjoining part of the same community, occasionally major gang fights broke

out across racial or ethnic groups involving youth from outside of Little Village.

Frank, the youth worker, reported that the Two Six (a Mexican-American gang) had been fighting recently with the Vice Lords, a major African-American gang from an adjoining neighborhood. This started when members of the Vice Lords had to travel through Two Six territory to return home from Currie High School, just the other side of Two Six territory in the early Fall. The school usually provided special buses to take the African-American students directly back to their neighborhood. Over the past week, because of a lack of special buses, the Vice Lords had to take public bus transportation and transfer on a street in the heart of Two Six territory to get back to their neighborhood.

Frank reported that the Two Six caught a Vice Lord as he waited for the bus. They shot and killed him. He called G. S. and R. C., the Project police, to give them some information on which Two Six faction was involved.

The above gang situation caused a furor among leaders in the African-American neighborhood about the failure of the school authorities to provide adequate transportation and protection for students. They demanded that the former busing arrangement of students directly to the African-American neighborhood be reinstated immediately. The police also came out in force both to patrol the Two Six area where the shooting occurred and further investigate the situation to find the killer(s).

The youth gangs in Little Village also had peripheral and sometimes direct connection with organized crime operations. Youth in the Two Six at times ran errands or transported drugs for the Mexican Mafia across country, i.e., between Mexico and the United States or across state lines, usually between Texas and Illinois. Some of the Two Six families were heavily involved in drug dealing. Nevertheless, most of the youth gang members were not disciplined racket-organization apprentices. They could readily attack or rob a local Mexican Mafia drug dealer to take his money. Such an incident occurred when one of the members of a Two Six faction

robbed twenty-thousand dollars from a Mexican Mafia drug dealer on the street. Retaliation by the adult criminal organization was swift and deadly.

Sammy, a youth worker, reported that a member of the same Two Six branch, whose parents were connected to the Mexican Mafia, was ordered to kill the particular Two Six member [a program youth] who robbed the drug dealer, which he did. The assailant [also a program youth] was quickly arrested. Special protection for the assailant was arranged for the youth in Cook County Detention when threats by other Two Six members who happened to be incarcerated were made. The Project police were fully informed by the youth worker of various aspects of the situation including possible threats to the family of the shooter. However, no attacks against the family of the assailant or other gang members on the street occurred. The Two Six youth worker also spent a great deal of time assisting the family of the youth who was killed with funeral arrangements while helping with arrangements for the family of the offender to leave the neighborhood for the suburbs.

Injury and death were ever-present threats for gang youth in Little Village, one of the two most violent gang areas of the city. However, death did not always come to gang youth from intra or inter-gang events.

Larry, one of the Latin King workers, reported that he attended the funeral of Sandman, a twenty year old youth who shot and killed himself, reportedly over problems with his girlfriend. Larry said that Sandman was a leader of the Sawyer Street branch, but he also used a lot of cocaine. Larry said he was surprised by the Sandman's death since he seemed happy with his newly-born child to whom he was very attached. Larry said he was planning to spend time with Arturo, a close friend of Sandman, who was now moody and depressed.

Many of the gang youth who were involved in gang fighting or drug situations were personally very troubled. They were usually not willing to seek mental health treatment. In two cases, based on prior youth-worker observations and assessment, the youth worker and Project police teamed up to pick up gang youth who were suicidal; they had mental hospital histories and were exhibiting self destructive behaviors. One of the youth, a Latin King periodically

marched into the Two Six territory wearing a Latin King jacket yelling for the Two-Six to kill him. The Two Six called him “crazy” and usually ignored him. The Project police were able to transfer this youth and another who tended to slash his wrists periodically back to local mental hospitals. In both cases the youth were back in the neighborhood within a day or two, since they had been voluntary patients and could not be compelled to remain for treatment.

### Social Intervention and Social Opportunities Provision

Because of his identification with gang youth, his imbeddedness in neighborhood relationships, and his strong interests in improving the life chances and welfare of gang individuals, their families and neighbors, the youth worker was viewed as a do-gooder or social worker in a very basic, if not professional, sense. He did not know much about social work or systematic counseling techniques, and use of agency resources. However, he did have easy and non-threatening access to and positive relationships with individual gang youth and their families. Provided with periodic Project staff training and close supervision, the youth worker was a reasonably effective social intervener. The worker was usually involved in a range of extremely tense and critical situations. He often had to perform interrelated crisis-intervention, advising, and referral functions.

The youth worker engaged gang youth individually or in small groups on the street, at home in family contexts, on athletic fields or recreation centers, detention facilities, at school, on the job, and elsewhere, about a range of problems. A primary concern of the worker was to help the youth stay out of trouble. He counseled the youth to stay off the streets, attend school, find a job, keep his appointments with probation officers, and turn himself in to the police when he was

being sought. Parents were constantly calling youth workers to find out where their son was, to help with a range of problems: referral of the youth for a job, getting him back in school or out of the gang. The youth worker was a pro-active communicator and mediator between the youth and other significant persons: the family, girlfriends and wives, and representatives of social, educational and criminal justice agencies.

Education. The gang youth was generally a high school drop out; yet he often aspired to complete his basic educational requirements and even get into a technical training program or college. The gang youth was aware that he could not obtain a decent job or prepare for a good career without a high school or even advanced education. The youth frequently declared his interest in obtaining a GED or attending an evening high school program, to the youth worker as well as to his family. His family was often willing, at considerable expense, to support their son's return to complete his high school education at a private institution. The workers enrolled youth in a variety of educational programs at youth agencies, parks and recreation centers and community colleges. A few of the older gang youth had completed college level courses in prison and expressed interest in achieving a bachelors's degree. Follow-through by the worker to sustain the youth in these programs was not easy.

A special GED evening program was established by the Project in a church for one of the gangs, but with hardly positive results. Attendance was poor. Gang members sporadically left class, diverted by gang business. The Project GED program had to be abolished; however, the youth worker than referred gang youth to other neighborhood and out-of-the-neighborhood GED programs. At times, the youth worker tried to assist the youth who had been kicked out of

school to gain readmission to a regular public high school or transfer to another high school. This was difficult. The youth worker often needed help from his supervisor, a personal relationship with the principal, or special contact in the rigid Chicago Public School system to achieve such readmission or transfer. The schools generally wanted to get rid of gang youth and were glad when they did not show up. Referral to an alternative school was not a simple matter either.

Yet, there were more subtle and indirect ways of getting a youth back to the public school. The youth worker at times assisted local high school or local elementary school administrators and school security personnel to resolve tension and conflict caused by particular gangs at war with other gangs attending the same school. He extracted promises from gang leaders or particularly violent youth to “cool it.” In turn the youth worker was able to persuade the principal or assistant principal as a kind of quid pro quo to permit certain troublesome program youth to return to regular school or aid in transfers of them to (or from) other schools.

Most gang youth in Little Village were highly ambivalent about returning to regular school programs. There was a preference for getting into a special non-public school training program (for example, the Army). School was associated with the pain of suspension, expulsion, long term academic failure, hostility of teachers, and low self-esteem. Occasionally, the youth worker was able to help the gang youth get out of the neighborhood and out of the gang by referring him to or supporting his application to a boot camp, Job Corps, or admission to military service, usually either the Marines or Army. However, not many gang youth qualified for these special job-training and military experiences.



Jobs. The gang youth generally was more motivated to find a job than complete high school or pursue further education. Holding a job was an acceptable and appealing symbol of adult status. Gang youth often had a strong commitment to the importance and rewards of work based on maturation factors, cultural, family, criminal justice, girlfriend, and even gang pressures. The role of the youth worker, as a job broker, was very important to the gang member. Gang youth continually approached the workers for help in finding a job, a “good paying” job. The economy was good during the Project years. A variety of jobs were available for youth without high school diplomas or GED certificates, in factories, hotels, restaurants, garages, local stores and businesses, some paying considerably more than minimum wage. Even before the Project part-time job developer came on board, the workers had established a variety of direct contacts with local employers and job agencies. However, the steps involved in connecting particular youth with jobs – let alone sustaining them on those jobs – were not simple.

A key first step was to get the gang youth sufficiently motivated to consider a job opportunity and to follow through with an application to an agency or employment office. The youth worker, with the aid of the Project secretary, was prepared to assist the youth with development of a job resume. The youth worker would sometimes pick up job applications to give to gang youth to complete and provide transportation for the youth to the job interview. However, one initial test of the youth’s intention was whether the youth could be out of bed and dressed, usually in the morning, by the time the worker showed up to take him to the employment office or the job interview. There were many failures at this important step.

The gang youth was also often unable to meet conditions of work. Some jobs required night hours, others drug tests and/or the possession of a driver’s license. In some cases the youth

would have to travel through enemy territory, or need a car which he did not have to get to the suburbs or the farther reaches of the city. In many cases the youth did not know what kind of job he wanted. The job made sense to him not because of his intrinsic interest in it or as a step on a career ladder, but because he would then have income, comply with pressures of his parents or girlfriend, get the probation officer off his back, or simply because it was the appropriate thing to have a job at his age by the neighborhood and even by gang standards. Some youth tried to hold an eight hour day job and still hang in the streets or party with gang friends for another eight hours or more on weeknights, which meant in due course either he had to give up the job or gang banging (or partying). A job could also have a gang-related meaning, getting money to buy a gun and bullets for use in gang fights.

The expression of a need for a job, nevertheless, was a major basis for communication between the youth worker and the gang youth. It was an acceptable way for the youth and the worker to justify contact with each other. It could open up conversations that led to other issues, such as gang fighting, girlfriends, drug use, problems with parents, as well as a continued search in earnest for a job, further training or education.

Each of the youth workers developed a somewhat different set of ways of finding jobs for youth, either through personal contact with particular employers, job agencies, reading newspaper ads, talking with neighbors in Little Village who hear of job openings, or contacts with former gang members now working in places that might need additional workers. Older, former gang members in the neighborhood would often spread the word to active gang members about job openings at factories, businesses, hotels, airports, construction sites. Based on a variety of leads, the youth worker would sometimes take a carload of gang youth to these places

for job applications or interviews. Not infrequently some of the youth would be hired on the spot, with or without resumes.

One worker had good connections with a security guard agency and was able to place several youth without felony records on these jobs. The same youth worker also accompanied a youth to a construction site for his first day of work, helping the youth load bricks. The youth worker wanted to demonstrate that the youth could make a good deal of money if he worked hard at a job for eight hours. In this particular case, the youth found the job too strenuous and quit after the first day. Some gang youth wanted “easy” jobs, some did not want to work during the summer but “promised” they would look for a job in the Fall or when the weather was cool, and when there was less action on the streets.

The youth worker collaborated with girlfriends, parents and neighbors to find and sustain a youth on a job. A parent or girlfriend would enlist the youth worker to persuade or pressure the youth to find employment. Or on the other hand, the worker might request that the girlfriend or parent keep up the pressure to make sure the youth stayed on the job. There were times when some of the younger youth actively sought and found part-time jobs, cutting grass, painting over graffiti, running errands, etc. The workers would circulate handbills or directly visit neighbors and local store keepers seeking jobs for program youth.

Employment was an acceptable means that gang youth could use to begin to break away from the gang, to fulfil family, neighborhood, and societal expectations of him. The gang would also accept and approve of the gang youth holding a job and no longer showing up as often on the street corner or participating in gang events. Again, the worker relied very heavily on interest in jobs as a critical means to establish relationships with gang youth and to assist them to

be more successful in the process of growing up and becoming less violent and delinquent.

### Mediation

We do not use the term mediation simply to signify that the worker settles disputes or arranges “peace” between gang factions or opposing gangs. A slightly different meaning of the term for the youth worker connoted brokering or mediating between the gang youth and the institutions of the larger society. Gang youth were usually alienated from (yet also at least partially identified with) family, school, employment, youth agencies and neighbors and even opposing gangs. This social-psychological distance or alienation was not only of the gang subculture, but also related to the youth’s personality or stage of adolescent rebellion, and also developed in response to the rules, actions, and attitudes of the representatives of social or community institutions in dealing with gang youth. The job of the outreach youth worker was to reduce the alienation or social distance of the gang youth by facilitating an accommodation between the gang youth and representatives of the institutions he had to contact or relate to. It was important not only to reorient attitudes of youth but those of significant institutional representatives as well, so that certain practices and (possibly) policies of organizations could change, or exceptions be made for the youth.

The traditional role of mediating conflicts between opposing gangs was not employed by youth workers. In Little Village the gangs were well organized with a long tradition of hostility toward each other. It was extremely difficult to mediate conflicts between gangs or establish peace treaties. It was easier to encourage lulls in fighting, and gain agreement from gang leaders

or influentials to get their men to “stay in their own neighborhood.” Gang conflict was a way of life generally accepted, encouraged, perhaps needed by gang leaders, gang influentials, and gang “shorties” or “wannabes.” Certain neighborhood entrepreneurs, including drug dealers, did not generally view gang conflict as a threat to their business. In fact, some viewed it as a means to distract police attention away from their operations. Also, gang youth were also available to sell drugs when they were not fighting. With this heavy tradition of gang fighting and drug dealing, it was simpler and more feasible for the youth worker to get individual gang youth and specific factions of the gang to “cool it,” as well as make sure the police were fully alert and prepared to deal with specific or potential conflict situations.

Violence between the gangs was essential to the development and survival of the gang as an institution. The leaders of the respective gangs claimed that a long term “peace” could not be achieved, although efforts to call a temporary peace around particular conflict situations by gang leaders in the community or in prison were sometimes successful. The best that could be achieved generally by youth workers was a promise by leaders of the gang to tell their members or respective faction leaders to “cool it” and “stay in their own neighborhoods” after a particular violent crisis situation. Gang influentials explained that if the opposition gang or its members entered their gang territory looking for a fight, they would find it. Gang turf would be defended, and violence would ensue. However, the control of gang leaders over gang members was only partial. Certain individual gang members or factions did not observe particular gang-leader calls to war or truces, and prided themselves on being rebels. It was not so much gang organization or leadership in Little Village that was critical, but the pervasive influence of gang culture or subculture that could be utilized by cliques of gang youth for a whole variety of reasons to attack

other youth.

The youth work Supervisor and Project team members were also reluctant to formally mediate conflicts between gangs through gang leaders, since this usually meant recognition of the ability, power and legitimacy of particular gang leaders to broker or “negotiate” a peace. This process could entrench gang leadership and contribute to gang cohesion. Care had to be taken not to legitimize the gang. The view of Project staff, including youth workers, was that gangs were illegitimate structures and the gang life was destructive and unrewarding, and youth had to be constrained on an individual basis as soon as possible to leave it. Nevertheless, the level of violence was so pervasive and extreme in Little Village, that occasionally almost any means was sought to prevent or neutralize frequent and deadly confrontations between gangs. The interposition of police, group recreational distractions and use of conditions of “war fatigue” often lead to temporary peace or lulls in gang conflict. Project workers could not resolve all of the many precipitating, daily unpredictable factors contributing to battles between the two gangs (Short, Strodbeck 1965).

Nevertheless, the tasks and requirements of preventing youth from getting into gangs were more difficult and complex in terms of personal and institutional change than getting youth out of gangs or gang-violent situations. The Project was not established to address the problem of preventing younger youth from joining gangs or participating in gang activity, although youth workers often counseled younger siblings of target youth to stay out of gangs. Sometimes older target youth aided in this process. Youth workers were called on by elementary school principals and churches to talk to youth about the perils of gang life. It is doubtful that such efforts were effective.

The youth worker and other Project workers were primarily concerned with reducing the level of gang conflict among those youth already gang involved. The efforts of the outreach youth worker were mainly ameliorative, facilitating social growth and maturation, and prevention of gang conflict in specific situations. The youth worker had to depend on his own presence of mind and available resources at this particular moment.

Larry (the youth worker) happened to be present and helped to persuade the Darkside not to jump in on the side of the Karlovs and the Chi-town branch to fight against the Komensky (all branches of the Two Six). Larry was almost hit by a Darkside member with whom he had a questionable relationship. Luckily the police came to the scene and the youths were dispersed. No major injuries were reported.

On Tuesday early evening, the Two Six Cal branch and the 28<sup>th</sup> Street branch of the Latin Kings got into a fight at the Boys Club, regarded as neutral turf. Frank, the youth worker, was at the club with the Latin Kings. He was able to separate the warring groups and calmed the situation, mainly because he knew the leader of the King branch, who respected him.

The youth worker could be an important mediator between the youth who wanted to leave the gang and the gang itself. At times he could persuade gang leadership to permit the youth to be released from gang membership. Often the gang member, if he had served his time and been a “good soldier,” could leave the gang with impunity. He could walk away under certain conditions: if he obtained a full time job, if he were involved in college studies, if his wife or his girlfriend was pregnant, if his brother or uncle had been a senior member or leader of the gang faction. The worker could sometimes persuade leadership of the gang to agree to arrange for only the mildest punishment for the youth who wanted out of the gang. On one occasion, a gang youth requested the youth worker to get the Project probation officer to say that he had been ordered by the court to stay at home in the evenings. The youth was not on probation, but the fiction was agreeable to the Project probation officer and accepted by the gang

members, permitting the youth to stay home and not engage in gang activities.

Changing or neutralizing the destructive or violent behavior of a particular gang faction was a difficult task and sometimes required the intervention of authority. The gang faction was often unable to control itself in many situations, e.g., the use of gym facilities at a local youth agency, church, or park recreational center. Younger members or those unable to participate adequately in a basketball game might deface property or smoke “pot” on the premises, in order to “show off” to girlfriends or fellow gang members. The entire faction might therefore be penalized, “thrown out of the gym”, and prevented from returning. In one instance, a fire extinguisher was left in the gym by the building staff member (no longer present), and one of the gang youth unable to resist the temptation sprayed foam all over the gym floor. Again, the entire group was restricted and not permitted to return to the gym. In this case, offers of the youth involved and his gang peers to make amends, clean up and pay for a new extinguisher – arranged by the youth worker – were not accepted.

On still another occasion, several factions of the Latin Kings – perhaps 50 or 60 youth – were barred from using a church gym because the pastor accused their members of stealing audio equipment from a nearby church meeting room. The gang members were not responsible and with the intervention of the worker were able to identify the thieves, who in fact were younger youth unrelated to the gang. They were made to return the equipment and the Latin Kings were permitted to continue to use the gym. Also, the worker was sometimes able, after a specific disruptive gang incident, to persuade a particular Park Department, or youth agency supervisor, or church pastor to permit several of the more conforming gang members to make use of the particular facility as “non-gang youth.” They were to come in as regular agency or church



members individually, without gang peers, and obey all rules. Such separation of individual youth from the gang was a key Project objective.

Arranging for amicable relations between gang members of the same faction was important. Youth workers were often able to work out a “peace” between rival youths from the same or different factions or even opposing gangs who disliked each other personally. Faction or gang-status issues were not at stake in these situations. Often the particular youth knew each other well but had built up long-term animosities. Youth workers could arrange rules and patterns of behavior for conflicting youth so that their paths were not likely to cross. This was difficult since each youth knew where the other lived and hung out.

Violence by gang youth was more often spontaneous and unpredictable than planned:

Frank (the community youth worker) reported that fifteen Latin Kings jumped two guys who suddenly came into their street, beating them severely with parts of a chair. Frank thought they were in danger of killing the victims; Frank urged the Latin Kings to stop the beating. The Kings claimed the two intruders were wearing colors of an opposing gang, the Latin Disciples, in this case. One of the victims denied being a gang member. The worker caused a pause in the fighting, the police also arrived on the scene. The police apprehended two of the Latin Kings, the other Kings ran away. Frank did not hang around, because he did not know the particular police, and they might assume he was involved in the incident.

### The Youth Worker and the Community

The youth workers were intimately connected to the community. They not only assisted specific gang youth and their families with a range of services and access to opportunities, but they also tried to assist the community to better address the problems of gangs and gang youth. They did this in various ways. They functioned as experts and helped educate local citizens, block club members, and local school administrators as to the reasons that particular gang

problems arose that affected the neighborhood, and how to deal with them. Much of this occurred as a function of youth workers regularly attending block club meetings, developing relationships with particular neighbors and being available to deal with problems of gang loitering, graffiti, littering, and various forms of citizen annoyance. Because of their relationship with key members of the various factions, youth workers were able to persuade gang youth to move from particular corners, avoid littering, clean up pop and beer cans, avoid street partying, and desist from marking up buildings, garages and fences. Youth gang members sometimes eagerly volunteered to paint over the graffiti which they themselves had put up.

Youth workers also assisted local residents and block clubs to address related community-action problems which contributed to gang congregation and delinquency. A Two Six faction was hanging out in a local bar, selling drugs, as well as painting gang emblems on the side of the building containing the bar. One of the Two Six youth workers spoke with the bar owner and observed that several of the Two Six in the bar were 15 and 16 years of age. The owner shrugged his shoulders. The owner said he was not interested in this problem, and besides he could not control it. The youth behaved themselves inside the bar and his business was good. The neighbors continued to express concern, and the youth worker helped them to compose and circulate a petition to the 10<sup>th</sup> District Police Commander to close down the bar. The youth worker also discussed the problem with the Project sergeant and the two Project tactical officers; they also spoke with the District Commander. Regular District 10 police officers were sent to investigate and within a matter of days, the bar was closed down.

In another community situation, one of the youth workers knew that some residents and block club members were not simply interested in getting rid of gang youth or putting them in

jail, but were genuinely concerned about their well being. One of the residents and several members of the block club were on “good speaking terms” with the gang members. The resident knew their families and had watched the gang members “grow up.” Frank (the Latin Kings worker) said that “the guys are very respectful of her; they cleaned up any garbage in her yard.” With the encouragement of the youth worker, she became the leader of a block effort to find an indoor facility in the community where they could play ball, especially when the weather got cold.

Youth workers also encouraged parents, neighborhood residents and block club members to attend meetings organized by Neighbors Against Gang Violence. These were occasions when representatives of various local agencies and community groups came together to address the gang problem. At one community meeting, the youth workers recruited members of the two gangs to participate in the residents’ discussions about the gang problem. Neighbors pointed out the dangers of children being caught in the cross-fire of gangs shooting at each other. The gang members promised to be careful, but they also insisted that members of each of the gangs should stay in their own part of the community. Nevertheless, the meeting had some value for potentially “cooling matters” between some of the opposing gang members. The youth from the two gangs glared at each other during the meeting, but some of the older members gave signs of recognition and some friendliness to members of the other gang.

Youth workers, along with gang members, were active in assisting parents and mobilizing neighbors to help during times of crisis, particularly when shootings occurred and gang members were injured or killed. Youth workers helped gang members with efforts to raise funds to give to parents to cover the cost of burial of gang members who had been killed in gang

battles, or to take care of gang members who were seriously injured. Fellow gang members were in full attendance at wakes and church services on these occasions. One of the youth workers, Larry, noted in the course of his weekly debriefing that:

The neighborhood is holding a fund raiser for “Dillinger” the Latin King who was shot last month. Dillinger was not working at the time of his shooting; he had no medical insurance, and left three children for his wife to support. He was receiving medical attention at home, but his condition was getting worse, and he was not expected to survive. The neighbors expressed compassion and support for Dillinger and his family despite the shooting.

The youth workers were called upon by schools, colleges, churches, neighborhood-relations police, probation, and media to describe the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Program and what specifically they did as youth workers. The organizations requesting youth workers as speakers were located both in and outside of Little Village and as far away as Aurora, a community about fifty miles northwest of Chicago. The youth workers were often asked why they had gotten into and then left the gang. On some of these occasions, current gang members accompanied the workers. As remuneration to youth workers and youth with them, the churches and other community organizations provided food, and tickets to ball games, circuses, and even theatrical performances.

Two of the Two Six youth workers who were closely affiliated with evangelical churches urged gang youth not only to stay in school but also to attend church. One of the youth workers occasionally conducted Bible lessons as well as provided specific information about the legal (and prison) consequences of gang violence. He took groups of six or more gang youth to an interdenominational church service out of the area on Thursday nights, at which time they sang, studied the Bible, and later played basketball together. What the effects of this particular youth

worker's community-relations and religious-commitment activities were are not known.

### Relationship with Police

The youth workers and Project police officers were partners, working along with probation and the NAGV neighborhood organizer to address the gang problem. Yet the relationship was not always one of equality, mutual respect and common purpose. The fundamental role of the youth worker was social support and opportunity provision, and that of the police officer control or suppression. These roles had to be modified and made interactive based on the Project model. It took time for these changes to take place.

On the one hand, the youth worker had been socialized to an entrenched gang culture and set of norms that expressed distrust of, and antagonism to, any form of collaboration with the police. On the other hand, the police in Chicago were highly committed to harassment and suppression of gangs, almost by any means. Police and gang cultures were continually mobilized in opposition to each other. During the course of the five years of the GVRP's existence, little or no antagonism developed, but rather considerable friendliness between Project police and Project youth workers. Despite the fact that many of the program youth were stopped and arrested by Project police, the Project police established generally positive relationships with the target youth of the Latin Kings and Two Six and their families, probably because they gave evidence that they could treat the youth courteously and respectfully. The Project police were often surprised to find themselves welcomed in the homes of gang youth by their families, even though their testimony had contributed to successful prosecution and long sentences for some of the target youth. A youth-work Supervisor, newly hired during the last six months of the

Project, wrote in one of his records:

One of the most interesting comments made by the (gang) guys was that they appreciated when the police officers in the Project would take time out to counsel them instead of just arresting them. They seemed to have really felt this was a strong part of the Project. It should be noted that they made it clear even though the officers did arrest the guys in many cases, the fact that they counseled them on the way to custody made a difference in the way they felt about being arrested.

The youth workers, as indicated, collaborated with the Project tactical officers in the exchange of information that was vital to their police suppression role. The youth workers also came to depend on the Project police for information, and for assistance and protection that was important in the implementation of their own role: counseling and neutralization of out-of-control gang youth, moderation of the dangers inherent in their outreach role in a high gang violence context, and also protection from “hard nosed” and sometimes brutalizing police officers in the District who were not affiliated with the Project. The Project police were helpful to the youth workers in many respects.

Relations with most of the police in the 10<sup>th</sup> District were less benign. The District police were prone to stop and harass clusters of young people, including gang youth, in the area. This directly and indirectly affected the activity of the youth workers. Much of the harassment was based on the “tough Chicago Police” tradition of “bust up” gangs and “lock up” gang youth. This was explicit in Chicago’s anti-gang loitering law, which forbade five or more gang youth to assemble on the street. The ban was declared unconstitutional in two court decisions, one most recently by the Supreme Court of the United States. The existence of the ordinance, however, served to give license to the police to charge youth with a variety of offenses, if not gang loitering, then mob action, disorderly conduct, and other minor offenses, without sufficient cause.

Lester (youth worker) reported that the Two Six shot a Vice Lord in Two Six territory on Thursday. Lester voiced concerns over the police response. They have been searching the homes of program youth without search warrants and trying to pin the shooting on one of them. Lester spoke to the parents of the youth and urged them to not only keep their sons off the street but to avoid the police request to search their home, unless they had search warrants.

Frank went to court with Joey and his father. Joey was arrested for possession of one ounce of marijuana (which Frank believes the police planted on him). The case was dismissed when the arresting officer never showed up in court.

Frank also reported another case of entrapment of a Latin King on a gun felony charge. The gun was presumed to have been used in a recent homicide. Frank attended a preliminary hearing for José, a fourteen year old newcomer to the gang. He was originally caught with a small amount of cocaine, but the police convinced him that they would forget about the cocaine charge, if he turned over a gun to them. José managed to obtain a weapon. It had no finger prints and the stories of the two police did not match each other. José's lawyer believes that the gun felony charge will be thrown out of court.

Another youth worker, also with the Latin Kings reported that on Friday evening, as he waited in his car with two target youth, he witnessed Officer L. slapping Mario in a nearby police car. Bobby said that the officer, who has been in the neighborhood for many years, hates Mario and is always harassing him. The worker encouraged Mario and his mother to file a report against Officer L.

The youth workers were at times stopped by non-Project police, harassed, abused, arrested, and taken to the District 10 station for booking. The Project Coordinator had to go to court on at least two occasions to persuade judges to dismiss cases of gang loitering against youth workers. G. S. and R. C., the Project police, were often in the field or at the police-district station when the youth workers were brought in on a variety of charges, and were able to vouch for the workers, who were then released and not arrested or booked.

Lester indicated that there was a large police presence in the area, including

officers of the violent crime unit from downtown (who did not know the neighborhood). On Wednesday, several of the violent crime officers tried to take Lester downtown to appear in a police line up. Lester showed the officers his Project identification but they did not believe him. G. S. and R. C. happened to be nearby on the street, vouched for Lester, and he was released.

Frank reported that Officer S. and another officer stopped his car. He had four of the target youth with him. The guys were driving to the YMCA. The officers searched the car, found nothing, but made Frank drive to District 10. He was about to lock Frank up, claiming he had no valid driver's license, which was untrue. Officer S. also tried to plant a marijuana joint in the car, but one of the target youth saw him. The other officer hit one of the guys in the face and kicked another. Frank also discovered that Officer S. is presently under investigation based on other citizen charges. Frank said he is going downtown to report the incident to the Office of Professional Standards (OPS).

George (another youth worker) reported that one officer pulled a gun on him while he was standing with several gang youth on Komensky and 25<sup>th</sup> on Wednesday. The police had received a great many complaints about drug dealing on the block. He and the other youth were searched. The police found nothing on them and then walked away.

Jake (the youth worker supervisor) reported that he took one of the Two Six youth to a District line up because the police were searching for him in a robbery case. The victim did not recognize the gang youth as the offender, but did claim that Jake, who also volunteered to be in the line up, was the offender in the robbery. Jake had earlier telephoned G. S. and R. C. that he was taking the Two Six youth down to the line up. G. S. and R. C. also came down to see what was going on. They persuaded the other police officers that Jake couldn't possibly have been involved and he was not arrested.

Resolution of cases of harassment and fake charges against gang youth and youth workers (particularly by police from outside the District who were brought in to do "sweeps" of gang members) took up a good deal of the youth workers' and NAGV neighborhood organizer's time.



George, the Latin King worker, in one of his weekly debriefing reports, recorded that most of his time that week was spent taking Latin Kings ( younger members) on different days downtown to the OPS office to fill out reports concerning police harassment.

On another occasion, Lester was trying to prevent a clash between the Darkside and Chitown factions of the Two Six. It was winter and snow was on the ground. The police arrived and placed twenty of the youth and Lester against the wall. Lester told them who he was, showed the police his ID card, and explained the workings of the Project. The police did not believe him. They checked his hands for spray paint, as they did to all of the gang youth present. Before letting the twenty youth go, the police made them do pushups in the deep snow and slush. Lester tried to read the badge numbers of the police in order to complain. The police saw this and handcuffed and put him into the police car, along with Ralphie, leader of the Chitown group, who also refused to do pushups. Both Lester and Ralphie were locked up for about an hour, and then released.

In the next several days, the Project Coordinator complained to the Project police sergeant and to the District Commander. Lester, as well as the Project neighborhood organizer and a priest on the NAGV Board paid a visit to the District Commander about this and a series of related harassment incidents. The police officer offenders – at least those local police who were known to harass youth – were identified. The Commander promised to talk to the officers in question; shortly afterwards the Commander did arrange a transfer of one of the officers out of the district.

In another instance, the Project Coordinator advised one of the target youth to obtain a lawyer and sue the Police Department for damages to his car due to negligent police work.

Rolando, a former leader of a faction of the Two Six, had just been released from a six month stay in prison on violation of probation. He was working and no longer a gang member. He was stopped for driving without a license on his way to visit his girlfriend in Latin King territory. He was made to park his car and then taken in the police car to the 10<sup>th</sup> district. Rolando pleaded with the officer to let him or have them drive his car out of the area, otherwise the car would be recognized and vandalized by the Latin Kings. He needed the car for his job. The police refused Rolando's request. The Latin Kings torched the car as soon as the police drove off with Rolando. Rolando was quickly released at the station but he was very upset. He had no objection to the charge of driving without a license, but was furious that the police disregarded his claim that his car would be vandalized. Rolando complained to the youth worker and the Project coordinator. He was referred to a lawyer with expertise in defending gang youth. The lawyer quickly obtained a judgement against the Chicago Police Department and the youth received a satisfactory sum of money for replacement of his vehicle.

### Youth-Worker Performance Problems

There were many problems as well as benefits to the Project in the use of youth workers who were former gang members. Both the limitations and advantages were largely anticipated. Close Project supervision and administration of their work were expected to, and did, minimize the negatives and maximize the positives. In the following section we concentrate on problems associated with a wide range of required activities youth workers were expected to perform and which they did not always do well. It took time for the Project to develop policies as to what was appropriate and not appropriate for youth workers to do in many unanticipated work or work-related circumstances. Some workers had to be fired for repeated failures to carry out their duties.

Articulating Project Policy. Youth workers as well as the Project Coordinator and the field supervisor spent the first months of the Project explaining what the Project was about to gang youth and to the local community organizations and groups. Trust and communication were

established with target gangs and gang youth, as local agencies began to develop interest in and support for the Project. Youth workers accomplished initial field-contact objectives reasonably well, but constraints on staff had to be imposed and policy forcefully articulated when certain situations arose, especially in light of the fact that the Project was sponsored by the Chicago Police Department. While no effort was made to publicize the Project, the local media quickly got wind of it, and both the supervisor and youth workers were soon being interviewed by print, radio, television, and even University of Chicago public relations reporters. Pictures were taken of youth workers with gang members on the street. Gang members appeared with youth workers and the NAGV organizer on television to describe the Project. Project staff often spoke of the need for more educational and job opportunities for gang youth. Concern by staff and even gang youth began to surface about the large amount of publicity directed to gang youth. The Project Coordinator determined to be explicit about whether and how staff should relate to the media, and formulated the following policy:

Memo To: Staff  
From: Project Coordinator  
RE: Staff Relationships with Media  
Date: October 1, 1993

It is the policy of the Project that all contacts with the media in which individual gang youth, family, gang locations, or other persons or items related to the particular gang youth or gang will be identified are forbidden, except on very special occasions and for specific purposes which must be approved by the Project Coordinator.

This in no way limits or denies Project staff the right to establish contacts and relationships with the media which serve general Project purposes but the contact must in no way identify particular youth or gangs.

The intent of this policy is to:

1. not give undue publicity to particular youth and gangs and thereby enhance individual gang member status or affiliation with a gang ;
2. protect gang youth from identification by opposing gang members; and
3. avoid competition by gang members and gangs for publicity through negative gang behavior.

Also, please note that the Gang Violence Reduction Project is funded and directed overall by the Chicago Police Department. This fact should be made known to media representatives who should be urged to contact:

1. Commander D. B., 10<sup>th</sup> District Chicago Police Department, (phone #); or
2. Lieutenant P. C., Research and Development Division, (phone #)

The development of a second policy at about the same time resulted from the participation of the field-work supervisor, several youth workers, a member of the NAGV board, and the Project part-time neighborhood organizer in a series of gang summits taking place in Chicago and in a nearby state. The summits involved representatives of several civil-rights, protest, and political organizations primarily concerned with a range of urban problems, including police brutality, housing, poverty and other agendas not specifically related to gang problems. The key issue was representation of the Project by youth workers in politicized situations.

Memo To: Staff  
From: Project Coordinator  
Re: Representing the Gang Violence Reduction Project at Political Events and Public Demonstrations  
Date: October 15, 1993

Staff are fully encouraged to participate in political events and demonstrations, a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. However, the Gang Violence Reduction Project is strictly a Demonstration-Research Program. Moreover, staff, clients, and those served in and through the program, are not permitted to state or imply that they are representing the Gang Violence Reduction Project, the School of Social Service Administration, or the University of Chicago in these activities, when in fact their views and activities represent

personal and not necessarily Project-related interests.

If you have any doubt about the distinction between personal and political interests and Project purposes and activities, you must clear them with me, the Project coordinator. In other words, your participation in political events and public demonstrations is on your own time and cost; and in no way should you indicate that such participation is sanctioned by the Project.

Both of the above policies were accepted by staff, except by the youth-worker supervisor, who shortly afterwards decided to run for Alderman and suddenly began to use time on the job to make contact with a great variety of persons unrelated to the Project or its purpose. He was no longer sufficiently available for Project responsibilities. The issue of time spent in preparation for an aldermanic race was raised by the Project Coordinator and became a key factor in changing the administrative structure of the Project, eliminating the combined position of Assistant Director/Field Supervisor. The former Assistant Director/Supervisor was now free to pursue his political interest, but not on Project time.

A serious problem in the implementation of the youth-worker role was over-identification by one worker with the role of Project police. Both over-identification with gang norms and values and over-identification with the police suppression role were contrary to the Project model and could (and did) interfere with Project operations. The tendency by one community youth worker to play a quasi-police role had to be constrained.

Manuel was the first full-time worker hired to work with the Two Six. As indicated, he was a big, self-assured man in his mid-twenties, honorably discharged from service in the Gulf War. He had been a Sergeant in the Military Police but also claimed that he had been a Lieutenant Governor in the Two Six before Army service, a position presumably just below that of chief governor, who happened then to be serving two life sentences in state prison for a

double homicide. Manuel had grown up in Little Village and knew many older members of the Two Six. He was an effective worker during the first year and a half of the Project, but also established particularly close relationships with the two Project tactical officers. He began to meet regularly and go to dinner with them in the Project neighborhood. He was frequently observed sitting in the Project officers' car in Two Six territory. He also drove with them across gang territories. This was not known to the Project coordinator or youth work supervisor until one of the Latin Kings complained that Manuel was an undercover police officer. Manuel was directed not to associate so provocatively with Project officers, particularly to ride with them across either Latin King and Two Six territories. He could arrange to have dinner meetings with them outside of Little Village.

Manuel also took a series of part-time jobs with security firms. He was proud of his work in security, and before coming to a staff meeting one Friday afternoon showed off a gun he was carrying. When confronted by the Project Coordinator, Manuel explained that he was licensed to carry the gun on his job as a security guard. He was planning to go to his security job after the staff meeting. The Coordinator ordered Manuel to return the gun to his car. He was not to show up with it in his role as youth worker in any work situations. In further discussion, Manuel did not see his youth-worker role as particularly different from that of a law enforcement officer. This situation resulted in the creation of a third policy clarifying the role of youth worker, especially directed to Manuel. It emphasized that the youth worker was not to perform as either a police officer or gang member. The worker does not carry a weapon on his job as youth worker.

Memo To: Staff  
From: Project Coordinator

Re: Further Policy Clarification of the Role of Community Youth Worker  
Date: December 14, 1994

The Community Youth Worker does not fulfil the role of police officer or gang member.

1. He is an outreach youth worker whose key function is to provide services and social opportunities, assist targeted gang youth to control their violent behavior, and to help them make a positive community adjustment.
2. To this end, he must not carry a weapon on the job, even if legally permitted to do so ...
3. Failure to conform to this policy will result in termination of the worker from the Project.

Conforming to Project Norms. Supervision and administration of youth workers who were formerly high status gang members, not long removed from the gang culture, were difficult and challenging. Outreach youth workers were on their own in the community much of the day or night. There was little hour-by-hour direct supervision and administration of their work. Youth workers had to internalize and operationalize legitimate values and conform to Project norms and expectations, particularly when in difficult field situations where pressures to engage in non-conventional or questionable activity were considerable. Social-agency rules and regulations or even basic job routines were not easy for several of the youth workers to follow. The youth workers were expected to complete bi-weekly time cards, account for field time, respond quickly and cooperatively to communications and requests from other staff or team members, make appropriate use of beepers and cell phones, provide their own job-related transportation (for which they were reimbursed), fill out special reports, and attend various meetings, especially weekly youth-worker and biweekly team meetings, and also assist field researchers in locating target youth for interviews.

These expectations were not always met. The problem was not lack of commitment to Project goals and objectives or lapses into criminal behavior, but lack of familiarity with and periodic non-observance of customary agency rules and regulations about how to achieve objectives. The specific problems were: not showing up on time (or at all) for staff meetings, not responding to beeper calls, and not being out in the field when or where the youth worker was scheduled to be. An early Project administrative problem was failure by youth workers to submit time cards and program-tracking forms on what they had done in the field. Most of the youth workers did not have adequate writing skills. Various recording forms were developed for the workers to complete, but they were not successful. The most feasible means of tracking worker effort proved to be regular weekly debriefings by a Project researcher or even the secretary, using a standardized tracking instrument.

Youth-worker accountability had to be stressed and the means to achieve it had to be developed. Staff meetings with youth workers were used to determine the nature and effects of services and contacts the youth workers were making. The reliability of youth-worker efforts was systematically monitored in the field by the youth work Supervisor. The quality of the worker's performance was difficult to determine. Individual worker supervisory meetings were of some help. Group training and staff-development sessions were initiated in the last two years of the Project to assist youth workers in learning how better to address certain gang and (especially) individual-youth and family problems. These training sessions should have commenced much earlier.

Firing Community Youth Workers. A range of problems led to termination of youth workers



from the Project more often than was anticipated. Termination of the workers came after frequent warnings and lengthy discussions with them about particular issues and problems. When the performance problems could not be corrected and the Coordinator determined to separate the worker from the Project, effort was made to assist the youth worker to find another position, obtain unemployment insurance, maintain health insurance, and assure that the worker would remain positively connected to the Project. Project and personal contacts were maintained and job references still provided for youth workers many years after the Project ended.

One youth-worker problem was insufficient sharing of information about gang activities with Project police and probation officers. Some of the youth workers at first were reluctant to provide meaningful information. Much of this problem abated over time. Youth workers were careful about information they provided, as were police and probation officers about what kind and how much information to give to the youth workers. As indicated above, youth workers and police evolved ways of sharing information that were adequate for Project purposes. Failure to share information, by itself, was usually not sufficient for terminating the youth worker from his job; frequent and repeated failures in meeting different job responsibilities was.

One of the first youth workers employed did not communicate to Latin King members that he was an employee of the University of Chicago and a member of a team that comprised police, probation and a neighborhood worker. He identified himself too closely with his gang. The Coordinator stated to the worker in a supervisory meeting: “You conceive your role mainly as a kind of gang insider, knowing what’s happening but not necessarily trying to effect change in the gang.” The worker smiled and admitted this, and continued to act as a senior gang member. He moved around the community contacting gang members on warm summer nights,

not wearing a shirt. His old gang tattoos were visible on his chest and back as well as on his forehead. However, he was able to resolve many internal gang and factional disputes, and he did make an effort to remove his face tattoo. After a while (based on information from Project police, probation officers, and other youth workers) it became clear that he was still too closely identified with the gang. After many discussions with the Coordinator, the worker was separated from the Project; but even after termination he proved useful to the Project police in locating a Latin King charged with a double homicide who had escaped from detention in the Cook County Department of Corrections.

In one case, the youth worker's performance was deemed unsatisfactory because of "insufficient numbers of gang youth contacted," "insufficient involvement in resource development or referral of youth for jobs or to school programs," "travel expenses were very high and out of range, three times as high for comparable-level and more productive workers," and "recording of activity with target youths has been thin." In another case, a youth worker was terminated before his 90-day probationary period was up because he had not established a "working relationship with senior members or shot callers of the Latin Kings;" earlier he had "several negative experiences with them, in which he was beaten up." He was "not trusted by them." The worker also had "not completed and turned in logs or records of Project activities, as requested." In still another case, the worker was well connected with some of the most violent Two Six factions and appeared positively motivated to helping them and sharing information with the police and probation. Unfortunately, he became substantially disengaged from job routines, and did not show up for meetings or turn records in. He periodically disappeared from the neighborhood. He was "spacey," personally troubled, battered his wife and periodically

abandoned both his wife and child. After a while neither the Coordinator nor other workers could keep track of his movements. When he finally did show up, he was fired.

In the case of Manuel, described above, he was a bright, hard worker during the first year and a half on the Project, and there was a plan to promote him to the position of assistant supervisor. However, personal and job-performance problems began to develop. He went through a separation and divorce from his first wife, and in the process was twice arrested on charges of domestic violence. His tendency to over-identify with the police continued. His second wife was a police officer. Several members of the gang factions he worked with accused him of “fingering them” for arrest, specifically in regard to possession and sale of drugs. Manuel lost his relationship with key leaders and members of the gang. “A contract was put out on him,” which he said he was able to have revoked, but he could no longer work effectively with a particularly violent and criminal target faction of the gang. Subsequently he focused his work on smaller numbers of less-violent youth in other Two Six factions. He began more and more to operate alone, not communicating with other youth workers. He also was no longer regularly seen in the street by the Project field supervisor and Coordinator. Manuel was terminated, but failed to return his beeper, cell phone, and protective vest to the Project. He claimed they were stolen from his car, but the Project police and a new youth-work field supervisor discovered the cell phone was still being used. The Project police tracked Manuel down and had him return all of his equipment. There is an interesting follow-up to Manuel’s career. He was able to obtain a managerial position in a security firm, did gang consultation for the State’s Attorney, and later became a coordinator of investigations out of the Mayor’s office.

The social-intervention strategy, employing local outreach youth workers, particularly

former gang members, in a team arrangement with police, probation, a neighborhood organizer and other representatives of conventional society, was difficult to implement. The use of (mainly) former gang members as outreach workers with hardcore gangs and their members in Little Village was an innovative, if not controversial, approach. Nevertheless, despite frustrations and questions by the Coordinator, field supervisor, and other team members about the performance of several of the outreach youth workers, Project results indicated that their efforts overall were substantially, if not remarkably, successful in reducing program-youth violence and drug selling.

## Chapter 6

### Suppression/Social Control

In this chapter we focus on the development of the strategy and structure of suppression in the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project. Our interest is not primarily in the leadership, or lack thereof, of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) in the Project, but in the participation of the two Project tactical officers in addressing the youth gang problem. We pay somewhat less attention to the role of the Cook County Department of Adult Probation (CCDAP) and the activities of probation officers in the Project. Youth workers and the Project-related neighborhood organizer played a complementary and supportive role in the implementation of the suppression strategy.

The Project suppression strategy was a special variation of community policing with primary attention paid to the youth-gang problem. It took into consideration the interests of the youth (for social control) and the community (for protection, i.e., law enforcement, including arrest and incarceration of law-violating gang youth), as well as concerns for gang youth social development. Project police focused on preventing gang crime and suppressing it, but also on not necessarily “throwing the book at” all gang kids. Other Project team members, neighborhood residents, and staffs of local organizations assisted the Project tactical officers in this more complex gang-targeted community-policing approach.

In the first section of the chapter, we describe the CPD’s purpose and design for the Project, and implementation problems. In the second section we examine in detail the modified suppression role of the two Project tactical officers, based on their own verbatim recollections. The CCDAP and its assigned probation officers played a secondary role to that of the CPD and

the tactical officers. The adult probation officers focused on both suppression and rehabilitation of offenders in a decentralized or more community-based context than was traditional. The CCDAP did not quite achieve the purpose of developing the general agency-wide collaborative role with the CPD it wanted.

### CPD Structure

The Research and Development (R&D) Unit of the CPD conceptualized a somewhat innovative but not clearly-defined approach to the gang problem through the development of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project (GVRP). Early on, the R&D Unit considered that the Gang Violence Reduction Project potentially could be integrated into the Chicago Area Policing Strategy (CAPS). In the initial proposal submitted by the CPD to the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, the following statement appears: “The police role in the Project will be community policing as it targets the gang violence problem in an outreach, flexible and comprehensive manner.” However, the police probably did not intend to develop or implement a fully-collaborative approach with other criminal-justice agencies, community groups, and social agencies which would encompass a broad set of strategies, involving services to gang youth and the employment of former gang members. The GVRP model came to be viewed as too broad in its purpose, incorporating a team approach and a variety of interrelated strategies rather than primarily suppression. The integration of the GVRP and the Community Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), i.e., community policing, did not occur. The CPD came to focus primarily on the role of the community in assisting the police to sustain its traditional suppression role.

The CPD proposal did speak of community mobilization and provision of opportunities

directed to hardcore older gang youth as the means to control gang violence in Little Village. It paid some attention to strategies of social intervention and collaboration with other criminal-justice agencies and grassroots groups. However, there was little discussion by the CPD as to how it would restructure its bureaus to facilitate or support Project operations.

In the original first-year proposal summary, the CPD stated:

“The strategy of the Gang Violence Reduction Component is based upon the concepts of community mobilization and provision of social opportunities. Community mobilization refers to the collaboration and integration of efforts of law enforcement and the criminal justice agencies, grass-roots organizations and local citizens. The provision of social opportunities depends on the availability and successful use of adequate training, education and jobs for those gang members most likely to engage in violent behavior...”

Project staff were to formulate and implement within a one-year period a plan for mobilizing the community and relevant justice agencies:

“to diminish the destructive influence of gangs upon the community and to reduce the amount of gang violence within the community.” The Project was also to develop “a community advisory structure, a system for communication, joint and complementary action by various members of the Project team in regard to specific gang problem situations, gangs and individual gang members, and additional social resources targeted to those youths... The (targeted) youths should receive, to the extent possible, intensive collaboration services or attention from the Project team and associated community-based agencies and grass-roots groups.”

The Project was also expected to base its gang and gang-member targeting efforts on a newly developed “automated early warning system” which would identify potential neighborhood crisis areas at high risk for suffering spurts of serious street-gang-related violence and homicide. Representatives of the University of Chicago were expected to initiate a process of community-problem and resource-assessment and planning, Project organization, and collaborative staff training prior to the actual initiation of field operations. At the same time,

field operations were expected to start no later than one month after the Project was funded. The entire Project was to be under the administration of the Commander of the 10<sup>th</sup> District. There was supposed to be internal departmental coordination and cross-agency and community collaboration. Members of the tactical unit were to collaborate with the Gang Crime Unit of the CPD. The proposed strategies were expected to represent an elaboration and extension of the Department's approach to gang related problems, but now even more closely interrelated with the criminal justice, community-based and grassroots efforts to control and reduce the problem. A close relationship with adult probation was to be established:

“Members of the CPD's Marquette District (10<sup>th</sup> District) along with members of the Cook County Adult Probation Department and the Gang Outreach Team are expected to play key collaborative roles. It is expected that team members will be able to fully exchange relevant information with each other.”

### Role Assignments

Police. The initial grant application proposed that the Commander of the 10<sup>th</sup> District would coordinate intelligence, investigations, training and community-outreach functions. Its Neighborhood Relations Unit was to be responsible for ensuring that all data necessary to Project operations was collected and reported as needed. One additional officer (limited duty status) was to be assigned to the Commander and the Neighborhood Relations sergeant. Of special importance was the assignment of two full-time tactical officers to the Project. They were to act as liaisons to the Project advisory council and be responsible for conducting the activities of the 10<sup>th</sup> District and representatives of other CPD units. CPD employees assigned to the Project were to analyze all offenses reportedly committed by and against gang members, and all incidents where gang members were arrested. The information gathered was to be shared with



the youth workers and the Cook County probation workers assigned to the Project. While the CPD's assignment of officers occurred as originally planned, their roles and functions and the police support structure developed in a quite different way, to be described below.

University of Chicago. The Project Coordinator and his staff from the School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago was expected to assist in the development of a prototypical collaborative effort bringing the CPD, CCDAP and gang outreach services personnel together under the sponsorship of the CPD in the planned program to reduce gang violence specifically in the South Lawndale (Little Village) area of the City of Chicago. A variety of community contacts, interagency networking activities, a community assessment, training and documentation activities, and gang outreach service were to be the primary means by which the University of Chicago team would assist the Project to achieve its goals and objectives in the first twelve months.

Cook County Department of Adult Probation. The CCDAP was expected to assign a supervisor and three full-time probation officers to the Project. They were to be experienced field officers who had completed weapons training and who had knowledge of street gangs and their related criminal activities. The supervision of targeted gang youth on probation was to be of a more intensive nature, combining close monitoring and compliance to special conditions through frequent face-to-face contacts and home visits, curfew checks, and drug testing, in coordination with services such as treatment and counseling. Support and encouragement were also to be provided to gang probationers to assist in their successful reintegration into the community. Probation was expected to benefit especially from a close relationship with the CPD – a relationship which had not previously existed in Chicago. The exchange of information was

expected to help probation respond more quickly and effectively when probationers were arrested.

Local Organizations. A group of representatives of local agencies, community organizations and local residents (including former gang members) was to be formed to advise and consult with the Project staff on the development of programs. Various members of such an advisory group would be integrally involved in specific activities of gang control and social support. Regularly scheduled meetings were to be held to discuss Project issues and activities. How specifically these organizations and residents were to be selected, who would sponsor the group of representatives and what benefits would accrue to such a group for participation or affiliation with the Project, particularly the police, were not indicated. Only a very general conception of community involvement and support for the Project was formulated.

Basic goals and objectives of the original CPD Project proposal were stated in relatively general terms, and only later took on bare bones administrative reality. The strategy of organizational change and development vis a vis general police policy and practice in respect to gangs was hardly achieved. An oversight administrative and/or policy group within the CPD and/or the CCDAP was not identified. The possibility of a larger advisory group, perhaps consisting of representatives of both neighborhood and citywide organizations to assist in Project development, was not discussed. In the first year, some preliminary thought was given by one of the District Commanders to the possibility of relating the Project to the local 10<sup>th</sup> District Neighborhood Relations Council.

Preparations and timelines for development of the Project were not adequate. Little attention was paid to day-to-day operations or administrative development, or to longer-term

potentials of the Project. The Project became a sort of “hip pocket“ administrative operation of District 10 and of peripheral interest to the Research and Development Division, with the Superintendent of the CPD mainly recognizing the existence of the Project through signatures on grant sign-off documents.

The responsibility of the CPD in the development and coordination of the Project was not clearly delineated. A realistic commitment and plan to develop the Project did not evolve. There was no assignment of the CPD leadership to take responsibility for Project implementation. The assumption seemed to be that everyone would “do his thing” and the pieces would somehow fall into place in due course, at least at the operational level. The 10<sup>th</sup> District Commander was only assigned five percent of time and the neighborhood relations police sergeant only twenty percent of time to the Project. The roles of the two full time tactical officers were not clearly or correctly envisioned.

### Implementation Problems

It was not at all clear how the Project was to be implemented. How Project development was to occur was not described. The structure for Project police and probation roles and operations was not specified. How the Project officers were to be connected to each other and how their respective departments or bureaus were to be interrelated were not ever identified or developed over the Project period. The status of the Project was to be temporary until a decision – possibly at the end of the first program year – was made about whether to incorporate the Project into ongoing regular police operations. However, such a decision was not made, and the Project remained in limbo for the entire five years of its life.

Chicago Police Department. A key problem was identification of who was responsible for, or who was to have “ownership” of, the Project. The CPD sponsored the Project apparently at the behest of the Associate Director of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. The Commander of the Gang Crime Unit originally interested in and responsible for planning the Project was “pushed aside.” The CPD Research and Development Division wrote the funding proposal, and, as the Project got underway, the Patrol Division through the local 10<sup>th</sup> District Commander was to have some (unclear) responsibility for administering the Project. Research and Development established financial oversight. The Deputy Superintendent’s Office presumably was to assure that inter-bureau cooperation was established to support the Project. It was not specified how the Organized Crime Unit, Youth Division, Neighborhood Relations, CAPS, and other units of the Department were to be connected with the Project.

A liaison lieutenant in Research and Development assisted in the implementation of the Project in the first year or year and half. He came closest to fulfilling the CPD leadership role, but he was unhappy with his role in R&D – and especially with insufficient CPD support for the Project – and transferred out of the R&D Division to an administrative patrol position in the 13<sup>th</sup> District. The local 10<sup>th</sup> District Commander (assigned only five percent of time to the Project) was never clear about what he was supposed to do. Three different Commanders were assigned to the 10<sup>th</sup> District in the first three years of the Project; each hardly paid attention to it. The Neighborhood Relations sergeant (appointed to the Project twenty percent of time) did appear at biweekly team meetings, but was not clear initially about his role. His major responsibility was to facilitate the development of the new CAPS effort. He served essentially as liaison to the Commander, keeping him informed of Project progress and problems. However, two tactical

officers did perform the essential police-development role. They did it in a unique way highly relevant to the Project model, which we describe below.

About the beginning of the third Project year, the Project police sergeant prepared to take a pro-active leadership role in regard to the Project. He offered to supervise the community youth workers during a transitional period if the Project were to be integrated into general police operations. However, R&D and the Deputy Superintendent's Office did not support this notion, and the sergeant, apparently disappointed, transferred, as did the liaison police lieutenant, to another District. The University of Chicago principal investigator by default filled the role of Coordinator, so that the Project would not fall apart.

The lack of sufficient and authoritative CPD involvement affected the Project in many ways. There was inadequate communication between the Research and Development Unit and the 10<sup>th</sup> District Commander. The Tactical Officer, Beat Officer, Community Policing, Youth Division and other units in the 10<sup>th</sup> District knew little about the Project. Little effort was made to interrelate their work with that of the Project. There was little evidence that the Project tactical officers developed a close or useful relationship with the gang intelligence or organized crime officers in the CPD, although they dealt with many of the same gangs.

Cook County Department of Adult Probation. CCDAP was strongly interested in participating in the Project, but much of the interest derived from probation administrators' desire to establish a closer general relationship with the CPD. There had been traditionally little systematic relationship between adult probation and the CPD. The GVRP was viewed primarily as an opportunity to develop an effective relationship around the gang problem, since many of the probationers seemed to be gang members. The CCDAP wanted to be the junior partner (with

the CPD as the senior partner) in the Project relationship, but a concept of how the probation officers were to relate to the Project police was not formulated. Apparently no policy-level or administrative meetings were held between the two departments to address this issue. The upper level of CCDAP administration was in the dark as to what the Little Village probation component of the Project specifically should do with the Project police, except carry out some form of regular probation in the area.

CCDAP originally assigned the Little Village gang probation unit to an area larger than the Little Village community. The unit at first was to be decentralized, dealing with all adults on probation from the area, whether they were gang youth or not. It was not until well into the first year of the Project that permission was granted for the Little Village probation unit to concentrate on gang youth in the same beats as the Project police. However, focus continued to be on gang probationers who were arrested for drug offenses. A complicating factor was that the supervising probation officer in the Project knew little about the gang problem and was disposed to apply restrictive rules and operating procedures to the three probation officers. The supervising probation officer strictly followed CCDAP standard operating procedures.

Influencing the development of the probation department's participation (and specifically the role of the probation officers in the Project) was that adult probation was also in the midst of its own reorganization under the aegis of a newly-appointed chief probation officer. A deputy administrative officer initially interested in and responsible for the development of the Little Village probation unit was also replaced. The lack of understanding of the nature of the Project and the gang problem in Little Village by the probation supervisor, as well as growing tension between him and his three probation officers who had more experience and better understanding

of the gang problem than he had, led to a major blow-up in the Little Village Project probation component. All three probation officers then requested and obtained a transfer out of the GVRP.

Staff dissatisfaction continued. Department policies remained restrictive. Adequate probation policies and procedures still were not established. The Project probation officers complained that they could not ride in the same vehicle with Project tactical officers. They were not permitted to invite the Project police officers along with them on home visits or searches. One of the new probation officers assigned to the Project submitted a grievance to the union in regard to insufficient support for the Project, particularly inadequate facilities and equipment.

“Management has violated Article XX, Section 1 in that they have failed to provide a safe and healthful work environment, as agreed to by the Chief Judge and AFSCME local 3486 in the collective bargaining agreement.” (10-19-94)

Among the specific grievances listed were: “no phones installed in GIU [Probation Gang Intelligence Unit] county vehicles;” “no county band radios in the GIU vehicles;” “The GIU have no cellular phones although the grant that funds the program provided gang workers with cellular phones;” “CCDAP has failed to supply the GIU work site with on-line county computers, printers and general office supplies thus rendering the office dysfunctional.”

In the original contract, CCDAP had agreed to supply office space in Little Village to be used by probation, police, community youth workers, and the affiliated neighborhood organization (Neighbors Against Gang Violence) for a variety of Project activities. This agreement was only partially honored over the course of the Project. Space and equipment for the Project police officers and community youth workers were not provided – however, the probation office did become the site for most team meetings. A computer was installed in the third year of the Project, and probation officers could provide information on the court status and

past and present history of all Project youth who were on adult probation. The office was also used by Project field researchers to conduct interviews of Project youth at times, whether they were on probation or not.

The replacement supervisor continued to voice his frustration with the lack of clear direction and failure of CCDAP to provide supportive policies. In the fourth year of the Project he recorded his views:

“I thought our mission was to work effectively with hardcore gang members in the area. We were not viewed as police officers ... I felt we’d be able to use the flexibility that probation has to identify the real-hard-core guys causing most of the problems... If we can identify those guys for the courts, these guys should be locked up and that may reduce violence. Also we could identify fringe or marginal members and then we could plug those guys into services, into education or job training or whatever, and slowly pull those guys out of the gang situation.

The team workers would give us access to information that G. and R. [Project police officers] had and we would be able to call on the outreach workers for information and access to families and their home situations that we wouldn’t normally have. We didn’t achieve all of these objectives well. On a scale of one to ten, I think we achieved a six. If I had criticism it is that everybody should have been plugged in better. I think a lot of the times, one hand didn’t know what the other hand was doing.

I think before you even start such a Project, you should have a clear direction, policy and procedures and these should be supported by administration. This lack of support by administration held us back. We were always waiting for this from above. When was there going to be a structure for us that came from above?”

### The Role of the Project Police Officers

Despite the failures of organizational policy, structure, and support for the roles of police and probation, and perhaps partially because of it, an unusual degree of cohesion evolved among the members of the Project team. A highly-effective set of working relationships developed in



response to the interdependent activities of staff and their increasingly common views about the goals and objectives of the Project. An unusual dedication to the work of the Project evolved. Much of this was a response to the operational performance of the two tactical police officers, and their daily interactions with other Project team members. The two police officers, largely cut loose from their traditional routine, were able to create a unique law-enforcement approach as they addressed the complex gang problem in Little Village.

The following is a discussion based on an edited transcript of a long conversation by the Project Coordinator with the two Project police officers, R. C. and G. S., in the fourth year of the Project. The two officers described the development of their Project roles. Both were young officers with about two years of CPD experience before they were assigned to the Project. When they came out of the police training academy, they were in further training (on a regular police probationary period) and in assorted assignments in the 10<sup>th</sup> or 11<sup>th</sup> District before joining the Project. Two other veteran 10<sup>th</sup> District officers had earlier been asked to participate in the GVRP, but refused presumably because they felt they were going to be taken away from doing police work, and they didn't want to become social workers. R. C. and G. S. were individually asked to be part of the Project. They expressed interest, but only if they could be together on the Project. The 10<sup>th</sup> District Commander agreed.

The Commander also indicated to the Coordinator later that he thought less-seasoned officers might do a better job. Veterans would have set views. They would not be as likely to change the typical police approach – “just lock 'em up, lock 'em up.” R. C. also said he knew a lot of the Little Village gang guys before starting the Project because he went to school with the older brothers of the Two Six in the 10<sup>th</sup> District. Both officers had just started working with

gangs as part of their police tactical work, and did not know much about the traditional CPD approach to youth gangs. R. C. indicated they did know patrol officers who had known these kids almost from the time they were born. These regular beat officers knew the families of these kids and said maybe they could help R. C. and G. S. They could “talk to the dads” whom they may have locked up years ago. Or they would say, “you know this kid is going to have an uphill battle because I locked up his dad for murder and he already has a hard-on for the police.”

The Project Coordinator (I. S.) asked a series of questions of R. C. and G. S., with their responses tape recorded, as follows:

I. S. What happened when you first came to the Project?

G.S. Part of the problem in the beginning was that there was no direction. Nobody really knew what they wanted us to do. We kind of looked at it as, we’re at the law end of it. If one of the kids is the bad apple, we can pull him out. If we can pull that shooter out, or the guy that’s doing the stick-ups, maybe we can quiet the rest of them down. We’re going to go out there and find out who these guys are, and when they screw up, we’re going to do our job, and we’re going to try to get them incarcerated. If we don’t get lucky and put them in jail for a long time, then maybe we’ll get them on probation and keep an eye on them twenty-four hours a day. And everybody’s got to work together and figure out what the kids are doing.

R.C. Community policing was just starting and nobody was paying much attention to us... so

we kind of went out and did this Project with the University and probation, and ... set our own rules, our own groundwork without the help of anybody else. Just started, trying different things.

G.S. The first thing... we went out there and started talking the these guys. We let them know who we are and what we're doing. We put out the word that we are the police, but if you have a problem, talk to us. If we can do something for you, we'll do it. We're not out here just trying to lock everybody up, because obviously that didn't work. If you have a problem, like you feel you can't go to your family; the boys on the street aren't helping you out, maybe we're the connection. We got some guys like street workers or the connections which the university had that can do something for these guys. Before the Project, what were the chances, if a kid came to a policeman and said, 'hey listen, I got kicked out of school for fighting, and I need to get back, I screwed up?' A policeman couldn't do anything.

R.C. We had a hard time in the beginning because the district police believed we were going to play babysitter. We got a lot of grief from other policemen. They thought we were going to stop doing police work and start doing social work.

G.S. And you know when we first talked with the gang guys that first night, a crowd of them gathered. Joe Citizen didn't realize what was going on. So, immediately they're calling the police saying it's a gang fight. We had to get on the radio and

say we're just talking to these guys. That's all there is to it. Well Joe Citizen doesn't see it that way. A lot of times, people look at us and they say; we don't want the police out there just talking to these guys, we want the police to lock up these guys, and throw the key away.

And a lot of time because of the media, Joe Public in Chicago also gets ideas that the police are just gang bangers themselves, congregating and making deals with these guys. But we were just talking with these guys. In the beginning we took a lot of aggravation from our own people. Other policemen got ugly. I told them I talk to those kids the same as I'm talking to you. You know not all these kids are bad kids. Some of these kids are having a lot of problems and we're trying to help them out. But the other police would say, "we want them locked up. That's our job." I say, excuse me, I lock them up, and three hours later they get out. Would that change any thing? I locked the kid up for gang loitering but the kid wasn't doing anything; and then I get them all against the police.

I.S. And has that changed much?

R.C. It's changed a lot since we started. The tactical police we work with, they've seen what we've done in four years, how we've developed the information that they didn't have and that they need. Now a lot of them are coming to us for information.

I.S. So, what do you see now as the role of the police?

R.C. We went out and from day one, we just started talking to everybody. We got to know all the gang sections. We got everybody's name by talking to them. We checked the arrest reports. We pinpointed the violent offenders and the guys who could be shooters, and they usually turned out to be shooters.

G.S. And who they teamed up with to do the shooting was important. It's a pattern. A guy is not going to do a shooting with somebody he doesn't really know that well. That guy could be talking to the police. But when he's done something with this guy and nothing's happened before, then he says "I'm safe with this guy." And so if those guys are arrested together, you have to watch them both.

R.C. You'll see that we didn't make many arrests in the first year. But once we got to the shot-callers, we began to solve a lot of homicides, especially in the second and third year.

I.S. How do you men start your day off?

G.S. The first thing we do when we go into the station is start talking to everybody working the same beats.

R.C. We call the detectives to see if they want us to pick up anybody we know, especially for a shooting. We know a lot of the gang guys out there and the detectives call us for information. We talk to the gang guys, the “tact” team, the rapid response guys.

I.S. How does your work differ from that of the gang or “tact” team right now?

R.C. Right now, they’re starting to do what we’re doing. They’re getting to know the kids. They’re talking to them. They have no choice. The Lieutenant is asking them to submit reports. This is all of the stuff we did a long time ago. They didn’t know who the guys were who were doing the crime.

G.S. And the other thing is that because we are not tied down to making a certain number of arrests per day or per week, and we don’t have a sergeant screaming over us, “ I want to see heads on this or that,” we’re able to concentrate on the gang problems. A lot of time if a police officer has to make a certain quota of arrests, no matter what it’s for, he’s going to bring something in, whether it’s a drunk, a mob action, a disorderly conduct, anybody with possession of dope or a gun. We don’t have that, so we concentrate on gang individuals and gang incidents.

I.S. Because you and the “tact” or gang team are now doing about the same thing, do you sometimes cross wires?

G.S. It's a problem. One of the Two Six [target guy] recently did an armed robbery that we knew about, and one of the gang teams also knew about it. Then the second gang team was on the following day, but didn't know anything about the incident. They wondered why we didn't let them have all the facts about the kids. We said we gave the first team all the information and assumed they would be talking to the second team when they came on. They didn't tell the second team because they wanted to get credit for the arrest.

I.S. So you also serve a kind of coordinating function. Officers give or should give the information you have to other officers, but many of the officers don't share the information.

R.C. Right. Now we're at the point where we're playing middle-man between the "tact" teams, the gangs and the other police, because we know a lot of people out there, not just gang kids. We can get information from probation about these kids – whether they're on probation or not.

G.S. The probation team has been great. We call them at home, "hey listen I need a favor, you've got to do whatever you can to help us with this guy." That worked out in a homicide recently. They had a guy under house arrest. He told the probation he would talk to us, but not in his home. The kid said, "make it look like you're taking me in," and we got the information we needed.

I.S. What are you doing that's different from what the gang or "tact" team is doing now?

R.C. For one, we're talking to probation almost on a daily basis. We also talk to the street workers from the university almost on a daily basis. We're gathering information. Sometimes even when we're not working, the probation or street worker guys call us about gang kids or incidents.

The regular gang or "tact" teams do an excellent job when it comes to arresting these guys for guns and things like that. That helps us too. They pinch a kid that we know and the kid may come to us and say, "They got me. Maybe there's something you can do for me." We get additional information that way.

G.S. That happens more than you think. It's amazing. These kids get arrested, they grab us on the street, "I got to talk to you. I got arrested with a gun by so and so two days ago. It's like, I'm on probation. I can't take a gun. I'll tell you whatever you need to know. Can you help me out." Sometimes the kid complains about a particular officer that's picking on him.

R.C. So we'll go to the police officer and say, "Give the guy some slack. He's talking to us, and he's giving us information. If he gives us anything, we'll give it to you guys Okay?" And the officer says "Okay." A couple of days later, we might call that officer and say remember the guy you've been bugging, he just gave us some information on a dope house... and if the officer goes and makes an arrest on the information, he'll say, "Okay,



leave it alone for a while.” Then the kid’s happy. Everybody’s happy.

I.S. What about the other members of the team? Does the team arrangement make sense in doing your law enforcement thing?

G.S. Oh definitely. Obviously, we’re going to trust law enforcement pretty much right off the bat. We’ve started trusting probation. The same with pre-trial services.<sup>1</sup> We’ll tell those guys anything. We feel like we’re talking to our own. But it took longer to develop relationships with the street workers.

R.C. These guys were gang members. If we told these guys something, we didn’t know how far it would go. They still have close relationships with the gang.

G.S. It was not only that we didn’t trust them. They didn’t trust us. There were a few times, one of the street workers thought I was wearing a wire. Like we were trying to set him up, and he got really paranoid and we’re like, “whoa, relax”.

R.C. As far as the team in concerned, we probably had the most trouble with the neighborhood organizer. She got too involved with some of these gang guys.

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<sup>1</sup> Pre-trial officers were briefly in contact with the Project team before they were incorporated into the regular CCDAP. The pre-trial service workers were responsible for supervision of chronic and serious offenders before they went to trial or were adjudicated.

G.S. We locked this one guy up. He was out on bond, and the trial was still pending. He had a record for a whole string of crimes. We said, don't defend this guy.

I.S. Did the street workers defend this guy?

G.S. No, not the street workers. The neighborhood organizer. The guy commits a homicide and then he say he quits the gang. "Okay, I'm straight. I'm behaving now." But he still has tatoos all over his body. He has the mark of the Devil on his face. The police know it. The street workers know it. But the neighborhood organizer doesn't see things that way.

I.S. How do you build the team relationship?

R.C. We spent time together and even socialized. We'd be in our meetings once every other week, and a lot of times we went to eat pizza afterwards. We had a picnic one time and two or three Christmas parties. You get trust talking about the job to the street workers, and then you talk about other things.

G.S. You get to know the other team members beyond the job.

R.C. You're talking about my family and your family and stuff like that. That's where the trust comes in. I invited most of the people on the program to my wedding two year's

ago. You know we helped some of the street workers with personal problems, not related to the program at all. We've done stuff that the police would not normally do for them. Family problems.

G.S. Some of these guys have our home phone numbers. They call us at home, 24 hours a day. I don't know too many policeman who are going to do that with guys from the street. That's a trust thing.

I.S. What about sharing information?

G.S. You know our department is very tight-lipped. That's even a problem among the police. You share as much information as you can with other police – more often with officers I know or trust, that I've worked with in the past. Some coppers call on us for assistance. Some don't. Once, there was this gang guy that escaped from Cook County Jail. They couldn't find him. Then they got the bright idea to call us.

I.S. The reason you were able to get this guy was because of a former youth worker that we fired, right?

G.S. That's true.

R.C. He didn't know much about the guy or the escape, but he was a connection. He told us

indirectly at first where to go. It was a piece of the puzzle.

G.S. The youth worker's girlfriend ended up getting charged with something. She was in custody, and depending on what's going to happen to her, we got information out of the worker.

R.C. Then, the FBI began to come to us for information. There was a kid killed outside of Little Village that we didn't know, apparently a Two Six. A Gang Crime Specialist put the FBI in touch with us because everybody was contacting us about gang incidents related to Little Village. As luck would have it, we knew about one of the kids involved. We helped put pieces of that puzzle together for them.

I.S. You share information with the police and probation. So what kind of information do you share with street workers?

G.S. You know, it depends on the particular street worker.

R.C. With certain street workers, we can say we're looking for the guy for murder. We're not sure he's the right guy. What can you find out about him?

G.S. Sometimes, he'll get the information we need and give it to us. But we are never going to front the street worker as a snitch. We don't want none of the workers to get harmed

because of the information they give us. We're not going to jeopardize anybody's life just for a piece of information on somebody's murder or arrest.

R.C. We'll never bring that worker's name up.

G.S. That's where the cellular phone has been a great asset. They can call us on the phone, and nobody knows who talked to us. I'm never going to tell who gave me the information. That's never come up.

But it's not just that kind of information we share. Sometimes, we're out late at night or early in the morning and we see this kid out. We get his name. He's fourteen years old. We call the street worker, we ask him, "do you know the kid's family"? Often the worker knows the family. The street worker will talk to the kid and the family about his sneaking out of the house. We say, he's going to get into trouble with the older guys because he hangs out with them. Either they're going to use him to hold the gun, hold the dope, steal the car, or whatever. They're going to use him. And the kid's not smart enough or he doesn't have enough self-esteem to tell them no. He goes along with the flow, to be one of the boys. Maybe his parents don't know what's going on out there. And I don't really have the connection with the parents. But the street worker does.

R.C. Then we got this call from Lester the street worker. The mother found a gun in the kid's bedroom and called him. She didn't know what to do with it. She's afraid the police are going to lock-up her son. Lester calls us. I asked him what kind of kid is he? He says,

“a real good kid. This is the first time he ever did anything wrong. Somebody gave him the gun to hold.”

So we went with Lester to the home to see if we could straighten this thing out. The mother made the kid stay home. We went to the house. We took the gun. We said we were not going to arrest the kid. After talking to the kid and to the mother, Lester recommended certain things, especially getting the kid into a different program at school, so he would go more regularly and make different friends.

We realized this kid didn't need to go to jail for his mistake. We also didn't want him to establish a record so that he could say to his gang members that he's been arrested, and released. The court isn't going to hold him on a first offense. We didn't want the kid to say, “ That's easy. I can do it again.”

I.S. Is there any thing more on building credibility with the gang members?

G.S. You know we have to live up to what we say. A lot of times the police officer just wants the arrest, and they'll force the kid to give up information. Then the police officer will go to the other guy and say, “He told me this about you.” Not only are they putting that kid in jeopardy, but they are often trying to squeeze the guy to whom they are revealing information. Say, “ Okay, now what information can you give on the first guy.” We don't do that. We never do that. It puts everybody in jeopardy, and we lose our credibility.

The first kid says I told you something in confidence, and you turn around and break that confidence. You told me you weren't going to say anything or implicate me. Maybe you said the same thing to the other guy. You're lying and making people rat on each other. If you do that you lose your credibility. We don't do that.

I.S. You've got admirers among the gang kids?

G.S. I remember we stopped one of the gang kids, a while ago. He was one of the Latin King section leaders. We caught him with two bullets. That happens every day. It's no big deal. It wasn't worth our time and trouble to arrest him. Besides, we wanted to establish a relationship with him. He was well connected to the main gang leaders. I said to him, "I think you're smarter than this. We're going to take the bullets. Don't let something stupid like this happen again. Goodbye." The guy looked at us like "Oh my God, this is incredible. Those cops didn't arrest me." Later the street workers came to us and said, "Man, he thinks you guys are the greatest. You could have put him jail for a lot of time."

I.S. So, who should be on the team in terms of types of people?

R.C. I'd like to see police and probation involved. But they have to be knowledgeable. It can't just be any policeman or probation officer. I wouldn't take any overly-aggressive officer; that's for sure.

G.S. That's part of the problem, you know. When you start talking to these potential police as team members, you have to see their approach. You give them the question: "Okay, you're a police officer, and you have a kid that's caught, let's say spray painting. What would your decision be? Lock him up for thirty days or maybe have him remove the graffiti, while his parents stand out there and watch. And make sure he goes back to school and put him on some sort of close supervision or probation." You have to see how hard a line an officer takes. You can not just snap the line on these kids. You have to give them some leeway, because otherwise it doesn't work. I mean, if they don't have the discipline at home, it's not going to change anything. We cannot be the disciplinarians. I would not put an older police officer on a Project like this, because he usually doesn't have the right mentality for gang kids: "Lock all these guys up. And let God sort it out." But that does not work!

R.C. One of the bad things about this job is that we get attached to these kids and the families. We interact with the kids' families. It makes it hard sometimes, especially if we know the family well. We've had to lock guys up for murder. We knew the kid and his background. We knew what he was capable of doing, and we were hoping that it would not come to putting him away – sometimes for thirty years.

I.S. What about probation officers? What kind of officers should be on the Project?



G.S. They're like us. The same qualifications should apply. They can be more helpful to the kid, but they have to understand and know how tough to be with them.

I.S. And the youth workers or street workers?

G.S. You definitely need them.

I.S. What kind of youth worker do we need for this kind of Project.

R.C. You have to check the youth workers out carefully. A good idea would be to have a balance of a former gang banger with some one from the neighborhood who has a college education. For example, Lester. He was a member of the Latin Kings. He isn't bad. He has some good work experience. He could be a good role model for the kids. Besides, this job helps the youth worker himself go straight. He can get something out of this program that will be useful for his future.

I.S. What about Frankie the street worker who wasn't confiding in you at the beginning?

G.S. You know, believe it or not, Frankie has come around. In the beginning, he didn't want to talk to us. He didn't trust us, and he was afraid that we were going to middle him. It took time to build our relationship. Frankie has come around a lot. We got to help the youth workers as well as the kids.

- R.C. He's not active in the gang, the same as Manny. We had to get rid of him.
- G.S. You know I think Frankie is more intelligent than Manny. He came out of prison and realized what he lost, and he decided that he ain't going back there. He would much rather get a job and have a family. His priorities have changed.
- I.S. It's hard to pick the right youth workers.
- R.C. That's why you have to try to keep a balance with some former gang guys and some college guys.
- I.S. What about the neighborhood organizer in the Project?
- G.S. You need a neighborhood organizer in the Project, not necessarily an activist, but somebody to get the community involved.
- I.S. The neighborhood organizer was supposed to have three missions: to organize the parents, to organize the agencies to work together on the problem, and to develop resources for the kids.
- R.C. The neighborhood organizer we have is from Neighbors Against Gang Violence. I would think she's supposed to get the neighborhood, the families together, and say, "We're

going to stop this. We're going to help the police, probation. We're going to stop the violence."

I guess she could also target certain kids and families for special help. But she has to be careful about which kid she tries to help. She gets too identified with some of them, the wrong ones. We tell her not to help the hardcore guys who have been arrested four times, twice for shootings, two times for a stolen car, and we think he did a murder. That's not the kid she as a neighborhood organizer should try to help. Let's get to this other kid. He's only been arrested once, for disorderly conduct. He's in the gang but he's on the edge and figure out how the community can pull him out. The neighborhood organizer should do more prevention, and help the community do more prevention.

- G.S. She takes it on herself to worry about these kids, but she picks the wrong ones.
  
- R.C. She also believes everything that the kids are telling her against the cops is true. They're using her. She's also trying to do the job of the youth worker, and doesn't know how to do it. She's not supposed to do it.
  
- G.S. You need a neighborhood organizer who knows the community, who has relationships with the families, who can get access to resources. She should be in a position to mainly help the street workers. She has to provide information about resources to the youth worker. He works with the kids directly. She works indirectly with the kids, helping the

family, helping the worker get to agency resources.

R.C. The neighborhood organizer should teach the parents what to look for in their kid.

Maybe their kid has just recently joined the gang, using gang colors. The neighborhood organizer should get the parents together at meetings and teach them about gangs.

G.S. Gang Awareness.

R.C. Their sons are starting to join gangs; this guy is wearing his hat cocked or has different color clothes. And he comes up with a tattoo and tells his mom, "Well that means I love you, ma." And it's really a gang symbol.

G.S. But above all, you have to get the neighborhood organizer to involve the community because it's their kids and the kids are the community. The family is part of the community. The neighborhood organizer and the community did not really help us out enough. There were times when we were looking for a particular individual. We were questioning people, and they would say to us, "You know, you guys just work here. But we live here. And our families live here. So, you don't know who you're questioning. There could be times when you're questioning my uncle, my aunt. You think they're going to help you? They're not going to help you. This is my community." They are kind of telling us, "we control the community. We can get away with whatever we want. This is our community."

R.C. Our neighborhood organizer never helped us enough. She gave us a few bits of information. She wanted information for her own purposes. Sometimes it was the wrong purpose, just to get these guys out of jail who should be in jail. Some of her own kids were associating with gang bangers.

G.S. Another thing, resources. The Project tried to make resources available but we caught hell from certain parts of the community and the agencies, and also our own police department. We opened up Pietrowski Park so the gang kids could play basketball. But we never heard the end of that. “These kids are playing basketball. You’re doing this and that for these guys but not the good kids.”

Then we would say, “What happened when the basketball game was going on? How many crimes were committed? The trouble makers were off the streets that night, and nothing happened. If you leave these kids on the streets, and you say you didn’t want them here and you don’t want them there, they’ll find something to do, and it’s not going to be what you or I want them to do.”

You know our 10<sup>th</sup> District is beginning to change. Some of the cops said, let’s open up a gym and let these kids do some boxing. This Project is starting to open up the eyes of the police guys and educate them a little bit. Giving the kids something to do is not such a bad idea.

I.S. Okay, the last thing is how do you organize a Project like this? What do you need?

- G.S. As we said before, before you get anything off the ground, you have to have resources in place, jobs, school, housing, medical, social activities – every possible thing that these kids are going to need. If you bring in empty promises, you're going to lose your credibility. They'll think you're blowing smoke.
- I.S. It took us two years, two years to gain access to resources, so the kids could go back to schools and get jobs for these fellows.
- G.S. Basically what a lot of these kids need is somebody to keep them occupied, whether at school or on the jobs or somebody to talk to. They could have personal problems, like with a girlfriend. She could be screaming she needs money to pay for their kid's diapers or to pay the rent. The gang guys need someone who can help them with these things. When they don't have the help, they're going to resort to stick-ups, sell dope or whatever.
- I.S. What should we avoid doing, if the Project continues?
- G.S. We need a leader from the CPD. You also have to have somebody with "clout". He has to be able to carry things out. We need somebody that has authority to get things done.
- R.C. We did a lot of stuff on our own, a lot of stuff.
- G.S. Because we were just police officers, and not sergeants, lieutenants, commanders, it was

extremely difficult. Nobody wanted to help us, because we were just patrol men. And there's twelve thousand of us.

R.C. But we found a way to do all that had to be done.

G.S. We wanted it done. But it really has to come from the top command, first. If you don't have their blessing, it's not going to happen, or happen as well as it could. This kind of Project needs a long term commitment. We need somebody that says, "Hey listen, I've got a long way to go. This looks like it's worth a shot. I'm going to stick with it."

## Chapter 7

### Community Mobilization

#### Introduction

Everyone in Little Village seemed to accept the notion that the gang-violence problem was extremely serious and had to be prevented or controlled; even gang members said they were against gang violence. There seemed to be a general readiness to support the particular roles of the youth workers, police, probation, and various community agencies and groups. However, the idea of an interagency or inclusive community organization addressing the gang problem was less clear. The need for a Project community advisory group was expressed in the original Chicago Police Department concept paper and funding proposal, but little consideration was given to its specific local-citizen or organizational form, process, or set of activities to be developed.

Organizing (or mobilizing) the community did not become a priority in the Little Village Project. The purpose of local-community mobilization was seen primarily as local-citizen and agency involvement in support of the purpose and structure of the program, which had already been decided, and also as a means to obtain social-intervention resources to provide social opportunities to gang youth. Local-resident and local-agency input in and commitment to the Project were envisioned, but in what way or how was not spelled out. The development of a high-level interagency steering committee or council involving the police department, adult and juvenile probation, local schools, and existing community coalitions, as well as other influential citywide groups and agencies, was not considered. A general community problem-solving or economic-development program in relation to the gang problem was not a primary or even a



secondary Project goal.

Community mobilization, like the term community organizing, community development, community involvement, community empowerment, or even the plain term community, is amorphous and complex. It is often employed rhetorically, politically, or sometimes rationally to signify a collective goal or good that should be sought by a group of people and/or organizations, often in relation to a non-satisfactory community condition or problem that needs to be prevented or addressed. The units of community and community mobilization generally indicate a structure and process that are smaller and less powerful than those at the governmental or larger environmental levels with which it interacts and which it may also influence.

Community mobilization, whether it is a problem-solving process, a goal, or a network of people and/or organizations in a neighborhood, city, across a state or even at a national level, is not something static or readily engineered, particularly in modern society. Community mobilization usually signifies a shifting set of interacting values, developing structures and contending forces to sometimes partially achieve goals and objectives, not always clearly defined, with results not always sustained.

Community mobilization was one of five model strategies that were to have been employed in the reduction of gang violence in Little Village. The others were social intervention, suppression, provision of social opportunities, and organizational change and development of policies and programs targeted to selected gangs and gang members in the area. Each of these interacting strategies, especially community mobilization, has multiple interactive dimensions. Local and external community conditions may support or limit the nature and scope of the local community mobilization process. In Chicago, the specific contextual and

organizational processes which affected Little Village mobilization were: (1) neighborhood and city politics; (2) organizational mission and power; (3) leadership interest and ideology; and (4) local community concerns and efforts.

In the discussion below we first briefly describe the key elements which we believe significantly affected community mobilization efforts around the gang problem in Little Village, and secondly, the sequence of mobilization activities actually carried out by the Project Neighborhood Organizer and the Coordinator. Limited and fragmented efforts went into the development of the community-mobilization strategy at the local level, without the essential support of external and/or internal organizational interests and leadership. These deficiencies affected institutionalization of the Project approach (see Chapter 17).

Neighborhood and City Politics. There is a long tradition of using the gang problem for political, organizational and moral-interest purposes by both aspiring and established leaders in Chicago. Current or former gang members have traditionally been employed by some local politicians, particularly in ghetto or transitional communities in the city, to get the vote out, intimidate opposition candidates, and to justify and represent local community interests. For politicians seeking higher office, gangs often symbolize the moral basis for the fight of “good” people against evil. Most political leaders, especially at election time, are expected to encourage a range of anti-gang actions. Suppression is almost always advocated, with little reference to its results or effectiveness for purposes of crime control.

Before the 1995 aldermanic election, Alderman Medrano of the 25<sup>th</sup> Ward (which includes mainly Pilsen but also the eastern part of Little Village) talked about “his successful

attacks against the drug peddling Ambrose Gang on 18<sup>th</sup> Street...” Democratic State Representative Ray Frias, running for aldermanic office in the 12<sup>th</sup> ward enclosing the western section of Little Village, talked about “pushing through anti-gang measures in Springfield.” And 22<sup>nd</sup> ward (in the mid-section of Little Village) aldermanic candidate Juan Rangel said it was “time to stop making excuses for gang behavior.” He portrayed the existing alderman, Ricardo Munoz, as a supporter of gangs. This was part of Chicago’s “new street gang politics.” Alderman Munoz was an opponent of Mayor Daley and a leader of a long-running feud among liberal and conservative Latino elements on the Southwest Side. Both Rangel and Munoz attended the early organizing meetings of Neighbors Against Gang Violence (NAGV).

Major community organizations in Little Village and Pilsen were engaged in the electoral process. In the “democratic mayoral primary between Daley and challenger Joseph Gardner, Danny Solis, director of UNO (United Neighborhood Organization) stood next to his candidate, Rangel, and shouted .... ‘we didn’t invite Munoz because we don’t support the active recruitment of street gangs, into politics as he does.’” Daley and Munoz both won in their respective elections in 1995. Danny Solis later was appointed alderman of the 25<sup>th</sup> Ward by Mayor Daley, after Medrano was forced to resign because of a conviction of criminal activity. Ray Frias was elected. Alderman Munoz persisted in his interest and support of NAGV and the GVRP until both organizations were terminated. Neither of the other two aldermen expressed any interest in the GVRP.

The above quotes come from a Chicago Tribune article which also noted that “the Rangel-Munoz feud is a blip in a much larger political war between activist Solis and the more liberal Garcia for the allegiance of the growing Latino electorate” (Kass 1995). Mayor Daley

consistently made it clear that his first order of business was to control crime and to protect and serve the community, and that the destruction of gangs should be accomplished almost exclusively through police suppression. A key question that arises is to what extent he knew about and really supported the GVRP. Part of the answer could be that he lacked a clear understanding of the purpose and nature of the GVRP at its initiation, and that once he understood the purpose and nature of Project operations in Little Village, he was against it. Had the Mayor supported the Project, the approach would readily have been sustained, particularly since local and national funding were available for three more years at the time the Project was officially terminated by the Chicago Police Department.

Organizational Mission and Power. Few agencies in Chicago had an interest in the gang problem other than through suppression, or avoidance. Youth agencies were mainly interested in the prevention of delinquency or gang membership for younger youth, mainly through recreational programs. There were no social-intervention or outreach youth-worker programs concerned with the gang problem in Little Village. Schools continually searched for methods such as “zero tolerance,” weapons screening, school uniform requirements, and drug free zones as well as suspensions and expulsions that would “get rid of gang youth.” Schools used the police to control potential or actual gang outbreaks on school grounds. They also used police or youth-agency personnel to teach youth to avoid joining a gang. The primary focus was on “good kids” in the school and how to protect them from gang members and gang activity, and not on the provision of special educational training or social support programs to keep gang or gang-prone youth in the regular school system.

There were some churches and recreation centers in Little Village that tolerated individual gang youth. Precautions were usually taken by recreation-center staff to prevent gang fights and keep troublemakers out of the agency. The priest's or minister's primary role was counseling families and youth to avoid gangs and providing memorial services to families and the community on behalf of gang youth or their victims who died in turf wars. There was no identifiable program to deal with particular gangs or gang youth, to provide them with special treatment, rehabilitation, or social-development or control services. The predominant organization in Chicago and Little Village addressing the gang problem was the CPD. Until 1993 the Gang Crime Unit had special responsibility for intelligence and law enforcement in regard to gang crime. The Gang Crime Unit had grown from a small operation of eight officers in the mid 1960s to the largest CPD unit – over five hundred men – in the late 1980s. However, in 1993 its size was reduced and its street-level operational function decentralized and integrated into the tactical units of the various local police districts. The Mayor and the CPD were still highly concerned with the gang problem, but organizational arrangements to address it were now decentralized and diffused. The district gang officers, as part of the tactical team, provided a focus on law enforcement and also on gang-awareness training for a variety of community groups. The Gang Intelligence Unit, now part of the Organized Crime Division, remained the main source of information about gang problems and regularly provided gang statistics for media consumption.

With the election of the new mayor, the appointment of a new superintendent of police, and an emphasis on community policing in 1993, the police suppression approach was not modified. District-level tactical and gang officers still represented the tough-on-crime, derring-

do approach of the CPD. Citizen involvement through community policing was expected to aid the police in its general crime-control and prevention efforts. Other criminal-justice organizations, whether prosecution or probation, remained largely dependent on the knowledge, skill, and leadership of the CPD gang officers in regard to the gang problem. Cooperative relationships among law enforcement agencies in Chicago and Cook County were not clearly developed.

Leadership Interest and Ideology. The gang problem in Chicago was extensive and serious, but no established agency or community leader appeared to have a significant plan for dealing with it, other than suppression and possibly recreational activity. In recent decades, there had been no general discussion or systematic effort to analyze the problem and explore alternative and perhaps more successful ways of addressing it. Community-agency and organizational leadership seemed to settle on two general approaches: (1) partially ignoring the problem, living with it, or in crises coming up with a demand for more police; (2) exploiting the problem for political purposes or agency-leadership advantage, mainly to secure more agency resources for organizational-development purposes. The gang problem had become the institutional means for goal achievement or goal displacement through a range of moral, political, social, educational, economic, and cultural objectives fundamentally unrelated to effectively addressing the gang problem.

Politicians and entrepreneurial administrators or professionals from mental health, youth-work, media, government, religious, and criminal-justice agencies often made use of the gang problem to push particular organizational agendas. The complex nature of the gang problem was not specified. Solutions proposed were either vague, generalized, and not targeted to issues of

prevention or intervention. A great deal of conviction and sincerity, if not evangelical fervor, usually accompanied these sporadic and pseudo crime-control efforts. Considerable public-relations attention, and reputational, moral, and economic benefits often accrued to the leaders of these efforts, at least during gang crises for a short time after the Program was initiated.

Conflicting policies and program approaches evolved or were recommended. Each suffered from a lack of resources, limited administrative capacity, goal displacement, and short existence. Some community-based programs directed to mediating conflicts between gangs soon turned to recreational services; some prevention programs were targeted to youth who had little likelihood of gang involvement; some social reformers viewed gangs and gang problems as mainly caused by racism, sexism, and/or capitalism, and recommended that such programs should not be established; some academics and political aspirants saw gangs as a positive force in the community, contributing to neighborhood development, and even to youth's school achievement.

#### Local Community Concerns and Efforts

Local community groups and residents in Little Village and elsewhere were intensely concerned with gang crime but were not sure what to do, or whether they could do anything about it. Neighborhood residents and parents were often conflicted over simultaneous needs for suppression and or/rehabilitation, but distracted or immobilized by a variety of personal, family, and other community problems. Gang youth were the sons (and sometimes daughters) of local residents. Fear and denial of the problem by parents were succeeded by frustration at the discovery that offspring were gang-involved; this was followed by apathy and confusion. Gang

youth were also part of an illegal income-providing system which benefitted certain parents and residents. In some cases the gang problem was intergenerational, and it seemed that there was little that could be done about it.

A 1990 community youth survey conducted by staff and students of a local youth agency – Latino Youth – in Pilsen/Little Village dealt with the gang problem. The findings were based on a randomly selected telephone sample of 353 persons aged fourteen to twenty one years in the two communities. Among the many problems articulated (unemployment, substance abuse, lack of health service, etc.), most youth in Pilsen and Little Village saw gangs as the most serious problem. Other problems such as school dropout, teen pregnancy and even family problems were viewed as caused by gangs. At least fifteen percent of all Latino youth in the area said they had been injured in gang-related activities. Gangs were perceived as a fact of life. Most youth expected gang activity either to become worse (46%) or to remain the same (28%); only a few thought the situation would improve (17%). More youth in Little Village than in Pilsen thought that gangs were the most serious problem affecting their community (70% and 62%, respectively); also more Little Village youth thought that gang activity would get worse in the future (Little Village 48%; Pilsen 42%), even though Little Village was considered economically better off than Pilsen (Proyecto Intercambio, Latino Youth, Inc., *Report on The Pilsen/Little Village Youth Needs Assessment Project, December 1990*, p. 6).

A second community survey, conducted by the research staff affiliated with the Gang Violence Reduction Project in 1992-1993 with heads of household in Little Village and Pilsen, produced similar findings. Residents most often mentioned gangs (86.5%) as a problem in the community: Pilsen residents (92.8%) and Little Village residents (80.2%). The second most



frequently mentioned problem was general crime and safety (51.8%): Little Village, (53.2%) and Pilsen (41.2%). Drugs and lack of services was the third set of problems most frequently mentioned, Little Village (31.3% and 28.1%, respectively) and Pilsen (26.8% and 27.8%, respectively). These problems again were mentioned more often than the economy, unemployment, ineffective parenting, alcohol, poor education, or housing (see Chapter 17).

Community efforts in Little Village and other high gang-crime communities to address the problem were limited. Marches, testimonials and community meetings typically were usually sporadic, one-time affairs. Patrols of local residents formed to protect youth on the way to and from school, as well as citizen efforts to aid police to detect or control gang activities, were short lived. Police occasionally instructed parents on how to determine whether their son was a gang member. Police sweeps, restrictive laws, or severe penalties for gang offenders were usually called for by local citizens as a last resort.

### Beginning the Organizing Process

The priority Project objective at the start had to be the creation of a street-level team to control and provide services to target gang youth in Little Village. The second objective would then be community involvement. How these two strategies were to be interrelated was not clear. The immediate community-organizing related activity was meeting with local community agencies, particularly around the need for jobs expressed by gang youth. The Project administrative staff spent a great deal of time contacting local employers as well as city agencies, colleges, unions, and youth agencies to inquire about access to training and jobs for program youth. Suburban Job Link, Inc., a relatively new agency in Little Village, happened to be

seeking applicants for jobs in booming suburban factories and businesses, but referral, transportation, and specific job-referral services were required. Several local agencies expressed an interest in providing special job-training, educational, and social-service support services to gang youth, but needed resources to do so.

The Coordinator's attempts to address this issue were not successful. The ICJIA and CPD would not provide any additional funds or subcontracts to local organizations (other than those supplied to CCAPD and the University of Chicago). Allocations to particular local agencies or organizations should have been provided from the beginning of the Project, to augment programs to gang youth on condition of being part of an interagency community-wide effort targeted to the gang problem. Interagency case management directed at program youth, or a range of other youth at serious risk of gang involvement, was not possible without additional funding. The Gang Violence Reduction Project was not in a position to both serve the interests of the youth and meet survival and expansion needs of organizations concerned with gang youth.

Interest in Community Organizing. There was no broad Little Village resident and organizational constituency to address the chronic gang problem. Such constituencies were beginning to form around other neighborhood problems, such as housing, education, health, sanitation, and economic development. The police in Little Village had the greatest interest in the gang problem. Schools had limited interest. They claimed they had to contend with other priority problems – poor student attendance, truancy, low educational achievement, racial conflicts (African-Americans versus Mexican-Americans). Youth agencies would participate as part of a network of agencies concerned with the problem, but, again, were primarily interested in recreation and gang-prevention activities for younger, possibly at-risk youth. Certain local

churches, however, came closest to addressing the gang problem in community-resident and resource-development terms. Local Catholic churches were very concerned with the needs of their Mexican-American parishioners, including families with youth who had gang problems.

The major community organization in the area, The Alliance for Community Excellence (ACE), was a broad coalition of local citizens, public agencies and businesses, and political, educational, social and religious organizations concerned with selected social, economic, law-enforcement, educational, and housing issues in both Little Village and Pilsen. ACE was the local neighborhood organization unit of UNO, the larger citywide organization. A confederation of Catholic churches also existed in the larger Little Village and Pilsen area, but it also had little interest in the gang problem. One of the Catholic church members of this coalition did establish a mission to meet the religious needs of prisoners, many of them gang members, in the nearby Cook County jail. However, there were three Little Village Catholic, and one Protestant, community churches that were deeply concerned, were interested in the gang problem in social, religious, and community-development terms and provided facilities for use by the Project staff in serving youth. A Priest from two of the Catholic Churches and a Protestant Minister from an Evangelical Community Church later assisted in the development of both NAGV and the GVRP.

The 10<sup>th</sup> Police District's Neighborhood Relations Council was also a potential source of local citizens and organizational representatives who could possibly participate in the GVRP. However, the Council represented mainly the northern part of the district, comprising African-American residents. Little Village Latino residents and organizations hardly participated in the Council. Only one Mexican-American businessman, a funeral director, appeared to be involved. The Council was also concerned primarily with eliminating drug houses in the African-American

part of the community.

There appeared to be only a few options for community and broader interagency involvement in developing, advising, and ultimately assuming responsibility for the Project:

1. A long-term, slow process of building institutional interest in the gang problem in one or more of the existing coalitions – ACE, the Catholic Confederation, and/or the 10<sup>th</sup> District council (CAPS);
2. A quick start-up of a new grass roots, local citizen and organization coalition to contribute to the development of the program; and
3. Persuading the police hierarchy at the downtown office to incorporate the Gang Violence Reduction Project approach in its community policing program and/or to take leadership in the development of a comprehensive community-wide approach to the gang problem in Little Village, involving a broader range of agencies and community groups.

To some extent the Project followed all three routes in the early period, but eventually focused on the second alternative, building a grass roots organization around the gang problem. A major limitation was the Police Department's and the Project's lack of a major focus (prior to or during the GVRP program) on building a broad base of community-organization interest and resident participation to address the gang problem. Also, during a meeting with the 10<sup>th</sup> District Commander about six months into the Project, he indicated that he saw no need for himself to be personally involved with GVRP. The two assigned tactical officers, G.S. and R.C. were to be the contacts between the Project and the 10<sup>th</sup> District. The CPD and the CCAPD were willing to sponsor a program of contact and service to gang youth with some unspecified neighborhood or

grass roots involvement for a limited period of time to see what would happen.

### The Sequence of Organizing Activities

Organizing the local community was initiated through an assessment of the community gang problem, and services that might be available to youth. The Crime Analysis Section of the CPD supplied aggregate gang and community-wide data about the gang problem. Outreach youth workers were determining the scope of the gang violence problem on the streets, and the University of Chicago research team was conducting a series of community resident and organization surveys. Contacts were also made with local service agencies, community groups, businesses, churches, the alderman's office and other individuals in the Little Village community to explain the Project. In this process, the Coordinator and the Assistant Director began to identify local leaders and activists who were not only concerned, but expressed interest in joining in an effort to address the problem. This occurred in terms of requests for specific program services to assist GVRP with program development. The pastor (N. C.) of a local Evangelical Protestant community church, offered rooms in his church that could be made available for GED or continuing education activities, as well as for community meetings. The priest (J. M.) of a local Catholic church, indicated that a large gym in the high school associated with the church might be used. The local alderman (R. M.) who himself had been involved peripherally in one of the local gangs as a youth, would make available block clubs and citizen contacts that could be helpful. The director of ACE, the local unit of UNO, also expressed some initial interest in the Project.

During the early period of community mobilization, contacts were made with

representatives of the Chicago Parks Department to provide access to a facility for basketball which one of the gangs could use. This request was received and positively acted upon. The recreation center at Piotrowski Park later became a place where police, probation, youth workers, and community volunteers could engage gang youth in recreational activities. At about the same time, the principal of the local high school, concerned with gang fights in and around the school, invited GVRP staff to explain the purpose of the Project to an assembly of teachers. The session served to provide information for GVRP staff about the scope of gang activities in the community and what teachers could do about gang tensions. In the days that followed, GVRP workers assisted school security guards in identifying gang leadership and helped “cool” tensions, particularly in the morning and afternoon when youth entered and left school grounds.

Project administrators also met a local community activist, M. L. G., at one of the ACE meetings. She was then employed as a local coordinator of services for a national alternative youth educational organization in the Chicago area. Earlier she had been an organizer for UNO, but had a “falling-out” and was no longer connected to the organization. She had close relations with families in Little Village who were concerned with the gang problem. She herself was a parent of three adolescent children and deeply interested in doing something about the gang problem. She volunteered to bring community leaders, residents, and local organizations together in some form of association to support GVRP. She knew the Catholic priests at Epiphany Catholic Church and Our Lady of Tepyac Church, the pastor of the Protestant La Villita Community Church, and the local director of Suburban Job Link, Inc. She could help develop resources and community contacts for the Project. With the encouragement of the Assistant Project Director, she had become very interested in the Project and especially in the

need for forming an advisory group. She had already selected a name for the potential organization, Neighbors Against Gang Violence (NAGV).

The GVRP research group planning a baseline community resident and organization survey in Little Village and Pilsen (the comparison community) added questions that might also help with the community organizing process. The community interview schedule for Little Village included a series of questions on whether local residents and organizations were interested in participating in Neighbors Against Gang Violence (NAGV), which was then forming. The later analysis of findings revealed that approximately 25% of the sample of fifty local organizations and 50% of the one hundred local residents interviewed were apparently interested in participating in some form of community action to address the gang problem.

By the spring of 1993 M. L. G. and Pastor N. C. had become the key movers in efforts to bring the community together around the gang problem. A community meeting was planned. The findings of the survey were made available and a series of phone calls followed by N. C., M. L. G., and GVRP staff to local residents and organizations informing them of the open community meeting at La Villita Community Church (N. C.'s church). Announcements were made at several of the Catholic churches at Sunday masses. Flyers were distributed throughout the area by Project youth workers.

Approximately thirty five people appeared at the first community meeting May 18<sup>th</sup>, 1993. Present were Project police, probation officers and community youth workers, and representatives of other agencies, but only seven local residents. A second community meeting was held shortly after, on June 1, 1993 and drew about sixty persons, including forty local residents (six were children). Great concern was voiced at both meetings about the gang

problem, especially as it affected children caught in gang cross-fires. A number of suggestions were made including activities for gang youth, adult volunteer activity, and ways to organize.

At the June meeting, a small number of residents and agency representatives volunteered to participate in a block-by-block organizing effort with the aid of police, probation, and youth workers. A part-time (20 hours per week) clerical assistant from the La Villita Community Church and a part-time organizer were to be funded through GVRP's staff budget line to manage and coordinate the organizing process under the direction of M.L.G. and N.C. for a three-month period until funding from outside sources was obtained for the new neighborhood organization. M.L.G. and the Project Coordinator began to solicit foundations and government sources to obtain funding for a long-term organizing process and program-development activities of NAGV.

Program development and contacts with gang youth were moving along with the NAGV organizing effort in interrelated fashion. Community volunteers were assisting the youth workers with their athletic programs for the Latin Kings at the Our Lady of Tepyac Catholic Church's gym, and for the Two Six the Piotrowski Park's gym. Youth workers and the part-time neighborhood organizer were meeting with block clubs about their gang concerns. They were assisting gang youth with a variety of personal problems, especially finding jobs.

But there was also growing tension between the part-time neighborhood organizer and M.L.G. The part-time organizer claimed that most of the residents who showed up at the June meeting had been members of two block clubs that he had organized. He claimed that M. L. G. and the pastor N. C. had no significant relationships with block clubs. M. L. G. raised questions about the reliability and honesty of the neighborhood organizer. Suddenly, the part-time



neighborhood organizer quit and accepted a full-time position at a local health agency.

Meanwhile, M.L.G., pastor N.C., and Father J.M. were apparently planning the development of a coalition of local organizations and community groups to comprise NAGV.

A first community leadership meeting to organize Neighbors Against Gang Violence took place at one of the Boys and Girls Clubs in late June, 1993. Represented at the meeting, in addition to M.L.G., Pastor N.C., and Father J.M., were the priest from St Agnes (Father A. M., later to become the Bishop of the Spanish Catholic community in Chicago), the local director of Suburban Job Link, Inc., the directors of the two Boys and Girls Clubs in the area, the local alderman (R. M.), and the local area president of UNO (J. R.) as well as two local residents, the Project Coordinator and Assistant Director, and several Project youth workers. The persons present, particularly the representatives of the various organizations, churches, and the alderman's office agreed to serve as board members of NAGV. Project police and probation officers were not invited. The importance of NAGV working closely with the GVRP was stressed.

M. L. G. stated that the group would organize block by block throughout the area to mobilize citizens to "suppress the problem and assist gang youth with various social resources." NAGV was to be independent of the police and the Project, but would work closely with them. M. L. G. and Pastor N. C. would make application to the state for a non-profit organization charter. M.L.G. would also apply for funds from the city's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds. In addition, the Coordinator agreed to assist in the development of specific NAGV funding applications to the Chicago Community Trust and the Woods Charitable Trust.

In the application for funding to the Woods Charitable Trust, M. L. G. stated that the key goal of NAGV was “to reduce gang violence in the Little Village Community,” and the objectives of the organization were: “1) To establish four chapters in target areas of high gang-violence activity; 2) to recruit two-hundred members from the community; 3) to initiate at least three activities in the four target areas (sub areas) that would bring together community residents, churches, block clubs, gang members and the police; and 4) also to place twenty hard-core gang members on jobs or in educational/training opportunities.”

The organizing strategy was “to establish an open dialogue with community residents and gang members in order to begin the process of working together to develop social/economic opportunities and the establishment of a new consensus of acceptable behavior among all community youth.” Moreover in a special meeting of NAGV in September, M.L.G., Pastor N.C. and two other members further elaborated the NAGV mission: “to re-assimilate alienated and isolated gang members into the fabric of society by providing opportunities and offering alternatives to a gang lifestyle; to make residents and businesses aware of what they can do to help reduce gang violence; and to coordinate activities with community groups, elected officials, police, and others who are affected by gangs.”

The funding applications went forward, but there was little direct resident, business, or local-agency participation, or organizing by the NAGV, in the next two months. The only organizing activity was by youth workers who participated at block club meetings and community policing meetings. Pastor N. C., along with probation and police officers, frequently attended and participated in the basketball games involving Two-Six gang youth at Piotrowski Park. M.L.G. became interested in the development of the Latin King basketball program at

Tepeyac church. She requested responsibility for supervision of the Tepeyac church Latin King basketball games, which the GVRP youth workers had initiated and conducted over the previous six months. She said that she and a volunteer could manage the twice-a-week basketball activities at the church. The Coordinator accepted the arrangement and directed the community youth workers to gradually withdraw from the gym. The youth workers were to confine their efforts largely to hardcore gang youth on the streets. (This, after all, was their primary mission.)

Contacts continued to be made with various foundations for funding. In due course, La Raza turned down the NAGV application. The Coordinator's proposal to the U. S. Department of Education for funding NAGV and GVRP activities was also turned down. However, M. L. G. obtained \$1400 from a local bank for a retreat to bolster NAGV's development as an independent organization. She visited a variety of local organizations to stimulate support for NAGV. The nature of NAGV participation in, or collaboration with, other local agencies or organizations in regard to the gang problem was not clearly stated, however.

At the NAGV board meetings at La Villita church in October, 1993, board attendance was sparse. Only M.L.G., Pastor N.C., and youth workers attended. However, Earl King, director of the No Dope Express Foundation and "Gator" Wallace Bradley, then of an organization called United In Peace, attended. They were organizing community participation for a national gang summit to be held in Chicago. A variety of representatives from African-American churches as well as African-American gangs and activist organizations on the south side of Chicago were expected to attend. King and Bradley were seeking the participation of Latino organizations. M.L.G. and Pastor N.C., as well as the Assistant Director of the Project, agreed to attend as observers. However, the summit attracted mainly organizations concerned

with the African-American gang problem. There was no significant discussion about integrating Latino and African-American community gang concerns.

At a later October NAGV meeting, M.L.G. also reported the results of a conversation she had with the director of the city's Youth Development Task Force. M. L. G. surmised from the director that the "Mayor is not supportive of what NAGV is doing." The Department of Human Resources Commission, under instructions from the mayor, was providing funding for other organizations in the city interested in the gang problem, but only for prevention programs, and not for NAGV. According to M. L. G., the close involvement of NAGV with the GVRP and Chicago Police Department was not regarded as consistent with the mayor's approach.

An NAGV retreat took place at a Catholic priest-training facility in the suburbs, north of Chicago, in November 1993. Again its purpose was to initiate "a process, structure and set of programs of community mobilization involving local residents and organizations to deal with the gang problem." A relatively small group of about 11 persons attended, including M. L. G., N. C., the conference facilitator, the 10<sup>th</sup> District Neighborhood Relations clerk officer, two Project youth workers, the Project's Coordinator and Assistant Director, two local citizens known to M. L. G, and a target gang youth who was also a leader of one of the major factions of the Latin Kings in Little Village. Key community groups and agencies were not represented.

The conference facilitator helped the group to identify NAGV's strengths, weaknesses and pressing concerns, and to discuss other NAGV issues. The most important strengths of NAGV, in order of priority, were identified as "strong vision," "youth workers," "ability to communicate with families," "act as intermediary with various organizations," and "need for NAGV services." The most pressing concerns were "the perception that NAGV was too close to

gang members, according to the police,” “too close to the police, according to gang members,” “lack of economic opportunities for gang youth,” and “exploitation of the gang issue by various organizations.” The most prominent weaknesses of NAGV were viewed as “lack of community involvement,” “lack of organizational structure,” “lack of a clear mission,” “limited funding and staffing.”

Finally, a critical issue discussed was whether NAGV should focus “on developing itself as a separate service organization or a coordinating organization, relating the services and programs of various local agencies on behalf of target gang youth.” It was agreed that these issues would be carefully considered. M.L.G. and Pastor N.C., however, were already moving in the direction of building a service organization directed to gang youth and gang families. M.L.G. also wanted to work closely with the pastor of Epiphany Catholic Church to further involve the Two Six gang youth and their families in church-related activities.

In the next six months, limited organizing and service efforts took place. M.L.G. was able to obtain two slots for Project gang youth at a special leadership training camp in Boston. The Chicago Community Trust provided a \$25,000 grant to NAGV for organizing activities, based on the strong recommendation of the Project Coordinator. Over the next six months, a variety of service and community-related contacts were made. One of the senior GVRP youth workers, J.A., was assigned to work with M.L.G. to continue to try to establish a network of agencies and services directed to the interests and needs of gang youth and their families. Some of the local agencies began to express interest, and attended a meeting at La Villita Church (where M. L. G.’s NAGV office was now located).

M. L. G. initiated a series of meetings with parents of the Two Six gang youth. The

purpose of the meetings was to raise consciousness and educate parents about the gang problem. Some of the parents in attendance had indicated their interest in the Project from the earlier community survey conducted by the GVRP research staff. Four such meetings were held in the Spring of 1994. Parents were particularly interested in how the justice system operated and what it meant when their sons were placed on probation.

The Project Coordinator decided to hire M. L. G. as a part-time organizer on the GVRP payroll to emphasize community-organizing efforts, for NAGV and/or GVRP. The tasks set for M.L.G., in addition to developing a community interagency network, were to arrange monthly meetings of agency representatives and residents in order to discuss program and treatment needs for GVRP gang youth, and to prepare for a mass meeting of community residents and gang youth about the work of NAGV and GVRP. She was to arrange for press publicity.

In a press release dated July 13, 1994 before a planned July 14<sup>th</sup> memorial service and community mass meeting, NAGV encouraged “all residents who have lost family, friends, or acquaintances to gang violence, including current gang affiliates, to attend... ‘We want the gang members to feel like members of the community.... We want other residents to respect their neighbors. We don’t necessarily want to get rid of the gangs – just the gang-related violence,’ explained M. L. G.”

This particular meeting became the largest community event in the Project’s history. The memorial service was sponsored by NAGV and the Catholic and Protestant churches together and took place at St. Agnes Church. Approximately two hundred community residents, including parents and gang youth (mainly Latin Kings, since St. Agnes was in Latin King territory) attended. Two members of the Two Six gang were also present. They were protected

by youth workers, police and probation who were stationed inside and outside the meeting hall. Some of the older Latin King leaders attempted to disrupt the meeting because the Two Six youth were present. But the Latin King youth workers and police intervened to prevent a melee. Reporters of several major city and Spanish-language newspapers were present. An account of the memorial service appeared in the English and Spanish press in the following days.

Subsequently, M.L.G. and the community youth workers were invited to participate in radio and television programs. Reports of the work of the Project and NAGV began to appear in the national media. NAGV board meetings increased in frequency, and board attendance improved in the fall of 1994. The Catholic churches were particularly active in preparations for the “Day of the Dead” marches in early November. Many gang youth (particularly Two-Six) along with their families were involved in a community march which ended up at the Epiphany Catholic Church. Again, Project youth workers, police, and probation were present.

In the early winter of 1994, the Governor of Illinois visited Little Village and publicly awarded a \$40,000 grant to NAGV through funds from the State’s Drug Prevention agency. The Woods Charitable Trust, however, turned down the NAGV application on the basis that it represented essentially a one-person agency, had little citizen involvement, and was primarily concerned with the provision of agency services rather than community organizing (a requirement of the Trust). At about the same time, a non-profit organization charter was granted to NAGV by the State of Illinois, with M. L. G. as chairperson and Pastor N. C. as co-chair.

M. L. G. hired an assistant to provide family services, but she herself continued to conduct mothers’ group meetings. NAGV board meetings seemed to slacken again in the late winter and early spring of 1994-95. The Project Coordinator encouraged M. L. G. to call an

interagency meeting, which was finally arranged at La Villita Church in April 1995.

Representatives of five local organizations especially concerned with the Little Village gang problem attended – Piotrowski Park, Latino Youth, Farragut High School, Catholic Charities, Mujeres Latinas (a Latina mothers and girls organization providing day care) – as well as the 10<sup>th</sup> District Neighborhood Relations unit, and Project police, probation, and youth workers. Each of the representatives of the community agencies offered information about programs and services that they could make available to gang youth. The agencies agreed to continue to meet to exchange information about target or problem gang youth in their own organizations. Some of the Project program youth were known across agencies. Joint, or collaborative, programming was recommended. However, there was no follow-up and no mechanism was developed for sharing information about such youth.

Failure of a Graffiti Program. A series of crises occurred in June 1995, which had long term effects on the development of NAGV. M. L. G. increased her interest in the delivery of services to families and individual gang youth. She referred youth for jobs; a few were GVRP target youth. However, tensions developed between M. L. G. and some of the GVRP youth workers. M. L. G. believed that the youth workers should have referred more youth to the NAGV program. The Tepyac Church gym program was suddenly closed down by the priest, due to lack of adequate supervision by M. L. G. and her volunteer staff. Apparently Latin King vehicles were parked illegally near the church and created a good deal of noise; neighbors complained to the police.

M. L. G., without consulting the GVRP Project Coordinator, suddenly decided to conduct



a graffiti paint-out involving Latin Kings. She inappropriately selected a “hot” border street between the Latin Kings and Two-Six for the paint-out. The youth participating were provided with NAGV t-shirt. The event was to be a way of advertising the work of NAGV to the community. A young, inexperienced Project probation officer, E. M., a friend of M.L.G., assisted with paint-out preparations. Project youth workers, the two tactical officers and two of the probation officers were not involved in the planning or implementation of the event. M. L. G. herself was not present, although her volunteers were. In the course of the paint-out, two of the Latin King youth broke away from the group, jumped into a car, and “did a driveby” at a nearby school yard. A Two Six youth was shot and wounded. Another youth (not a gang member) standing with the Two Six was killed.

Subsequently, the Project Coordinator insisted that the number of gang members selected by NAGV for any paint-out event be small – no more than 10 to 15 youth, and not 40 or 50 (as was the case in the incident); close coordination and supervision by GVRP of NAGV staff and volunteers must be developed; Project police had to be present; the building and streets selected for the paint-out had to be well within the territory of a particular gang, and not on the border of an opposing gang territory.

Shortly after the paint-out, the mother of the youth killed sued NAGV and La Villita Community Church (Pastor N.C.’s church). The State’s Attorney required NAGV staff to testify in court against several of the Latin Kings who were involved. Tension arose between M. L. G. and Pastor N. C., who disassociated himself from NAGV. NAGV also was having increased funding difficulties. Funds began to run out and the state grant was not renewed, largely because M.L.G. did not document NAGV’s efforts. Accounting of how funds had been used was not

provided to the state funding agency. The NAGV Board was also concerned that M.L.G. had been drawing substantial funds from both her grant and her University of Chicago part-time job, without full clearance from the NAGV Board. There was a question about “double dipping.”

Nevertheless, M.L.G. and Pastor N.C. continued NAGV fund-raising and organization-building efforts. A breakfast meeting at the end of July, 1995 brought together a variety of local organizations, including representatives of Catholic and Protestant churches, Suburban Job Link, Inc., Latino Youth, Mt. Sinai Hospital, Ridgeway Boys and Girls Club, Mujeres Latinas, Farragut High School, and the Santa Fe Corporation, which had a large transportation center in the area. Mutual agency and program concerns about gangs and the gang problem were also discussed. The representative from the Santa Fe Corp. indicated interest in providing funds to NAGV, but apparently did not follow through.

Tensions between the gangs remained high during the summer of 1995, and efforts by the youth workers to bring the leaders of the two gangs together to arrange a peace were only partially successful. Nevertheless, there was some interest by the two gangs in joining with community residents in a discussion of the needs of gang youth for training and jobs. The meeting would be an opportunity for the community residents again to talk and complain to gang youth about their violent activities and property damage which had not significantly subsided, as well as make offers of training and job help. Where to hold such a meeting when the gang situation was so volatile was a question. Efforts to meet at the nearby Cook County Criminal Court Building were met by resistance from the Cook County Presiding Judge’s office.

By the end of the third year of the Project, the organizing efforts of NAGV continued to be sporadic and only mildly effective. Although M. L. G. was a community activist, her

expressed concern was now to establish her own service agency. Her ties to the community, which were initially stronger with the Two Six youth and families, began to weaken. A group of Two Six youth accused her of “ratting” to the police. In addition, tension between Project police and M. L. G. increased. The Project police were increasingly distrustful of some of M. L. G.’s efforts to organize the community against the police. She had charged that the local police were falsely accusing a (non-Project) gang youth of a shooting.

M. L. G. suddenly disappeared from the scene. She was more involved in gang-related and youth-development meetings across a variety of citywide social agencies and churches. She developed close relationships with a YMCA program interested in gang outreach recreational work on the north side of the city. She was also working part-time in a program at the Juvenile Detention Center of the Cook County Juvenile Court.

Nevertheless, she was still involved in the development of NAGV-sponsored resident meetings in Little Village in late 1995. Two community meetings were held. At the first meeting, specific plans for involving youth from the Two Six and the Latin Kings as well as community residents, church representatives and GVRP, were developed. The second meeting in December at La Villita Community Church (organized mainly by the priests from Epiphany Church, M.L.G. and GVRP staff) involved four local social agencies, ten local residents and nine members of the Latin Kings and Two Six. Also attending were two of the Project probation officers; the two Project tactical officers were stationed outside the church to prevent and control any gang activity that might result.

The discussion at this meeting, which lasted about one and a half hours, was mainly about the needs of gang youth for education, training, and jobs, and also the reduction of gang

activity, especially violence and graffiti. The gang youth – mainly the older gang youth – were almost exclusively interested in vocational training and job opportunities. M.L.G. and several citizens promised to find an instructor to provide basic vocational training. The older gang youth also said that they were concerned about the graffiti problem, particularly as it was a stimulus to gang violence, and they were trying to control it.

There was almost no tension between the Latin Kings and Two Six who sat opposite each other, but there were some cold and suspicious looks between gang members and community residents. The issue of a specific peace between the two gangs did not arise. Focus was on the needs of youth for training and jobs. M.L.G. said she would involve both gang youth and residents in planning for the vocational training project.

At a follow-up meeting at La Villita Community Church in late February 1996, representatives of several agencies, including Latino Youth Inc. and Suburban Job Link, Inc., and a large group of older gang youth (seventeen Latin Kings and eight Two Six brought by youth workers) were in attendance. Each of the agencies indicated that they could provide training and job opportunities, but the main interest was in a plan by M. L. G. to invite an instructor to La Villita to conduct a half-year carpentry training session that would lead to some form of apprentice licensing. In March the carpentry instructor began to hold sessions; however, attendance dwindled sharply by April. The instructor also refused to continue with his lectures because his wallet had been stolen while preparing for one of the sessions at the church.

In early June, M. L. G. declared that because of lack of funding from foundation and government sources, she could no longer continue efforts to organize the community. The Project Coordinator began to use youth workers to enlist selected storekeepers and residents in

the area where frequent gang shootings were occurring to assist gang youth with job and recreational opportunities, as well as to coordinate their efforts with police to control gang youth. Increased emphasis was placed on involvement by representatives of youth agencies, schools, and probation in GVRP meetings.

In late June 1996, the Project Coordinator sent a letter to M. L. G. notifying her that her contract as part-time organizer with GVRP would terminate July 17, 1996. His explanation was that the original GVRP contract with CPD would terminate around that time, and he was uncertain whether or on what basis the Project contract would be renewed. He had hoped to transfer the Project to a community agency or network of organizations, or to have the CPD take over the Project. He asked M. L. G. to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the GVRP and NAGV organizing effort.

M. L. G. noted as follows:

“... the churches continue to offer night basketball at Our Lady of Tepeyac, St. Agnes, and La Villita Community Church.”<sup>1</sup> The Epiphany Catholic church attempted to offer group discussion services to the Two Six, but this was discontinued because there was little attendance. Parents of Two Six, however, did continue attending a support group at the church. However, their commitment was stronger to the church than to any community organization.

. . . the community continued to have a tough time coming to grips with the gang problem and creating alternatives for gang youth. Basically, they still were afraid of gang youth and view them as troublemakers.

Two agencies were providing additional services to gang youth. Mt. Sinai hospital was offering a tattoo removal program with counseling for gang youth. Latino Youth remained involved, mainly through its alternative high school. However, the Boys and Girls Club and Piotrowski Park were still mainly interested in younger youth, 5 to 13 years old; they provided no special programming for gang youth; Farragut High School, under its new principal, was

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<sup>1</sup> GVRP was able to negotiate a contract for the return of Latin Kings to use of the gym, under GVRP youth-worker supervision.

expelling more gang members than ever.

In agreement with the Project Coordinator, the Chicago Police Department decided to renew the University of Chicago contract to continue the Project for another six months (until January 1997) rather than a full year, to give the CPD more time to decide what they wanted to do with the Project. Funding for the Project was available for another three years, if the CPD wanted the Project to continue. The Coordinator would be leaving to take on another assignment at the end of August, 1997.

In October 1996, Pastor N. C. agreed to replace M. L. G. as part-time community organizer for the GVRP. He would also draw together a group of community leaders and organizational representatives to assist with the Project transition, to work with neighborhood groups at the block level to support GVRP operations, and to assist in the development of Project resources, especially training and job development for Project youth. He was to attend all GVRP meetings and became more intimately involved in the day-to-day operations of the Project.

Pastor N. C. contacted the NAGV board to explain his new role. Meetings of the board had become infrequent, even before M. L. G.'s departure. However, like M. L. G., the pastor seemed to be less interested in contacts with community groups and agencies than in supervision and ultimate responsibility for the GVRP outreach workers. Pastor N. C. did arrange one community meeting of agencies and local groups to develop a more active and coordinated approach to the gang problem. In attendance were the Alderman (R. M.), representatives of Victory Outreach (a religiously-oriented drug rehabilitation program), Mt. Sinai Hospital, the Little Village Community Chamber of Commerce, Spry School, a regional Evangelical protestant church youth director, and Project staff. Suddenly, Pastor N. C. could not attend, and

the Project Coordinator conducted the meeting.

None of the Catholic Church priests or their representatives attended. The various agency and organization representatives did not know each other well. The meeting served mainly to introduce the agencies and groups to each other; each explained their respective programs and offered to provide services to program youth. Plans for a follow-up meeting were to be developed by Pastor N. C. upon his return, but this did not happen.

Community-organization efforts thereafter were mainly concerned with issues and options for transferring the GVRP program to local agencies (see Chapter 17). A final community citizens meeting in the spring of 1997 was arranged by the Pastor to “protest” the Chicago Police Department’s probable closure of the Project. The meeting was poorly organized and attended. Pastor N. C.’s small church staff and twelve local residents as well as three youth workers were present. The protest effort did not materialize.

In sum, the community-mobilization objectives of the Project and NAGV were limited to stimulating local resident and organization interest in the development of activities to address the gang problem. Commitment of significant agencies and citizens inside and outside of Little Village to sustain the Project approach was not achieved. The Project’s primary organizational and program achievements were in the development of the staff team approach, and the delivery of outreach social services and controls for targeted youth. There was considerable evidence of positive outcome for youth participating in the Project and of the reduction of gang crime, which we describe in the following chapter.

## Chapter 8

### Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth

#### Introduction

The Project focused on individual youth in two large, established street gangs that had been engaged in intergang violence, as well as an assortment of other crimes, over several decades. The gangs were complex and important systems in the Little Village community. The Project targeted individual gang sections (or branches) and in particular those gang members identified as having influence on, and being responsible for, a significant amount of violent activity in Little Village. The major goal of the Project was to reduce gang crime, especially violence, first at the individual and then, if possible, at the aggregate (especially gang and community) levels.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide background characteristics of youth in the program which are particularly related to their existence as gang members in Little Village. We are interested in community, family, gang, and life-course factors as perceived by program youth during their participation in the Project. Program youth were naturally undergoing a series of life-space and life-course changes, which may or may not have been influenced by the program. We also describe pre-program arrest and confinement histories of program and comparison youth. In later chapters, we describe the patterns of services provided to youth, and attempt to discern program effects in terms of changes in self-reported offense and arrest patterns, taking into consideration these life-space and life-course events and other changes that were also occurring during the Program period.

The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part – based on the interview responses



of program youth at three time periods during the program – we provide a picture of the social context of program youth. In the second part, we introduce two comparison samples – quasi-program and “pure” comparison – and briefly compare the demographic and arrest (or criminal) histories of all three samples in the pre-program period. Our key outcome variables in later chapters will be changes in specific patterns of self-reported offenses, and especially arrests, during the program period.

The individual gang-member survey and police arrest records were key data sources used to evaluate the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project. The individual-level survey findings focus on changes in the social context and behavior of program youth only, which may have been directly or indirectly affected by program efforts. Later in the chapter, we present police data indicating pre-program criminal histories of program as well as comparison youth. We do not yet address the specific services or service factors which may have contributed to these changes.

### Survey Research Design: Target Youth

We discuss first the findings relevant to 195 targeted individual male gang members in the program, and the changes that occurred in their behavior, attitudes and relationships to school and employment during the program period. We look at changes that occurred in the gang, the family, and the community – changes which may have been associated with or contributed to the youth’s deviant or criminal acts. Focus is on the targeted youths’ perceptions of their life space, i.e., those community, institutional, family and gang factors that may have affected their behavior during the course of the Project. Three Cohorts (or groupings) of targeted

youth who entered the program in overlapping three-year periods responded to interview questions on a yearly basis. The initial interviews were conducted early in the youth's participation in the program. Two subsequent follow-up interviews were conducted while youth were still in the program, and even when, for various reasons, they no longer had contact with the program or were out of the community.

We were not able to interview youth in the two comparison groups, but we do have their complete pre-program and program police arrest-history data, which will be used to compare arrest charges with those of program youth. One of the comparison samples is a group of non-targeted gang youth [n = 90] – members of the two target gangs in the Project – who received very limited, mainly recreational services or contacts. The other comparison sample is a non-served group of youth (n = 180) from these two gangs. In the three samples, Latin King and Two Six youth are similarly represented.

We focus attention in this section on the program sample (n = 127) in terms of changes in the characteristics of the two gangs, the three Cohorts, different age groups and different types of offenders, over three annual interview periods. The youth were interviewed at baseline (Time I), a second time (Time II), and again a third time (Time III), between 1992-1997. We attempt to account for the changes in self-reported deviant (as well as conventional) behaviors, based on data from the interviews. In this chapter, we make no specific claims that the Project was responsible for changes in the youth's behavior, attitudes, and relationships. We will make this claim substantially in later chapters when we incorporate other data sets and analyses using program services/contacts and police arrest reports. Our present analysis will suggest mainly that there is a progression of gang youth both into and out of the gang world, and that the nature

and amount of criminal behavior they commit is associated with a variety of maturation, environmental, and, we believe, Project effects.

The Project analysis is based on certain constructs. We believe that concepts of social control, cohesion, anomie, alienation, provision of opportunities, differential association, socialization, and differential gang organization are components of, or strongly associated with, more general theories of social disorganization and underclass (or differential) opportunity systems. No one theory sufficiently accounts for, nor can predict, the behavior of gang youth or provide adequate direction for policy or program development. We prefer the classic idea of social disorganization rather than the more recent notions of differential or alternate social organization (Kontos, Brotherton, Barrios 2003). The classic notion has moral and policy implications, more consistent with the Little Village Project's purpose of planned change in individual, collective and community-level behavior (Shaw, McKay 1942; Bursik, Grasmick 1993; Spergel 1995). No one theory or set of constructs alone provides a set of comprehensive strategies for intervention, prevention, or suppression of the gang problem.

#### Individual Gang-Member-Survey Procedures

The individual gang-member survey was administered by Project field research staff in a one hour interview session using a questionnaire containing mainly closed-ended questions. The sequence of question categories was: *program youth views about community institutions and agency programs relevant to the gang problem, individual gang member information (including gang structure and process), family life, employment, educational experience, household and individual income sources (legal and illegal), income and occupational aspirations and*

*expectations, peer relationships, and demographics. (Self-reports of deviant behaviors and justice system involvement and changes between the Time I and Time III survey are discussed in Chapter 10). Informed consent forms were signed by the youth (and a parent, if the youth was under 17), giving us permission to examine their justice system records. A sum of \$20.00 was paid to the youth for each interview.*

The Project sought to target the most violent members of the two major warring gangs in the community – the Latin Kings and the Two Six – who were active in the six beats of the 10<sup>th</sup> Chicago Police District, which comprised Little Village. After a period of initial field observation and early outreach contacts with youth on the streets, the Project team, particularly the youth workers, identified key gang leaders, influentials, hardcore and violent gang-youth for inclusion in the program. There was no formal program registration or intake process. Gang youth who met the criteria of violent activity were included in the program. The targeted youth were requested to take the baseline interview as soon as possible. Most of the youth were interviewed within a six-month period after they began receiving program worker services/contacts.

The youth workers, together with the Project field researchers, arranged for the interviews. A youth worker often accompanied a field researcher to the place where the interview was to take place, then usually left. The youth workers had high status, acceptance and respect from the gangs they worked with. The field researchers also were often from the same neighborhood, but likely to be college students or older residents. There was little resistance to taking the interviews. Initially, the major problem was finding interview locations, privacy, and times convenient both for the gang youth and the field researcher. Interviews were

generally conducted in local churches, libraries, fast-food restaurants, parks, recreation centers, the backs of cars, and in the homes of program youth themselves.

The key data-collection problem was finding and reinterviewing program youth at Times II and III. Youth interviewed were sometimes on the run from police, or in jail or prison; three youth joined the armed forces, one program youth was killed during the program period, and several of the youth left either temporarily or for long periods to reside in other places in Illinois, Minnesota, Florida, Texas, and Mexico. Time II and Time III interviews were sometimes conducted by long distance telephone.

Youth were located for reinterviews using information provided through a network of gang peers, family, community youth workers, and other members of the Project team. The reinterview rate at Time III for those interviewed at Time I was 65.5%, – relatively high, considering the nature of the hardcore gang population, their mobility in and out of the neighborhood, and the violence reduction purpose of the program. Inability to locate program youth, rather than any resistance to being reinterviewed, was the major reason for failure to obtain additional interviews after Time I.

### The Gang Member Survey Sample

The sample of program youth used in this analysis included 127 youth who were interviewed all three times (at Times I, II, and III) and the few who were interviewed only twice (at Times I and III).<sup>1</sup> The Latin King youth were a year older (18.4 years) than the Two Six youth (17.4 years) at program entry. Almost all of the youth were of Mexican-American origin.

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<sup>1</sup>Some youth (n = 12) who were not reinterviewed at Time II were later located and reinterviewed at Time III.

To determine the representativeness of this analysis sample we compared it to the remaining group of program youth (n = 68) who were excluded from the sample (those interviewed at Time I only, or at Times I and II) – the non-analysis sample. Using Time I interview data (including self-reported offenses) we found non-statistically significant differences in the distributions of the following variables for those youth included in our analysis and those not:

- *Latin Kings and Two Six*
- *Program Cohort (I, II, III), i.e., period of program entry*
- *age group (14 and under, 15 to 17, and 18 years and older)*
- *residence in or out of Little Village*
- *educational status*
- *household and individual income (legal and illegal)*
- *gang membership status*

We found essentially no biases using bivariate analysis. There were only two statistically significant differences: 1) in Cohort I the Two Six in the non-analysis sample were older (mean age = 17.2) than the Two Six in the analysis sample (mean age = 14.6) ( $t = .001$ ); 2) more of the youth in the non-analysis sample (76.1%) were not residents of Little Village at Time I, compared to 86.2% of youth in the analysis sample ( $F^2 = 6.97$ ;  $p = 0.031$ ). We speculate that those in the Latin Kings and Two Six gangs who did not reside in Little Village at Time I were more difficult to find at Time III.

Self-reported offense patterns for the analysis sample and the excluded sample were almost identical at Time I, using the variables<sup>2</sup>: *total offenses* (not including drug selling), *total violence offenses*, *serious violence offenses*, *property offenses*, *drug use*, *drug selling*<sup>3</sup>, and

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<sup>2</sup> The components of these variables, i.e., the specific offenses in these aggregate offense categories, are described in Chapter 10, when we analyze changes in offense patterns between Time I and Time III.

<sup>3</sup> We computed drug use and drug selling based on a different pattern of questions and, although these data were normed and compared with the other data, we did not include them in the *total offenses* category.

*alcohol use*. Self-reported arrest patterns were essentially identical. Thus, we concluded with some confidence that the characteristics of the analysis sample were representative of all targeted youth in the program.

### Descriptive Findings

We were particularly interested in certain construct or theoretically-relevant characteristics that could be associated with deviant-behavior change among youth during the program period, i.e., between the Time I and Time III interviews. We included perceived neighborhood characteristics, household/family background, gang membership status, and personal relationship factors. Many of these relationships were statistically significant in the bivariate analyses, but would drop out in more controlled multivariate analyses. In this section, they serve to describe changes at a simple descriptive level rather than through more rigorous analysis, which we conduct in later chapters.

#### The Neighborhood

The Latin Kings and Two Six were largely neighborhood-bound, and hung out in certain gang territories – “turfs” – which they defended or sought to expand. One major proposition was that if general neighborhood social and economic conditions improved, gang youth behavior would improve. Reciprocally, if the behavior of gang youth grew more positive (i.e., less violent or delinquent) neighborhood conditions could be perceived as improved. The gang is an integral part of the social, economic, cultural, and organizational world – the ecology – of the local community. We expected changes in gang-youth behavior to be associated with certain

neighborhood characteristics, as well as with changes in the larger society.

We asked the individual youth about any changes they perceived in the activities of neighborhood institutions and local community groups, and in particular about any neighborhood changes related to the gang problem, and how those changes affected them. It was clear, based on the responses at Time III compared to Time I, that the community was perceived to be a somewhat better place to live. For example, while twelve youth at Time I thought the community had gotten better in the previous six months, forty said it was about the same, and seventy-one regarded the community as worse. At Time III, twenty-four regarded it as better, fifty-two thought it was about the same and fifty-six regarded it as worse. Thus, while the majority of program youth still did not regard the community favorably at either Time I or Time III, there was perceived improvement (Sign test of forty-three positive changes and eighteen negative changes indicated statistical significance at  $p = 0.001$ ). The youth also were relatively more satisfied with living in the community; seventy-one were satisfied and fifty-three dissatisfied at Time I, but eighty-one were satisfied and forty-three were dissatisfied at Time III (Sign test of forty-three positive changes and thirty negative changes indicated almost statistical significance at  $p = 0.080$ ).

Of interest was whether perceptions of gang-related crime in the neighborhood had changed for better or worse, i.e., essentially decreased or increased between Time I and Time III. The dominant view at Time I was that the gang problem was a serious or very serious problem ( $n = 104$ ) compared to little or no problem ( $n = 21$ ). At Time III, the gang problem was still considered as serious or very serious ( $n = 95$ ) compared to little or no problem ( $n = 30$ ). This constituted a significantly improved view about the problem (Sign test of fifty-eight positive



changes and sixteen negative changes indicated statistical significance at  $p \neq 0.001$ ). Similarly, the non-gang crime problem was viewed as less serious. At Time I, seventy-one youth saw it as serious or very serious, and fifty-three saw it as no problem or a little problem; at Time III, only thirty-one saw it as a serious problem and ninety-three as a small or no problem (Sign test of sixty-four positive changes, twenty negative changes:  $p \neq 0.001$ ). Program youth saw neighborhood crime (gang or non-gang related) as significantly less serious at Time III. These perceptions were only partially consistent with those of the community residents (see Chapter 16).

At Time III, the youth perceived fewer gang activities in the neighborhood (Sign test,  $p = 0.022$ ) and they were less concerned about the possible victimization of a family member through gang crime (Sign test,  $p = 0.021$ ), although a majority considered there was still a substantial amount of gang activity in Little Village. All of these changes suggested that while there remained considerable gang and non-gang criminal activity within the community, the situation had improved. On the other hand, there was no statistically significant change in respect to other gang crime-related characteristics of the community. Program youth were still afraid of gang attacks and of walking alone in the neighborhood; they were not doing fewer things to avoid gang crime.

There was also no evidence that local institutions, community groups or adults generally had significantly affected the community's gang problem. At Time III, youth did not think the police were doing more to deal with gang crime than they did at Time I, and local residents or organizations were not perceived as doing much to help reduce gang crime. There was no perceived change in the activity of criminal adults who used gang youth as accomplices. There

was evidence, however, that some of the probation officers were more likely to be dealing with the gang problem. The youth could not clearly see community change or improvements which were attributed to the activities of police, local organizations or community residents. To some extent this may have reflected the inability of the Project to mobilize community support or directly modify institutional local conditions that were associated with or contributed to the gang problem.

### The Family/Household

We were not sure how directly influential family factors were in gang-youth development. The youth in our sample were older adolescents and young adults, with already weakened ties to their families of origin. Nevertheless, it was possible that changes in family structure and relationships between the Time I and Time III interviews could account for, or predict, changes in youth behavior. Gang youth mostly still lived in the same neighborhood as their families, and had some contact with their families of origin; many were presently married or had steady girlfriends, setting up new family arrangements.

Household Size and Age. There was little difference in family structure over the three-year interview period – either in size or family members’ age patterns – for the sample as a whole or for each of the gangs. The average size of the households dropped from 3.5 to 3.3 members; the average age of the household members increased from 20.7 years to 27.3 years. Much of the increase in age occurred in the Two Six households, where program youth were more rapidly leaving their families of origin than was the case with the Latin Kings, more of whom were older and had already left their original family households. None of these

differences were statistically significant across time, or between gangs.

Household Employment. Household employment increased, but not significantly. At Time I, 46.8% of household members over 14 years of age were employed, compared to 54.5% at Time III. The level of employment was slightly higher for the Two Six households (50.0% at Time I; 59.1% at Time III) than for the Latin King households (43.7% at Time I; 50.6% at Time III). Increases in the levels of employment for members of the households could have been due to the general upswing in the economy in Chicago during the Project period.

Household Income. Of special interest were the findings on average household income, from both legal and illegal sources. Average total household income for the entire sample increased from \$23,644 to \$24,173, hardly a significant rise over a three year period. There were differences between Latin King and Two Six households. While average Two Six household income increased significantly from \$25,104 to \$29,649 ( $t = 2.53, p \# 0.05$ ), average Latin King household income decreased from \$22,407 to \$19,297, but this change was not statistically significant. The pattern between groups was significant ( $F = 6.68, p \# 0.05$ ).

From self-reports, we were able to obtain information differentiating legal and illegal household income. Yearly legal household income increased slightly for the sample as a whole, from \$20,700 to \$21,033; for the Latin King households it increased from \$15,555 to \$15,703 and for the Two Six families from \$26,739 to \$27,018, which was statistically significant ( $t = 0.427, p \# 0.05$ ). Again, the difference between the legal household income of the two gangs was significant ( $F = 6.77, p \# 0.05$ ).

We were also able to calculate differences in sources of income per household. At Time I the total sample of respondents ( $n = 121$ ) reported that 67.0% of household income was from

legal sources; at Time II it was 71.0%. The percent of Latin King legal household income did not essentially change (62.0% to 63.0%), but the percent of Two Six legal household income did increase significantly from 72.0% to 80.0% ( $t = 2.27, p \# 0.05$ ). Again, there were statistically significant differences between the two gang households ( $F = 4.13, p \# 0.05$ ).

Of further interest was our finding that household illegal income comprised a relatively small proportion of total income. Annual illegal household income for the total sample increased from an average of \$2,727 to \$3,140 over the three-year period. Illegal income increased more for the Latin King households – \$1,666 to \$5,370 – than for the Two Six households – \$454 to \$2,045. However, the percentage of the sample reporting household illegal income was only 9.0% at Time I ( $n = 53$ ), and 12.0% at Time III ( $n = 121$ ). It was 16.0% for the Latin Kings at Time I, and about the same (15.0%) at Time III; and 1.0% for the Two Six at Time I and 10.0% at Time III. The difference between the gangs' households was statistically significant ( $F = 6.63, p \# 0.01$ ). The findings for illegal household income should be interpreted cautiously, since our response rate at Time I was very low. The figures are probably conservative, and need to be examined in conjunction with the data reported by youth for changes in their own individual illegal income over time (see below).

Thus, total household income rose somewhat for the Two Six households, but not for the Latin King households. Latin King households appeared to depend relatively more on income from illegal sources. In any case, illegal income comprised a small but probably important source of household income, more for the Latin Kings than the Two Six.

Criminal Character of Households. The criminal character of households (excluding the youth themselves), as measured by household members' gang affiliations, arrests, incarcerations,

and probation status, lessened between Time I and Time III. Whereas 12.1% of household members were reported as currently gang members at Time I, only 3.8% were so reported at Time III. The decline was greater for the somewhat more criminally-oriented Latin King households (16.7% to 4.6%) than for the Two Six households (4.2% to 2.8%). The decline in household arrests was statistically significant, from 13.5% to 5.9% ( $t = -2.64$ ,  $p \neq 0.01$ ), and occurred mostly in the Latin King households. The percentage of total sample household members on probation also declined, from 7.7% to 3.7%, and occurred more in the Latin King households (10.7% to 2.6%) than in the Two Six households (5.1% to 4.9%).

### Relationships

Family. The quality of the youth's relationships with family members was reported to be generally quite positive. The most positive family relationships were with mothers. Between 86.0% and 91.0% of the youth said they got along well, most of the time, with their mothers. There was little change over time. The pattern was a little different for relationships with their fathers, with whom program youth generally seemed to get along a little less well. While there was some slight evidence among the Latin Kings of a decline in favorable relationships with their fathers (67.4% to 57.1%), there was an increase in positive relationships for the Two Six (60.0% to 75.9%). None of these changes across time, or between the gangs, was statistically significant. Patterns of positive relationships with siblings, while greater than with fathers, generally declined for both gangs: Latin Kings from 81.3% to 77.4%, and Two Six from 87.9% to 78.3%. These differences were also not statistically significant. We shall see that some of these relationships are quite significant, in perhaps unexpected ways, in explaining deviant

behavior and arrests when we later examine the findings of our multivariate models.

Wives/Steady Girlfriends and Gang Friends. Of some interest was the pattern of relationships between program youth and their wives or steady girlfriends. Some of the differences could be accounted for by the average age differences between the program youth of the two gangs. The Latin Kings were older than the Two Six, and more of the Latin Kings had wives or steady girlfriends, both at Time I (75.4%) and Time III (84.6%), than did the Two Six (66.1% at Time I, 64.5% at Time III). While the differences between Time I and Time III were not statistically significant for the sample as a whole or for each of the gangs, the changes were statistically significant between the gangs ( $F = 6.48, p \neq 0.01$ ).

Unexpectedly, the quality of relationships between program youth and their wives or steady girlfriends was only moderately good at Time I, and deteriorated by Time III. The overall quality of deteriorating relationships was statistically significant, although it was more variable for the Two Six than the Latin Kings. The rate of deterioration of relationships between Time I and Time III (i.e., getting along well most of the time with wives/steady girlfriends) was greater for the Latin Kings (61.2% to 44.4%) than for the Two Six (68.4% to 57.7%).

Time spent with wives or steady girlfriends increased significantly for the whole sample between Time I and Time III (Sign test,  $p = 0.01$ ). The increase was statistically significant for the Latin Kings (Sign test,  $p = 0.001$ ), but not for the Two Six. It could be that as gang youth matured, they were spending more time with their wives and steady girlfriends, but, surprisingly, the relationships were increasingly conflictual during this maturation (or transition) period.

Gang members could be reluctantly or ambivalently spending less time with fellow gang members. The data indicate that gang members in the total sample, and in each of the gangs,

were spending significantly less time with gang friends: total sample – (Sign test,  $p = 0.001$ ); Latin Kings – (Sign test,  $p = 0.038$ ); Two Six – (Sign test,  $p = 0.001$ ).

Household Crises. There was strong evidence of an increase in household or family crises between Time I and Time III, e.g., death, illness, physical abuse, income-related problems, drug abuse, gang violence victimization, and arrests. These variables were disaggregated into family-related crises and crime-related crises. Both sets of crisis-changes were statistically significant: family-related crises – ( $t = 5.26$ ,  $p \neq 0.01$ ); crime-related crises – ( $t = 4.09$ ,  $p \neq 0.01$ ). The increase in criminal-justice problems was slightly less in the Two Six than in the Latin Kings households. However, they were statistically significant for both types of crisis: Latin Kings = family-related crises – ( $t = 4.03$ ,  $p \neq 0.01$ ), crime-related crises – ( $t = 3.1$ ,  $p \neq 0.01$ ); and Two Six = family related crises – ( $t = 3.39$ ,  $p \neq 0.01$ ), crime-related crises – ( $t = 2.61$ ,  $p \neq 0.05$ ). Household crises would prove to be an important variable later in our multivariate models.

### The Gang

The gang itself was obviously a key context that directly affected the youth's criminal identity and activity. The objective of the Project was to modify the behavior of individual hardcore youth in the gang, within a context of some institutional change, so that the youth's and his gang's crime patterns (especially of serious violence) would be reduced. Whether this meant that the institution of the gang (i.e., the tradition, structure, and processes of ganging in Little Village) would thereby be modified was not clear. It was possible that a complex gang system could not be readily changed until local community and larger social, political, economic, and

cultural institutions (e.g., poverty, access to jobs, isolation of low income minority groups, low quality of education and gun-control laws) were also changed. The Project did not address these larger issues. Some specific questions were asked relevant to gang structure and behavior: whether changes occurred in the size of the gangs (see M. Klein 1971), – for both female and male sections – and whether gangs grew less violent over time. At each interview period, youth were also asked to what extent they were aware of the Project and what it was doing.

Gang Size. Based on interview responses, we found no evidence that the target gangs (comprising mainly males) were structurally changing over the five-year Project period, although individual gang sections might have been changing. The size of gangs was not statistically significantly different at Time III, compared to Time I. Latin King respondents generally indicated that their gang was either larger (52.9%) or about the same (39.2%) at Time III, compared to estimates that it was larger (62.1%) or about the same (24.1%) at Time I. The Two Six respondents viewed their gang as larger (63.2%) or about the same (17.5%) at Time III, compared to larger (56.0%) or about the same (24.5) at Time I. While the average perception of the size of the gangs by youth in our sample was not changing between Time I and Time III, it was possible that individual youth saw differences in the size and cohesion of gangs, and that this could be related to his perception of his own gang membership status and criminal activity. We examine this proposition later.

The size of female groups or sections, however, was perceived by the mainly male youth sample as changing. The Latin Kings saw their female associates, the Latin Queens, as increasing in number. This change was statistically significant ( $t = - 3.94, p \# 0.01$ ). The Two Six youth also saw their female associates as increasing in number ( $t = - 4.17, p \# 0.01$ ).



However, the Two Six females were not organized as formally as were the Latin Queens which was a distinct but closely-related organization of the Latin Kings.

Fighting Between the Gangs. Fighting between the two gangs was continual. Hardly a day passed without a confrontation between individuals and sections of the two opposing gangs. Some sections had a reputation for being more violent than other sections of the same gang; the various sections also seemed to go through phases or cycles of violence. There were fashions in violence among the sections, from bottle throwing, knifings and car ramming by one section to drive-by-shooting, bicycle and walk-up shooting by another. Field observations indicated that the Latin Queens and the clusters of Two Six females clashed with each other in periodic fist and knife fights. These violent incidents were more often unplanned than planned, depending on situational opportunities and the moods of the gang youth. The more lethal encounters were less frequent, and occurred in spurts followed by quiet periods.

Fighting was an essential component of the gang tradition in Little Village. Its purpose seemed to be to develop or sustain the status and reputation of the individual gang member as well as the gang. The tradition of a particular gang and of its particular sections seemed to make a difference in the scope and nature of the youth-gang member's violence and criminal activity. The Latin Kings generally were an older, more established and larger gang with sections throughout Chicago, the Midwest, and the rest of the country. The Project team worked with about fifteen sections of the Latin Kings in Little Village. The Two Six were a large gang that also comprised about fifteen sections, although the sections were smaller than the Latin King's. The Two Six were somewhat younger and had more recently expanded into the Chicago suburbs, to Indiana, and as far away as Texas. The Two Six were more volatile and mischievous, and

prone to attacking the Latin Kings who would then retaliate, usually with greater force and violence.

A key question was whether the gangs or gang sections, as perceived by individual gang members, modified their violent behavior over the course of the five-year program. To the question “Has your gang been in a fight with other gangs in the last three months?,” the responses were very similar at Time I and Time III (Latin Kings “yes” = 93.7% at Time I and 92.2% at Time III; Two Six “yes” = 95.2% at Time I and 89.5% at Time III). The fights generally involved weapons, i.e., guns (Latin Kings = 80.7% at Time I and 85.1% Time III; Two Six = 87.5% at Time I and 90.2% at Time III). None of these changes were statistically significant. However, the respondents claimed there was some decline in the high levels of lethality, i.e., death from fighting with the other gang, in spite of continuing fights (Latin Kings = 58.2% at Time I and 37.0 at % Time III; Two Six = 48.9% at Time I and 33.3% at Time III). These perceived changes at the group level were not statistically significant for either gang.

Fighting Between Sections of the Same Gang. The sections or branches of the gangs were perceived as continuing to fight other sections of the same gangs (Latin Kings = 48.3% at Time I and 44.9% at Time III; Two Six = 36.0% at Time I and 47.4% at Time III). These differences were not statistically significant. The youth stated that the confrontations between gang sections were generally less serious than confrontations across gangs, although occasionally a weapon such as a gun (more often a bottle or knife) was used. The fights between sections were more likely to occur at weekend parties as part of drunken brawls, or to test the machismo or reputation of the sections with each other. The youth reported that fights between sections were becoming more serious, with death or serious injury increasingly more likely.

Fighting Within the Same Gang Section. Fighting between members of the same gang section did occur periodically, again often at parties, usually over personal conflicts, girlfriends, drug deals, etc. These fights were rarely lethal, although occasionally a death did result. Based on observations of youth workers, two such deaths occurred within Latin King sections over “bad” drug deals, and one death occurred within a Two Six section, again over a drug deal. In the latter case, as recounted earlier, one of the Two Six youth robbed a Mexican Mafia adult drug-dealer, and a fellow member of the same section was persuaded by the adult criminal organization to kill the robbery offender. There were complex and unstable connections between the youth gangs and the adult criminal organizations in the area.

Varied patterns of fighting by gang youth could be serious or lethal but did not seem to change much over time; they continued to be more serious between gangs, and less serious (although still at times lethal) between and within gang sections. Youth who were drawn to gang activity may have been relatively disposed to violence, although the commitment by gang members to different types and levels of violence varied within and across gang sections. The youth were asked about the possibility that their own deaths could result from gang violence. They clearly understood that gang fighting could result in death, and there was little change in awareness of this possibility over time (Latin Kings “yes” = 67.1% at Time I and 71.2% at Time III; Two Six “yes” = 80.4% at Time I and 76.8% at Time III).

Finally, youth reported that they were more aware of the Project over time (Latin Kings = 40.0% at Time I and 85.5% at Time III; Two Six = 44.0% at Time I and 75.9% at Time III). The change for the Latin Kings was statistically significant ( $t = -2.4, p \neq 0.05$ ). In Chapter 11 we examine to what extent the patterns of violence and general crime among program youth

changed, and to what extent the reductions were due to or associated with the effects of specific Project services or strategies.

### Individual Gang-Member Characteristics

The Project identified and targeted individual hardcore gang youth in order to modify their violent behavior and the factors contributing to it. The focus was on specific, individual, violence-prone gang youth and their relationships to particular contexts – neighborhood, family, school, work and the gang itself. There was limited attention paid to other crime patterns of these youth, or to any general change in their community or institutional contexts. We attempted modification of these environments or contexts to a limited extent, mainly in relation to the youth's social-development needs and the community's need for protection. Our expectation was that the Project would contribute to individual change in a positive social direction, particularly resulting in the youth's reduction of violent behavior, and that a cumulation of such individual youth changes would have some effect in lowering gang and community levels of violence.

Mobility. In our earlier discussion, we observed that most of the youth who were not reinterviewed at Time III had probably left the area. Mobility was a factor even for youth who were reinterviewed and continued to be involved in the program. The number of program youth who did not live in the area but still hung out in Little Village increased over the course of the program. The mobility of reinterviewed program youth was similar for the Latin Kings and the Two Six: 87.7% of the Latin Kings lived in Little Village at Time I, but only 70.8% at Time III; similarly, 88.7% of the Two Six lived in Little Village at Time I, but only 68.9% at Time III. Fewer members of both gangs were living in Little Village at Time III (Latin Kings:  $t = 2.49$ ,  $p$

# 0.01; Two Six:  $t = 3.83$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ).

Gang Membership Status. All youth were asked to indicate whether they were current or former gang members. While most claimed to be current gang members at Time I and Time III, a few had already identified themselves as former gang members at Time I. The category of former gang membership increased for the Latin Kings – from 4.6% to 29.7%, and for the Two Six – from 3.9% to 18.0%. The drop in current gang membership for the Latin Kings was statistically significant ( $t = 4.58$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), as it was also for the Two Six ( $t = 2.19$ ,  $p \# 0.05$ ).

Position in the Gang. Gang members who stated they were current gang members at Time I tended to declare they had become leaders and core members by Time III. This pattern was expected. If gang members stayed in the gang, their status would rise. The pattern was similar and statistically significant for the Latin Kings and the Two Six, with the increase in gang status more characteristic of the Two Six ( $t = - 3.66$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ) than of the Latin Kings ( $t = - 2.15$ ,  $p \# 0.05$ ). On the other hand, those who claimed they were former gang members at Time I tended to classify themselves still as former non-gang or peripheral members at Time III.

Education. Most youth in both gangs improved their educational standing during the Project period. Dropout rates were reduced, and more youth returned to school – graduating from high school, achieving their GED, or entering community college. The percentage of dropouts declined between Time I and Time III for the Latin Kings – from 52.3% to 35.4%, and for the Two Six – from 43.6% to 25.8%. The percentage of youth who returned to school or graduated increased significantly between Time I and Time III for the Latin Kings ( $t = 2.28$ ,  $p \# 0.05$ ) and for the Two Six ( $t = 2.23$ ,  $p \# 0.05$ ). The total number of Latin Kings and Two Six who were in school, had a GED, or graduated high school increased from 66 to 88, i.e., from

52.0% to 70.0% of the interview sample (n = 127).

Employment. More program youth were employed at Time III than at Time I: the Latin Kings reported employment at 35.7% at Time I and 48.2% at Time III, while 30.9% of the Two Six were employed at Time I and 63.3% at Time III. The increase of employed youth for the Two Six was statistically significant ( $t = -4.11, p \neq 0.05$ ). More program youth had both access to, and were using, educational and employment opportunities at Time III than at Time I. How these factors were specifically related to the youth's continued gang membership, his increased position in the gang and any reduction in his patterns of gang crime and violence are assessed in later chapters.

Income. Most of the gang youth in the sample were 17 years of age or older, and no longer completely dependent on family for income. Some youth were working legitimate jobs, others were "hustling" or engaged in illegal enterprises. A series of questions was asked about the source and amount of the youth's annual income. We found an increase in total individual income for the program sample as a whole ( $t = 2.15, p \neq 0.05$ ). Total annual income for the Latin Kings increased from \$9,730 at Time I to \$12,787 at Time III; the increase for the Two Six was from \$9,268 to \$11,797.

Total income was computed based on two sources of income – legal and illegal – considered separately and together. The increase in annual legal income for the Latin Kings was hardly impressive, from \$7,036 at Time I to \$7,969 at Time III. The increase for the Two Six was more substantial, from \$5,927 to \$9,393. The Latin Kings showed an increase in annual illegal income from \$2,564 to \$4,720, but the Two Six showed a decrease in illegal income from \$3,438 to \$2,332. These changes were not statistically significant, since only a small percentage

of youth (particularly at Time I) stated they were obtaining income from illegal sources. The number of Latin Kings, who said they were engaged in illegal enterprise increased from 12 at Time I to 24 at Time III; the number of Two Six from 8 to 13. The level of illegal income as a proportion of total income for the Latin Kings rose – from 15.0% at Time I to 23.0% at Time III; it remained at 12.0% for the Two Six. Thus, combined legal and illegal income increased for members of both gangs, but growth for the Latin Kings came mainly from illegal sources. The increase for the Two Six came mainly from legal sources. More youth were employed at Time III than at Time I, but not necessarily at legally defined work.

#### Aspirations/Expectations

We asked a series of questions based on concepts of anomie or alienation. Both at Time I and at Time III, we asked the youth to state what their *aspirations* were for future occupation and income, and then to state what their realistic *expectations* were. We then computed the gap, or disjunction, subtracting expectation from aspiration responses at each interview period. We proposed that the greater the disjunction, i.e., the greater the interpreted anomie or alienation, the greater the participation in crime or violent activity. We anticipated that as the youth aged or matured – and/or was exposed to the influence of the program – his level of alienation and crime participation would decline. Later we ask whether the size of the disjunction or gap was associated with levels of self-reported gang crime and arrests (see Chapter 12).

Occupation Aspirations/Expectations. Occupational aspirations declined for gang youth over time. While at Time I a high proportion of Latin Kings and Two Six aspired to be professionals, own their own businesses, or become managers, by Time III a greater number

aspired to clerical, trade, and factory positions. The changes were consistent, but not statistically significant, within and between groups. On the other hand, rather low realistic expectations for future jobs (such as clerk, trade, or factory worker) were typically reported at Time I, but substantially increased (to managerial and clerical-level jobs) at Time III. The increased occupational expectations, in relation to the lowered occupational aspirations, was statistically significant for the total sample ( $t = - 2.35$ ,  $p \# 0.05$ ).

In other words, by Time III members of both gangs had lowered their occupational aspirations, but raised their occupational expectations. The decrease in disjunction for the total sample was statistically significant ( $t = - 2.01$ ,  $p \# 0.05$ ). The decrease was statistically significant for the Latin Kings, who were older (Sign Test,  $p = 0.016$ ), but not for the Two Six. Perhaps by Time III gang members had become generally more realistic about their future careers (Merton 1957).

Income Aspirations/Expectations. The results were different using the *income* variable. At Time I, members of both gangs aspired to future income levels between \$30,000 and \$40,000 per year; these aspirations rose to between \$40,000 and \$50,000 at Time III. The increases were similar and statistically significant for members of each of the two gangs (Latin Kings:  $t = - 2.96$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ; Two Six:  $t = 5.94$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), and for both gangs together ( $t = - 6.14$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ). However, income expectations declined only slightly, from the high-\$30,000 range at Time I to the low-\$30,000 or upper-\$20,000 range at Time III. There were minor differences in these patterns between the two gangs. The gap between aspirations and expectations declined for the Latin Kings, but increased slightly for the Two Six. Using income as a criterion, the disjunction or degree of alienation was possibly greater for the Two Six than for the Latin Kings (both at



Time I and Time III), but these differences were not statistically significant. In Chapter 12, we examine whether the increases or decreases in aspirations or expectations – and especially the size of the gap – were related to increases or decreases in crime patterns.

### Summary

A great many changes occurred between the time of the first and third interviews of the Program youth (usually an interval of two years). The changes reported were often statistically significant. The community was perceived as getting better. The youth were relatively more satisfied being in Little Village. Community gang and non-gang crime were generally seen as reduced. Gang youth were less concerned about family victimization in a gang crime. However, the program youth did not see local organizations, residents, or police as changing or doing much during the program period to address the gang problem.

There was little change in household composition or size. Household income increased slightly, and was higher in the Two Six than in the Latin King households. While illegal income was a smaller proportion of household income than legal income, ranging from 9.0% to 16.0%, it increased at a faster rate in the Latin King households. Mean total household income for the total sample increased from \$23,644 to \$24,173 over the three-year period.

Some of the households or families had experience or contacts with the criminal justice system, but at a declining rate over the program period. Gang membership of households declined from 12.1% to 3.8%; arrests of household members from 13.5% to 5.9%; household members on probation declined from 7.7% to 2.7%.

Relationships of gang members with mothers, fathers and siblings were reported as very

positive at Time I and Time III, but were statistically non-significant. The quality of relationships between gang youth and wives or steady girlfriends was only moderately positive (and deteriorated by Time III), but was important to the reduction of gang violence by program youth. There was some increase in household criminal, health, and mental health crises at Time III.

The gang itself was a key context that directly affected the level of participation of the youth in crime. The gang (mainly male), was perceived as not changing in size between Time I and Time III. The size of female sections (or clusters) who hung around with gang males was viewed as growing larger, however. Fighting between the two male gangs was continual, serious and lethal. Somewhat less-serious fighting went on between sections and within sections of the same gang, which was not often as lethal, although fights by individuals in the same section over drug deals could be lethal. There was no evidence that violence at the gang level was perceived as changing between Time I and Time III, although a reduction in violent activity by particular program youth was evident.

A number of youth in the program declared they were no longer active members of the gang at Time III, compared to Time I. The drop was particularly marked for the Latin Kings who said they were no longer active at Time III. Also, there were those who were ordinary gang members at Time I who were likely to be core or leadership members at Time III.

Educational level and employment increased for members of both gangs. At Time III, the number of Latin King dropouts decreased from 52.3% to 35.4%, and Two Six dropouts from 43.6% to 25.8%. At Time I, 35.7% of the Latin Kings reported they were employed. This jumped to 48.2% at Time III. At Time I, 30.9% of the Two Six reported employment, while

63.3% reported employment at Time III. The increase in employment for the Two Six was statistically significant ( $t = -4.11, p \neq 0.05$ ).

Most of the gang youth in the sample were 17 years of age or older at Time I, and no longer completely dependent on the family for sources of income. There was an increase in income for the program sample from approximately \$9,200 per year to \$12,000 per year. The increase in individual legal income was greater for the Two Six than the Latin Kings, while the increase in illegal income was greater for the Latin Kings. The level of illegal income for the Latin Kings, as a proportion of total income, rose from 15.0% to 23.0%; it remained at 12.0% for the Two Six.

Realistic occupational expectations rose but aspirations fell over time for members of both gangs. However, income expectations remained high for members of both gangs. The gap between these sets of income aspirations and expectations declined more for the Latin Kings than for the Two Six.

### Criminal Histories

In this section, we focus on the criminal histories of youth in the program and comparison samples, based on police arrest data for equivalent periods before and during the Gang Violence Reduction Project. We introduce two comparison groups: a *quasi-program* group of youth who received some services and contacts, and a *comparison* group of youth who received no program services or contacts from Project workers. We have selected and matched the comparison samples based on youth from the same two gangs, the Latin Kings and Two Six

in Little Village, who were gang member<sup>4</sup> co-arrestees of program youth at about the time the latter entered the program. Our concern is to determine the general effects of the Project on targeted youth compared to other similar youth. We used police arrest data, and controlled for detention and incarceration experience in the period before the Project (pre-program) as well as during the Project period. We did not have individual-youth interview and self-report data on the two comparison samples. Comparable data on the three samples was only available through use of official criminal histories.

Police data were of special importance from a policy perspective in assessing the value of gang programs, particularly since the Little Village Project was sponsored by the Chicago Police Department. Changes in arrest patterns, rather than changes in self-reported offenses, were the coin of law enforcement approval. In our later analysis of program effectiveness we focus especially on arrest patterns, although we also employ the self-report data of program youth. Arrest data for program and comparison youth covered a longer period (both a five year program and five-year pre-program period); self-report data for program youth was confined to three reporting periods within the program period.<sup>5</sup> Program youth were likely to self-report more

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<sup>4</sup> We had access to RAP sheets and police arrest reports which provided arrest histories of these comparison youth for the period equivalent to program entry for program youth. The arrest reports indicated that 85% of comparison youth either identified themselves and/or the arresting officer identified them as members of one of the two target gangs. There was an extremely high probability that the remaining co-arrestees were also gang members, based on community gang dynamics.

The quasi-program sample (n = 90) comprised youth originally identified as comparison youth in the larger comparison group sample (N = 298). Project workers were later able to identify a sub-sample of these 298 youth as indeed having received some Project services, mainly recreation. Each of the co-arrestees in the sub-sample was identified as a member of either the Latin Kings or the Two Six.

<sup>5</sup> The Program period was defined on a Cohort basis. Program youth from Cohorts I and II and their corresponding co-arrestees – the comparison youth sample – were defined as entering six months after the Project started, for an average of 4½ years of program exposure. Program youth in Cohort III and their corresponding co-arrestees were defined as entering the program at the end of the third or beginning of the fourth year of the Project, for an average of 2 years of program exposure. The arrests of the Cohort III youth were then multiplied by a factor of 2.25 to make Project (although not necessarily direct program-service) effects equivalent.

crime incidents than police records indicated. However complete arrest records were available for all the youth – program and comparison. Furthermore, the range of types of offenses in arrest records was greater than the more limited range of self-reported offenses, which stressed mainly violence, drug and property crime, more typical of gang-type offenses. Consistency in the trend of findings based both on self-report and police arrest data would also provide a greater measure of validity of Project outcome for program youth than if only one source of data was used.

### Sampling Method

The interview and self-report data in Chapter 10 were based only on those program youth in the interview sample (n = 195). In this discussion we describe and compare three subsamples: the original target or interview program sample (n = 195); a quasi-program group (n = 90) who were also known to have received some contacts or services during the course of the Project; and a non-service, non-contact comparison group (n = 208). The way we arrived at the comparison and the quasi-program samples is as follows.

In 1995 we began collecting police histories, elaborated by court-processing data, for all targeted youth based on their involvement in the program and participation in our annual, individual gang-member interviews. As we searched and examined justice-system records, we noted that the program youth were usually arrested with others from the same gangs as co-offenders. These co-arrestees were not interviewed or part of the program and we decided they could comprise a non-program comparison group. Subsequently, we obtained special court permission to examine their criminal histories as well as those of program youth. In an open community setting it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to randomly select highly gang-

involved and violent youth and assign or provide some with social services or special control contacts and some not, at least for members of the same gangs. (The universe of Latin King and Two Six youth in Little Village involved in gang crime was not necessarily known to Project workers, the police generally, or even among the program youth.) We also did not have sufficient funds to interview comparable gang youth from Pilsen, the nearby equivalent gang-problem community, although crime data from that area was used in the aggregate-level analysis.

The large initial group of approximately three hundred co-arrestees, mainly from Cohorts I and II (early in the program) were mainly adults identified through criminal court records. All of these co-arrestees were arrested in the same early period as targeted youth, approximately during the first three months of target-youth program entry. However, several problems arose in the development of the comparison group. We discovered that juveniles arrested along with adults were not listed in criminal court records; also, insufficient juveniles were found as co-arrestees of program juveniles in juvenile court records, and in addition the records of juvenile co-arrestees in the Chicago Police Department's Youth Division were often expunged before we could get to them.

We developed an equivalent group of juvenile co-arrestees based on the co-arrestees of the adult program youth when they were juveniles, using data from juvenile court records. We also extended the risk period of program juveniles as far back as necessary to obtain a sufficient number of juvenile co-arrestees. In due course we obtained a sample of 21 juvenile co-arrestees, and a further group of 52 juvenile co-arrestees using the additional earlier-time-period sampling frames. After extensive analysis, based on prior arrest, detention/ incarceration and age distributions, we discovered that the various subgroups of juvenile co-arrestees did not differ

significantly on any of these criteria.

Another problem arose late in the program and the research in the classification of who was a program and who was a comparison youth. An extensive review of co-arrestees with Project youth workers, probation officers, and police produced information that some contacts and services were indeed provided to 90 of the co-arrestees – now termed a quasi-program group – in the original comparison sample during the five-year program period, even though they had been neither targeted, interviewed, nor tracked through program records. We already had complete official criminal histories for the quasi-program youth, as we did for the program and comparison groups. The quasi-program group, often on the fringes of the program, proved to be generally the most delinquent and criminal of the three samples.

A highly exhaustive search of Chicago Police Department (juvenile and adult) and Cook County (juvenile and adult) criminal court records was carried out annually over the course of the program and a two-year post-program period to obtain police arrest records. We believe these records and our use of them to be accurate and reliable as to crime histories and justice system processing. However, we observe that there may be gaps in the criminal histories due to arrests of youth outside of Chicago and the state, and to court processing of youth outside of Cook County. We have tried to compensate for this through an extensive examination of the Illinois Department of Corrections' (adult and juvenile) records of youth in our various subsamples. We have cross-checked serious offenses of the youth in our samples in the various justice system records and believe the data we are using to be unbiased and reliable.

We observe that the task of collecting accurate and reliable (and sometimes any) criminal justice records for youth and adults in Illinois is formidable. This is true not only because of

inaccuracies and inconsistencies in recordkeeping both within and across components of the justice system, but also in part to the fact that youth who are arrested may give false or contradictory information to police, the courts, and correctional officials. Arrested youth frequently falsify their real names, and change their family names, their birthdates and addresses. One of the means our justice-system researcher employed to identify program and comparison youth was to compare, over time, the records of both program youth and co-arrestees. Because of the network-character of the gang problem, the same youth are often arrested together in different gang incidents. In most cases, we were able to accurately identify youth even though false or inaccurate names and addresses might have been given. Through this continued network-type of checking procedure, we believe we established a valid set of records.

#### Demographic Characteristics of Youth

There was no statistically significant difference in characteristics of race/ethnicity, gender, and age across the three samples: program, quasi-program, and comparison.

Race/Ethnicity. The ethnicity of program, quasi-program, and comparison youth (N = 493) was predominantly Latino, mainly Mexican-American. Only 4.2% (n = 8) of the program group was of European origin, with no Asian or African-Americans. The quasi-program group was even more predominantly Latino or Mexican-American; only 2.3% (n = 2) were non-Latinos. The comparison group, although predominantly Mexican-Americans or Latinos, were a little different. Eleven and five-tenths percent (11.5%) of this sample (n = 25) were non-Latino or non-Mexican-American, including youth of middle European origin (n = 19); five additional



youth were African-American and one was Asian. Our general estimate of Latino youth in the comparison sample is probably underestimated since most of these youth had one parent of Mexican-American background.

Gender. We used only males in this sample. There were only a small number of females in each of the samples; program (n = 4); quasi-program (n = 3); comparison (4). Because this sample selection was a function of the focus of the Project on reduction of serious violence, those identified and arrested as offenders in gang-violent situations were almost exclusively males. This is not to deny that females were affiliated with the Latin Kings and Two Six in a variety of social and anti-social situations, as observations in previous chapters indicate. In a later chapter, we will describe the nature and changing patterns of gang-related female delinquency and criminality in Little Village, based on aggregate or community-level statistics.

Age. There were no significant age differences in the youth of our different samples at the time of program entry (or its equivalent for the two comparison groups); in fact their ages were almost identical: program mean = 17.98 years; quasi-program mean = 17.86 years; and comparison mean = 17.95 years. There was also no significant statistical difference between the ages of the Latin Kings and the Two Six in the program sample, although the Latin Kings were older in the first Cohort but younger in the third Cohort than the Two Six. The age range of youth in our samples at the time of program entry was originally 12 years to 29 years. One program and two comparison youth were almost 13 years of age; twelve youth were between 25 and 29 years of age: program (n = 5), quasi-program (n = 3), comparison (n = 4). For purposes of the analysis,

we excluded the twelve youth over 24 years of age.

We divided our age groups based on the assumption that three social stages seemed appropriate for purposes of legal definition or justice-system processing of gang youth in Little Village and in Illinois, as well as an empirical gang research and developmental theory. Gang youth under 16 in Little Village were largely wannabes looking for gang status, mainly by increased gang-related delinquent activity. Youth 17 and 18 years of age generally were at the peak of their participation in gang activity and crime, especially gang-motivated violence. Youth 19 and over were usually leaving the gang, obtaining legitimate jobs, raising families and settling down, and/or moving into more sophisticated economic-gain crime. These were the age-related gang-developmental stages that the Project was trying to modify, or accelerate program youth out of.

#### Prior Criminal Arrest History

We focus on the pre-program criminal arrest histories of youth with respect to their patterns of detention/incarceration, total offenses and types of offenses matched by age categories within and across the three samples. There were few significant statistical differences in criminal history patterns prior to the program period, other than age-category differences. The average risk period for first and second-Cohort youth (program, quasi-program, and comparison) is 4½ years, and for the third-Cohort youth (program, quasi-program and comparison) it is 2 years. When computing arrest data we adjust for time that the youth was in confinement and not at risk in the community.

For purposes of the analysis based on arrest data we have selected only those program

youth with criminal histories at the time of program entry. All of the youth in the quasi-program and the comparison samples had criminal histories in the pre-program period. While 83.1% (n = 162) of the program sample had prior criminal histories, 16.9% (n = 33) in fact had no prior or subsequent history of arrest or court appearance (and therefore no detention or incarceration record). Some of the program youth developed criminal-justice records during the program period. Regression effects account for much of the change in the program period. Youth with more arrest records in the pre-program period are likely to have fewer arrest records in the program period. We control for these effects in the models we develop in Chapter 11.

#### Detention/Incarceration

Our various samples seem to be well matched on characteristics of pre-program detention/incarceration records as well as ethnicity, gender, and age. We find that 14.2% of the program sample had records of pre-program secure confinement (n = 23), compared to 12.2% (n = 10) for the quasi-program group, and 10.6% (n = 26) for the comparison group. These proportions do not represent statistically significant differences among the three samples.

The age breakdowns, albeit with relatively small numbers, clearly indicate that very few of the youth 16 and under have pre-program-period detention or incarceration records: program = 1; quasi-program = 1; and comparison = 0. As expected, the older the youth, the more likely he is to have had a secure confinement record. This is the case relatively more often for the 19-and-over comparison group (76.2%) than for the program group (65.2%) or the quasi-program group (54.6%). The numbers are smaller for the 17-and 18-year-old group across the samples, but we find that relatively more of the quasi-program group (45.5%) than the program group

(30.4%) and the comparison group (19.1%) have prior detention or incarceration histories. At the same time, if we examine days in detention/incarceration, the comparison group spent more pre-program-period time in detention or incarceration (mean = 62.98 days) than the quasi-program group (mean = 49.84 days) or the program group (mean = 49.84 days). Again, these differences are not statistically significant, even when controlling for age groupings.

All of these secure-confinement percentages and figures go up drastically for each of the samples and age categories during the program period, in large measure because of more stringent laws and a hardening of the justice system approach to gang offenders during that period. If we compare the number of youth in secure confinement during the program versus the pre-program period, the increase is four or five fold. The average increase for program youth is up from 20 to 89 days; quasi-program youth from 11 to 57 days; and comparison youth from 16 to 73 days. The increase in time in detention and/or incarceration goes up, particularly for younger youth.

#### Arrest Patterns: Pre-Program

In the analysis of pre-program arrest patterns, we removed from our sample and analysis not only youth who were over 24 years of age at program-period entry, females (because of small numbers) and those youth in the program sample without pre-program or program-period arrests, but also those in the three samples who were serving long sentences after the first three months of program contact (or equivalent), since they were essentially no longer at risk for arrest in the community. This gives us samples of: program youth (n = 154), quasi-program youth (n = 84) and comparison youth (n = 180). A fairly equal distribution of age grouping remains – about

a third 19-and-over, a third 17 and 18, and a third 16-and-under – across the samples. The 16-and-under age group is slightly larger, at 36.8% in the program sample compared to 39.3% in the quasi-program sample, and 40.6% in the comparison sample.

We examine mean arrests of youth for a variety of juvenile and adult arrest categories: total arrests, serious violence arrests (including homicides, aggravated batteries, aggravated assaults, and armed robberies – most involving use of a firearm), total violence arrests (including serious and less-serious violence arrests) property arrests, drug/alcohol arrests, arrests for other crimes of less severity (e.g., mob action, gang loitering, disorderly conduct, obstruction of law enforcement – all reflecting a good deal of police discretion), and status offenses.

First we attempt to discover whether arrests in the pre-program period vary across the samples by types of arrests and age categories, controlling for equivalent program and pre-program periods. We find no statistical differences in total arrest patterns by respective age categories between program and comparison groups; they do exist for the quasi-program sample, whose youth generally have a more extensive history of total and different types of offenses. For the pre-program period, total mean arrests for the program sample is 4.57, for the comparison sample 4.01, and for the quasi-program group 7.75. The difference is statistically significant ( $p = 0.05$ ) between the quasi-program and each of the other two samples. However, when we examine serious violence arrests (homicide, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and robbery), we find no statistically significant differences in the pre-program period between program youth (mean = 0.79) and comparison youth (mean = 0.82), but each of these two samples has significantly less ( $p = 0.05$ ) history of serious violence than the quasi-program sample (mean = 1.35). The same pattern occurs in the comparison of a more expansive list of arrests for total

violence which includes, in addition to the serious violence offenses listed above, simple assault and simple battery as well as illegal possession of a weapon, mainly a gun. The mean scores are: program = 1.04, comparison = 1.16, and quasi-program = 1.95.

Again, the same pattern is present for mean property arrests: program = 1.44, comparison = 1.29, and quasi-program = 2.36. When it comes to drug and alcohol arrests, there are no statistically significant differences among the three samples in the pre-program period. The means are: program = 0.43, comparison = 0.34, and quasi-program = 0.56. For other types of crime (particularly mob action, disorderly conduct, obstruction of an officer, and also for status offenses) we find the pattern of difference as above, i.e., the quasi-program group has significantly more arrests than either the program or comparison group. There is no statistically-significant difference between program and comparison groups. We appear to have well-matched samples (particularly for program and comparison youth, less-so for quasi-program youth) on all key types of arrest variables, based on justice system information. However, in a later analysis, when we match the samples by combinations of categories of arrests, particularly violence and drugs, we will find important differences which we attribute to different types of gang offenders in our three samples (see Chapter 13).

### Summary

Using data from three annual interviews of program youth we have described important personal, gang, and community characteristics that would be addressed by Project workers through the services and contacts they provided. Changes in these characteristics could be important variables in multivariate models, accounting for change in self-reported offense and

police-arrest patterns.

Of special importance for evaluation purposes will be a comparison of arrest-change patterns in the three samples, with special interest in those Project services and contacts that contribute to a reduction in arrest behaviors, mediated by changes in certain life-course events such as job and education, as well as gang and family changes.

## Chapter 9

### Program-Worker Contacts, Services and Strategies

In the present chapter, we examine the nature of the various contacts, services, and strategies provided by the Project workers, community youth workers, police, probation officers, and the NAGV workers to program youth (Bickman 2000). We do this first through use of summary reports (worker tracking) collected on an annual basis from all of the types of workers with 191 program youth. Second, using debriefing records, we focus in greater detail on the activities of the youth workers who had the preponderance, the most frequent, and the widest scope of service contacts with target youth. Weekly debriefing records, however, were only completed for 65 of the 191 program youth. The findings of the worker-tracking and debriefing records, based on quantitative data, prove to be reasonably consistent. The use of both sources of data on worker contacts, services and strategies, in addition to the qualitative descriptions of the efforts of the different workers (discussed in earlier chapters), provides a substantially complete picture of Project program efforts.

### Part I

We use worker-tracking data on 191 program youth to look at characteristics of services or contacts – duration, frequency, intensity – and specific types of service activities – individual counseling (advice), family contacts, school and job contacts, and suppression efforts. Services or contacts are aggregated into types of strategies: social intervention, social opportunities, and suppression. The worker-tracking forms were completed annually three times during the course of the five-year program period – in the second, fourth, and fifth years – summarizing



service/contact activities during the reporting periods. We wanted to determine: 1) what services were provided by which workers; 2) when contacts by the various workers were made, over how many months, and with what frequency of contact per youth per month; and 3) the degree of worker-perceived success in the provision of their services or activities.

We note that the dosage – duration and frequency – of all services was not necessarily expected to be correlated with Project worker-perceived success. Contacts by workers were directed to hardcore gang youth who were at various times exhibiting high rates of violent and other kinds of criminal behavior. The more serious a youth's involvement in such behavior, the more Project workers were expected to sustain and/or intensify contacts with the youth. Nevertheless, we expected that the nature and frequency of certain services and contacts provided, and the types of strategies they represented, along with the particular combination of workers involved, would be generally associated with, if not contribute to, the Project goal, i.e., the reduction of gang activities, gang violence, and even possibly drug use and drug dealing.

### The Worker-Tracking Youth Sample

with Sung Eun Choi

Three waves of activity-tracking records involving the various types of workers were collected and analyzed. Our sample of program youth having worker-tracking records (n = 164) is not exactly the same as the sample of program youth in the Project who received some service/contact, or even the sample of youth who were interviewed in the gang member survey or for whom we have police data. Our gang member survey (interview) sample included 195 youth; of these only 164 also had worker-tracking data. Outreach youth workers, for various

reasons, failed to provide tracking data for 31 youth, although (based on field observational reports) most of these youth did receive some services and/or contacts. There were 27 program youth who did not participate in the gang member survey who were tracked by the workers and received some services/contacts. We do not have demographic data or criminal-justice histories for these gang youth, but they are included in the present analysis of services and contacts.

Of the program youth in our worker-tracking sample, 85 (51.8%) are from the first grouping (Cohort I) who entered the program in its first two years; 38 (23.2%) are from the second grouping (Cohort II), some of whom began receiving services at about the same time as the first Cohort, but were not first interviewed until the second Project year; and 41 (25%) are from the third grouping (Cohort III), who came into the program and were interviewed at the beginning of the fourth program year. Relatively more of the older program youth were in Cohorts I (mainly 19 years and older) and II (mainly 17 and 18-year-olds); relatively more of the younger group (mainly 15- and 16-year-olds) were in Cohort III. More of the youth who were interviewed two or more times had worker-tracking data (91.4%), compared to those who were interviewed only one time (50.0%).

### Scope of Worker Contacts

In this section we describe the scope of contacts provided to program youth by type of Project workers, and in the following section we describe the service nature of those contacts. The scope of contacts is based on the amount of time (expressed in months) contact was maintained, the frequency of contacts per month, and the intensity of contacts, i.e., total frequency of contacts with youth divided by total months of contact. This analysis covers all

164 interviewed program youth, plus an additional 27 youth for whom we have tracking but no individual interview data, for a total of 191 different youth. We examine the dimensions of the contacts provided by the particular Project workers: outreach youth workers, police officers, probation officers, the neighborhood organizer, and all of these providers together. We describe program effects over the five-year Project period: by total sample, by Cohort, and by specific gang.

Duration of Contacts. Not all Project workers were in continuing contact with each program youth; the same worker team did not necessarily service or contact a particular youth. Nevertheless, multiple types of workers did often contact each youth served. Several of each type of worker, in coordination with one or more other types of workers, were often in contact with a particular youth during the course of the program. On average, contacts were made by 2.4 different workers with the total youth sample over a period of 29.2 months. In other words, the average program youth for whom tracking data exists received contacts from one or more different types of workers over an average of almost 2½ years.

Project youth workers were in touch with and served the largest number of these youth. An average of 1.7 different youth workers served 179 youth over 17.5 months. (Note that the average stay of community youth workers with the Project was approximately two years.) The youth workers were usually assigned in sets of two to the Latin Kings and Two Six program youth. As a rule, the different youth workers contacted members of several sections of one gang only. The police, probation, and to some extent, the neighborhood organizer, were generally able to work with youth across all sections of both gangs.

The pattern of Project police contacts was different from that of the youth workers: 1.6

Project police officers served or contacted 58 youth from both gangs, for an average of 32.6 months per youth. The same two police officers worked together and were active during the entire five years of the Project. This consistency was not the case with the youth workers, the probation officers, or the neighborhood organizer.

Three adult probation officers were each assigned to the Project in two overlapping three-year periods. On average, 1.8 different probation officers served 20 program youth for an average of 15.5 months. Probation officers reported contacts only for those youth who were currently on probation. Our data in this chapter do not include program-youth contacts with other Cook County adult probation officers, and we have no tracking data regarding those youth on juvenile probation during the program period. We know that a significant number of program juveniles were either on probation or in juvenile detention at some point during the program period. Cook County Juvenile Court probation as an organization did not formally collaborate with the Project, although Project workers did contact individual juvenile probation officers on a case-by-case basis.

The neighborhood organizer provided services to some program youth, particularly juveniles and their families. The organizer was in contact with 25 youth for an average of 10.2 months, and was involved with youth (mainly providing advice or brief counseling and occasionally supervising athletic activities) over a period of 2½ years.

The majority of tracked youth in the first Cohort was exposed to more workers and had longer periods of service, but was not necessarily provided a greater frequency or intensity of contacts (as we will see in the next section). On average, 85 Cohort I youth were served by 3.0 workers over 37 months; 65 Cohort II youth were served by 2.0 workers for an average of 27.3

months; and 41 Cohort III youth were served by 1.7 workers for an average of 15.9 months. Frequency of contact did not vary by Cohort or by length of time the youth was in the program. Frequency of contact mainly depended on the nature of the youth's troublesome gang activity, especially his violent behavior. Frequency of contact usually diminished once the youth "settled down."

Based on worker-tracking data, the Project served more Latin Kings (n =102) than Two Six (n = 89).<sup>1</sup> On average, the Latin Kings were served by more workers (2.6) and for a longer period of time (32.5 months); the Two Six were served by 2.1 workers for an average of 25.3 months. More of the program youth who were both tracked and interviewed were in contact with more workers (2.6), and longer (31.7 months) than program youth who were tracked but not interviewed. The 27 youth for whom only tracking data exist were served essentially by only one worker for a period of 13.4 months. There was also a relationship between the number of times a program youth was interviewed and the length of time the youth was tracked. Youth interviewed two or more times were provided with 23.2 months of contacts, while youth who were interviewed only once were provided with 16.7 months of contacts.

Frequency of Contacts. Frequency was based on the number of youth contacts per month by each worker. An average of 2.4 Project workers were in contact with program youth an average of sixteen times per month over the entire time those youth were in the program. In other words, program youth were provided with a great deal of contact by a variety of workers, on average almost four times a week. An average of 1.7 youth workers serving 179 youth were

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<sup>1</sup> In our analysis of debriefing records of a subsample (n = 65) of youth identified in the worker-tracking records (n = 164), Two Six workers indicated they contacted more youth than did Latin King workers. Overall, the Project provided services and contacts to more Latin Kings.

in contact with a youth 13 times per month; an average of 1.6 Project police serving 58 youth had contact with a youth 7.7 times per month; an average of 1.6 Project probation officers serving 20 youth provided contact with a youth 7.4 times per month. One neighborhood organizer with a 25-youth caseload contacted youth an average of 5.6 times per month.

Youth in Cohort I (n = 85) had contact with more workers – an average of 3.1 – and were contacted more frequently – 18.3 times per month – than youth in Cohort II (n = 65), who were contacted by an average of 2 workers 15.3 time per month, and youth in Cohort III (n = 41), who were contacted by an average of 1.7 workers 12.3 times per month. The pattern of contacts varied slightly for the Latin Kings and the Two Six. While the Latin Kings (n = 102) were contacted on average by a few more workers – 2.7 – they received somewhat less frequent contact, an average of 15.7 times per month. The Two Six (n = 89) were contacted by fewer workers – 2.1– but more frequently – 16.3 times per month.

We observe that the 164 tracked youth who were interviewed were provided with considerably more worker contacts – n = 2.7 – more frequently – 17.0 times per month – than the 27 tracked youth who were not interviewed. These youth were provided contact by a worker (exclusively by youth workers) an average of 9.7 times per month. Also to be noted is that youth who were interviewed only once, and who were in the program for a shorter period of time, were not necessarily provided fewer contacts per month during the period they were in the program than youth interviewed two or more times. In sum, however we analyze the data, program youth received frequent contacts from workers, many more than is typical in a street-based program.

Intensity of Contacts. We developed a measure of intensity of program contacts for each youth. The computation of the intensity score was based on the total number of contacts made

with the particular youth, divided by the number of months the youth was in the program. The score took into consideration the length of time the youth was in the program overall, and the frequency of contact by all of the workers. For the total 191 youth, the average intensity score was 8.9 contacts per month, and represented mainly the intensity of contacts established by the youth workers with 179 youth – 8.8 contacts per month. Contacts by the Project police, who served fewer youth (n = 58), were less intense – 5.4 contacts per month, the same as that established by the neighborhood organizer, who served even fewer youth (n = 25) – 5.4 contacts per month. The intensity score for Project probation officers, who served the fewest number of youth (n = 20) was 4.3 contacts per month. In other words, the intensity of contact by youth workers, even though they served more youth, was greater than that of other team members.

The intensity of contact may have varied by the needs of youth in the different Cohorts, not necessarily by how many times they were contacted. Youth in Cohort II were provided with the most intense contacts per month – 10.3 – compared to youth in Cohort I – 8.4 – and in Cohort III – 7.8. The Two Six were provided with more intense contacts per month – 10.1 – than the Latin Kings – 7.9. In general, we find that youth 17 and 18 years of age, who were probably at the peak period of their gang activity and gang violence, were provided with the most intense contacts over the longest period of time, particularly by Project youth workers and Project police.

### Types of Service Activities

In this section we describe the types of services provided by the various Project workers, but not the duration and frequency, which we were unable to disaggregate by specific services.

We describe the proportion of different types of services regardless of intensity provided. The services provided were: *individual counseling or advice* (brief rather than extended); *family services*; *school referrals or assistance*; *job training, job referral or job placement*; *suppression* (arrest, probation violation, etc.); *athletic activities*; and *other kind of services* (e.g. hospital visits, assistance for girlfriends, camping trips). The actual scope of services provided was understated in the tracking reports, but is elaborated in the debriefing records (see below, Part II).

Individual Counseling. Brief counseling, or advice, was the principal service provided to youth by the workers. Some form of brief counseling was provided to 86.4% of all youth (n = 191) by an average of 2.4 workers. Youth workers provided the most brief counseling to the most youth. An average of 1.7 youth workers contacted 91.2% of the youth (n = 179). Brief counseling was provided to 64.4% of the youth (n = 58) by 1.6 Project police. A somewhat higher percent – 78.0% – of the youth (n = 20) were contacted for brief counseling by an average of 1.6 Project probation officers. Although the neighborhood organizer contacted only 25 youth, almost all (92.0%) received some form of brief counseling. While all types of workers provided a certain level of such counseling and advice, this did not necessarily preclude the Project police and probation officers from arresting and violating these same youth at various times.

The third Cohort, comprising the larger proportion of youth 16 years of age and under, was contacted the most for brief counseling – 90.4% – by an average of 1.7 workers, mainly youth workers. Somewhat fewer (82.5%) of the first Cohort, which comprised the largest proportion of older youth (19 years and over), were provided with some form of counseling, albeit by an average of 3 workers. The corresponding percentages for the second Cohort were



between those of the first and third Cohorts. A slightly higher percentage – 89.2% – of the Two Six (n = 89) were provided with counseling than were the Latin Kings at 83.9% (n = 102). However, slightly more workers (2.6) provided counseling to the Latin Kings than did workers (2.1) to the Two Six. A slightly smaller proportion (85.7%) of the 164 interviewed youth were provided with counseling services, but by more workers (2.6, on average) than the 27 non-interviewed youth, who were provided with slightly more brief counseling-type contacts (90.7%), almost exclusively by youth workers.

We observe that all types of workers generally reported some positive responsiveness of youth to their efforts. Such claims of success were not necessarily related to longer-term behavioral outcome, but to the workers' perceptions of the youth's responses to their more immediate efforts. Youth workers reported a slightly higher level of success than did the other types of workers. Also, a slightly higher level of responsiveness to brief counseling was reported for the third Cohort compared to the other two Cohorts. Slightly more counseling success was reported for the Two Six than the Latin Kings.

Family Services. About half of all youth tracked (52.8%) were provided with some form of family service by an average of 2.4 workers (usually in the youth's home, and consisting of brief counseling or advice). Youth workers contacted more families than the other workers, but this was still only 51.3% of the families of youth in their caseloads. The neighborhood organizer and the Project probation officers reported the highest proportion of family contacts, 78.0% and 71.0% respectively, but each had smaller caseloads than the youth workers. The Project police were also in contact with a substantial number of families (46.3%) of youth in their caseloads.

More of the families – 61.0% – of youth in the third Cohort (generally comprising

younger youth) were provided with services, compared to 52.9% of families in the first Cohort, and 47.7% of families in the second Cohort. However, more youth workers were involved in family-service contacts with Cohort I youth than with youth in Cohorts II and III. A higher proportion of service contacts was made with Two Six families (59.1%) than with Latin King families (47.2%). (The Two Six were younger on average than the Latin Kings.) Also, a slightly higher proportion of non-interviewed youth received family-services contacts than did interviewed youth.

Overall, workers reported a slightly higher level of brief counseling responsiveness from families than from individual youth. Youth workers, and especially the neighborhood organizer, reported relatively higher levels of family counseling success (i.e., by their responsiveness) than did Project probation or police officers.

School Referrals (Assistance). About 38.0% of the tracked program youth (n = 191) were provided with school referrals, or special educational or school-related contacts, by 2.4 workers. The highest proportions of youth-contacts around school issues, per caseload, were made by the neighborhood organizer (86.1%) and the Project probation officers (65.3%). Fewer youth-per-caseload were contacted in regard to school issues by youth workers (35.7%) and Project police (31.6%). What is remarkable is that a high proportion of youth were contacted by the Project police in regard to school referrals or school-related issues. More of the Two Six (45.0%) than Latin Kings (31.7%) were provided with school-related contacts. Also, youth who had been interviewed were provided with slightly more school-related contacts (38.7%) compared to non-interviewed youth (33.0%).

The level of successful effort, or positive responsiveness, claimed by workers in regard to

school issues was slightly lower, in the fair-to-good range (Scale 2-3)<sup>2</sup>, than the level of successful effort claimed in respect to individual or family counseling, which was closer to the “good” (Scale 3.0) part of the range. There was little variation in claims of success for youth across the three Cohorts. A somewhat lower level of school-related-contact success was claimed for youth in the third Cohort, who were (or should have been) in school, and presumably had more school problems than older youth. The level of claimed worker success was slightly lower for the Two Six than for the Latin Kings, and for the interviewed youth than for the non-interviewed youth.

Job Training/Referral/Placement A higher proportion of youth were contacted, and a higher level of contact success or responsiveness was reported, for job training/job referral and job placement (mainly by community youth workers and the neighborhood organizer) than for school referrals/assistance. However, individual and family-counseling efforts were rated as slightly more successful than those of job training/referral/placement, most of which were made by youth workers, who also reported that they attempted to place about half of all youth (50.3%) in jobs. These youth were provided jobs, training, or related contacts by an average of 1.5 youth workers. Only the neighborhood organizer, working with a smaller number of youth (n = 20), reported job-related contacts with a higher proportion of youth (75.0%). No job-related referrals were made by Project probation or police officers.

The proportion of youth contacted for job training/referral/placement was about equal across the three Cohorts. Relatively more Two Six – 59.6% (n = 82) – were provided job-related contacts than Latin Kings – 43.0% (n = 98). However, more Project workers were

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<sup>2</sup> On a 4-point scale: 1 = None; 2 = Little; 3 = Some; 4 = Very Good.

involved in job-related contacts with the Latin Kings (1.9) than with the Two Six (1.4). A slightly higher proportion of interviewed youth were contacted around job-related issues (51.0%) than were non-interviewed youth (48.1%).

The level of success of these efforts was rated as almost “good” (Scale 2.9) by the neighborhood organizer and the community youth workers. Job-related efforts were rated as a little better than “good” for Cohort I, and not quite so “good” for Cohorts II and III.

Responsiveness to job-training/referral/placement efforts was rated as slightly better for the Latin Kings than for the Two Six, and for interviewed compared to non-interviewed youth.

Suppression. The second highest proportion of total contacts with youth (66.3%) was in regard to suppression, i.e., surveillance, warning, arrest, probation violation, etc. – second highest after individual counseling (86.4%). However, all of the suppression contacts reported were by either probation (85.8% – with a caseload of 20 youth), or by the Project police (64.9% – with a caseload of 58 youth). Youth workers and the neighborhood organizer reported no suppression contacts with youth, but this may have been because no questions about suppression were posed to these workers. Based on field observations, the youth workers and neighborhood organizer occasionally recommended arrest or probation violation to Project police and probation officers for certain youth, about 10% of youth on their respective caseloads. Advice and counseling efforts by youth workers, particularly on the streets, often included warnings about avoiding criminal behavior, particularly violent acts. The suppression aspects of the youth worker’s role and his suppression-related contacts are described in Part II, below.

Relatively more youth (73.3%) in the second Cohort than in the first Cohort (68.2%) or third Cohort (50.0%) were provided suppression contacts by Project police and probation

officers. A slightly higher proportion of Two Six (68.5 %) than Latin Kings (62.7%) was contacted for suppression purposes. Almost all interviewed program youth contacted for suppression had been interviewed. Only one of the non-interviewed youth was provided with a suppression contact, by probation. The non-interviewed youth with tracking records were possibly more likely to be fringe gang members who were provided mainly with social support or job training/referral/placement services. Responsiveness of program youth to worker suppression efforts by Project police and probation was rated as almost “good.”

Athletics. Low program priority was given to athletic activities, e.g., basketball, baseball, football. Project workers reported that they provided sports-related services to 35.7% of program youth. A substantial number of workers per youth – an average of 2.3 – were involved in such activity. Youth workers were involved in athletic activities with 42.5% of the youth in their caseloads; probation – 38.7%; the neighborhood organizer – 38.0%; and Project police – 24.4%. The first Cohort was provided with slightly more athletic activities than the other two Cohorts, while both gangs were provided with an equal proportion. Interviewed youth were provided with more athletic-related services by the youth workers – 38.1% – than were non-interviewed youth – 20.0%. The level of youth responsiveness to these efforts was not measured.

In sum, individual and family counseling, job/school referral, and suppression were the primary activities of Project workers. All Project workers provided these activities to a different degree to a varying number of youth. Workers generally claimed a modest level of responsiveness (i.e., success) by youth to their particular service or contact efforts.

## Youth Response to the Project

Finally, in a series of open-ended questions in the individual gang-member survey about the purpose of the Project, 48.2% of the 135 program youth who responded said the purpose of the Project was the reduction of gang activity and communicating dangers of gang membership. Counseling was next – 21.9%, followed by general reduction of crime and violence – 11.3% ; helping the community deal with gang problems – 8.0%; jobs or job training – 4.7%; and athletics – 1.8%.

Furthermore, of the youth who were interviewed and for whom we had worker-tracking data, 77.5% (n = 133) said that the Project helped them to deal with one or more personal problems, and 71.9% (n = 135) said that the Project helped them get involved in a range of legitimate activities.

## Part II

### Patterns of Youth-Worker Services and Contacts

In addition to worker-tracking information obtained on a summary basis, detailed process information was obtained on the activities of 11 youth workers with 65 youth (a subsample of the 154 youth for whom both summary worker-tracking records and complete police arrest histories were collected).<sup>3</sup> Youth workers were expected to fill out debriefing forms once a week, although this did not always occur. A total of 284 forms were completed by the end of the

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<sup>3</sup> On average, debriefing information from youth workers was obtained for 46.1% of the weeks during the period the youth workers were on the Project. The debriefing interviews were conducted during the last half of the program and did not represent the full scope of activities of all of the youth workers. The summary tracking forms were completed systematically during the entire five-year Project, three times, 1½ years apart, but provided less-detailed information.

Project. The debriefing form consisted of nine major topics the youth workers were expected to respond to: the most important things that happened in their work; gang-related issues; contacts with Project police/probation officers; job-related services; education-related services; other services provided to youth; contacts with family members; special problems (including field-work and administrative problems); and any further support they felt they needed in order to do their work. While interviewing each youth worker at the Project research offices at the University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration, the research assistant usually filled out the form as they talked together about the questions and the youth worker's responses to them. The discussion, although guided by specific topics, was relatively open-ended. The questions were general, so that the youth workers would feel free to bring up other related things they had done or observed during the week.

The debriefing form was originally intended as a method of monitoring what youth workers were doing on the job, and was not meant to provide comprehensive information on youth-worker activities. Nevertheless, the forms proved highly useful in gathering detailed information about the nature of their activities. The analysis of the data supplied focused on what the worker did and whom he contacted. The analysis reflected a bias in favor of the worker who completed a greater number of forms compared to those who filled out fewer forms. (A good worker might have completed fewer forms, but done a better job.) Despite this problem, the debriefing forms were a source of useful information that was generally consistent with the findings of the summary worker-tracking forms reported in Part I, above.

Except for one youth worker (who had not been a gang member but lived in Little Village and had extensive contacts with gang youth), all Project youth workers were former

members of the two targeted gangs in Little Village: the Latin Kings and the Two Six. In order to take advantage of gang-member social networks in the respective gang areas, and to avoid hostility or suspicion from the opposing gangs or different sections of the same gang, youth workers were assigned to youth in the same gang or gang section they had originally been affiliated with (or those sections of the gang they were familiar with). Six (54.5%) out of the eleven youth workers described in the analysis worked with Two Six sections, and completed 57.0% of the total 284 debriefing forms. The five Latin King workers completed 43.0% of the debriefing forms. The Latin King workers contacted more program youth than did the Two Six workers, but did not fill out as many debriefing forms. Their work, as we shall see below, was at least (if not more) effective than that of the Two Six workers. The amount of time the youth worker was on the Project – his tenure – ranged from 2 months to 3¼ years. The median youth-worker tenure was 1 year and 3 months (Table 9.1).

Each statement (N = 3043) in the completed debriefing forms was coded regarding particular youth-worker services (activities) provided and/or person(s) contacted. In 1299 statements, the service (activity) provided by the worker and to whom it was provided were identified. In 887 statements, the specific person(s) contacted was identified, but the service (activity) was not. There were 30 additional specific services (activities) identified, but not the person(s) contacted for the services. An additional 827 statements did not include a specific service (activity) and identifiable person(s) contacted. Later tables will vary in their totals, depending on whether the analysis focuses on types of services (activities) or person(s) contacted, or both.

The analysis of the debriefing-form data centers attention on two major dimensions:



whom the youth workers contacted, and what services (activities) they provided. The data were classified and aggregated in ways relevant mainly to the underlying strategies of the program and the kinds of participants involved. The types of services provided by the youth workers were classified into nine major categories and one residual category (Table 9.2); and the types of persons the youth workers contacted were classified into eight categories (Table 9.3). Coding the types of persons the worker contacted was not a simple process. Although the categories of “individual youth” and “a group of youth” are logically separable, it was often difficult for the coder to make a clear distinction as to whom the youth worker was primarily addressing. When a specific person was clearly identified as a recipient of a service (activity) it was coded as a service to an individual; when focus seemed to be on a section of the gang, or associates of the gang member, it was coded as a service to the gang. In some cases, neither the person(s) contacted nor service (activity) provided were clearly identified.

Table 9.4 summarizes the types of identifiable services (activities) youth workers provided, and to whom they were directed. Percentages that follow in parentheses are proportions of the total number of services (activities) (N = 1299). Youth workers had contacts with a wide range of individuals or groups. Most services (activities) were directed to individual program youth (41.5%). Substantial numbers of contacts were also with family members (13.9%) and groups of gang youth (12.1%). Significant numbers of contacts were made with Project probation officers (8.0%), Project police officers (6.2%), other Project youth workers (5.0%), the Project Neighborhood Community Organizer (3.9%) and community leaders/agency personnel/residents (6.3%). It was clear from the debriefing records that youth workers were not strictly oriented to work with groups of gang youth. Their primary objective was working with

individual youth in a group context. More than three times as much contact was made with individual youth as with gang groups as a whole.

More than 40% of youth-worker activities were directed to personal, economic and career-development issues (i.e., opportunity-related services), mainly job-related services (26.4%) and education-related services (13.9%). Recreation-related (16.5%) and criminal-justice-related (6.4%) contacts were also frequently made. Services provided which focused mainly on individual youth were: gang-related (4.9%), job-related (21.8%), education-related (10.8%) and criminal-justice-related (2.6%). The bulk of services provided on a group basis were for recreation or athletic activities (10.5%) and for gang-related issues (1.2%).

The essence of the youth worker's role with individual program youth was counseling around jobs, education and delinquency/gang control. A variety of services and contacts with others – particularly family, probation, and police – were made in support of these primary individual-youth-related concerns and problems. Of importance to gang-violence control was that group or gang-related recreational activities involving members of opposing gangs almost always included the presence of probation and police officers, as both observers and participants. Certain community-related activities such as citizen meetings and graffiti-expunging projects also involved Project police and probation officers. Information from field surveillance activities of youth workers about criminal and potentially-criminal youth-gang activities was shared with Project probation (3.1%), Project police (1.3%) and also the youth's family, especially parents (3.6%).

Gang-related Issues, (although they comprised only 12.2% of total youth-worker services) were

discussed most with individual program youth (40.3%), Project police (27.0%) and families of youth (12.6%). The specific gang-related topics varied with the particular persons contacted. In regard to issues of serious violence, youth workers mainly contacted Project police (17.6%). Quitting the gang was discussed mainly with individual youth (12.6%), and families and girlfriends (5.0%). Stopping gang feuding was discussed mainly with individual youth (9.4%), as was drug selling/drug use (5.7%). These four topics (issues of serious violence, quitting the gang, stopping gang feuding, and drugs) comprised 67.3% of all gang-related issues discussed. Other gang-related topics of discussion included relations with Project police (7.5%), weapons (5.0%), robbery activities of program youth (3.8%), and youth not coming home (3.1%) (Table 9.5).

The discussions around gang-related issues were not necessarily initiated by the youth workers; often they were initiated by Project police, or the program youth himself. Police and youth workers frequently interacted with each other in discovering details of a youth's involvement in particular crimes, especially gang-related fighting. The youth worker continually advised the individual youth not to be involved in gang activities. Program youth in turn initiated contact with youth workers to seek advice about quitting the gang. The youth worker shared information openly with Project police about gang violence (or threats of gang violence), both at staff meetings and frequently through telephone calls or field contacts with the officers. However, information about other types of gang-related activities, such as vandalism, disorderly conduct, or drug dealing, was not often shared openly at staff meetings; rather it was discussed informally with individual Project police officers, particularly after staff meetings or on the phone. Youth workers as a rule did not meet openly with Project police in the gang territories.

Job-Related Services, the primary overall service (26.4%) provided by youth workers, were directed mainly to individual program youth (82.5%). The worker's job contacts were usually specific and concrete; driving the youth to apply for a job (36.4%) and searching newspapers or agency advertisements for jobs and contacting other job-resource personnel, including neighborhood adults and even former gang members (32.7%). The youth worker interacted with the youth directly in such efforts most of the time (25.9%). The youth workers also referred youth to go on their own to specific employment agencies or businesses for jobs (11.4%). In addition, the workers handled requests for general information about jobs, or specific help with finding a job, from the youths' family members and girlfriends (7.9%). The NAGV neighborhood organizer was also a resource for job information and job placement (2.9%) (Table 9.6).

Education-Related Services were also directed primarily to individual program youth (77.3%). Key issues or topics discussed included the youth's return to or staying in school (40.3%). Mostly the youth himself was contacted (23.2%), but family members or girlfriends (12.7%) were also involved. A good deal of worker effort was in assisting youth in contacts with school officials, arranging their return or transfer to another school, and occasionally mediating a conflict between the school and the youth (12.2%). Other education-related services included placing the youth in a GED program (9.9%), providing information about trade schools (5.5%), and providing youth with special educational programs available through Job Corps, public-school summer sessions and boot camps (12.7%). It was not unusual for the workers to respond to requests for information about programs at junior colleges (7.7%) (Table 9.7).

Nevertheless, only about half as many services were directed to education-related issues as job-related issues. This was due in part to the fact that most youth were over 16 years of age and out of school, as well as to the extreme alienation of youth from the public school educational system, and the far greater interest in the rewards of status and income inherent in a job. Most of the worker's efforts in regard to school or education issues were directed to youth under 16 years of age; most of the job-related contacts were directed to youth 17 and older. We shall see (in Chapter 14) that job-related contacts proved to be more successful than school contacts, and were more likely to be associated with a reduction in arrests during the program period.

Criminal-Justice Contacts were mainly with individual program youth (41.0%), but also with family (28.9%) and Project probation officers (27.7%). Youth workers accompanied the youth (21.7%) and his family (13.3%) to court, providing emotional support and assisting with communication between parents, the youth and court personnel. The youth worker was concerned with the interests of both the youth and the probation officers, helping youth remember appointments and accompanying them to the probation office (7.2%). The youth workers provided information to the probation officer about where a youth might currently be living and his current job and school status. The youth worker often arranged special meetings between the Project probation officer and the youth, particularly when they missed probation appointments (15.7%). He explained court procedures to family members (8.4%) and helped them to understand the specific probation requirements the youth had to meet (4.8%) (Table 9.8).

### Aggregating Types of Services (Activities) and Persons Contacted

To facilitate the analysis, the different types of services (activities) and persons contacted were assigned to the more general Project-strategy categories, i.e., *community mobilization/coordination*, *social intervention*, *opportunities provision*, and *suppression*. Our purpose was to prepare for a comparison of worker strategies with the two gangs, as well as to better relate the patterns of services and strategies which emerged from the debriefing and/or worker-tracking data to outcomes. We use the data from the worker tracking forms (which cover more program youth) to determine service and strategy effects on youth arrest patterns (Chapter 14).

Strategies. Ten types of youth-worker services or activities (Table 9.2) were aggregated into five strategies. Job-related and education-related services were included in the *opportunities-provision* strategy. Family-related, recreation-related, and spiritual-related services comprise the *social-intervention* strategy. Two control strategies were created: gang-related counseling directed to violence control was included in the category of *social control*; formal criminal justice-system and surveillance-related activities were included in the strategy of *suppression*. Services addressed to community meetings, community concerns, and agency coordination or administration were included in the strategy of *community mobilization/coordination* (Table 9.9).

Types of Persons Contacted. The eight categories or types of persons contacted (Table 9.3) were aggregated into six. Project police and probation officers were combined into one criminal-justice category, and the Neighborhood Organizer and other community and social-agency

workers were combined into a community/social-agency worker category (Table 9.10).

### Strategies and Persons Contacted, by Different Youth-Worker Gang Assignments

The strategies and types of persons the youth workers contacted were organized by the gang constellation to which the workers were assigned – Latin Kings or Two Six. A comparison of worker strategies and types of persons contacted was expected to show that, although there were similarities in worker approaches based on the assigned gang (and its segments), there were still differences across the two gangs, based on the different characters and needs of the respective gang members, as well as on the backgrounds and interests of the workers. The Latin Kings were an older, well-established and traditionally more violent gang, and were increasingly involved in drug-dealing activities. The Two Six were a younger, more recently-established gang, becoming pro-active in violent activities. The Latin King workers were generally older, with former high gang-leadership status. Several had extensive prison histories. The Two Six workers were generally younger, with lower former gang status and little prison history.

Different Worker Strategies. The patterns of activities of the workers – both Latin King and Two Six workers – were similar when we focused on the general nature of services provided to all persons contacted. The dominant strategy was opportunities-provision – particularly providing access to jobs and facilitating educational achievement; slightly more so for jobs among the Latin King workers (41.9%) than the Two Six workers (39.4%). Social intervention, mainly through individual program-youth/family counseling and recreational activities, appears to have been an approach equally important to Latin King (21.6%) and Two Six (21.1%)

workers. Of interest are the gang social-control efforts – Latin Kings (10.8%) and Two Six (12.7%). Suppression-related strategies were also quite similar – Latin Kings (14.4%) and Two Six (14.5%) – as were community-mobilization and coordination strategies – Latin Kings (11.22%) and Two Six (12.3%) (Table 9.11).

Overall, in contacts with all persons (including individual program youth), there was little difference in the service strategies used by Latin King and Two Six workers – perhaps more use of opportunities-provision and slightly less use of gang social-control strategies by the Latin King workers. Although the Two Six gang youth are younger and a little more troublesome (but less violent) than the older and traditionally aggressive Latin Kings, differences in strategies become more apparent when we focus on services aimed at individual youth (Table 9.12). There were more than twice as many gang social-control contacts by Two Six workers than by Latin King workers, and considerably more opportunities-provision contacts made by Latin King workers. The Two Six workers also were slightly more involved in social intervention. The differences in patterns of strategies based on services directed only to individual youth were statistically significant.

Different Types of Persons Contacted. There was greater emphasis placed on the types of persons contacted than on the strategies or services utilized by the two sets of youth workers. The Two Six workers appeared to be relatively more oriented than the Latin King workers to direct-service contacts with individual program youth, groups, and families (Two Six = 61.3%; Latin Kings = 49.6%). The Latin King workers were relatively more oriented to work with criminal-justice personnel and community leaders (Latin Kings = 38.2%; Two Six =



29.5%)(Table 9.13). This may have been in part a function of the better access the Latin King workers had to Project police and probation officers, who met for weekly meetings at a location deep within Latin King territory. Latin King workers also had more ready access to community gym facilities and church programs and facilities than did Two Six workers.

Nevertheless, both sets of workers spent the majority of their time in direct contact with individual youth, their families and the gangs. Youth workers were street-based, and spent less than 10% of their time on office or administrative tasks. Youth-worker supervisors were mainly on the streets, in frequent contact with both street workers and gang youth.

What should be noted in interrelating and interpreting the data in Tables 9.11, 9.12, and 9.13 is that opportunities-provision services, particularly helping the Latin King youth find jobs, may have been more important and successful in terms of outcome than assisting the younger Two Six youth with school-related problems. Also, simply hanging around with the older adolescents or providing general support services to their families may not have been as productive for Latin King youth. The Latin King worker may have had to spend more time in contact with Project police and probation officers regarding criminal-justice issues, while the Two Six worker may have spent more time on social control (i.e., advice and counseling efforts with younger delinquent youth). Each worker, within as well as across gang constellations and specific gang sections, had somewhat different styles of responding to the different interests and needs of youth and their gang sections (Table 9.14). Finally, we observed differences in patterns of persons contacted by individual youth workers. The Two Six workers generally made more family contacts than did Latin King workers. Where differences occurred in patterns of persons contacted or services provided among the two sets of gang workers, they may be due to the

proportion of younger or older gang youth serviced in the particular gang section (Table 9.15).

Table 9.1  
Youth-Worker Gang Assignment, Tenure and Debriefing-Form Activity

Youth-Worker ID	Gang	Starting Date	Ending Date	Tenure (Weeks) <sup>a</sup>	No.( %) of Debriefing Forms Completed	Completion Rates <sup>b</sup>	No.(%) of Services/ Persons Contacted
M	LK	10/7/93	4/9/94	26	12 (4.2%)	46.2%	131 (4.3%)
W	LK	10/7/93	12/20/96	167	7 (2.5%)	4.2%	66 (2.2%)
A	LK	11/11/93	3/15/94	18	7 (2.5%)	39.5%	87 (2.9%)
G	LK	9/22/95	6/27/97	91	59 (20.8%)	65.0%	538 (17.7%)
E	LK	9/22/95	4/25/97	82	37 (13.0%)	45.2%	388 (12.8%)
T	26	10/7/93	1/13/97	168	30 (10.6%)	17.9%	227 (7.5%)
RA	26	9/22/95	5/24/96	35	16 (5.6%)	46.3%	188 (6.2%)
RO	26	9/29/95	6/13/97	88	72 (25.4%)	82.1%	912 (30.0%)
B	26	10/27/95	1/17/97	63	35 (12.3%)	55.7%	394 (12.9%)
S	26	4/11/97	6/20/97	10	6 (2.1%)	60.9%	79 (2.6%)
RS	26	4/25/97	6/13/97	7	3 (1.1%)	43.8%	33 (1.1%)
Total					284 (100.0%)		3043 <sup>c</sup> (100.0%)

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<sup>a</sup> Median length of service was 63 weeks.

<sup>b</sup> The number of weeks the debriefing form was actually filled out as a proportion of the total possible number of forms that could have been filled out during the worker's tenure.

<sup>c</sup> The total number of services (activities) provided to identifiable person(s) = 1299 (Table 9.4); the total number of all types of services/persons contacted = 3043.

Table 9.2  
Types of Services (Activities)

<b>Service (Activity) Type</b>	<b>Description</b>
Gang-related Service	Mostly counseling regarding gang-related activities (such as gang feuding, violence and drug dealing)
Job-related Service	Counseling regarding job search and placement
Education-related Service	Counseling regarding staying in (or returning to) school; help with school placement
Recreation-related Service	Facilitating participation in sports, such as basketball and baseball
Criminal-justice-related Service	Counseling regarding legal issues; accompanying youth and family members to court
Family-related Service	Services directed specifically to family members (or girlfriends); counseling gang youth regarding their relations with family members/girlfriends
Community-related Service	Services such as graffiti paint-outs, attendance at community meetings; contacts with representatives of other community organizations and agencies
Spiritual-related service	Advising youth and family members in regard to religious matters
Surveillance	Any form of contact with youth (or field observation by the worker) providing information about actual or potential gang crises
Other	Organization or agency activities that could not be included in any of the above categories, such as staff meetings, facilitating special events and other administrative work

Table 9.3  
Types of Person Contacted

Persons Contacted	Description
Youth	Individual program youth
Gang/Group	Any program youth in a group
Family/Girlfriend	Family members or girlfriends of gang members
Other Project Youth Workers	Other youth workers in the Project
Project Police Officers	Police officers assigned to the Project
Project Probation Officers	Probation officers assigned to the Project
Project Neighborhood Organizers	Workers from Neighbors Against Gang Violence (NAGV)
Community Leaders/ Agency Personnel/Residents	Members of NAGV Advisory Board (priests, aldermen, youth-agency administrators), school personnel and a few community residents and storekeepers

Table 9.4  
Type of Service (Activity), by Person(s) Contacted<sup>a</sup>

Service/Activity	Person(s) Contacted								Total
	Youth	Gang/ Group	Family/ Girlfriend	Other Project Youth Workers	Project Police Officers	Project Probation Officers	Project Neighborhood Organizer	Community/Agency Personnel/Residents	
Gang-related Service	64 (4.9%)	15 (1.2%)	20 (1.5%)	4 (0.3%)	43 (3.3%)	10 (0.8%)	2 (0.2%)	1 (0.1%)	159 (12.2%)
Job-related Service	283 (21.8%)	2 (0.2%)	31 (2.4%)	4 (0.3%)	2 (0.2%)	2 (0.2%)	10 (0.8%)	9 (0.7%)	343 (26.4%)
Education-related Service	140 (10.8%)	2 (0.2%)	25 (1.9%)	1 (0.1%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.1%)	4 (0.3%)	8 (0.6%)	181 (13.9%)
Recreation-related service	3 (0.2%)	136 (10.5%)	11 (0.8%)	16 (1.2%)	7 (0.5%)	14 (1.1%)	10 (0.8%)	17 (1.3%)	214 (16.5%)
Criminal-Justice-related Service	34 (2.6%)	0 (0.0%)	24 (1.8%)	2 (0.2%)	0 (0.0%)	23 (1.8%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	83 (6.4%)
Family-related Service	16 (1.2%)	0 (0.0%)	7 (0.5%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	23 (1.8%)
Community-related Service	4 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.1%)	5 (0.4%)	6 (0.5%)	3 (0.2%)	14 (1.1%)	21 (1.6%)	54 (4.2%)
Spiritual-related Service	19 (1.5%)	2 (0.2%)	9 (0.7%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.1%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.1%)	3 (0.2%)	35 (2.7%)
Surveillance	1 (0.1%)	0 (0.0%)	47 (3.6%)	4 (0.3%)	17 (1.3%)	40 (3.1%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	109 (8.4%)
Other	15 (1.2%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (0.5%)	29 (2.2%)	4 (0.3%)	11 (0.8%)	10 (0.8%)	23 (1.8%)	98 (7.8%)
Total	579 (41.5%)	157 (12.1%)	181 (13.9%)	65 (6.0%)	80 (6.2%)	104 (8.0%)	51 (3.9%)	82 (6.3%)	1299 <sup>b</sup> (100.0%)

<sup>a</sup> Percentages are calculated using the total number of services (activities) (N = 1299) provided to identified youth (N = 65) and/or other persons related to the program.

<sup>b</sup> The total number of services (activities)/person(s) contacted (N = 1299) in this Table is different from the total number of services/persons contacted (N = 3043) in Table 9.1, which includes 887 persons contacted with unidentified specific services (activities), and 827 unidentified services (activities) to unidentified persons contacted, as well as 30 identified services (activities) to unidentified persons contacted.

Table 9.5  
Gang-Related Issues, by Person(s) Contacted<sup>a</sup>

Gang-Related Issues	Person(s) Contacted								Total
	Youth	Gang/ Group	Family/ Girlfriend	Other Project Youth Workers	Project Police Officers	Project Probation Officers	Project Neighborhood Organizer	Community- Agency Personnel/ Residents	
Serious Violence (e.g., gang homicide and gang shooting)	3 (1.9%)	2 (1.3%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (1.3%)	28 (17.6%)	2 (1.3%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.6%)	38 (23.9%)
Quitting the Gang	20 (12.6%)	2 (1.3%)	8 (5.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	30 (18.9%)
Stopping Gang Feuding	15 (9.4%)	3 (1.9%)	1 (0.6%)	1 (0.6%)	1 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	21 (13.2%)
Drug-related Activities	9 (5.7%)	1 (0.6%)	3 (1.9%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (1.3%)	3 (1.9%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	18 (11.3%)
Relations with Project Police	4 (2.5%)	1 (0.6%)	7 (4.4%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	12 (7.5%)
Weapons	1 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (2.5%)	3 (1.9%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (5.0%)
Robbery	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (2.5%)	2 (1.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (3.8%)
Gang Youth Not Going Home	5 (3.1%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	5 (3.1%)
Other	7 (4.4%)	6 (3.8%)	1 (0.6%)	1 (0.6%)	4 (2.5%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (1.3%)	21 (13.2%)
Total	64 (40.3%)	15 (9.4%)	20 (12.6%)	4 (2.5%)	43 (27.0%)	10 (6.3%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (1.9%)	159 (100.0%)

<sup>a</sup> Percents are calculated using the total 159 gang-related issues.

Table 9.6  
Job-Related Services, by Type of Person(s) Contacted<sup>a</sup>

Job-Related Services	Person(s) Contacted								Total
	Youth	Gang/ Group	Family/ Girlfriend	Other Project Workers	Project Police Officer	Project Probation Officer	Project Neighborhood Organizer	Community- Agency Personnel/ Residents	
Talking about getting a job	17 (5.0%)	1 (0.3%)	27 (7.9%)	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	47 (13.7%)
Helping with job preparation (vocational training, etc.)	9 (2.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	10 (2.9%)
Job referral	39 (11.4%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (0.9%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	43 (12.5%)
Job search, placement, and development	89 (25.9%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (0.6%)	1 (0.3%)	1 (0.3%)	10 (2.9%)	8 (2.3%)	112 (32.7%)
Taking youth to apply for a job	125 (36.4%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.3%)	127 (37.0%)
Taking youth to a job interview	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (0.6%)
Taking youth to work	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (0.6%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>283 (82.5%)</b>	<b>2 (0.6%)</b>	<b>31 (9.0%)</b>	<b>4 (1.2%)</b>	<b>2 (0.6%)</b>	<b>2 (0.6%)</b>	<b>10 (2.9%)</b>	<b>9 (2.6%)</b>	<b>343 (100.0%)</b>

<sup>a</sup> Percentages are calculated using the total 343 job-related services.



Table 9.7  
Education-Related Services, by Type of Person(s) Contacted<sup>a</sup>

Education-Related Services	Person(s) Contacted								Total
	Youth	Gang/ Group	Family/ Girlfriend	Other Project Workers	Project Police Officers	Project Probation Officers	Project Neighbor- hood Organizer	Community- Agency Personnel/ Residents	
Advice about returning to/staying in school	42 (23.2%)	1 (0.6%)	23 (12.7%)	1 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (2.2%)	2 (1.1%)	73 (40.3%)
Secondary school placement (return, transfer, conflict mediation)	22 (12.2%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (1.1%)	24 (13.3%)
GED Program Placement	18 (9.9%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.6%)	20 (11.0%)
College Placement	4 (2.2%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (2.2%)
Trade School Placement	10 (5.5%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	10 (5.5%)
Junior College Information	14 (7.7%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (1.7%)	18 (9.9%)
Information about other education/training	23 (12.7%)	1 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	24 (13.3%)
Other	7 (3.9%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (4.4%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>140 (77.3%)</b>	<b>2 (1.1%)</b>	<b>25 (13.8%)</b>	<b>1 (0.6%)</b>	<b>0 (0.0%)</b>	<b>1 (0.6%)</b>	<b>4 (2.2%)</b>	<b>8 (4.4%)</b>	<b>181 (100.0%)</b>

<sup>a</sup> Percentages are calculated using the total 181 education-related services.

**Table 9.8**  
**Criminal-Justice-Related Services /Issues, by Type of Person(s) Contacted<sup>a</sup>**

Criminal Justice-Related Services/Issues	Person(s) Contracted								Total
	Youth	Gang/ Group	Family/ Girlfriend	Other Project Workers	Project Police Officers	Project Probation Officers	Project Neighbor- hood Organizer	Community- Agency Personnel/ Residents	
Accompanying Youth (& Family) to Court	18 (21.7%)	0 (0.0%)	11 (13.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.2%)	30 (36.1%)
Presence at Time of Arrest	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (3.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (3.6%)
Monitoring Criminal-Justice Relationships	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (3.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (3.6%)
Discussing Probation-related Responsibilities	6 (7.2%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (4.8%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	13 (15.7%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.2%)	24 (28.9%)
Taking Youth to Probation Office	1 (1.2%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.2%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (2.4%)
Missing probation appointments	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (2.4%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (2.4%)
Discussing Court Proceedings	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	7 (8.4%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	7 (8.4%)
Discussing Legal Rights	2 (2.4%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (2.4%)
Helping obtain Legal Assistance	2 (2.4%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (2.4%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (4.8%)
Advice about Surrendering to Authorities	3 (3.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (3.6%)
Other	2 (2.4%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.2%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (3.6%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>34 (41.0%)</b>	<b>0 (0.0%)</b>	<b>24 (28.9%)</b>	<b>0 (0.0%)</b>	<b>0 (0.0%)</b>	<b>23 (27.7%)</b>	<b>0 (0.0%)</b>	<b>2 (2.4%)</b>	<b>83 (100.0%)</b>

<sup>a</sup> Percentages are calculated using the total 83 criminal-justice-related services/issue.

Table 9.9  
Relating Services (Activities) to Project Strategies

<b>Project Strategies</b>	<b>Services (Activities)</b>
Social Control	Gang-related counseling services directed to violence control, especially by youth workers
Opportunities Provision	Job-related services Education-related services
Social Intervention	Family-related services Recreation-related services Spiritual-related services
Suppression	Criminal-justice-system-related services Surveillance-related activities
Community Mobilization/Coordination	Community mobilization/agency coordination Community-related services

Table 9.10  
Aggregated Types of Persons Contacted

<b>Aggregated Types of Persons Contacted</b>	<b>Description</b>
Youth	Individual Program Youth
Gang/Group	Gang/Group – the Latin Kings and Two Six
Family/Girlfriend	Family Members/or Girlfriends/Spouses
Criminal-Justice Workers	Project Police Officers and Project Probation Officer
Other Project Youth Workers	Other Project Youth Workers assigned to the Latin Kings and the Two Six
Community/Agency Workers	Project Neighborhood Organizer and Community-Agency Personnel (i.e. aldermen, priests, school administrators, youth agencies, etc.)

Table 9.11  
Project Strategies, by Youth-Worker Gang Assignment  
All Persons Contacted

Strategy	Youth-Worker Gang Assignment		Total N and (%)
	Latin King N and (%)	Two Six N and (%)	
Social Control	51 (10.8%)	109 (12.7%)	160 (12.3%)
Opportunities Provision	198 (41.9%)	338 (39.4%)	536 (40.3%)
Social Intervention	102 (21.6%)	181 (21.1%)	283 (21.2%)
Suppression	68 (14.4%)	124 (14.5%)	192 (14.4%)
Community Mobilization/Coordination	53 (11.2%)	105 (12.3%)	158 (11.8%)
Total	472 (100.0%)	857 (100.0%)	1329 <sup>a</sup> (100.0%)

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<sup>a</sup> Note that the total number of services (activities) provided by the youth workers (N = 1329) included an additional 30 services (activities) provided to unspecified persons.

Table 9.12  
Project Strategies, by Youth-Worker Gang Assignment  
Only Individual Youth Contacted

Strategy	Youth-Worker Gang Assignment		
	<u>Latin King</u> N and (%)	<u>Two Six</u> N and (%)	<u>Total</u> N and (%)
Social Control	10 (5.2%)	54 (14.0%)	64 (11.1%)
Opportunities Provision	158 (82.3%)	265 (68.5%)	423 (73.1%)
Social Intervention	9 (4.7%)	29 (7.5%)	38 (6.6%)
Suppression	13 (6.8%)	22 (5.7%)	35 (6.0%)
Community Mobilization/ Coordination	2 (1.0%)	17 (4.4%)	19 (3.3%)
Total	192 (100.0%)	387 (100.0%)	579 <sup>a</sup> (100.0%)

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<sup>a</sup> Number of valid cases = 579. Pearson Chi-Square = 18.414; df = 4;  $p = 0.001$

Table 9.13  
Person(s) Contacted, by Youth-Worker Gang Assignment

Person(s) Contacted	Youth-Worker Gang Assignment		Total N and (%)
	<u>Latin King</u> N and (%)	<u>Two Six</u> N and (%)	
Youth	240 (33.0%)	563 (38.6%)	803 (36.7%)
Gang/Group	48 (6.6%)	131 (9.0%)	179 (8.2%)
Family/Girlfriend	73 (10.0%)	200 (13.7%)	273 (12.5%)
Criminal-Justice Workers	193 (26.5%)	262 (18.0%)	455 (20.8%)
Other Project Youth Workers	85 (11.7%)	168 (11.5%)	253 (11.6%)
Community/Social- Agency Personnel	89 (12.2%)	134 (9.2%)	223 (10.2%)
Total	728 (100.0%)	1458 (100.0%)	2186 <sup>a</sup> (100.0%)

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<sup>a</sup> Note that the total number of persons contacted (N = 2186) included an additional 887 persons contacted with unidentified services (activities).

Table 9.14  
Services (Activities), by Youth-Worker Gang Assignment

Service (Activity)	Youth-Worker ID (Gang Assignment)										
	B (26)	E (LK)	S (26)	G (LK)	RO (26)	RS (26)	T (26)	RA (26)	A (LK)	M (LK)	W (LK)
Gang	34 (15.9%)	9 (4.9%)	0 (0.0%)	30 (19.4%)	51 (12.2%)	0 (0.0%)	10 (11.2%)	14 (18.7%)	4 (8.0%)	4 (8.3%)	4 (11.8%)
Job	77 (34.8%)	58 (31.4%)	4 (12.5%)	43 (27.7%)	69 (16.5%)	6 (28.6%)	24 (27.0%)	30 (40.0%)	10 (20.0%)	22 (45.8%)	11 (32.4%)
Education	31 (14.0%)	20 (10.8%)	8 (25.0%)	7 (4.5%)	54 (12.9%)	7 (33.3%)	22 (24.7%)	6 (8.0%)	3 (6.0%)	14 (29.2%)	10 (29.4%)
Recreation	14 (6.3%)	33 (17.8%)	13 (40.6%)	33 (21.3%)	88 (21.0%)	4 (19.0%)	10 (11.2%)	12 (16.0%)	9 (18.0%)	2 (4.2%)	7 (20.6%)
Criminal Justice	7 (3.2%)	24 (13.0%)	4 (12.5%)	6 (3.9%)	23 (5.5%)	1 (4.8%)	5 (5.6%)	0 (0.0%)	12 (24.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.9%)
Family	2 (0.9%)	5 (2.7%)	1 (3.1%)	3 (1.9%)	7 (1.7%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (3.4%)	1 (1.3%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.1%)	0 (0.0%)
Community	10 (4.5%)	10 (5.4%)	2 (6.3%)	8 (5.2%)	15 (3.6%)	2 (9.5%)	2 (2.2%)	4 (5.3%)	1 (2.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Spiritual	1 (0.5%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	22 (5.3%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (3.4%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (16.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.9%)
Surveillance	22 (10.0%)	6 (3.2%)	0 (0.0%)	13 (8.4%)	57 (13.6%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (2.2%)	3 (4.0%)	2 (4.0%)	4 (8.3%)	0 (0.0%)
Other	23 (10.4%)	20 (10.8%)	0 (0.0%)	12 (7.7%)	33 (7.9%)	1 (4.8%)	8 (9.0%)	5 (6.7%)	1 (2.0%)	1 (2.1%)	0 (0.0%)
Total <sup>a</sup>	221 (100.0%)	185 (100.0%)	32 (100.0%)	155 (100.0%)	419 (100.0%)	21 (100.0%)	89 (100.0%)	75 (100.0%)	50 (100.0%)	48 (100.0%)	34 (100.0%)

<sup>a</sup> Note that the total number of services (activities) provided (N=1329) included an additional 30 services (activities) to unspecified person(s) contacted.



Table 9.15  
Person(s) Contacted, by Youth-Worker Gang Assignment

Person(s) Contacted	Youth-Worker ID (Gang Assignment)										
	B (26)	E (LK)	S (26)	G (LK)	RO (26)	RS (26)	T (26)	RA (26)	A (LK)	M (LK)	W (LK)
Youth	136 (38.1%)	92 (35.1%)	27 (39.7%)	53 (19.6%)	270 (38.1%)	10 (40.0%)	71 (42.0%)	49 (37.4%)	23 (36.5%)	52 (58.4%)	20 (45.5%)
Gang/Group	14 (3.9%)	16 (6.1%)	6 (8.8%)	23 (8.5%)	81 (11.4%)	4 (16.0%)	13 (7.7%)	13 (9.9%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (3.4%)	6 (13.6%)
Family/Girlfriend	35 (9.8%)	48 (18.3%)	10 (14.7%)	15 (5.6%)	122 (17.2%)	4 (16.0%)	10 (5.9%)	19 (14.5%)	8 (12.7%)	1 (1.1%)	1 (2.3%)
Other Project Workers	55 (15.4%)	20 (7.6%)	5 (7.4%)	43 (15.9%)	56 (7.9%)	2 (8.0%)	21 (12.4%)	29 (22.1%)	5 (7.9%)	12 (13.5%)	5 (11.4%)
Project Police Officers	41 (11.5%)	29 (11.1%)	5 (7.4%)	59 (21.9%)	50 (7.1%)	2 (8.0%)	14 (8.3%)	8 (6.1%)	4 (6.3%)	8 (9.0%)	3 (6.8%)
Project Probation Officers	45 (12.6%)	30 (11.5%)	4 (5.9%)	41 (15.2%)	70 (9.9%)	0 (0.0%)	15 (8.9%)	8 (6.1%)	8 (12.7%)	8 (9.0%)	3 (6.8%)
Neighborhood Organizers	13 (3.6%)	13 (5.0%)	0 (0.0%)	13 (4.8%)	26 (3.7%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (4.7%)	2 (1.5%)	5 (7.9%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (6.8%)
Community-Agency Personnel/ Residents	18 (5.0%)	14 (5.3%)	11 (16.2%)	23 (8.5%)	33 (4.7%)	3 (12.0%)	17 (10.1%)	3 (2.3%)	10 (15.9%)	5 (5.6%)	3 (6.8%)
Total <sup>a</sup>	357 (100.0%)	262 (100.0%)	68 (100.0%)	270 (100.0%)	708 (100.0%)	25 (100.0%)	169 (100.0%)	131 (100.0%)	63 (100.0%)	89 (100.0%)	44 (100.0%)

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<sup>a</sup>Note that the total number of persons contacted by the youth workers (N=2186) included an additional 887 persons contacted with unidentified services (activities)

## Chapter 10

### Self-Reported Offense, Arrest and Lifestyle Changes

In this and the next chapters we examine outcomes for individual program and comparison youth. First, we look at changes primarily in self-reported offenses only for program youth between the Time I and Time III individual gang-member interview. In the next chapter we look at changes in police arrests for program, comparison, and quasi-program youth between the five-year program and five-year pre-program periods. Second, we attempt to relate these self-reported offense changes to life-course and life-space change patterns. Although our later analysis (when we use police data) covers a longer period of time, the self-report and interview data provide much detail about the relation of self-reported offense change patterns to lifestyle changes. We do not yet look at worker service effects on program youth.

There are limitations in the use of self-report data in evaluations of gang programs (Tas, Marshall 1999). In the case of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project, we were not able to interview or obtain self-report data from youth in the comparison and quasi-program samples. Self-report data may not account for periods of time when the youth was in confinement, and not present or at risk for committing offenses in the community. Reliable measures of self-reported offenses are particularly difficult to obtain for an extended period prior to the youth's entry into the program. Also, reinterview failure rates are very high for gang youth in the open community.

We believe that program youth in Little Village were positively identified with the Project. It is possible that program youth who were interviewed at both Time I and Time III were not only different from youth interviewed only once, but may have exaggerated the positive

effects, in particular their offense reduction. This contingency is provided for by examining police histories, which were integrated for all program youth, whether interviewed one or more times. We will see that the trend of changes in program-youth offense patterns is generally consistent with the trend of changes in their arrest patterns.

### Self-Reported Offense (Arrest) Changes

We examine crime and/or deviant activities reported by 127 program youth, and changes in these activities between the Time I and Time III interview periods. We describe and compare the mean frequencies of self-reported offenses (and self-reported arrests) for the total program sample, for the two gangs separately, the three Cohorts, the various age groups, and for different levels of offenders. The self-report list of offenses is short and not inclusive of all offenses or crimes the youth may have committed. It is also less inclusive than the list of crimes or offenses indicated in the Chicago Police Department offense code which we use in the next chapter. However, it is an efficient list focusing on offenses – particularly violence – likely to be committed by gang youth.

The research interviewers asked the program youth whether they had committed any of sixteen<sup>1</sup> offenses, and how many times they had committed them. The offenses, which were typical and traditional among gang youth in Chicago and probably elsewhere, were: 1) writing non-gang graffiti; 2) writing gang graffiti; 3) destroying property worth \$300 or less; 4) breaking and entering a building to commit theft; 5) shoplifting; 6) stealing a car for joy-riding purposes;

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<sup>1</sup> These offenses are not necessarily equivalent to the larger listing of official criminal justice offense codes (see Chapter 11). There is a seventeenth offense category, “other.” It was not frequently used, and when it was, we were usually able to reclassify the offense into one of the regular sixteen categories. The crimes which were not reclassifiable were included only in the analysis of total self-reported offenses/(arrests).

7) breaking into a car and stealing parts; 8) robbery, by force or threat of force, without a weapon; 9) robbery with a weapon – gun or knife; 10) gang intimidation; 11) threat to attack a person, without a weapon; 12) threat to attack with a dangerous weapon; 13) battery without a dangerous weapon; 14) battery with a dangerous weapon; 15) drive-by shooting; and 16) homicide.

Respondents were also asked about their use and sale of each of the following drugs: marijuana, cocaine, crack, heroin, “wicky stick” (marijuana soaked in PCP), LSD, and “other” drugs. These represented the range of drugs used by gang members in the Little Village community during the Project period. These drug-related questions were separated from the sixteen offense-scale questions, and frequently asked for a specific type or category of drug abuse or drug sale. The self-reported responses to the drug questions are not included in the findings of total self-reported offenses.

We calculated offending rates by frequency and category of each types of offense and arrest. *Total offenses (arrests)* included: *serious violence* (robbery with a weapon; battery with a weapon; threaten someone with a weapon [gang-motivated]; threatened someone with a gun [not gang-motivated]; participated in a homicide; participated in a drive-by shooting); *less-serious violence* (robbed someone of property without use of a weapon; threatened to attack someone without a weapon; beat up or battered someone without using a weapon [i.e., other than fists]); *property* (wrote non-gang graffiti; wrote gang graffiti; destroyed property worth \$300 or less; entered a building or store to commit a theft; broke into a building to commit a theft; stole a car for joy-riding; broke into a car and stole auto parts). A separate index of *drug-selling* offenses was also created.

### Mean Offense (Arrest) Changes

Total Sample. We found extensive, if not extraordinary, reductions in frequencies of self-reported offenses and arrests between Time I and Time III (Table 10.1). Most of these declines were highly statistically significant using T-tests. Substantial percentage reductions of frequencies of self-reported total offenses occurred, from a mean of 52.7 to 9.4; violence offenses, from a mean of 28.7 to 6.6; the most serious violence offenses, from a mean of 18.5 to 3.6; property offenses, from a mean of 24.0 to 2.8; drug selling offenses, from a standardized mean of 4.1 to 2.8 (but this reduction was not statistically significant). There were also non-statistically significant declines in the use of drugs and the use of alcohol. The percentage of decline in self-reported total violence, serious violence, and property offenses was in the range of 77.0% to 88.0%. These are very highly significant declines from a youth-development or policy perspective, even assuming exaggeration and the presence of a statistical regression artifact.

Youth were also asked to report frequencies of self-reported arrests for these same types of offenses (Table 10.1). Again, the pattern of (non-significant) declines in self-reported arrests was similar over the three-year interview period. The reduction in frequencies of self-reported total arrests was from a mean of 2.0 to 0.3; violence arrests from a mean of 1.0 to 0.2; serious violence arrests from 0.6 to 0.1; property arrests, from 1.0 to 0.1, i.e., arrests for property offenses were reduced almost to zero. These patterns of decline appear to be generally similar to findings using official police arrest data, but not so drastic over somewhat different but overlapping time periods (particularly for violence and drug arrests)(Chapter 11).

Gangs. There were also declines in total self-reported offenses when the unit of analysis was the gang, i.e., using individual self-reports, aggregated by time period (Time I-Time III).

Similar sharp declines in frequencies and categories of various types of offenses occurred for the Latin Kings and Two Six. The reductions were statistically significant for all types of self-reported offenses in both gangs, except for drug selling, which declined, but again not to statistical significance. The percentages of decline for the Latin Kings and Two Six were similar, with a slightly greater reduction for the Latin Kings (Table 10.2).

Similar patterns in the reduction of arrests for the different offenses for each of the gangs were reported, with greater statistically significant reductions for the Latin Kings than for the Two Six. For all types of self-reported offenses and arrests, the Latin Kings appear to have been more delinquent than the Two Six. Some of these differences, we shall see later, were attributable to the differences in the average age of the Latin Kings, who were older and, perhaps, aging out of criminal behavior more rapidly. We control for age differences in the multivariate analyses (below).

Cohort. It is difficult to compare the three youth Cohorts because of variations in the size of each Cohort, and in the youth-age distribution within each Cohort. The first Cohort contained more than twice the number of youth than in either the second or third Cohorts. Cohort I youth tended to be a little older and were in the program for a longer period. Cohort III youth were younger, with the least program exposure. In general, all of the Cohorts reported declines in offenses and arrests over time. The level of decline in self-reported offenses and arrests is statistically greater for the first Cohort than for the other two Cohorts. There were two minor exceptions to the reduction of offense and arrest patterns across the Cohorts. Cohort II showed a slight increase in drug selling at Time III, and property arrests were unchanged for Cohort II (but they were already at zero at Time I and remained at zero for Time III) (Table 10.3).

Age Group. We wondered whether changes in the patterns of gang offenses and arrests might be mainly a result of age differences. Our knowledge of age-related gang participation generally suggested that older youth, 19 years and over, would experience lower rates of gang offending (possibly at Time I, and more likely at Time III) because they were at the end of their gang-involvement cycle. Youth 17 and 18 years old were expected to be at a peak age for gang crime, especially violence, and therefore should show a greater relative decline; thereafter youth 16 years old and under, who were just entering the gang-crime cycle, probably would show the least decline or even an increase.

These expectations were largely, but not completely, fulfilled. Most important, all age groups showed a decline in the sixteen gang offenses and arrests. However, the oldest group, 19 years and over, already had the lowest mean level of offenses and arrests at Time I. The 17- and 18-year-olds had the highest level of offenses and arrests in six of the nine offense and arrest categories at Time I, but they also had the highest level of reduction in these six categories of offenses and arrests by Time III. The youngest age groups did not necessarily have the highest level of offenses and arrests at Time I, though they had the least decline in self-reported offenses (but not arrests) between Time I and Time III. Nevertheless, even this age group experienced consistent declines, some highly statistically significant (see Table 10.4).

We look at some of the specific factors which might account for these changes, using multivariate analysis, in the final section of this chapter. Again, these changes might have been due mainly to an aging-out for the oldest and largest group, and a stronger regression effect for the 17- and 18-year-olds. Both program and non-program effects, interactively, probably accounted for these changes. We explore the distinctive program contributions to these declines

also in our analysis using official arrest variables in Chapter 11.

### Offender Changes

We were interested first in any change in types of offenders, based on their total self-reported offenses and arrests at Time I. We define type of offender in simple statistical terms based on number of offenses reported. (Types of offenders are defined differently in Chapter 13 – by specific arrest or combination of arrest histories.) For present purposes, we divided our sample into offender quartiles: those who self-reported the most total offenses and arrests (n = 32), above-average total offenses and arrests (n = 32), below-average total offenses and arrests (n = 31), and those who reported the least total offenses and arrests (n = 32). In more than two-thirds (69.4%) of the offender quartiles, there was a reduction in frequency between Time I and Time III. In more than half (56.0%), the reduction was statistically significant.

The largest reduction in total self-reported offenses and arrests at Time III was for those youth who reported the most total offenses and arrests at Time I (first quartile). This is due probably a strong regression effect. There was a reduction for every type of self-reported offense and arrest for the first quartile (most total offenses). The most statistically significant reductions occurred in total offenses, violence offenses, serious violence offenses and property offenses.

A somewhat lower level of reduction occurred for youth in the second quartile (above-average total offenses and arrests). The differences were particularly marked for drug-selling offenses (which showed a slight, not statistically significant increase). Significant declines occurred in self-reported total offenses, total violence, serious violence, and property offenses.



Declines also occurred for total arrests and property arrests, but increased for total violence arrests and serious violence arrests.

The differences for the below-average (third quartile) and least-frequent (fourth quartile) offenders were generally smaller. In five out of the nine kinds of offenses and arrests, there was a decline in both of these offender quartiles. There was an increase in violence offenses and serious violence offenses (all statistically non-significant) for the third and fourth quartile offenders. In general, an increase in offenses, when it occurred, came from a small base of the least offending (fourth quartile) group. There were no property arrests for the least frequent (fourth quartile) offenders at Time I or Time III (Table 10.5). A statistical regression effect generally appeared to characterize differences for many of these types and categories of offenders, yet there was a distinct and substantial reduction for self-reported total offenses for all types of program youth, which we will address more systematically, using police data and comparison groups, in Chapter 11.

Violent Offender Types. Our major concern in the Project was the reduction of violence, particularly the reduction of the level of violence for the frequent, or hardcore, offenders in the program. We originally expected that hardcore violent offender types in the program would decrease their levels of offending, while relatively less violent or less seriously-violent types of offenders would increase their levels of offending somewhat.

Again, to test this regression effect, we divided our sample into quartiles and classified violent offenders into four categories: those youth who committed the most, above-average, below-average, and the least number of violent offenses. Changes in mean frequency of offenses/arrests by the four kinds of violent offenders were compared across the range of minor-

offense and arrest categories between Time I and Time III (Table 10.6).

The findings were mixed. The regression effect seemed to be most operative in respect to self-reported offenses (arrests) by the most violent offender types. That is, the largest relative reduction in the level of general offending and arrests at Time III occurred for the most violent offenders. However, different offense and arrest patterns did not uniformly decline or increase in the expected direction for the other quartiles. The largest relative increase in level of violence offenses (arrests) at Time III was among the less-violent groups, however, these two groups substantially reduced their levels of offending, particularly for total offenses, property offenses, drug selling offenses, total arrests and property arrests.

The patterns of change were somewhat anomalous for the two middle groups of violent offenders – above-average and below-average (second and third quartile) – particularly in respect to drug-selling offenses, violence arrests and serious violence arrests. The frequency of self-reported drug selling increased both for the below-average group and for the above-average group. The pattern of arrests also showed a non-significant increase in violence and serious violence for both groups (Table 10.6).

Violent gang subcultures, youth age or maturation, drug specialization, as well as regression and other effects might be influencing outcomes, as we shall see below and in later chapters.

An interesting finding in the first part of this analysis was that while youth self-reported a variety of offenses, not all of the youth in the program committed all of the types of offenses. Some who reported property or violence or drug selling did not report the other types of offenses, either at Time I or Time III. Furthermore, there were six youth out of the sample of

127 who self-reported they had committed no offenses at Time I or Time III. It is possible that these particular youth were not appropriate for the program, were not involved in offending in the particular reporting period, were in jail for this period, or lied. Some of the youth in the program in fact had no police arrest records.

#### Percent of Youth Self-Reporting Offenses With and Without Gang Peers

Based on data derived from other sections of the gang-member survey, we focused not only on change in the level of offenses by program youth, but on the number or percent of youth reporting different types of offenses or deviant behaviors, including drug use and alcohol use, as well as total offenses, total violent offenses, serious-violence offenses, property offenses and drug offenses. Also of interest was whether program youth committed their offenses with peers, particularly gang members. We found considerable variations in numbers of youth showing declines in committing different types of offenses between Time I and Time III. The least variation in numbers of youth self-reporting offenses or deviant behaviors was for alcohol use and drug selling. The greatest reductions in numbers of youth showing changes or declines was for property and serious-violence offenses (Table 10.7).

There was considerable variation in the number of youth self-reporting the use and sale of drugs, and alcohol consumption. At Time I, most youth used alcohol (92.6%), and few reported selling drugs (41.3%). More than three quarters of all youth (78.5%) reported using drugs, exactly the same percentage who said they were engaged in serious or less-serious violent acts (78.5%). The greatest decline in numbers of youth who said they committed offenses between Time I and Time III was for property offenders (-54.8%) and serious-violence offenders

(-48.3%). The least decline was for youth who used alcohol (-6.3%). Strangely enough, at Time III there was a greater decline in numbers of program youth using drugs (17.9%) than selling drugs (-10.0%).

We could not clearly determine (mainly because of the way self-report questions were asked) the extent to which different types of offenses were committed in tandem (or in close relation) with each other (e.g., violence along with drug-selling, drug-use, or alcohol-use). We could determine whether the offenses or behaviors were in the company of gang peers or others. The data were clear that the patterns of gang-companionate or non-gang companionate offenses changed variably between Time I and Time III, depending on type of offense (Table 10.8).

In general, program youth were relatively more involved with gang peers in certain types of offenses – particularly violence, property offenses and alcohol-use – and less-involved with gang peers in drug-selling and drug-use. Surprisingly, more gang youth consumed alcohol in the company of gang peers rather than non-gang peers, particularly at Time I. Most gang youth used alcohol rather than drugs in the company of gang peers. Drug-selling was about as likely to take place with or without gang peers. In other words, for youth in the Latin Kings and Two Six, violence and property crime were more likely to occur with gang peers, but drug-selling was (relatively) less likely to occur with gang peers. Drug-selling in particular did not appear to be as integral to gang activity and the gang rationale as other types of offenses. This is not to say that drug-dealing was not a frequent activity for certain gang youth, but they may not have needed the assistance of gang peers or the gang structure to do it.

Also, gang youth who engaged in acts of violence might have been more likely to be high on alcohol rather than on drugs, but we cannot be sure. Latin Kings and Two Six gang norms

were against the use of drugs, particularly drugs that were addictive (i.e., drugs other than marijuana). This would be consistent with the findings of classic research on “fighting gangs.” A youth who was high on drugs, or an addict, was not likely to be a good gang banger. However, the traditional gang norms against selling drugs appeared to have been modified in recent decades. More than 40% of program youth were engaged in selling drugs – probably an important source of income.

The drug used and sold was mainly marijuana. At Time I, 76.9% of the program youth used marijuana, while 40.5% sold marijuana; 28.9% used cocaine, and 21.7% sold cocaine. Relatively few youth used and/or sold other types of drugs (Table 10.9). According to self-reports, the average frequency of drug-use among those who used drugs was 5.1 times per week at Time I, lower than the frequency of drug-selling by those who sold drugs, which was 10.4 times per week at Time I.

Declines in self-reported drug use, drug-selling, and alcohol-use were not as great as declines for a range of violence, property, and other self-reported offenses. In general, such declines parallel the trend in self-reported arrests, but not their magnitude. Assuming there was some legitimacy to the self-reported declines in offenses, and assuming that these declines were not strictly or entirely due to maturation or statistical regression, it is possible that they were due to program effects, directly and/or indirectly. Changes in self-reported offenses were also associated with certain life-course changes.

Again, a major limitation of the self-report analysis was the lack of community at-risk data for the youth. Recidivism findings using official police arrest data account for periods of confinement time (i.e., time in detention or prison), when the youth was not at risk of committing

a crime in the community. All of the youth in both the interview and police-arrest samples were involved in a variety of offenses, but not in all types of offenses, or to the same degree. There were different patterns of offending for the gang youth. We develop a typology of gang offending and gang offenders based on arrest data in Chapter 13.

### Correlational Analysis

In this section, we inquire into whether there was a relation between the reductions of self-reported offenses or patterns of offenses (arrests) and life-course or life-space variables such as changes in the characteristics of the neighborhood, household, family and gang between the Time I and Time III interviews. We are particularly interested in changes in those life-course or life-space variables that are negatively correlated with offense variables, i.e., which may have contributed to the decrease of self-reported offending. We are also interested in those variables that may give us insight into the possible causes of increased (or decreased) offense patterns within, and, to some extent, across time periods. While we identify correlations that are statistically significant in the relationship of neighborhood, gang, family, and individual-youth characteristics to offense variables, we do not yet adequately control for the effects of, or interactions between, variables. A multivariate analysis will do so in the next and final section of this chapter. Furthermore, we do not yet address the key issue of what role did the Project services and contacts play in these changes, directly or indirectly.

### The Neighborhood

At Time I we find that the youth's greater satisfaction with the community is associated

with lower self-reported serious violence offenses ( $r = 0.274$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ). Total offenses are also negatively correlated (i.e., are lower) with the youth's increased satisfaction with the community, but at only 0.05 level of statistical significance. However, at Time III the youth's satisfaction with the community is no longer significantly correlated with the offense variables, at least using self-report data.

The youth's fear of gang-related problems in the neighborhood, at Time I, is highly correlated with decreases in the youth's self-reported drug-selling offenses ( $r = 0.448$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), total arrests ( $r = 0.380$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), and especially, total violence arrests ( $r = 0.509$ ,  $p \# 0.001$ ) and total serious violence arrests ( $r = 0.524$ ,  $p \# 0.001$ ). Fear emerges also as a very powerful variable in the later analysis based on police arrest data. In related fashion, efforts by the youth to avoid neighborhood crime is highly correlated with low self-reported total offenses ( $r = -0.246$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ). But the youth's perception of the presence of adults who use youth for illegal activities at Time I is correlated with high rates of self-reported total violence offenses ( $r = -0.245$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), total arrests ( $r = -0.0273$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ) and total drug offenses ( $r = -0.308$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ).

Two community-level police variables correlate especially with arrest variables. At Time I, if the youth does not perceive the police patrolling in squad cars, he self-reports higher rates of total violence arrests ( $r = 0.235$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ) and even higher rates of total serious violence arrest ( $r = 0.299$ ,  $p \# 0.001$ ). A perception of less police patrolling, and/or increased harassing of youth is associated with increased self-reported total offenses ( $p \# 0.05$ ) at Time III.

Youth perceptions of probation officers addressing the gang problem are broadly correlated with self-reported offense and arrest variables, but in a manner which suggests a

suppression effect, particularly at Time I. If the youth knows specific probation officers who have dealt with the gang problem, there is an association with lower self-reported total offenses, (excluding drug offenses) ( $r = -0.245$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), and total serious violence offenses ( $r = -0.252$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ); also, total violence offenses, total property offenses, and total drug use are somewhat decreased, at a significance level of 0.05. There are fewer correlations between perceptions of probation-officer activity and self-reported offenses and, especially, arrests at Time III. However, the effect of the presence of probation officers is important in later multivariate analyses, which show that it predicts a lesser level of offenses or arrests.

Further, we note that the community-organization efforts (by various local groups) to reduce gang crime are generally correlated in the wrong direction at Time III, but not at Time I, with the youth's increase in total offenses ( $r = 0.426$ ,  $p \# 0.05$ ), property offenses ( $r = 0.506$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), and total arrests, violence arrests, and property arrests, which are all at 0.05 level of significance. On the other hand, the activities of churches are mildly correlated at Time III with the youth's reported reduction in total offenses ( $r = -0.316$ ,  $p \# 0.05$ ) and violence offenses ( $r = -0.293$ ,  $p \# 0.05$ ). The positive view of the churches as possibly effecting a reduction of gang crime, at Time III, may be related to significant outreach efforts by several churches involved with the Project. Four churches opened up their gym facilities – two for the Latin Kings and two others for the Two Six – during the program period. Also, two of the Two Six youth workers were in counseling that had religious content.

### Household Characteristics and Family Relationships

A series of questions to youth regards characteristics of their households, and their own



relationships to family members. Total household size is correlated with an increase in property arrests both at Time I ( $r = 0.386, p \# 0.01$ ) and Time III ( $r = 0.249, p \# 0.01$ ). In other words, the more household members, the more likely the youth reports that he has been arrested for property offenses. Annual household illegal income is highly correlated with an increase in arrests for serious violence ( $r = 0.426, p \# 0.01$ ) at Time I, but not at Time III. Annual household illegal income is also highly correlated with an increase in drug-selling offenses at Time I ( $r = 0.303, p \# 0.05$ ) and also at Time III ( $r = 0.305, p \# 0.001$ ), i.e., the higher the level of household illegal income, the higher the probability that the youth reported he was selling drugs.

Also, the more household members the youth reports are incarcerated, the more likely the youth will self-report lower levels of property offenses ( $r = .280, p \# 0.01$ ) and total arrests ( $p \# 0.05$ ), but only at Time I. A household crime-socialization effect may have occurred for certain youth in our sample. Deviant family members may or may not be a model for deviancy for gang youth.

Program youth reported very positive relationships with members of their families, particularly with their mothers. At Time I, these positive relationships with mothers tend to be highly correlated with a lower level of self-reported criminal offenses and arrests. The more positive the relationship with mothers, the more likely the youth self-reported fewer total offenses ( $r = 0.255, p \# 0.01$ ), total fewer property offenses ( $r = 0.231, p \# 0.01$ ), fewer total arrests ( $r = 0.272, p \# 0.01$ ) and fewer total property arrests ( $r = 0.382, p \# .01$ ). Positive relationships with mothers are also correlated with less violence, less serious violence, and less drug use at Time I ( $p \# 0.05$ ). However, all of these statistical relationships are no longer

present at Time III. There are no significant correlations between relationships with fathers and self-reported offense variables, either at Time I or at Time III.

On the other hand, positive relationships with siblings at Time I are correlated with fewer self-reported offenses. This pattern is somewhat sustained at Time III, but is not statistically significant. Positive relationships with siblings are related to decreases in total self-reported offenses, property offenses, drug use and selling, total arrests and property arrests at Time I ( $p \# 0.05$ ), but only to decreased property offenses and drug use at Time III ( $p \# 0.05$ ). Many of these parental and sibling relationships are no longer present, or show opposite effects, in our multivariate analyses.

One surprising correlation is the relationship of youth with wives or steady girlfriends to self-reported offenses. A negative relationship with a wife or steady girlfriend at Time I is correlated with a reduction in self-reported total offenses, violence offenses, and property offenses ( $p \# 0.05$ ). Unlike the youth's relationships with mothers, fathers and siblings, problematic relationships with wives or steady girlfriends may have resulted in reduced levels of offending. This could be explained by pressures from wives or steady girlfriends on the youth to reduce their levels of involvement with the gang, which creates tension and conflict in the relationship. At the same time, an increase in the amount of time spent with wives and steady girlfriends is significantly and positively correlated at Time I with a reduction in total offenses, violence offenses and serious violence offenses, at 0.05 significance level. In other words, the more time spent with wives or steady girlfriends, the lower the drug and violence offense rates.

Youth reported spending more time with wives or steady girlfriends at Time III than they did at Time I. Total offenses and violence offenses go down at Time III also, as the youth spend

more time with their wives and steady girlfriends ( $p \# 0.05$ ).

### Family and Personal Problems

The greater the number of social and personal problems among household members, the greater the increase in the youth's self-reported offending. Household drug abuse problems are strongly correlated at Time I with increases in program youths' self-reported offenses, particularly drug use ( $r = -0.418$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ) and drug selling ( $r = -0.470$ ,  $p \# .001$ ). Drug abuse in the household is also correlated with youth's total violence offenses, serious violence offenses, and serious violence arrests at Time I ( $p \# 0.05$ ). Gang crime-related problems involving household members are also correlated at Time I with higher levels of youth's self-reported violence arrests ( $r = -0.352$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), total arrests and drug offenses (both at  $p \# 0.05$ ). However, at Time III, only household drug abuse remains associated with an increase in drug selling ( $p \# 0.05$ ).

Family problems reported at Time III have a somewhat different character than those reported at Time I. The problems now include physical abuse, which is highly correlated with the youth's self-reported serious violence offenses ( $r = -0.236$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), total arrests ( $r = -0.326$ ,  $p \# 0.001$ ), violence arrests ( $r = -0.365$ ,  $p \# 0.001$ ), serious violence arrests ( $r = -0.305$ ,  $p \# 0.001$ ) and violence offenses ( $r = -0.189$ ,  $p \# 0.05$ ). At Time III, arrests of household members are highly correlated with the youth's self-reported total offenses ( $r = -0.259$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), violence offenses ( $r = -0.244$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), drug use ( $r = -0.250$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), and serious violence offenses ( $r = -0.189$ ,  $p \# 0.05$ ). At Time III, victimization of household members due to gang violence is correlated with higher levels of self-reported total offenses, violence offenses, property offenses,

violence arrests and serious violence arrests, at  $p = 0.05$  levels of statistical significance. A death in the family is also correlated with increased total offenses and property offenses reported by the youth ( $p \# 0.05$ ) at Time III. Thus, household and family problems are strongly associated with increased levels of self-reported offending by youth, although the character of these household or family problems seems to vary somewhat between Time I and Time III.

A variety of personal and health crises may be inferred from responses to questions asking whether the youth had undergone treatment for a drug, alcohol, or physical or mental-health problem. At Time I, a small number of youth reported having received treatment for mental-health problems, and such report is highly correlated with a reduction in self-reported total offenses ( $r = -0.263$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), total arrests ( $r = -0.254$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), property offenses ( $r = -0.313$ ,  $p \# 0.001$ ) and property arrests ( $r = -0.274$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), as well as drug use and violence arrests ( $p \# 0.05$ ). Treatment for alcohol problems is also associated at Time I with reduced levels of self-reported drug selling ( $r = -0.224$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ) and property arrests ( $p \# 0.05$ ). None of these treatment effects are statistically significantly related to reduced offending patterns at Time III, however.

In sum, a range of serious family/household problems is highly correlated with many of the youth's self-reported patterns of offending. We may infer that a range of personal physical and mental-health problems is associated with the youth's offending behavior. There is also some evidence that treatment is useful in the reduction of some of the youth's own personal and offending problems. The question arises as to whether these family and youth crises and problems were adequately identified and treated during the course of the Project. Social and health interventions may contribute directly and indirectly to a reduction in offending. Our

discussion in Chapter 9 sheds some light on the nature of services provided, and specifically whether the provision of social-intervention services was associated with lowered levels of offending and arrests.

### The Gang

A variety of questions were asked about the program youth's perception of their gang's structure, its patterns of fighting and reasons for fighting. There were few gang-level characteristics, per se, correlated positively or negatively with the youth's self-reported offense or arrest level. There was little to distinguish the perceptions of Latin Kings and Two Six regarding gang structure.

The one meaningful or interpretable relationship was the youth's perception of change in the size of the gang section to which he was most closely affiliated. If the youth perceived that his section had become smaller, this was associated at Time III with a reduction in his total self-reported offenses, violence offenses, serious violence offenses, and property arrests ( $p \# 0.05$ ). In other words, the smaller the perceived size of the gang section over time, the less likely the youth would be involved in gang offending. This could suggest several things: the youth himself was withdrawing from the gang; others in his group were also withdrawing; the gang section may have become less "tight," (or cohesive) and diminished in size; the gang section was in fact smaller; or, most important, the youth was no longer attracted to or influenced by the gang's criminal norms or activities (see also M. Klein, 1971).

The above correlation indicates it is not only the gang's scope, or character of operations, but also the nature of the youths' individual relationships to the gang which may be associated

with offending behavior. In the rest of this section we examine certain key characteristics of this relationship to the gang which may be associated with youths' offending behavior. We describe the current status of the youth's membership in the gang, his position in the gang, his relationship to school, employment, sources of income, and also his connection with the conventional world in terms of future aspirations and expectations. We find that a substantial number of these relationships are correlated with self-reported levels of offending. In this part of the analysis, we employ not only frequencies of offenses and arrests, but also the different types of offenses and arrests self-reported by the program youth.

Time Spent with Friends Inside and Outside the Gang. The literature on gangs indicates that the youth's being an active gang member and holding high status or position in the gang both affect the likelihood of his being involved in criminal activities. Our correlational findings tend to support these indications (see Thornberry et al 2003). The youth who claims to be currently an active gang member is more likely to self-report high levels of total serious violence offenses ( $r = -0.215, p \# 0.01$ ), and fairly high levels of total offenses, total violence offenses, and drug use ( $p \# 0.05$ ) at Time III, but not Time I. The currently-active gang member is likely to report high levels of property offenses, drug selling, and total arrests at Time III, at 0.05 significance level.

The youth (regardless of his position in the gang) who declares he is still active in the gang, particularly at Time III, self-reports higher levels of violence offenses ( $r = -0.269, p \# 0.01$ ), serious violence offenses ( $r = -0.269, p \# 0.01$ ) and drug use ( $r = -0.299, p \# 0.01$ ) than the youth who says he is no longer active in the gang. At Time III, the more gang friends he reports, the more likely he is to be involved in drug dealing ( $p \# 0.05$ ); the higher his rank in the

gang (e.g., core member or leader) the more likely he will report higher levels of total offenses ( $r = -0.287, p \# 0.01$ ) and violence offenses ( $r = -0.253, p \# 0.01$ ). Also at Time III, serious violence offenses, property offenses, total arrests, violence arrests, and serious violence arrests show correlations with rank in the gang – all at the statistically significant level of 0.05.

The amount of time the youth spends with gang friends is positively correlated with total self-reported offenses and property offenses ( $p \# 0.05$ ) at Time I. The more time youth spend with gang friends is also highly correlated with an increase in a range of offenses and arrests at Time III. Conversely, the less time youth report spending with gang friends, the lower the level of self-reported total offenses ( $r = 0.307, p \# 0.001$ ), total violence offenses ( $r = 0.245, p \# 0.01$ ), serious violence offenses ( $r = 0.212, p \# 0.05$ ), property offenses ( $r = 0.334, p \# 0.01$ ), drug use ( $r = 0.458, p \# 0.001$ ), drug selling ( $r = 0.343, p \# 0.001$ ), and the lower the level of total arrests, violence arrests, and serious violence arrests ( $p \# 0.05$ ). This strong pattern generally holds across time periods, whether at Time I or at Time III, especially in regard to property offenses and total arrests.

On the other hand, the more time youth spend at some form of legitimate employment, the lower the level of self-reported total offenses ( $r = -0.221, p \# 0.01$ ), serious violence offenses ( $r = -0.231, p \# 0.01$ ), total violence offenses, drug use and drug selling, at  $p = 0.05$  significance levels – all at Time III. Further, if youth said they were thinking of leaving the gang, or considering leaving in the future, the more likely they were to self-report lower levels of offenses and arrests, both at Time I and Time III. The pattern was highly significant at Time I for total offenses ( $r = 0.381, p \# 0.001$ ), violence offenses ( $r = 0.375, p \# 0.001$ ), serious violence offenses ( $r = 0.408, p \# 0.001$ ), property offenses ( $r = 0.390, p \# 0.001$ ), drug use ( $r = 0.390, p \#$

0.001), drug selling ( $r = 0.259$ ,  $p \neq 0.01$ ), and for total arrests, violence arrests, and serious violence arrests ( $p \neq 0.05$ ).

There is also a correlation between more time spent with parents and relatives and fewer self-reported offenses and arrests. At Time I, this is particularly true for total offenses ( $r = -0.275$ ,  $p = 0.01$ ), violence offenses, serious violence offenses, property offenses, total arrests, and property arrests ( $p \neq 0.05$ ). However, there is a different and unexpected correlation at Time III between certain types of self-reported offenses and the amount of time spent with parents and other relatives: the more the youth spend time with parents or relatives, the more likely they are to report increased involvement in drug use or drug selling ( $p \neq 0.05$ ). This difference between Time I and Time III may reflect diminishing influence by parents and relatives (i.e., less social control by them, as the youth ages), and also increased need of gang youth to concentrate on developing more adequate sources of income, legitimate or illegitimate. It may also indicate that parents and relatives have become more involved in certain types of offenses, particularly drug selling, in which youth also participate. In general, there are clear links between gang membership, family relationships, and crime, but the links may be time-related.

### Social (Educational and Economic) Opportunities

For policy and Project-intervention purposes, we were particularly interested in program youths' access to social opportunities as it could be related to the reduction of gang crime. We examined youths' access to social opportunities such as education, employment and income (legal and illegal) in relation to levels of offending, at Time I and Time III. We looked first at the relationship of program youth to educational status. Almost all the youth had marginal or



negative experiences with the formal public school system. Educational achievement was weakly correlated with self-reported offenses, and only at Time I. The higher the educational level, the more likely youth were to report lower levels of total arrests or property arrests ( $p \# 0.05$ ) at Time I. The pattern remained at Time III, but was not statistically significant.

The situation was somewhat different for employment, which was much more extensively associated with self-reported arrest variables. Jobs are more meaningful for gang youth than is education. Employment was extensively and powerfully correlated at Time I with lower levels of total offenses ( $r = -0.262$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), as well as with lower levels of violence offenses, property offenses, drug use and drug selling ( $p \# 0.05$ ). At Time I, employed youth were likely to report less involvement in property offenses ( $p \# 0.05$ ). Also, youth who were employed at Time III reported fewer categories of total arrests and property arrests ( $p \# 0.05$ ). In other words, employment appeared to be a stronger predictor than educational achievement of lower levels and fewer types of self-reported offenses and arrests. We will further test this relationship in our multivariate analyses in the next section of this chapter.

The youth's individual income – legal and illegal – was also correlated with self-reported offenses (arrests), in various ways. Legally-derived income was correlated at Time III with a reduction in offenses (arrests), i.e., the higher the level of legal income the lower the level, and the fewer the types, of total offenses, violence offenses, serious violence offenses, property offenses and drug use ( $p \# 0.05$ ). Simply put, if youth had legitimate jobs and/or access to legal sources of income, their offending patterns were reduced, particularly at Time III. We will look more closely at access to legal and illegal income as predictors of offense reduction in the next section of this chapter.

Finally, we began to test the utility of anomie, or alienation propositions, as a correlate of the youths' aspirations and expectations for future income and occupation. Aspirations, per se, were not correlated with the offense variables. However, higher expectations for future income were correlated with lower levels of self-reported total arrests ( $r = -0.423$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), and with lower levels of violence arrests, serious violence arrests and property arrests ( $p \# 0.05$ ), at Time I but not at Time III. Also, higher occupational expectations were correlated negatively with drug use, i.e., the lower the level of occupational expectation, the less the drug use at Time I ( $r = 0.305$ ,  $p \# 0.05$ ) and at Time III ( $r = 0.256$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ). A higher level of occupational expectation was also extensively correlated with lower self-reported offenses.

The "disjunction," or difference, between income or occupation aspirations and expectations did not generally produce significant correlations with offense variables in the simple bivariate analysis. The larger the income aspiration/expectation gap, or "disjunction," the greater the association with increased property offenses at Time III ( $r = 0.305$ ,  $p \# 0.01$ ), but not at Time I. A larger occupational gap or disjunction between aspirations and expectations was associated with greater drug use at Time III ( $p \# 0.05$ ). In our multivariate analysis we shall more strongly show that, when other variables are controlled, using either the income or occupation measures, a smaller disjunction (or gap) is associated with a lower level of self-reported total offenses, especially violence offenses.

### Models

The Gang Violence Reduction Project was primarily concerned with the reduction of gang violence. In the following multivariate analyses, we first test the strength of the

relationship of life-course and life-space variables to changes in the program youth's self-reported offenses (arrests) between Time I and Time III, particularly the difference between frequency of self-reported total offenses and violence offenses. The second test more directly addresses changes in responses of program youth which might be associated with Project effects. We do not yet consider changes using arrest data.

We have selected multiple regression modeling as the statistical analysis method by which to predict the effects of neighborhood, family, gang, and individual-youth characteristics identified as statistically significant from the correlation analyses above – along with control variables (the youths' ages, and the gangs with which they are affiliated), and covariates (prior total offenses, prior violence offenses) – on change in self-reported offenses. These sets of variables will enter our model as predictors of change in four dependent, or outcome, variables: *total offenses*, *total violence offenses* and *changes in these two sets of offenses over time*. Since the values of some of the characteristics are missing for 6 program youth, the sample size for the models in this analysis is 121.

### Predicting Total Self-Reported Offenses at Time III

Our best model for predicting total offenses at Time III includes ten variables. Three are control variables, or covariates, derived from responses at Time I: *total offenses* (excluding drug offenses), *youth's age* (1 = under 19 years of age, [mainly 14 to 18 years]) (0 = 19 years and over, [mainly 19 to 24 years]) and *gang affiliation* ( 1 = Latin Kings) (0 = Two Six).

The remaining seven variables in this model are derived from responses at Time III: *gang membership status* (1 = former) (0 = current); *thinking of quitting gang* (1 = yes) (0 = no);

*employment status* (1= currently employed) (0 = currently unemployed); *differences between future income aspirations and expectations*, (2 = larger difference) (1 = smaller difference) (0 = missing response) (-1 = no difference); *choosing to spend most free time with gang friends* (1 = yes, mainly with one or two gang friends or a group of gang friends) (0 = no, mainly by himself, with a wife/steady girlfriend, or with one or two non-gang friends); *gang size* (-1 = gang section is smaller) (0 = about the same) (1 = section is larger); and *number of household/family crises* (ranging from 0 to 11).

This model, with all of its variables together, explains 53.0% of total variance in the equation. The variables which best predict lower levels of total offenses at Time III, in order of their significant statistical differences, are: *being 19 years of age and older*; *spending most of the free time with individuals other than gang friends*; *thinking of quitting the gang*; *smaller size of the gang section*; *smaller or even no difference between future income aspirations and expectations*; *membership in the Latin Kings*; and *currently employed*. Three of the variables are marginally statistically important in predicting lower offense levels at Time III: *a lower number of household/family problems and crises*, *a higher number of total offenses at Time I*, and *former gang membership* (Table 10.10).

The findings support the following commonly accepted propositions, in descending order of strength: 1) developmental or maturation theory – the gang problem is largely a function of developmental crisis during the transition to adulthood of certain younger adolescent youth; 2) differential association – those youth who hang out with gang friends are most likely to commit offenses; 3) cognitive theory – those who plan to quit the gang are less likely to continue to be offenders; 4) gang cohesion/size theory – those who perceive their gang section to be smaller are

less identified with the gang, see others in the gang as less involved and are most likely to report fewer gang offenses; 5) anomie theory – those youth who have unrealistic income aspirations in relation to expectations are probably more alienated and likely to engage in offending behavior; 6) gang organization theory – those youth identified with a more traditional, cohesive or centralized and violent gang structure (such as the Latin Kings) are more likely to commit offenses; 7) opportunity theory – those youth who are employed in legitimate jobs are less likely to commit offenses; 8) family disorganization – those youth from families with many social, health, economic, and criminal problems are more likely to engage in offending behavior; 9) statistical theory – those youth who have prior histories of extensive offending are likely to commit fewer offenses in the future (i.e., a regression effect); 10) socialization theory – whether the youth declares he is a current or former member of a gang may have something to do with whether he will continue to commit offenses; if he states he is a former gang member there is a likelihood that he will commit fewer offenses.

Propositions of developmental/maturation, differential-association, cognitive, gang-cohesion, and anomie theories would appear to be particularly useful in predicting lower levels of gang offending at Time III. This suggests that policy and program efforts should primarily – but not exclusively – target younger adolescents, persuade them not to associate with gang friends, encourage them to quit gangs, and provide reality counseling, especially about future levels of income from legitimate jobs and lifestyle.

#### Predicting Change in Total Self-Reported Offenses Between Time I and Time III

Perhaps a better model focuses on change in offenses between Time I and Time III. It

includes six variables: one control variable and several Time I/Time III variables that are statistically (or almost statistically) significant. They include *youth's age* at Time I (1 = youth under 19 years) (0 = youth 19 and older); *time spent with wife or steady girlfriend* at Time III (1 = a few hours or most of the day) (0 = no time); *having known probation officers who dealt with the gang problem* at Time I (1 = yes) (0 = no); *gang size* at Time III; *number of household family crises* at Time III (ranging from 0 to 11); and *difference between future occupational aspirations and expectations* at Time I (2 = large difference) (1 = small difference) (0 = missing response) (-1 = no difference).

This model explains 43.0% of total variance in change in total offenses between Time I and Time III. The factors which best account for variance, in order of significance are: the *youth having known a probation officer addressing the gang problem* at Time I, the *youth spending more time with wives or steady girlfriends* at Time I, and the *younger age of the youth*, (under 19 years). Although younger youth report higher levels of offenses at Time III in our prediction model above, they are likely to show more positive change, or greater reduction in total offenses, than older youth, particularly when we did not distinguish between differences between 16-and-under, and 17- and 18-year olds. This age finding will be reversed when we use total and violence arrests in General Linear and Logistic Models in later chapters. Also, those youth with no gap or “disjunction” between future occupational aspirations and expectations at Time I are likely to decrease their offending level between Time I and Time III, while those with a larger gap or “disjunction” are likely to increase their offending level the most. The presence of fewer household/family crises at Time III results in a significant decrease in total self-reported offenses. Finally, the youth's perception at Time III that the gang is smaller is almost

statistically significant in predicting positive change or a higher reduction in total offenses (Table 10.11).

Knowledge of a probation officer, indicating a combined deterrence and social intervention strategy, is the strongest predictor variable in the reduction of offenses between Time I and Time III. A social control variable is also important – the youth identifies with the values of his wife and/or steady girlfriend (which presumably are generally more conventional than those of the gang youth himself). The greater the alignment of occupational aspirations and realistic expectations contributes to a reduction in total offenses. A household with fewer health and criminal-justice crises also contributes to a reduction in offenses between Time I and Time III. Finally, a perceived reduction in gang size, an indicator of weaker gang cohesion, is somewhat associated with a reduction in offenses.

Implications for policy and practice in this model are that suppression and social control together may play key roles in successfully addressing the gang problem. Monitoring and supervision of the youth's behavior, as well as guidance about social mores and behaviors and realistic occupational opportunities are important. Counseling youth to spend more time with their wives or steady girlfriends, rather than with the gang, and helping youth and their families cope with a variety of social, health, and criminal-justice problems are also recommended.

#### Predicting Change in Total Self-Reported Violence Offenses Between Time I and Time III

The best model for predicting self-reported total violence offenses of youth is similar to the model predicting total offenses, above; it explains 46.0% of total variance in the model. The variables which account for reduction in total violence offenses at Time III, in order of statistical

significance are: *youth over 19 years of age*; *youth thinks he will leave the gang* at Time III; *youth does not spend free time mostly with gang friends* at Time III; *youth's perception that gang size is smaller* at Time III; *smaller or even no gap between increased income aspirations and expectations*. Other variables that are almost significant include: *individual had returned to school, GED or job training program* at Time I; *being a former gang member* at Time III; *low number of household/family problems* at Time III; and *high number of self-reported total violence offenses* at Time I (Table 10.12).

Our initial efforts to predict change, or reduction, in violence offenses between Time I and Time III were only mildly successful. We couldn't find a strong model to predict change in total violence offenses using the entire gang sample. Consequently, we decided to divide this sample into those who committed fewer violence offenses at Time III than at Time I ( $n = 75$ ) – possibly representing the youth with whom the Project was successful – and those who committed the same number or even more violence offenses between Time I and Time III ( $n = 46$ ). Different best models were selected to predict change in violence offenses for each of these two subsamples.

The best model for predicting change in self-reported total violence offenses of youth who reduced their total violence offenses between Time I and Time III includes seven variables. No control variables (e.g., age and specific gang) enter significantly into this equation. The predictor variables used in our model are: *number of gang avoidance actions* at Time I (ranges from 0 to 5), including turning down a job because of unsafe location, keeping a gun or other weapon at home, arranging to go out with someone so the youth would not be alone, selecting a residence because it was safe, and not going to school; *satisfaction with community* at Time I,



(1 = very/somewhat satisfied) (0 = very/somewhat dissatisfied); *number of treatments for problems* (drug, alcohol, physical, mental health) at Time III (ranges from 0 to 4); *youth's total monthly illegal income* at Time III; *knew probation officers who dealt with the gang problem* at Time I (1 = yes) (0 = no); *total household yearly legal income* at Time I (ranges from 0 to 7 category levels); and *got along with father in the past year* at Time I (1 = always/most of the time) (0 = sometimes/never).

This change model explains 60.0% of total variance in the equation, i.e., a reduction in violence offenses between Time I and Time III. The factors, in order of degree of influence, are: avoiding actions which expose the youth to gang crime, satisfaction with living in the community, undergoing treatment for personal problems, lower level of illegal income, and not knowing probation officers who addressed the gang problem. Higher legitimate levels of household income and not having a positive relationship with the father are important factors in predicting lower levels of violence offenses, but just miss statistical significance (Table 10.13).

Of special interest is that the most powerful factors contributing to a reduction of the youth's violent activity is rationally and obviously avoiding violent situations, and realistically being satisfied with or adapting as best he can to conventional norms. Also important is the youth' undertaking treatment for his various personal problems, as well as not engaging in illegal activity (such as selling drugs) and not being placed on probation.

These are commonsense considerations which do not seem difficult for the youth to achieve with some external guidance, support and control. Combining individual counseling, provision of opportunities for legitimate jobs, and curtailment of sources of illegitimate income for the youth appear to be useful directions for program and policy development.

Our best model for predicting change in self-reported total violence offenses for youth who increased (or experienced no change in) total violence offenses between Time I and Time III also includes seven variables: *number of gang avoidance actions* at Time III but not Time I, as in the above model (ranging from 0 to 5); *gang size* at Time III (see above); *household total yearly illegal income* at Time III; *total monthly illegal income of youth* at Time III; *total monthly legal income of youth* at Time III; *gets along with siblings* at Time III (1 = always/most of the time) (0 = sometimes/never); and *number of days per week carrying a gun* at Time III (ranges from 0 to 7).

This change model explains 68.0% of total variance in the equation. The characteristics of youth who show no change or get worse in terms of an increase in total violence offenses are: not avoiding activities or situations which expose them to gang crime; perceiving an increase in gang size or viewing and identifying with the gang as a growing and powerful entity; having limited access to either or both illegal and legal income; getting along well or identifying with siblings who may be gang members; and often carrying a gun (Table 10.14).

The addition of two more variables in this model – *fear of walking alone because of gang concerns* and *gap between occupation aspirations and expectations* – would have produced an even more powerful (but perhaps less efficient) model, contributing 74.0% of the total variance in the model for predicting changes in total violence offenses of youth who have unchanged or increased violence rates.

This last model indicates that hard-to-change and resistive, violent gang-youth are characterized by high levels of personal disturbance or disorientation. Such youth do not avoid high-risk gang situations; they are highly fearful, and frequently carry a gun; they see the gang as

growing larger; their siblings may be gang members and/or involved in criminal activities; their families, including siblings, provide a criminal-gain learning environment. These youth are also exposed to a double failure of opportunities. They have not been successful at gaining income from either legitimate or illegal sources, such as selling drugs (see Cloward and Ohlin 1960).

All of these factors are highly statistically significant predictors of a program's possible failure in addressing the problems of violence-prone gang youth. It is apparent that a comprehensive effort involving strong controls and suppression, intensive counseling and support, as well as long-term, persistent efforts to provide access to legitimate opportunities for them and their families are required. Violent gang youth are not simply prone to personal and social failure. They and their families may be highly socially-disordered or criminally-oriented during the period of the youth's gang involvement.

It should be noted again that our findings are highly suggestive, but do not yet relate to specific Project effects. We need to add data on services and contacts provided by the Project team to our current analysis, and to utilize official police arrest-history data in our evaluation analysis. Nevertheless, the analysis thus far helps to develop specific indicators, or predictors, of what it takes to produce success with gang youth at the time of their more active participation in gang crime, particularly violent crime.

We found general and extensive reduction of frequencies and categories of self-reported offenses and arrests between Time I and Time III; total offenses dropped in frequency from a mean of 52.7 to 9.4; violent crime from a mean of 28.7 to 6.6; the most serious violent crime (e.g., aggravated assault, aggravated battery, robbery, drive-by shootings and homicides), from 18.5 to 3.6; property crime, from 24.0 to 2.8; drug selling, from a mean frequency of 4.1 to 2.8.

All of these reductions were highly statistically significant, except for drug selling. Similar declines in self-reported arrests for these offenses were reported. We will see in Chapter 11 that these declines are generally similar to those reported in police arrest records (particularly for violence and drugs), although not so extreme.

These patterns were the same when we examined changes by gang, Cohort, age and type of offender. Youth 19 years of age and older at Time I lowered their offense levels. The patterns were similar for the 17- and 18-year olds, as well as for the 16-years-and-younger group, although the patterns were somewhat less dramatic for this youngest group.

The largest reduction in self-reported total offenses at Time III was for those youth who reported the most total offenses at Time I. The largest reduction in level of offending occurred for those youth who were classified as the most violent offenders. In general, 77.5% of the program sample decreased their levels of property and violence offenses; 72.8% reported a decrease in numbers of violence offenses; however, youth who said they were selling drugs (n = 60) reported a 50.0% decrease in the frequency of selling drugs. The degree of these declines was not supported by police arrest data, as we shall see in Chapter 11.

## Summary

### Correlations with Outcome Variables

At Time I, efforts by youth to avoid neighborhood gang crime situations were correlated with reduced self-reported offense patterns. However, fear of gang-related problems, and the gang-youth's perceptions of neighborhood adults who use youth for illegal activities were correlated with high rates of self-reported offending, particularly at Time I. While the perceived

presence of police was not related to a decrease in gang violence rates, the presence of probation officers addressing the gang problem was related to decreases in levels of various self-reported offenses and self-reported arrests. Some of these correlations remained significant at Time III, but some did not. The youth's perceptions of the activities of community organizations and resident groups are not correlated to increases or decreases in offenses; but the activities of churches, at Time III, are mildly correlated with the reduction in total offenses and violence offenses.

Certain household or family characteristics are correlated with increases in crime. These include larger-size families, higher illegal income, lower legal income, more family members arrested and incarcerated, more household members victimized, and more family problems and crises. Positive relationships with mothers, fathers, and siblings may not be correlated with increases or decreases in self-reported offenses; conflictual relationships with wives or steady girlfriends are correlated with a decrease in the youth's offenses. However, the more time the youth spends with family, relatives, and particularly wives or girlfriends, the lower the probability of his offending. Reports by program youth of undergoing treatment for drug, mental-health or other problems are correlated with reduced total self-reported offenses, property offenses, drug use and selling, total self-reported arrests, violence arrests and property arrests, particularly at Time I.

There are other individual-level variables at Time I, at Time III, or at both times which are associated with decreases in offenses and arrests: a youth's claim that he is a former or a less-active gang member; the fewer gang friends he has and the less time he spends with them; the more time he spends at work; he is currently thinking of leaving the gang or thinking of leaving

it in the future; and the higher the level of his reported legal income.

There are no gang-level variables, per se, associated with outcome offense or arrest variables, except perceptions of the size of the gang. If a youth perceives that the size of the gang has gone down, he reports a reduction in total offenses, violence offenses and property offenses between Time I and Time III.

### Models

We selected Multiple Regression modeling as the statistical analysis method by which to predict the effects of our control variables (total offenses and total violence offenses at Time I, the youth's age and whether he was affiliated with the Latin Kings or the Two Six). We also selected neighborhood, family, gang and individual-youth characteristics shown to be statistically significant from the correlation analyses. They entered our model as predictors of four self-reported dependent or outcome variables: *total offenses*, *total violence offenses*, and *changes in these offenses between Time I and Time III*.

The best model for predicting change in total offenses between Time I and Time III explains 43.0% of the total variance in the model. The variables which are most significant in predicting greater reduction of total offenses are, in order of statistical significance: *perception that probation officers are addressing the gang problem at Time I*; *spending more time with wives or steady girlfriends at Time I*; *the youth is under 19 years of age at Time I* (although the younger youth generally reported higher levels of offenses at Time III in our prediction model above, they are more likely to show relatively more positive changes than older youth); *smaller "disjunction" between future occupational aspirations and expectations at Time I*; *fewer*

*household/family crises* at Time III; and the *perception that the gang is smaller* at Time III (which is almost statistically significant).

Our initial efforts to predict change or reduction in violence offenses between Time I and Time III were only mildly successful. We could not find a strong enough model to predict change using the sample of youth committing violent offenses, essentially all youth in the sample. Consequently, we decided to divide the sample into those who committed fewer violence offenses at Time III than at Time I ( $n = 75$ ), and those who committed the same number or more violence offenses at Time III than at Time I ( $n = 46$ ).

The best model for predicting change in total violence offenses of program youth who reduced their total violence offenses explains 60.0% of the total variance. The variables which are most significant in predicting a decrease in total violence offenses at Time III, in order of significance, are: *number of actions taken to avoid gang-crime situations* at Time I; *satisfaction with the community* at Time I; *higher number of treatments undergone for personal problems* at Time III; *low level of monthly illegal income* at Time III; and *not having known of or contacted probation officers who dealt with the gang problem* at Time I.

The best model for predicting change in total violence offenses of program youth who did not reduce (or who increased) their total violence offenses explains 68.0% of the total variance. The variables which are most significant in predicting no change or an increase in total violence offenses are, in order of statistical significance: *very close to siblings* at Time III; *carrying a gun a higher number of days per week* at Time III; *perceiving a larger gang size* at Time III; *taking a smaller number of actions to avoid gang crime situations* at Time III; *having access to lower levels of total illegal and legal income* at Time III.

The above models suggest that a variety of factors contribute to a decrease in, and changes in, total offenses and total violence offenses for different types of gang youth. Consequently, it appears to be important to be able to develop a comprehensive approach to reducing gang violence, which includes varying combinations of strategies; social intervention or counseling for the youth and his family, provision of job opportunities for legitimate income, suppression which serves to reduce the size of the gang and diminishes illegal income sources, and community-development efforts to improve the quality of life in the neighborhood.



Table 10.1  
Mean Frequencies of Self-Reported<sup>a</sup> Offenses and Arrests for Program Youth  
Comparing Time I and Time III

Offenses/Arrests	Time I		Time III		Difference		T <sup>b</sup>
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	
Total Offenses <sup>c</sup>	52.68	127	9.40	121	-42.56	121	-6.91***
Total Violence Offenses <sup>d</sup>	28.72	127	6.57	121	-21.54	121	-5.26***
Serious Violence Offenses <sup>e</sup>	18.53	127	3.55	121	-14.49	121	-4.97***
Property Offenses <sup>f</sup>	23.95	127	2.83	121	-21.02	121	-6.26***
Drug-Selling Offenses <sup>g</sup>	4.11	126	2.80	121	-1.12	120	-1.54
Total Arrests <sup>h</sup>	2.00	127	0.31	121	-1.64	121	-2.62**
Total Violence Arrests	1.02	127	0.22	121	-0.74	121	-1.84
Serious Violence Arrests	0.59	127	0.13	121	-0.47	121	-1.53
Property Arrests	0.98	127	0.09	121	-0.49	121	-2.77**

<sup>a</sup> Source: Individual Gang-Member Survey.

<sup>b</sup> For differences between time periods: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

<sup>c</sup> Includes both violence and property offenses, but not drug selling offenses.

<sup>d</sup> Includes robbery with and without a weapon, threats with and without a weapon, gang intimidation, battery with and without a weapon, homicide, and drive-by shootings.

<sup>e</sup> Includes robbery with a weapon, threats with a weapon, gang intimidation, battery with a weapon, homicide, and drive-by shootings.

<sup>f</sup> Includes writing gang and nongang graffiti, destroying property worth \$300 or less, entering or breaking into a building to commit a theft, stealing a car for joyriding, and breaking into a car and stealing parts.

<sup>g</sup> Includes selling marijuana, cocaine, crack, heroin, “wicky” stick, acid and other drugs.

<sup>h</sup> Includes both total violence and property arrests, but not drug arrests.

Table 10.2  
Mean Frequencies of Self-Reported<sup>a</sup> Offenses and Arrests for the Two Gangs  
Latin King (LK) and Two Six (26)  
Comparing Time I and Time III

Offenses/Arrests <sup>b</sup>	Gang	Time I		Time III		Difference		T <sup>c</sup>
		Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	
Total Offenses	LK	57.26	65	10.60	62	-45.61	62	-5.12***
	26	47.87	62	8.14	59	-39.36	59	-4.61***
Total Violence Offenses	LK	32.22	65	7.05	62	-23.24	62	-4.17***
	26	25.07	62	6.07	59	-19.75	59	-3.27**
Serious Violence Offenses	LK	19.40	65	4.07	62	-13.81	62	-3.96***
	26	17.61	62	3.02	59	-15.20	59	-3.19**
Property Offenses	LK	25.05	65	3.55	62	-22.37	62	-4.79***
	26	22.81	62	2.07	59	-19.61	59	-4.03***
Drug-Selling Offenses	LK	5.28	65	3.96	63	-1.11	63	-0.92
	26	2.87	62	1.54	58	-1.13	57	-1.46
Total Arrests	LK	2.57	65	0.39	62	-2.03	62	-2.12*
	26	1.40	62	0.22	59	-1.22	59	-1.53
Total Violence Arrests	LK	1.15	65	0.27	62	-0.73	62	-1.80
	26	0.87	62	0.15	59	-0.76	59	-1.06
Serious Violence Arrests	LK	0.42	65	0.15	62	-0.26	62	-2.05*
	26	0.77	62	0.12	59	-0.69	59	-1.12
Property Arrests	LK	1.42	65	0.11	62	-1.31	62	-2.21*
	26	0.53	62	0.07	59	-0.46	59	-2.05*

<sup>a</sup> Source: Individual Gang-Member Survey.

<sup>b</sup> Same offenses and arrests as in Table 10.1.

<sup>c</sup> For differences between time periods: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

Table 10.3  
Mean Frequencies of Self-Reported<sup>a</sup> Offenses and Arrests for the Three Cohorts, Comparing Time I and Time III

Offenses/Arrests <sup>b</sup>	Cohort	Time I		Time III		Difference		T <sup>c</sup>
		Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	
Total Offenses	Cohort 1	56.38	72	10.22	67	-47.52	67	-5.41***
	Cohort 2	46.88	24	7.26	23	-38.65	23	-3.10**
	Cohort 3	43.94	31	9.19	31	-34.74	31	-2.96**
Total Violence Offenses	Cohort 1	31.97	72	7.21	67	-23.60	67	-4.32***
	Cohort 2	27.54	24	5.22	23	-23.13	23	-2.11*
	Cohort 3	22.10	31	6.19	31	-15.90	31	-2.20*
Serious Violence Offenses	Cohort 1	20.17	72	3.67	67	-15.54	67	-4.80***
	Cohort 2	22.88	24	2.96	23	-20.70	23	-1.96
	Cohort 3	11.36	31	3.74	31	-7.61	31	-1.73
Property Offenses	Cohort 1	26.40	72	3.02	67	-23.93	67	-4.72***
	Cohort 2	19.33	24	2.04	23	-15.52	23	-2.34*
	Cohort 3	21.84	31	3.00	31	-18.84	31	-3.51**
Drug-Selling Offenses	Cohort 1	4.97	72	3.20	67	-1.47	67	-1.28
	Cohort 2	1.96	24	2.58	23	0.53	23	0.53
	Cohort 3	3.77	31	2.10	31	-1.60	30	-1.40
Total Arrests	Cohort 1	2.79	72	0.45	67	-2.27	67	-2.24*
	Cohort 2	0.04	24	0.00	23	-0.04	23	-1.00
	Cohort 3	1.68	31	0.23	31	-1.45	31	-1.36
Total Violence Arrests	Cohort 1	1.51	72	0.34	67	-1.09	67	-1.57
	Cohort 2	0.04	24	0.00	23	-0.04	23	-1.00
	Cohort 3	0.61	31	0.10	31	-0.52	31	-1.03
Serious Violence Arrests	Cohort 1	0.99	72	0.19	67	-0.84	67	-1.52
	Cohort 2	0.04	24	0.00	23	-0.04	23	-1.00
	Cohort 3	0.10	31	0.10	31	0.00	31	0.00
Property Arrests	Cohort 1	1.28	72	0.10	67	-1.18	67	-2.30*
	Cohort 2	0.00	24	0.00	23	0.00	23	0.00
	Cohort 3	1.07	31	0.13	31	-0.94	31	-1.59

<sup>a</sup> Source: Individual Gang-Member Survey.

<sup>b</sup> Same offense and arrest categories as in Table 10.1.

<sup>c</sup> For differences within group between time periods: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 10.4  
Mean Frequencies of Self-Reported<sup>a</sup> Offenses and Arrests for the Three Age Groups  
(16 & Under, 17 & 18, 19 and Over), Comparing Time I and Time III

Offenses/Arrests <sup>b</sup>	Age	Time I		Time III		Difference		T <sup>c</sup>
		Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	
Total Offenses	16 & Under	47.53	34	16.12	33	-31.03	33	-2.80**
	17 & 18	67.22	54	9.06	52	-59.33	52	-5.36***
	19 & Over	37.03	39	3.72	36	-28.92	36	-3.88***
Total Violence Offenses	16 & Under	29.09	34	11.36	33	-18.61	33	-1.77
	17 & 18	31.44	54	6.50	52	-25.15	52	-4.41***
	19 & Over	24.64	39	2.28	36	-19.00	36	-3.41**
Serious Violence Offenses	16 & Under	21.71	34	6.76	33	-15.61	33	-1.84
	17 & 18	18.50	54	3.06	52	-15.56	52	-4.57***
	19 & Over	15.80	39	1.33	36	-11.92	36	-3.30**
Property Offenses	16 & Under	18.44	34	4.76	33	-12.42	33	-4.24***
	17 & 18	35.78	54	2.56	52	-34.17	52	-4.87***
	19 & Over	12.39	39	1.44	36	-9.92	36	-3.81***
Drug-Selling Offenses	16 & Under	3.62	34	3.38	33	-0.35	33	-0.23
	17 & 18	4.56	54	2.91	52	-1.42	52	-1.22
	19 & Over	3.92	39	2.11	36	-1.40	35	-1.21
Total Arrests	16 & Under	2.09	34	0.73	33	-1.36	33	-1.06
	17 & 18	2.74	54	0.19	52	-2.60	52	-2.18*
	19 & Over	0.90	39	0.08	36	-0.50	36	-2.59*
Total Violence Arrests	16 & Under	1.38	34	0.52	33	-0.91	33	-0.71
	17 & 18	1.09	54	0.14	52	-0.98	52	-2.00*
	19 & Over	0.59	39	0.06	36	-0.25	36	-2.17*
Serious Violence Arrests	16 & Under	1.18	34	0.30	33	-0.91	33	-0.85
	17 & 18	0.46	54	0.12	52	-0.37	52	-1.64
	19 & Over	0.26	39	0.00	36	-0.22	36	-2.09*
Property Arrests	16 & Under	0.71	34	0.21	33	-0.45	33	-2.33*
	17 & 18	1.65	54	0.06	52	-1.62	52	-2.22*
	19 & Over	0.31	39	0.03	36	-0.25	36	-1.95*

<sup>a</sup> Source: Individual Gang Member Survey.

<sup>b</sup> Same offenses and arrests as in Table 10.1.

<sup>c</sup> For differences between time periods: \* p = .05, \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

Table 10.5  
Mean Frequencies of Self-Reported<sup>a</sup> Offenses and Arrests for the Four Offender Types,  
Comparing Time I and Time III

Offenses/Arrests <sup>b</sup>	Offender Type (Quartile)	Time I		Time III		Difference		T <sup>c</sup>
		Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	
Total Offenses	Most	149.94	32	11.10	31	-137.23	31	-11.54***
	Above Average	43.88	32	12.96	28	-29.93	28	-6.80***
	Below Average	14.32	31	11.26	31	-3.06	31	-0.80
	Least	1.38	32	2.61	31	1.19	31	1.25
Total Violence Offenses	Most	85.88	32	7.32	31	-73.32	31	-7.31***
	Above Average	20.34	32	9.39	28	-11.68	28	-3.18**
	Below Average	7.26	31	7.77	31	0.52	31	0.16
	Least	0.75	32	2.06	31	1.29	31	1.69
Serious Violence Offenses	Most	56.19	32	3.77	31	-49.90	31	-6.22***
	Above Average	12.75	32	5.00	28	-8.29	28	-3.53**
	Below Average	4.32	31	4.45	31	0.13	31	0.05
	Least	0.41	32	1.13	31	0.71	31	1.33
Property Offenses	Most	64.06	32	3.77	31	-61.90	31	-6.62***
	Above Average	23.53	32	3.57	28	-18.25	28	-6.55***
	Below Average	7.07	31	3.48	31	-3.58	31	-2.76**
	Least	0.63	32	0.55	31	-0.10	31	-0.27
Drug-Selling Offenses	Most	7.81	32	2.73	30	-4.11	30	-2.58*
	Above Average	2.56	32	3.30	29	0.48	29	0.39
	Below Average	4.32	31	3.90	31	-0.42	31	-0.23
	Least	1.68	31	1.29	31	-0.40	30	-0.45
Total Arrests	Most	6.63	32	0.39	31	-6.00	31	-2.65*
	Above Average	0.78	32	0.50	28	-0.21	28	-0.86
	Below Average	0.45	31	0.32	31	-0.13	31	-0.58
	Least	0.09	32	0.03	31	-0.06	31	-0.16
Total Violence Arrests	Most	3.81	32	0.39	31	-3.16	31	-2.11*
	Above Average	0.16	32	0.39	28	0.25	28	1.13
	Below Average	0.00	31	0.10	31	0.10	31	1.36
	Least	0.06	32	0.00	31	-0.06	31	-1.44
Serious Violence Arrests	Most	2.22	32	0.19	31	-2.03	31	-1.76
	Above Average	0.06	32	0.29	28	0.21	28	1.14
	Below Average	0.00	31	0.07	31	0.06	31	1.00
	Least	0.06	32	0.00	31	-0.06	31	-1.44
Property Arrests	Most	2.81	32	0.00	31	-2.84	31	-2.42*
	Above Average	0.63	32	0.11	28	-0.46	28	-2.22*
	Below Average	0.45	31	0.23	31	-0.23	31	-1.23
	Least	0.03	32	0.03	31	0.00	31	0.00

<sup>a</sup> Source: Individual Gang-Member Survey.

<sup>b</sup> Same offenses and arrests as in Table 10.1.

<sup>c</sup> For differences between time periods: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 10.6  
Mean Frequencies of Self-Reported<sup>a</sup> Offenses and Arrests for the Four Violent Offender Types,  
Comparing Time I and Time III

Offenses/Arrests <sup>b</sup>	Violence Types	Time I		Time III		Difference		T <sup>c</sup>
		Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	
Total Offenses	Most	145.29	31	7.80	30	-	30	-10.81***
	Above Average	41.59	34	14.63	32	-27.25	32	-5.64***
	Below Average	15.55	33	8.66	32	-5.22	32	-1.60
	Least	8.93	29	5.85	27	-1.52	27	-0.27
Total Violence Offenses	Most	92.16	31	5.63	30	-83.40	30	-9.23***
	Above Average	19.53	34	10.31	32	-8.81	32	-3.17**
	Below Average	3.85	33	5.28	32	1.59	32	1.04
	Least	0.00	29	4.70	27	4.70	27	1.58
Serious Violence Offenses	Most	60.39	31	3.07	30	-54.87	30	-7.28***
	Above Average	12.29	34	5.19	32	-6.91	32	-4.21***
	Below Average	1.91	33	2.50	32	0.69	32	0.74
	Least	0.00	29	3.41	27	3.41	27	1.46
Property Offenses	Most	53.13	31	2.17	30	-52.27	30	-5.25***
	Above Average	22.06	34	4.31	32	-18.44	32	-4.86***
	Below Average	11.70	33	3.38	32	-6.81	32	-2.48*
	Least	8.93	29	1.15	27	-6.22	27	-1.40
Drug-Selling Offenses	Most	7.48	31	1.97	29	-4.48	30	-3.04**
	Above Average	3.53	34	3.62	33	-0.02	33	-0.01
	Below Average	3.03	33	3.69	32	0.56	32	0.34
	Least	2.36	28	1.64	27	-0.84	26	-0.76
Total Arrests	Most	6.74	31	0.13	30	-6.37	30	-2.74*
	Above Average	0.68	34	0.56	32	-0.06	32	-0.34
	Below Average	0.46	33	0.34	32	-0.13	32	-0.61
	Least	0.24	29	0.15	27	-0.04	27	-0.30
Total Violence Arrests	Most	3.90	31	0.13	30	-3.50	30	-2.30*
	Above Average	0.18	34	0.47	32	0.31	32	1.54
	Below Average	0.03	33	0.22	32	0.19	32	1.29
	Least	0.03	29	0.00	27	-0.04	27	-1.00
Serious Violence Arrests	Most	2.23	31	0.10	30	-2.13	30	-1.79
	Above Average	0.12	34	0.22	32	0.09	32	1.36
	Below Average	0.03	33	0.19	32	0.16	32	1.09
	Least	0.03	29	0.00	27	-0.04	27	-1.00
Property Arrests	Most	2.84	31	0.00	30	-2.87	30	-2.36*
	Above Average	0.50	34	0.09	32	-0.38	32	-1.93
	Below Average	0.42	33	0.13	32	-0.31	32	-1.97
	Least	0.21	29	0.15	27	0.00	27	0.00

<sup>a</sup> Source: Individual Gang-Member Survey.

<sup>b</sup> Same offenses and arrests as in Table 10.1.

<sup>c</sup> For differences between time periods: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 10.7  
 Program Youth (N = 121)<sup>a</sup> Committing Offenses  
 Numbers (%)<sup>b</sup> of Youth and Means (Standard Deviations)<sup>c</sup> of Offenses  
 Time I and Time III

Offenses	Time I		Time III		Differences <sup>d</sup> in No. of Youth with Offenses	Percent Decline
	Youth N <sub>1</sub> (%)	Offenses Mean (S.D.)	Youth N <sub>3</sub> (%)	Offenses Mean (S.D.)	N <sub>d</sub> = N <sub>1</sub> - N <sub>3</sub>	% = N <sub>d</sub> / N <sub>1</sub> * 100
Total Offenses (excluding drug and alcohol offenses)	107 (88.4)	60.4 (67.5)	69 (57.0)	16.1 (18.4)	38	35.5
Total Violence Offenses (serious and less serious)	95 (78.5)	36.8 (47.3)	61 (50.4)	12.8 (15.3)	34	35.8
Serious Violence Offenses	85 (70.2)	26.6 (36.1)	44 (36.4)	9.6 (11.6)	41	48.3
Property Offenses	93 (76.8)	32.0 (39.5)	42 (34.7)	7.9 (6.7)	51	54.8
Drug-Selling Offenses	50 (41.3)	10.4 (7.5)	45 (37.2)	6.9 (4.8)	5	10.0
Drug Use	95 (78.5)	5.1 (4.6)	78 (64.5)	4.5 (3.0)	17	17.9
Alcohol Use	112 (92.6)	5.0 (3.8)	105 (86.8)	3.6 (2.6)	7	6.3

<sup>a</sup> One-hundred-twenty-one (121) youth (males, aged 12-24 years) said they committed offenses and completed both Time I and Time III interviews. One-hundred-eighty-two (182) youth completed Time I interviews only (Time II data are not used). The attrition rate between Time I and Time III interviews was 33.6%. Mainly youth 19-years-and-older did not complete a Time III interview. They were also generally the most serious offenders at Time I. Complete police arrest histories were obtained for all 182 youth.

<sup>b</sup> Note that N<sub>1</sub> and N<sub>3</sub> indicate the numbers of youth who self-reported having committed offenses in the offense categories at Times I and III, respectively. Percents (%) are calculated using a total N = 121.

<sup>c</sup> Means and standard deviations (S.D.) are calculated using only youth who self-reported having committed offenses in the offense categories at Times I and III.

<sup>d</sup> N<sub>d</sub> = number or percent of differences between Time I and Time III.

Table 10.8  
 Self-Reported Offenses – Program Youth (N = 121)<sup>a</sup>  
 With and Without Gang Peers  
 Time I and Time III

Offenses	Time I			Time III		
	Youth with Offenses	With Gang Peers	Without Gang Peers	Youth with Offenses	With Gang Peers	Without Gang Peers
Total Offenses (excluding drug and alcohol offenses)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Total Violence Offenses (serious and less serious)	107 (88.4)	101 (83.5)	6 (5.0)	69 (57.0)	55 (45.5)	14 (11.6)
Serious Violence Offenses	95 (78.5)	85 (70.3)	10 (8.3)	61 (50.4)	48 (39.7)	13 (10.7)
Property Offenses	85 (70.3)	75 (62.0)	10 (8.3)	44 (36.4)	39 (32.2)	5 (4.1)
Drug-Selling Offenses	50 (41.3)	26 (21.5)	24 (19.8)	45 (37.2)	23 (19.0)	22 (18.2)
Drug Use	95 (78.5)	33 (27.3)	62 (51.2)	78 (64.5)	32 (26.5)	46 (38.0)
Alcohol Use	112 (92.6)	74 (61.2)	38 (31.4)	105 (86.8)	85 (70.5)	20 (16.3)

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<sup>a</sup> One-hundred-twenty-one (121) youth (males, aged 12-24 years) who said they committed offenses completed both Time I and Time III interviews. One-hundred-eighty-two (182) youth completed Time I interviews only (Time II data are not reported). The attrition rate between Time I and Time III interviews was 33.6%. Mainly youth 19-years-and-older did not complete a Time-III interview. They were also generally the most serious offenders at Time I. Complete police arrest histories were obtained for all 182 youth.



Table 10.9  
Types of Drugs and Alcohol  
Percent of Youth (N = 121) Using and Selling Drugs/Alcohol  
Time I and Time III

Drugs	Time I		Time III	
	% Used	% Sold	% Used	% Sold
Marijuana	76.9	40.5	63.8	36.5
Cocaine	28.9	31.7	18.1	19.1
Crack	2.5	4.1	0.0	0.0
Heroin	0.8	5.6	0.0	0.0
LSD	10.7	5.0	12.9	3.4
Other	8.3	0.9	1.8	0.0

Alcohol	Time I		Time III	
	% Used	% Sold	% Used	% Sold
Beer	90.0	—	96.5	—
Wine	19.8	—	13.9	—
Hard Liquor	44.6	—	38.3	—

Table 10.10  
Best Model Predicting Self-Reported Total Offenses<sup>a</sup> at Time III

Youth Variables	Beta	F	Probability > F
Total Number of Self-Reported Offenses at Time I	-0.04	3.19	0.077
Under 19 (=1) or 19 & Over (=0) at Time I	9.54	15.97	0.000
Latin King (=1) or Two-Six (=0)	5.24	4.80	0.031
Former (=1) or Current (=0) Gang Member at Time III	-4.51	1.98	0.162
Thinking of leaving the gang at Time III: Yes (=1) or No (=0)	-7.33	8.95	0.003
Currently Employed (=1) or Unemployed (=0) at Time III	-5.01	4.53	0.035
Income Aspiration/Expectation <sup>b</sup> Difference at Time III: Large (=2), Small (=1), Missing (=0), Zero (=1)	2.91	6.41	0.013
Spends free time mostly with Gang Friends (=1) or Others (=0) at Time III	8.75	12.40	0.001
Gang size at Time III: Larger (=1), About the Same (=0), or Smaller (=1)	5.08	7.00	0.009
Number of major household problems <sup>c</sup> at Time III (0-11)	1.46	3.78	0.054

Overall R square for the model = 0.53

N=121

df=10

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<sup>a</sup> Same Total Offenses as in Table 10.1.

<sup>b</sup> Includes 8 aspiration/expectation categories: 0 = \$0, 1 = \$1-\$10,000, 2 = \$10,001-\$20,000, 3 = \$20,001-\$30,000, 4 = \$30,001-\$40,000, 5 = \$40,001-\$50,000, 6 = \$50,001-\$60,000, 7 = \$60,001 and More.

<sup>c</sup> Includes 11 problem categories: death in the family, serious illness in the family, drug abuse, physical abuse, crime-related problems, victim of gang violence, arrest in the household, family-relationship problems, job-related problems, income-related problems, and others.

Table 10.11  
Best Model Predicting Change In Self-Reported Total Offenses<sup>a</sup>  
Between Time I and Time III

Youth Variable	Beta	F	Probability > F
Under 19 (= 1) or 19 & Over (= 0) at Time I	-19.88	4.14	0.044
Time spent with Wife/Steady Girlfriend at Time I: A Few Hours/Most of The Day (= 1) or No Time (= 0)	-26.22	6.06	0.015
Has known Probation Officers who have dealt with the gang problem at Time I: Yes (= 1) or No (= 0)	-39.58	7.54	0.007
Gang size at Time III: Larger (= 1), About The Same (= 0), or Smaller (= -1)	15.35	3.42	0.067
Number of major household problems <sup>b</sup> at Time III: (0-11)	6.15	3.99	0.048
Occupational Aspiration/Expectation <sup>c</sup> Difference at Time I: Large (= 2), Small (= 1), Missing (= 0), Zero (= -1)	13.44	4.09	0.046

Overall R square for the model =0.43

N=121

df=6

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<sup>a</sup> Same Total Offenses as in Table 10.1.

<sup>b</sup> Includes 11 problem categories: death in the family, serious illness in the family, drug abuse, physical abuse, crime-related problem, victim of gang violence, arrest in the household, family relationship problems, job-related problems, income-related problems, and others.

<sup>c</sup> Includes 8 aspiration/expectation categories: professional/executive, managerial, clerical, mechanical, semi-skilled and unskilled positions, own business, and not working.

Table 10.12  
Best Model Predicting Self-Reported Total Violence Offenses<sup>a</sup> at Time III

Variable	Beta	F	Probability > F
Self-Reported Total Violence Offenses at Time I	-0.04	3.06	0.083
Under 19 (=1) or 19& Over (=0) at Time I	6.25	11.62	0.001
Latin King (=1) or Two-Six (=0)	4.02	3.97	0.049
Former (=1) or Current (=0) Gang Member at Time III	-4.67	3.47	0.065
Gang size at Time III: Larger (=1), About the Same (=0), or Smaller (=1)	4.03	6.34	0.013
Spends free time mostly with Gang Friends (=1) vs Others (=0) at Time III	5.71	7.89	0.006
Income Aspiration/Expectation <sup>b</sup> Difference at Time III: Large (=2), Small (=1), Missing (=0), Same (=1)	2.10	4.90	0.029
Number of major household problems <sup>c</sup> at Time III (0-11)	1.11	3.37	0.069
Returned to school, enrolled in college, or started a continuing education, GED or job training program at Time I: Yes (=1) or No (=0)	-5.64	3.78	0.054
Thinking of leaving the gang at Time III: Yes (=1) or No (=0)	-6.28	10.00	0.002

Overall R square for the model = 0.46

N=121

df=10

<sup>a</sup> Same Total Violence Offenses as in Table 10.1.

<sup>b</sup> Includes 8 aspiration/expectation categories: 0=\$0, 1=\$1-\$10,000, 2=\$10,001-\$20,000, 3=\$20,001-\$30,000, 4=\$30,001-\$40,000, 5=\$40,001-\$50,000, 6=\$50,001-\$60,000, 7=\$60,001 and More.

<sup>c</sup> Includes 11 problem categories: death in the family, serious illness in the family, drug abuse, physical abuse, crime-related problem, victim of gang violence, arrest in the household, family relationship problems, job-related problems, income-related problems, and others.

Table 10.13  
Best Model Predicting Change In Self-Reported Total Violence Offenses<sup>a</sup>  
of Youth Who Reduced Their Total Violence Offenses Between Time I and Time III

Youth Variables	Beta	F	Probability > F
Satisfied (=1) or Dissatisfied (=0) with his community at Time I	-37.49	13.93	0.001
Number of actions <sup>b</sup> taken to avoid gang-crime situations at Time I (0-5)	-11.89	23.66	0.000
Has known Probation Officers who have dealt with the gang problem at Time I: Yes (=1) or No (=0)	22.71	4.57	0.036
Total Household Yearly Legal Income <sup>c</sup> at Time I (0-7)	-0.47	3.45	0.068
Number of treatments <sup>d</sup> undergone at Time I (0-4)	-39.70	6.33	0.014
Total Youth Monthly Illegal Income <sup>e</sup> at Time III	0.01	5.00	0.029
Gets along with father at Time III: Always/Most Of The Time (=1) or Sometimes/Never (=0)	16.05	2.84	0.097

Overall R square for the model = 0.60

N=75

df=7

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<sup>a</sup> Same Total Violence Offenses as in Table 10.1.

<sup>b</sup> Includes 5 actions: turned down a job at an unsafe location, kept a gun or other weapon at home, arranged to go out with someone, selected a safe residence, or didn't go to school.

<sup>c</sup> Includes 8 income categories: 0=\$0, 1=\$1-\$10,000, 2=\$10,001-\$20,000, 3=\$20,001-\$30,000, 4=\$30,001-\$40,000, 5=\$40,001-\$50,000, 6=\$50,001-\$60,000, 7=\$60,001 and More.

<sup>d</sup> Includes treatments for 4 problems: drug, alcohol, physical, and mental.

<sup>e</sup> Includes income from 2 sources: selling drugs and other illegal activities.

Table 10.14  
 Best Model Predicting Change In Self-Reported Total Violence Offenses<sup>a</sup>  
 for Youth Who Increased (or Experienced No Change) in Total Violence Offenses  
 Between Time I and Time III

Youth Variable	Beta	F	Probability > F
Number of actions <sup>b</sup> that youth has taken to avoid gang-crime situations at Time III (0-5)	-4.60	18.56	0.000
Gang size is Larger (=1), About The Same (=0), or Smaller (=! 1) at Time III	10.407	19.09	0.000
Total Household Yearly Illegal Income <sup>c</sup> at Time III (0-7)	12.28	19.80	0.000
Total Youth Monthly Illegal Income <sup>d</sup> at Time III	-0.01	14.06	0.001
Total Monthly Legal Income <sup>e</sup> at Time III	-0.01	8.37	0.006
Gets along with siblings at Time III: Always/Most Of The Time (=1) or Sometimes/Never (=0)	13.89	23.48	0.000
Number of days per week carrying a gun (0-7)	8.52	23.40	0.000

Overall R square for the model = 0.68

N=46

df=7

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<sup>a</sup> Same as Total Violence Offenses in Table 10.1.

<sup>b</sup> Includes turned down a job at an unsafe location, kept a gun or other weapon at home, arranged to go out with someone, selected a safe residence, and didn't go to school.

<sup>c</sup> Includes 8 income categories: 0=\$0, 1=\$1-\$10,000, 2=\$10,001-\$20,000, 3=\$20,001-\$30,000, 4=\$30,001-\$40,000, 5=\$40,001-\$50,000, 6=\$50,001-\$60,000, 7=\$60,001 and More.

<sup>d</sup> Includes income from 2 sources: selling drugs and other specified illegal activities.

<sup>e</sup> Includes income from 9 sources: jobs/regular employment, odd jobs/self-employment, public aid, unemployment compensation, parents/family, girlfriend/spouse, friends, and others.

## Chapter 11

### Criminal Histories and Outcome: Program and Comparison Youth Samples

In this chapter we begin to evaluate the effects of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project using police arrest data. We compare changes in different categories of offences/arrests for 418 program, comparison and quasi-comparison youth<sup>1</sup> between the pre-program and program periods. As indicated in Chapter 8, program youth who were arrested (N = 154) are compared to co-arrestee youth from the same gangs early in the program or in the pre-program period, who were either not provided with services – the comparison sample (N = 180) – or who were provided with very limited recreation services – the quasi-program sample (N = 84).<sup>2</sup> We have selected and matched the three samples based on youth from the same two gangs – the Latin Kings and Two Six. Our concern is to determine the effects of the Project on program youth, in comparison with other similar non-program youth. We used police arrest data, and controlled for detention and incarceration experience at baseline (the period before the Project) as well as during the Project period. In the next chapter we integrate findings on self-reports, police data, and worker contacts and services.

Complete arrest histories were obtained for all three samples, and we were able to determine whether program youth arrests for different categories of offenses increased,

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<sup>1</sup> See Footnote 4 in Chapter 8 for a description of the procedures used to select the comparison and quasi-program samples.

<sup>2</sup> The program period for collection and analysis of police-arrest data was defined as the point of entry, i.e., identification of program youth on a Cohort basis for attention by Project workers. The pre-program period was equivalent to the period prior to their entry dates. The periods (program and pre-program) were 4½ years for Cohorts I and II, and 2¼ years for Cohort III.

Comparison and quasi-program youth were selected and their program and pre-program periods established based on their arrests with program youth in the pre-program period. They were also matched to program youth on an age basis.

decreased or remained the same between the program and pre-program periods relative to those of the comparison and quasi-program youth. The arrest categories include: *total arrests*, *serious violence arrests*, *total violence arrests*, *property arrests*, *drug-related arrests*, *other arrests* and a *subset of other arrests common for gang youth*, for example, gang loitering, disorderly conduct, and mob action.

Despite the fact that there was general similarity in gender and ethnicity across the samples, and even in mean age and prior arrests and detention/incarceration patterns (particularly for the program and comparison samples), there were important differences which we needed to control for. The size of the samples was different. In terms of the total aggregated sample, 43.0% were comparison youth, 33.0% program youth and 20.0% quasi-comparison youth. The distribution of age categories varied somewhat across the samples, particularly program and comparison youth samples. For example, there were relatively more 16-and-under youth in the comparison sample (40.6%) than in the program sample (37.7%), but there were relatively more 17- and 18-year-olds in the program sample (31.2%) than in the comparison sample (27.8%). The distribution of 19-and-over youth was relatively similar across the three samples (see Figure 11.1, for the distribution of each age category by sample).

There were differences in the relative distribution of different categories of arrests within and across the samples. We do not fully account for these differences in the present analysis, since we are examining changes by particular categories of arrests. This unit of analysis is useful for law-enforcement recording purposes, but may not be sufficiently useful for program-development or public-policy purposes, where a more complex unit of analysis may be required – one focused on youth who commit different patterns of crime (e.g., combinations of drug and



violence crimes, as well as those crimes separately), i.e., more specialized offenders. We conduct this typological analysis in Chapter 13.

Furthermore, we had to establish levels of arrests for each category of arrests to control for regression effects. It was likely that those youth who had higher numbers of arrests in the pre-program period would generally have lower numbers of arrests in the program period; similarly youth who had lower numbers of arrests in the pre-program period were generally likely to have higher numbers of arrests in the program period, based on statistical theory (Campbell, Kenny 1999). Thus, for analysis purposes, we had to determine appropriate arrest levels for each category of arrest, and then compare changes in categories of arrest by determining particular arrest levels that would be common across the three samples. To do this we aggregated arrests for each category of arrests per youth for the three samples together in the pre-program period, and developed quartiles for numbers of particular arrests. For example, youth who had no arrests in the pre-program period were assigned to the “none” category, youth with 1 or 2 arrests were placed in the “low” category, youth with 3 to 7 arrests were assigned to the “medium” category, and youth with 8 or more arrests were placed in the “high” category of total arrests. Similar arrest-level assignments were made for each of the different categories of arrests in the pre-program period. The numbers of arrests by category varied, however (Table 11.1).

In the present discussion, we deal with a small range of criminal history variables to describe and compare the three samples both in the pre-program and program period<sup>3</sup> – mainly

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<sup>3</sup> The program period was defined on a Cohort basis. Program youth from Cohorts I and II and their corresponding co-arrestees (fellow gang members who were not served or contacted by Project workers) – the comparison youth sample – were defined as entering six months after the Project started (or its equivalent for co-arrestees), an average of 4½ years. Program youth in Cohort III and their corresponding co-arrestees were defined as

the types and scope of arrests, and detention and incarceration histories. We are especially interested in the effects of the Project on program youth compared to non-targeted youth in the same age categories: 19 years and older, 17 and 18 years, and youth 16 years and younger, adjusting or controlling for particular category of arrest and confinement histories. We observe again that the key goal of the Project was to reduce gang crime, especially gang violence, for youth 17 to 24 years of age. The program focused on a 16-years-and-under group in the last two years of the program.

### The Outcome Variables

We compare changes in youth police arrest histories for *total arrests*, *serious violence arrests*, *total violence arrests*, *property arrests*, and *drug arrests* between the 4½ year pre-program period (Time I) and the 4½ year program period (Time II). We are interested in two different units of analysis: *change in the level or frequency of arrests* and *change in the number of youth who show any improvement or deterioration in arrests*, regardless of level of change.

For research methodology and Project-evaluation and policy purposes we believe that police data provide a more useful and reliable set of outcome indicators than either youth self-reports or worker field observations. While self-report data for sixteen categories of offenses were more complete than arrest data in respect to actual incidents of gang criminal behavior committed by youth, they were gathered from the youth's recollections of prior six-month

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entering the program (or its equivalent for co-arrestees) at the end of the third or beginning of the fourth year of the Project, an average of 2 years. The arrests of the Cohort III youth were then multiplied by a factor of 2.25 to make Project effects equivalent.

periods at each annual interview.<sup>4</sup> Police data were collected and recorded more proximately and systematically at the point that the incident or police contact occurred. Police data also provided a greater range of offenses – approximately 90 different criminal charges.

Furthermore, worker tracking reports were based on worker perceptions and provided categorical rather than interval data, since workers were asked to record their perceptions of an increase or decrease in the criminal behaviors of program youth in respect to only four kinds of general behaviors: *gang activities*, *gang violence*, *drug selling*, and *drug using*.

Particularly useful for Project-evaluation purposes was the availability of extensive pre-program and program police arrest data for youth over as much as a nine-year period. This scope of data was not available in self-report or program tracking information. Since our samples of youth were highly delinquent and in frequent contact with the justice system, sufficient official data for analysis purposes was available.

We aggregated the specific police arrests into seven general categories: *total arrests*; *arrests for serious violence offenses* (homicide, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and armed robbery); *arrests for all violence offenses* (including misdemeanors) such as simple battery, simple assault, intimidation, and weapons possession; *arrests for property offenses* of all sorts; *arrests for the full range of drug offenses* (although our youth sample was arrested mainly for possession and sale of marijuana and powdered cocaine); *arrests for additional offenses characteristic of police suppression efforts*, such as disorderly conduct, mob action, unlawful assembly; and *arrests for other offenses*, mainly status offenses, but excluding arrests for probation or parole violations.

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<sup>4</sup> Program youth were interviewed annually: approximately at program entry – Time I; a year later – Time II; and again a year later – Time III.

## Program-Period Arrest Patterns

The following discussion is based on the results of a General Linear Model statistical procedure – the analysis of variance. Seven classes of variables, and three or four levels of control variables, enter our equations. Our key outcome or dependent variables are: *changes in mean arrests of individuals between Time I and Time II* for the particular type of offense in the program period, controlled for category and level of offense in the pre-program period (i.e., the mean number of arrests at Time II, minus the mean number of arrests at Time I). Detention/incarceration time in the pre-program and program periods are controlled. The values of the arrest variables are adjusted for the youth's at-risk time in the community. Our key control age categories are 19-and-over, 17 and 18 years, and 16-and-under. Again, the three samples are program, quasi-program, and comparison youth.

The seven models we present each employ a different dependent variable: *total arrest change*; *total serious violence arrest change*; *total violence arrest change* (including serious and less serious violence arrests); *property arrest change*; *drug arrest change*; *other arrest change*; and *change in arrests of special interest to law enforcement* such as mob action, gang loitering, disorderly conduct.

Similar independent variables and control factors are respectively entered into each equation to explain the different dependent variables: 1) the particular offense level (four levels) in the pre-program period; 2) the three age categories; 3) the three samples; 4) the four detention/incarceration levels in the pre-program and program periods. There are two interaction terms in each model: age category in interaction with the particular sample; and the level of the prior offense in interaction with the particular sample. Only the type of offense in the pre-

program period and the co-relative offense dependent variables differ in each of the models.

We note that the length of detention/incarceration had significant effects on the dependent variables (arrest change), but the direction during the program period tended to be positive, while it tended to be negative in the pre-program period. In other words, most youth who increased their number of arrests, regardless of type of arrest, had relatively short stays in confinement in the pre-program period, but considerably longer stays at in the program period. This was particularly true for violence arrests. In general, length of time in confinement did not have a differential effect on the program, comparison, and quasi-program youth samples.

We describe the findings of the seven models in the pre-program period in some detail, i.e., mean arrests for the total of all three samples, for the three samples separately, for the three age categories separately, and, finally, for the samples by age categories. The specific numbers of program, quasi-program and comparison youth by levels of arrests and types of offenses in the pre-program period, for each of the model analyses below, is described in Table 11.2.

Again, in the analyses that follow we refer to the pre-program period as Time I, and the program period as Time II.

#### Model I: Total Arrest Differences

In the first model, the level of total arrests at Time I, the age category of the youth at Time I, and time in secure confinement (especially at Time II) are each highly significant ( $p = 0.001$ ) in explaining variance in the dependent variable, *difference in total arrests between Time I and Time II*. Level of detention and/or incarceration at Time I and the interaction of the age category and the particular sample are also statistically significant, respectively at  $p = 0.018$  and

$p = 0.039$ . This model explains 43.6 % of the variance of the dependent variable, *difference in total arrests* (Table 11.3).

In terms of detailed results, we find that the level of total arrests at Time I has a strong regression effect, adjusting for all other variables in the equation. The greater the level of total arrests at Time I, the greater the reduction in total arrests at Time II; the lower the level of total arrests at Time I, the greater the increase in total arrests at Time II.

Youth in the age categories 19 and older, and 17 and 18, demonstrate a reduction in total arrests at Time II. Youth in the youngest age category, 16 and under, show an increase in total arrests at Time II compared to Time I. The difference between the two older age categories is not statistically significant, but the differences between both 19-and-older youth and the 17- and 18-year-olds compared to the 16-and-younger age group are statistically significant ( $p = 0.001$ ).

Most important for our analysis, when we compare the three samples – program, quasi-program, and comparison – for total arrest changes between Time I to Time II, we find increases, but no statistical difference among the samples together. However, if we compare outcomes within age categories, we find several differences, some statistically significant. The older age categories of youth in each of the samples are reducing their total arrests at Time II, but the younger groups, 16-and-under, are generally increasing their total arrests.

There are statistically significant differences when we examine total arrest levels for the three age categories by specific samples. The program sample 17- and 18-year-olds are reducing their total arrests, while arrests for the comparison 17- and 18-year-olds are increasing. However, the statistically significant difference is between the 17- and 18-year-olds in the comparison and quasi-program groups. The latter has a significant decrease, (-2.47 arrests) in

relation to the comparison group, which has a slight increase (0.75). Noteworthy also is that the increase for the 16-and-under program group is 3.7 arrests, while that for the comparison group is 1.6. The difference is almost statistically significant ( $p = 0.056$ ).

For the first model, we conclude that there is little to distinguish among the three samples in difference in total arrests comparing Time I with Time II, controlling for other factors. There is an overall increase in arrests for each sample. However, we observe that the older youth generally reduce their arrests across the samples, while the younger youth, especially 16-and-under, increase their level of arrests. The program sample 17- and 18-year-olds do better than the comparison sample, as well as better than any other age category, in the reduction of their level of arrests. The youngest program group, 16-and-under, appears to do worse than the comparison group.

#### Model II: Serious Violence Arrests

In this model, the variables *levels of arrests for violent crime at Time I* and the *levels of detention/incarceration at Time I and Time II* are highly statistically significant,  $p = 0.001$ , in explaining total variance of the dependent variable *serious violence arrests comparing Time I and Time II*. There are also significant differences in violence arrests for the three samples ( $p = 0.014$ ), as well as in the interaction term *level of arrests for serious violence and particular sample at Time I* ( $p = 0.013$ ). The model explains 45.4 % of variance on the dependent variable (Table 11.4).

Again, we observe a regression effect comparing youth with different levels of arrests for serious violence between Time I and II. Only the group with no history of arrests for serious

violence at Time I increases its arrests for serious violence at Time II. Youth with backgrounds of arrests for serious violence reduce their patterns, with the greatest reduction for youth with the most serious-violence arrest histories at Time I.

All age categories across each of the three samples reduce their levels of arrests for serious violence. The greatest reduction is for the 19-and-over category ( $m = -1.40$ ), followed by the 16-and-under category ( $m = -1.11$ ), and the 17- and 18-year-old group ( $m = -0.96$ ). While the size of the decrease between the 19-and-over and the 16-and-under groups is not statistically different, it is between the 19-and-over group and the 17 and 18 year old group ( $p = 0.039$ ).

The combined age categories of youth in each of the samples – program ( $m = -1.59$ ), quasi-program ( $m = -.95$ ), and comparison ( $m = -.94$ ) – reduce their level of serious violence arrests at Time II. However, the program group does significantly better in reducing its level of serious violence arrests than the quasi-program group ( $p = 0.01$ ) and the comparison group ( $p = 0.010$ ). When we examine differences by age categories across the three samples, the program group reduces its level of serious violence arrests more compared to the quasi-program and comparison samples for each age category. The difference is highly statistically significant between the program and comparison group in the 19-and-older age category ( $p = 0.001$ ). The program sample 17- and 18-year-old group also does significantly better than the quasi-program comparable age group in reducing its level of serious violence arrests ( $p = 0.040$ ). However, while the 16-and-under group reduces its level of serious violence arrests more than the comparison and quasi-program groups, this difference is not statistically significant.

Finally, we observe that the program sample high-violence groups do significantly better than the comparison sample high-violence groups in reducing serious violence arrests at Time II.



The reduction in serious violence arrests is more than 60% greater for each of the two highly-violent program-youth arrest categories, controlling for other variables in the equation. The findings suggest that the Project had a distinctive and considerable effect in reducing the level of arrests for serious violence of program youth in relation to the comparison youth, and also in relation to the less-served, quasi-program youth.

### Model III: Total Violence Arrests

The variable *total violence arrests* in this model includes not only the more serious violent crimes (homicide, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and armed robbery) but also less serious violent crimes (simple battery, simple assault, and weapons violations). The results of this analysis are very similar to those of Model II. Similar control variables are significant. The model explains 43.7% of variance on the dependent variable (Table 11.5).

Again, program youth reduce their level of total arrests for violent crime more than the comparison sample ( $p = 0.030$ ). The program group has a greater reduction of total arrests for violence at all age levels compared to the other samples. The differences are significant for the 19-and-over category of program youth in relation to the quasi-program sample ( $p = 0.013$ ) and the comparison sample ( $p = 0.023$ ). Again, program sample subgroups with an extensive history of prior arrests for violence do better than the comparable quasi-program and comparison sample sub-groups, respectively at  $p = 0.001$  and  $p = 0.003$  levels of statistical significance. The effects of the Project in reducing total as well as serious violence arrests, at least based on police arrest data, using various statistical controls, is highly noteworthy.

#### Model IV: Property Arrests

The same procedures are used in this model as in the previous models, except that the dependent variable is the *change in property arrests between Time I and Time II*, and the key control variable is *property arrests at Time I*. Only three variables are statistically significant in this model: *property arrests at Time I*, *detention and/or incarceration at Time I*, and *at Time II*. Age, sample, and interaction terms of *age and sample*, and *property arrests and sample* are not significant. The variables in this equation account for 44.3% of variance on the dependent variable (Table 11.6).

Once more we find that a regression effect explains the relation between levels of Time I and Time II property arrests. Youth in the category for the lowest numbers of property arrests at Time I account for a higher increase in property arrests at Time II. The reverse is also true: the category of youth with the most property arrests at Time I now accounts for a higher reduction in property arrests at Time II.

Also, the youngest age group at Time I demonstrates the least reduction of property arrests at Time II. The 19-and-over group has the greatest reduction in property arrests at Time II, followed by the 17- and 18-year-old group. None of these differences is statistically significant, except that the difference between the oldest and youngest groups does approach statistical significance ( $p = 0.077$ ).

The patterns for the samples are not significantly different, although the reduction in property arrests is greatest for the quasi-program sample. The patterns of reduction are almost identical for the program and comparison sample.

The reduction of property arrests by youth in the different age categories across the

samples is also similar. There are no statistically significant differences. There are also no differences in pattern of regression effects for the three samples when controlling for degree or amount of property arrests at Time I. In other words, the Project appears to have had an effect on the level of property arrests of the program sample that is no different from that of the quasi-program and comparison samples.

#### Model V: Drug Arrests

The Project did not primarily target drug-crime behavior by program youth, although workers were concerned with and attempted to address the problem. Drug use and drug selling activities were pervasive among gang and non-gang youth in Little Village, but may not have been directly related to the intergang violence problem. Drug selling was organized, with a great deal of control exercised by an adult criminal organization, particularly the Mexican mafia. (Program youth, mainly some of the Two Six, were only peripherally connected with the Mexican Mafia.) Drug selling by program youth was generally on a small scale. Little Village gang youth arrested for drug crimes were mainly charged with drug possession of small quantities of marijuana or cocaine.

Based on aggregate-level arrest data, gang-related drug crime in Little Village increased markedly over the program period, and we expected a significant increase in drug arrests for program youth, particularly since gang violence seemed to be going down, or at least not increasing as much as in the comparison areas. To our surprise, the analysis indicates that arrests for drug crime actually decreased for the program group while it increased for the two comparison groups during the program period.

The drug-change model was constructed the same way as the other models. Again, the control variable was *Time I category of drug arrests*, and the dependent variable was *change in drug arrests between Time I and Time II*. Drug arrests are not as frequent as violence and property arrests for Little Village gang youth. The drug-change model is not as powerful as the others. Only drug arrests at Time I and detentions/incarcerations at Time II are highly significant predictors ( $p = 0.001$ ). The different samples variable approaches significance ( $p = 0.053$ ), and the interaction term *drug arrests with different sample categories* is significant ( $p = 0.021$ ). The model accounts for 17.1% of variance on the dependent variable at Time II (Table 11.7).

The regression effect – i.e., the youth with fewer drug arrests at Time I increasing their drug arrests at Time II, and those with more drug arrests at Time I decreasing at Time II – does not completely pertain for the category of youth with the most-serious drug arrest histories. These youth show an increase rather than a decrease at Time II. In terms of age effects, the youngest group, 16 and under, shows the largest relative increase in drug arrests at Time II. In comparison with the 17- and 18-year-old group, the 16-and-under group shows almost a significantly greater increase at Time II ( $p = 0.058$ ).

Comparing the samples, we find that only the program sample has a drop in drug arrests at Time II. There is a substantial increase in drug arrests for the comparison sample, controlling for other variables. This difference is statistically significant ( $p = 0.015$ ). We observe that each of the youth age categories of the program sample reduce their drug arrests at Time II, while each of the age categories for the comparison and the quasi-program samples are increasing, except for the 17- and 18-year-old quasi-program sample, which still does not decrease as much

as the comparable program age group. The differences are statistically significant for the 16-and-under and the 17- and 18-year-old youth in the program sample compared to the same age categories of the youth in the comparison sample (respectively  $p = 0.011$  and  $p = 0.024$ ). Finally, we note differences over time between moderate and serious drug offenders. The reduction is for program youth with moderate levels of drug arrests at Time I who increase their level of drug arrests at Time II, in relation to similar comparison youth with the same level of drug arrests at Time I.

At this time, we cannot adequately explain why the Project was so consistently effective in reducing gang-related drug crime. This objective was not a priority for the Project. The combination of Project-police and youth-outreach attention was apparently effective with those program youth who were only partially committed to drug dealing and were in process of transitioning out of the gang and criminal behavior generally. We explore this possibility in the next chapter. Also, in Chapter 14, we find that youth who are not highly committed to violence and drug crime do better in reduction of the different types of arrests than youth more specialized to either violence or drug arrests.

#### Model VI: Other Arrests

“Other” arrests include arrests for all other crimes committed by the youth in the three samples, as well as and status offenses and violations of probation, but especially crimes such as mob action, disorderly conduct, gang loitering and obstruction of justice which typically may reflect special police activity regarding gang youth. We look at this latter combination of other offenses separately in the next model.

Our analysis procedure is the same as that in the previous models, except that our key crime control variable now becomes *total other arrests at Time I*, and the dependent variable is the *difference in other arrests between Time I and Time II*. In this model, other arrests at Time I, age categories, and detention/incarceration at Time II are highly statistically significant ( $p = 0.002$ ). Also statistically significant is the interaction term, *age category and sample* ( $p = 0.02$ ). Together these variables account for 40.6% of the variance on the dependent variable (Table 11.8).

Again we observe a strong regression effect comparing levels of arrests by youth for other crimes at Time I, compared to categories of high and low arrests by these same youth for other crimes at Time II. For example, the youth who have very high arrests for other crimes at Time I experience very sharp reductions in such arrests at Time II. Further, there is a great increase in arrests for other crime (particularly minor crimes) by youth 16 and under at Time II, while youth in the older age categories are experiencing a reduction in such offenses. The differences are highly statistically significant in a comparison between the 16-and-under youth and the 17- and 18-year-olds ( $p = 0.001$ ) and 19-and-over youth ( $p = 0.001$ ).

There is little difference in pattern of arrests for other crimes by age categories across program, quasi-program and comparison samples. However, there are increases for the 16-and-under age group of program and quasi-program youth, while there is a decrease for the comparison group of the same ages. The differences are not statistically significant for the 16-and-under program and comparison groups, but are for the comparison and quasi-program 16-and-under age group ( $p = 0.033$ ).

There were few differences in outcome controlling for level of other arrests by particular

sample at Time I. All youth with substantial records of arrests at Time I show large reductions at Time II. There is one significant statistical difference in pattern, however. The program group with the next-to-highest record of other arrests at Time I does better at Time II than the comparison group at this level of arrests ( $p = 0.039$ ).

The key finding in respect to arrests for other crimes is that the younger group does worse than the older group at Time II, but there is little difference across the three samples, or by age categories across the samples. There appears to be no “pillow,” or offense-substitution, effect, especially in relation to gang violence and drug crime, particularly as it effects youth in the program sample. A reduction in gang violence or drug crime does not necessarily bring with it an increase in other types of crime, except perhaps for the youngest age group.

#### Model VII: Special Police Activity Arrests

There are certain crime categories, such as disorderly conduct, mob action, obstruction of a police officer, that are closely related to police suppression activities, particularly in respect to gang youth. Our final model addresses the issue of whether law enforcement was becoming more suppressive at Time II and arresting more gang youth for minor crimes, especially younger program youth. Did the Project have an effect of identifying younger gang and/or program youth for arrest for minor crimes during the program period?

Our model employs the same General Linear Modeling analysis of variance procedure. We enter the same pattern of variables in our equation, with the exception of the control variable *pre-program police-activity arrests*, which now includes only the distinctive (presumed) police-suppression arrests directed against gang youth, and the dependant variable *differences in these*

*types of arrests, comparing Time I with Time II.* The Time I control variables – *police-suppression arrests, age group, and detention/incarceration effects* – are significant at Time II ( $p = 0.001$ ), suggesting a special police activity influence on these arrests. This notion seems initially to be confirmed by the statistical significance of the two interaction terms in the equation: *age and sample effects* ( $p = 0.01$ ) and *Time I police suppression and sample effect* ( $p = 0.045$ ). The contribution of all of these variables to explain total variance on the dependent variable *police suppression activity differences at Time I compared to Time II* is 40.27%, and is highly suggestive, but a detailed examination of the specific effects of these variables is the opposite of what we might have expected (Table 11.9).

Again, we find a strong and consistent regression effect similar to the findings in all of the other models. The category of youth with the fewest arrests for typical police suppression-type activity at Time I has the most increase in such arrests at Time II. Those youth who have the most arrests for crimes of this type at Time I are now in the category of most decrease in these arrests at Time II, at least in terms of differences between Time I and Time II.

In general, the youngest age group, 16 years and under, is relatively more likely to be the subject of such police-suppression activities compared to the other age categories. While the difference scores between Time I and Time II show a decrease for the 17- and 18-year-old and 19-and-over groups, they show an increase for the 16-and-under age group, and these differences are highly statistically significant, respectively at  $p = 0.001$ . The differences across samples favor the program group, however. The program sample shows a greater decrease in these arrests at Time II compared to Time I, as does the quasi-program sample; the comparison sample shows the least decrease. The difference between the program and comparison sample is



statistically significant ( $p = 0.03$ ).

A specification of these results indicates that the 17- and 18-year-old program group does better than the comparison 17- and 18-year-old group ( $p = 0.028$ ), and the 19-and-over program group also does better than the comparison 19-and-over group ( $p = 0.010$ ) in reduction of arrests for these types of offenses. But there are no statistically significant differences for the 16-and-under group across the three samples, although there is an increase in arrests for these youth in the three samples.

Finally, controlling for level of such arrests at Time I, we find more than a regression effect. The youth with the higher levels of Time I arrests for disorderly conduct, mob action and gang loitering do better at Time II than those with lower levels of such arrests. But the program sample does significantly better than the comparison sample ( $p = 0.03$ ). The program sub-groups that do especially better are those with the two highest levels of arrests – medium and high – for these distinctive police suppression-type offenses, compared to the comparison groups ( $p = 0.043$  and  $p = 0.050$ ).

Surprisingly, there appears to be no evidence of an increase in suppression-type activities by police at Time II compared to Time I, for all of the samples. Evidence indicates that there was a decrease, and the decrease was significantly greater for the program sample in relation to the comparison samples. The police did not single out program youth for special attention. However, the data indicate that the younger, 16-and-under group generally was more vulnerable to being arrested through special police activities than older categories of youth during the Project period.

Thus, the police were not more often targeting gang youth for arrest at Time I than they

were at Time II, at least for relatively minor crimes, and they were not specifically “picking on” or labeling program youth. If gang youth were being arrested more at Time II than Time I, it was because they were probably committing more of these offenses, and not because of special police tactics.

### Success and Failure

Instead of looking at mean differences in types of crime that might be related to program effects, we shift our focus to whether the program succeeded or failed in its effort to reduce the number of serious gang offenses, especially by gang-violent offenders in Little Village. The Gang Violence Reduction Project targeted hardcore gang youth in an effort to reduce the level of violence of these youth as well as of gang youth generally in the area. The Project did not target gang members per se, but those who were the most troublesome.

Because of the chronic and serious nature of the gang behavior of the targeted youth, we did not expect them suddenly to convert to law-abiding citizens overnight, no longer getting into difficulty with the law. Our expectation was that the targeted program youth would reduce their gang crime, especially serious gang violence, to a lower level compared to gang youth with similar backgrounds who were not targeted by the Project. Did more of the program youth shift from medium or high levels of crime to lower levels of crime than did comparison youth?

For purposes of this analysis, we established two categories of outcome for youth in both the program and comparison samples: success and failure. If the youth shifted from a medium or high level of crime to a lower level of crime, he was classified as a success. If the youth remained at low, medium or high levels of crime (as manifested in his arrest pattern), or shifted

from the low to medium or high, or from the medium to the high category, he was classified as a failure.

We also focused on three categories of arrests: total arrests, serious violence arrests, and total violence arrests. The classification of levels for total arrests was: low = 1-2; medium = 3-7; high = 8 or more. The classification levels for serious violence arrests and total violence arrests was: low = 1; medium = 2; high = 3 or more.

In a series of Logistic Regression analyses, the program sample did better, but not significantly better than the comparison sample. This could have been because there were fewer cases in these analyses than in the GLM analysis. Nevertheless, the program sample had a 35% greater relative reduction than the comparison sample in total arrests; a 33% greater absolute reduction of arrests for serious violence than the comparison group, and a 3% greater absolute reduction of arrests for total violence – serious and less serious – than the comparison group during the program, compared to the pre-program, period. Again, when we focused our analysis on the more serious type of offender, we found more program than comparison youth who reduced their level of offending.

Figure 11.1  
Distribution of Youth in Three Age Groups for the Three Samples




Table 11.1  
Pre-Program Arrest<sup>a</sup> Levels (Quartiles) for Different Types of Arrests

Arrest Type	Offense Levels			
	None	Low	Medium	High
Total Arrests	0	1-2	3-7	> = 8
Serious Violence	0	1	2	> = 3
Total Violence	0	1	2	> = 3
Property	0	1	2-3	> = 4
Drug	0	1	2-3	> = 4
Other	0	1-2	3-7	> = 8
Special Police Activity	0	1-2	3-4	> = 5

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<sup>a</sup> Offenses were aggregated for each category of arrests. Offense levels were determined based on the number of arrests for each type of offense per youth (N = 418). Quartile offense levels were: none, low, medium, and high.

Table 11.2  
Pre-Program Period Distribution of Youth (N = 418)<sup>a</sup>  
in the Three Samples by Levels and Types of Arrests

Four Levels of Arrests for the Three Samples	Types of Arrests						
	Total Arrests n %	Serious Violence	Total Violence	Property	Drug	Other	Special Police
None - Program	30 19.5	95	83	69	112	63	68
None - Comparison	63 35.0	119	106	91	145	100	112
None - Quasi-Program	14 16.7	37	29	34	57	24	29
Low - Program	46 29.9	33	36	36	28	54	55
Low - Comparison	46 25.6	28	32	36	23	50	44
Low - Quasi-Program	15 17.6	21	21	18	15	31	29
Medium - Program	46 29.9	14	19	34	12	32	18
Medium - Comparison	37 20.6	8	11	29	9	27	13
Medium - Quasi-Program	27 32.1	11	6	15	10	20	7
High - Program	32 20.8	12	16	15	2	5	13
High - Comparison	34 18.9	25	31	24	3	3	11
High - Quasi-Program	28 33.3	15	28	17	2	9	19

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<sup>a</sup> Program Sample n = 154 (100.0%); Comparison Sample n=180 (100.0%); and Quasi-Program Sample n = 84 (100.0%).

Table 11.3  
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Arrests During the Program Period  
for the Program, Comparison and Quasi-Program Samples

11.3(a) ANOVA Summary Table (R-square=0.436)

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Total Arrests at Time 1: None, Low, Medium, High	3	1567.49	47.96***	0.001
Age: Under 16 (<16), 17-18, 19 & Over (\$19)	2	562.44	17.21***	0.001
Total Incarceration at Time 1: None, Low, Medium, High	3	111.70	3.42*	0.018
Total Incarceration at Time 2: None, Low, Medium, High	3	1009.14	30.87***	0.001
Sample: Program (P), Comparison (C), Quasi- Program (Q)	2	1.28	0.04	0.962
SamplexAge	4	83.28	2.55*	0.039
SamplexTotal Arrests at Time 1	6	24.91	0.76	0.601
Within error	394	32.69	—	—
Total	417	—	—	—

11.3(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Total Arrests at Time 1 Main Effect

Total Arrests at Time 1	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
			<i>i/j</i>	1	2	3	4
None	4.82	1.06	1	—	0.065	0.001***	0.001***
Low	3.11	1.02	2	0.065	—	0.002**	0.001***
Medium	0.35	0.89	3	0.001***	0.002**	—	0.001***
High	-6.34	0.80	4	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

11.3(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age Main Effect

Age	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
\$19	-0.77	0.79	1	—	0.995	0.001***
17-18	-0.77	0.92	2	0.995	—	0.001***
<16	3.00	0.91	3	0.001***	0.001***	—

11.3(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Sample Main Effect

Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
Program	0.60	0.82	1	—	0.857	0.788
Comparison	0.48	0.84	2	0.857	—	0.898
Quasi-Program	0.38	0.96	3	0.788	0.898	—

11.3(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Tests for the Sample×Age Interaction

Age	Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)									
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
\$19	P	-1.28	1.02	1	—								
\$19	C	-0.95	0.98	2		—							
\$19	Q	-0.09	1.31	3			—						
17-18	P	-0.59	1.09	4				—					
17-18	C	0.75	1.12	5					—	*			
17-18	Q	-2.47	1.43	6						*	—		
<16	P	3.67	1.08	7								—	*
<16	C	1.64	1.06	8								*	—
<16	Q	3.70	1.21	9									—

For differences between groups: \* *p* = .056; \* *p* < .05; \*\* *p* < .01; and \*\*\* *p* < .001 .



Table 11.4  
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Serious Violence Arrests  
During the Program Period for the Program, Comparison and Quasi-Program Samples

11.4(a) ANOVA Summary Table (R-square=0.454)

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Serious Violence Arrests at Time 1: None, Low, Medium, High	3	123.49	52.94***	0.001
Age: Under 16 (<16), 17-18, 19 & Over (\$19)	2	5.21	2.23	0.109
Total Incarceration at Time 1: None, Low, Medium, High	3	29.83	12.79***	0.001
Total Incarceration at Time 2: None, Low, Medium, High	3	76.31	37.71***	0.001
Sample: Program (P), Comparison (C), Quasi- Program (Q)	2	10.09	4.32*	0.014
Sample×Age	4	3.52	1.51	0.199
Sample×Serious Violence Arrests at Time 1	6	6.36	2.73*	0.013
Within error	394	2.33	—	—
Total	417	—	—	—

11.4(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and  
Pairwise *t* Test for the Serious Violence Arrests at Time I Main Effect

Serious Violence Arrests at Time 1	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
			i/j	1	2	3	4
None	0.35	0.23	1	—	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
Low	-0.50	0.25	2	0.001***	—	0.005**	0.001***
Medium	-1.45	0.31	3	0.001***	0.005**	—	0.001***
High	-3.04	0.27	4	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.4(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age Main Effect

Age	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
\$19	-1.40	0.20	1	—	0.039*	0.150
17-18	-0.96	0.23	2	0.039*	—	0.467
<16	-1.11	0.24	3	0.150	0.467	—

11.4(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Sample Main Effect

Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
Program	-1.59	0.23	1	—	0.010**	0.014*
Comparison	-0.94	0.25	2	0.010**	—	0.981
Quasi-Program	-0.95	0.25	3	0.014*	0.981	—

11.4(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Tests for the Sample×Age Interaction

Age	Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)									
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
\$19	P	-2.10	0.27	1	—	***	*						
\$19	C	-0.93	0.27	2	***	—							
\$19	Q	-1.18	0.35	3	*		—						
17-18	P	-1.40	0.30	4				—		*			
17-18	C	-0.92	0.31	5					—				
17-18	Q	-0.57	0.36	6				*		—			
<16	P	-1.25	0.32	7							—		
<16	C	-0.98	0.31	8								—	
<16	Q	-1.10	0.36	9									—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

11.4(f) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Serious Violence Arrests Index (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Tests for the Total Serious Violence Arrests Index at Time I x Sample Interaction

Serious Violence Arrests at Time I	Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)													
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
None	P	0.34	0.26	1	—												
None	C	0.00	0.26	2		—											
None	Q	0.72	0.32	3			—										
Low	P	-0.42	0.33	4				—									
Low	C	-0.50	0.35	5					—								
Low	Q	-0.58	0.38	6						—							
Medium	P	-2.18	0.44	7							—	*					
Medium	C	-0.80	0.57	8								*	—				
Medium	Q	-1.36	0.49	9										—			
High	P	-4.08	0.47	10											—	**	
High	C	-2.47	0.34	11											**	—	
High	Q	-2.57	0.44	12													—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

Table 11.5  
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Violence Arrests  
During the Program Period for the Program, Comparison and Quasi-Program Samples

11.5(a) ANOVA Summary Table (R-square=0.437)

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Total Violence Arrests at Time I: None, Low, Medium, High	3	182.77	52.54***	0.001
Age: Under 16 (<16), 17-18, 19 & Over (\$19)	2	4.13	1.19	0.306
Total Incarceration at Time 1: None, Low, Medium, High	3	30.83	8.86***	0.001
Total Incarceration at Time 2: None, Low, Medium, High	3	108.88	31.30***	0.001
Sample: Program (P), Comparison (C), Quasi- Program (Q)	2	17.32	4.98**	0.007
Sample×Age	4	1.09	0.31	0.868
Sample×Total Violence Arrests at Time I	6	9.75	2.80*	0.011
Within error	394	3.48	—	—
Total	417	—	—	—

11.5(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Total Violence Arrests at Time I Main Effect

Total Violent Crime Arrests at Time I	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
			i/j	1	2	3	4
None	0.57	0.30	1	—	0.032*	0.001***	0.001***
Low	0.01	0.30	2	0.032*	—	0.002**	0.001***
Medium	-1.28	0.41	3	0.001***	0.002**	—	0.001***
High	-3.16	0.28	4	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.5(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age Main Effect

Age	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
\$19	-1.18	0.26	1	—	0.324	0.127
17-18	-0.92	0.30	2	0.324	—	0.623
<16	-0.80	0.29	3	0.127	0.623	—

11.5(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Sample Main Effect

Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
Program	-1.48	0.27	1	—	0.030*	0.003**
Comparison	-0.89	0.29	2	0.030*	—	0.268
Quasi-Program	-0.53	0.34	3	0.003**	0.268	—

11.5(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Tests for the Sample×Age Interaction

Age	Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)									
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
\$19	P	-1.89	0.33	1	—	*	*						
\$19	C	-1.01	0.33	2	*	—							
\$19	Q	-0.63	0.43	3	*		—						
17-18	P	-1.39	0.36	4				—					
17-18	C	-0.89	0.38	5					—				
17-18	Q	-0.48	0.49	6						—			
<16	P	-1.15	0.37	7							—		
<16	C	-0.76	0.36	8								—	
<16	Q	-0.48	0.43	9									—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.5(f) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Tests for the Total Violence Arrests at Time I × Sample Interaction

Total Violence Arrests at Time I	Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)												
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
None	P	0.45	0.33	1	—											
None	C	0.32	0.33	2		—										
None	Q	0.95	0.43	3			—									
Low	P	-0.28	0.39	4				—								
Low	C	-0.21	0.41	5					—							
Low	Q	-0.05	0.47	6						—						
Medium	P	-2.02	0.48	7							—					
Medium	C	-0.85	0.60	8								—				
Medium	Q	-0.96	0.80	9									—			
High	P	-4.62	0.51	10										—	**	**
High	C	-2.81	0.38	11										**	—	
High	Q	-2.05	0.41	12										**		—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

Table 11.6  
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Property Arrests  
During the Program Period for the Program, Comparison and Quasi-Program Samples

11.6(a) ANOVA Summary Table (R-square=0.443)

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Property Arrests at Time I: None, Low, Medium, High	3	349.49	63.84***	0.001
Age: Under 16 (<16), 17-18, 19 & Over (\$19)	2	8.81	1.61	0.201
Total Incarceration at Time 1: None, Low, Medium, High	3	33.79	6.17***	0.001
Total Incarceration at Time 2: None, Low, Medium, High	3	87.27	15.94***	0.001
Sample: Program (P), Comparison (C), Quasi- Program (Q)	2	2.58	0.47	0.625
SamplexAge	4	4.87	0.89	0.470
SamplexProperty Arrests at Time I	6	3.30	0.60	0.727
Within error	394	5.47	—	—
Total	417	—	—	—

11.6(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Property Arrests at Time 1 Main Effect

Total Property Arrests at Time I	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
			<i>i/j</i>	1	2	3	4
None	1.28	0.37	1	—	0.002**	0.001***	0.001***
Low	0.24	0.40	2	0.002**	—	0.039*	0.001***
Medium	-0.58	0.39	3	0.001***	0.039*	—	0.001***
High	-4.79	0.39	4	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.6(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age Main Effect

Age	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
\$19	-1.21	0.31	1	—	0.528	0.077
17-18	-1.01	0.36	2	0.528	—	0.279
<16	-0.66	0.36	3	0.077	0.279	—

11.6(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Sample Main Effect

Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
Program	-0.83	0.33	1	—	0.876	0.357
Comparison	-0.88	0.35	2	0.876	—	0.417
Quasi-Program	-1.17	0.38	3	0.357	0.417	—

11.6(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Tests for the Sample×Age Interaction

Age	Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)									
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
\$19	P	-1.08	0.41	1	—								
\$19	C	-1.25	0.40	2		—							
\$19	Q	-1.31	0.53	3			—						
17-18	P	-1.20	0.43	4				—					
17-18	C	-0.60	0.46	5					—				
17-18	Q	-1.22	0.58	6						—			
<16	P	-0.22	0.44	7							—		
<16	C	-0.79	0.43	8								—	
<16	Q	-0.97	0.55	9									—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .



Table 11.7  
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Drug Arrests  
During the Program Period for the Program, Comparison and Quasi-Program Samples

11.7(a) ANOVA Summary Table (R-square=0.171)

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Drug Arrests at Time I: None, Low, Medium, High	3	25.92	8.82***	0.001
Age: Under 16 (<16), 17-18, 19 & Over (\$19)	2	5.59	1.90	0.150
Total Incarceration at Time 1: None, Low, Medium, High	3	0.61	0.21	0.892
Total Incarceration at Time 2: None, Low, Medium, High	3	33.77	11.49***	0.001
Sample: Program (P), Comparison (C), Quasi- Program (Q)	2	8.73	2.97	0.053
Sample×Age	4	2.12	0.72	0.579
Sample×Drug Arrests at Time I	6	7.41	2.52*	0.021
Within error	394	2.94	—	—
Total	417	—	—	—

11.7(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Drug Arrests at Time I Main Effect

Drug Arrests at Time I	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
			<i>i/j</i>	1	2	3	4
None	1.08	0.24	1	—	0.003**	0.001***	0.219
Low	0.32	0.29	2	0.003**	—	0.033*	0.897
Medium	-0.53	0.38	3	0.001***	0.033*	—	0.316
High	0.23	0.68	4	0.219	0.897	0.316	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.7(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age Main Effect

Age	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
\$19	0.35	0.27	1	—	0.168	0.655
17-18	0.02	0.30	2	0.168	—	0.058
<16	0.46	0.31	3	0.655	0.058	—

11.7(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Sample Main Effect

Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
Program	-0.33	0.39	1	—	0.015*	0.186
Comparison	0.81	0.36	2	0.015*	—	0.327
Quasi-Program	0.34	0.39	3	0.186	0.327	—

11.7(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Tests for the Sample×Age Interaction

Age	Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)									
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
\$19	P	-0.09	0.42	1	—								
\$19	C	0.67	0.38	2		—							
\$19	Q	0.48	0.47	3			—						
17-18	P	-0.54	0.44	4				—	*				
17-18	C	0.71	0.42	5				*	—				
17-18	Q	-0.10	0.49	6						—			
<16	P	-0.35	0.46	7							—	*	
<16	C	1.06	0.42	8							*	—	
<16	Q	0.65	0.50	9									—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

11.7(f) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Tests for the Drug Arrests at Time I x Sample Interaction

Drug Arrests at Time I	Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)												
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
None	P	1.22	0.26	1	—											
None	C	0.96	0.26	2		—										
None	Q	1.07	0.32	3			—									
Low	P	-0.06	0.38	4				—	*							
Low	C	0.97	0.43	5				*	—							
Low	Q	0.06	0.48	6						—						
Medium	P	-1.04	0.53	7							—	*				
Medium	C	0.66	0.62	8							*	—	*			
Medium	Q	-1.19	0.61	9								*	—			
High	P	-1.42	1.24	10										—		
High	C	0.66	1.02	11											—	
High	Q	1.45	1.24	12												—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

Table 11.8  
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Other Arrests  
During the Program Period for the Program, Comparison and Quasi-Program Samples

11.8(a) ANOVA Summary Table (R-square=0.406)

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Other Arrests at Time I: None, Low, Medium, High	3	348.8	44.49***	0.001
Age: Under 16 (<16), 17-18, 19 & Over (\$19)	2	276.92	35.32***	0.001
Total Incarceration at Time 1: None, Low, Medium, High	3	16.54	2.11	0.099
Total Incarceration at Time 2: None, Low, Medium, High	3	121.28	15.47***	0.001
Sample: Program (P), Comparison (C), Quasi- Program (Q)	2	0.11	0.01	0.986
SamplexAge	4	23.10	2.95*	0.020
SamplexOther Arrests at Time I	6	11.73	1.50	0.178
Within error	394	7.84	—	—
Total	417	—	—	—

11.8(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Other Arrests at Time I Main Effect

Other Arrests at Time I	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
			i/j	1	2	3	4
None	1.95	0.44	1	—	0.003**	0.001***	0.001***
Low	0.66	0.41	2	0.003**	—	0.001***	0.001***
Medium	-1.78	0.44	3	0.001***	0.001***	—	0.001***
High	-6.05	0.82	4	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.8(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age Main Effect

Age	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
\$19	-2.25	0.40	1	—	0.696	0.001***
17-18	-2.09	0.45	2	0.696	—	0.001***
<16	0.43	0.45	3	0.001***	0.001***	—

11.8(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Sample Main Effect

Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
Program	-1.35	0.48	1	—	0.926	0.867
Comparison	-1.30	0.53	2	0.926	—	0.957
Quasi-Program	-1.27	0.47	3	0.867	0.957	—

11.8(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Tests for the Sample×Age Interaction

Age	Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)									
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
\$19	P	-2.54	0.58	1	—								
\$19	C	-2.01	0.58	2		—							
\$19	Q	-2.20	0.67	3			—						
17-18	P	-1.96	0.57	4				—					
17-18	C	-1.50	0.65	5					—				
17-18	Q	-2.82	0.67	6						—			
<16	P	0.45	0.60	7							—		
<16	C	-0.38	0.62	8								—	*
<16	Q	1.22	0.63	9									* —

For differences between groups: \* *p* < .05; \*\* *p* < .01; and \*\*\* *p* < .001 .

11.8(f) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Tests for the Other Arrests at Time 1×Sample Interaction

Other Arrests at Time 1	Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)												
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
None	P	2.29	0.50	1	—											
None	C	1.56	0.47	2		—										
None	Q	2.00	0.68	3			—									
Low	P	0.78	0.50	4				—								
Low	C	0.52	0.51	5					—							
Low	Q	0.68	0.62	6						—						
Medium	P	-2.22	0.58	7							—	*				
Medium	C	-0.68	0.64	8							*	—				
Medium	Q	-2.43	0.69	9									—			
High	P	-6.25	1.31	10										—		
High	C	-6.59	1.66	11											—	
High	Q	-5.32	1.02	12												—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

Table 11.9  
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Special Police Arrests  
During the Program Period for the Program, Comparison and Quasi-Program Samples

11.9(a) ANOVA Summary Table (R-square=0.402)

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Special Police Arrests at Time I: None, Low, Medium, High	3	320.37	43.57***	0.001
Age: Under 16 (<16), 17-18, 19 & Over (\$19)	2	254.55	34.62***	0.001
Total Incarceration at Time 1: None, Low, Medium, High	3	9.99	1.36	0.255
Total Incarceration at Time 2: None, Low, Medium, High	3	86.22	11.73***	0.001
Sample: Program (P), Comparison (C), Quasi- Program (Q)	2	17.92	2.44	0.089
Sample×Age	4	24.66	3.35*	0.010
Sample×Special Police Arrests at Time I	6	15.91	2.16*	0.045
Within error	394	7.35	—	—
Total	417	—	—	—

11.9(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Special Police Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Special Police Arrests at Time I Main Effect

Special Police Arrests at Time I	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
			i/j	1	2	3	4
None	1.74	0.40	1	—	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
Low	0.49	0.39	2	0.001***	—	0.001***	0.001***
Medium	-1.80	0.56	3	0.001***	0.001***	—	0.004**
High	-3.74	0.53	4	0.001***	0.001***	0.004**	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

11.9(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Special Police Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age Main Effect

Age	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
\$19	-1.80	0.38	1	—	0.512	0.001***
17-18	-1.54	0.42	2	0.512	—	0.001***
<16	0.85	0.42	3	0.001***	0.001***	—

11.9(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Special Police Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Sample Main Effect

Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
			i/j	1	2	3
Program	-1.22	0.41	1	—	0.030*	0.564
Comparison	-0.31	0.43	2	0.030*	—	0.180
Quasi-Program	-0.96	0.46	3	0.564	0.180	—

11.9(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Special Police Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Tests for the Sample×Age Interaction

Age	Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)										
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
\$19	P	-2.65	0.52	1	—	**								
\$19	C	-1.02	0.49	2	**	—								
\$19	Q	-1.72	0.67	3			—							
17-18	P	-1.79	0.51	4				—	*					
17-18	C	-0.44	0.55	5				*	—	**				
17-18	Q	-2.40	0.67	6					**	—				
<16	P	0.77	0.52	7								—		
<16	C	0.52	0.52	8									—	
<16	Q	1.26	0.60	9										—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .



11.9(f) Adjusted Mean Change in Special Police Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Tests for the Special Police Arrests at Time 1xSample Interaction

Special Police Arrests at Time 1	Sample	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)													
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
None	P	2.05	0.47	1	—												
None	C	1.58	0.43	2		—											
None	Q	1.59	0.61	3			—										
Low	P	0.83	0.47	4				—									
Low	C	0.29	0.52	5					—								
Low	Q	0.35	0.60	6						—							
Medium	P	-2.49	0.70	7							—	*					
Medium	C	-0.46	0.82	8								*	—				
Medium	Q	-2.46	1.09	9										—			
High	P	-5.27	0.82	10											—	*	*
High	C	-2.65	0.88	11											*	—	
High	Q	-3.30	0.72	12											*		—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

## Chapter 12

### Modeling Program Effects: An Integrated Analysis

In this chapter we focus on the specific effects of the Project on program youth based on an integrated analysis of variables across the data sets described in the previous three chapters (9, 10, and 11). We examine program effects, specifically the direct and indirect effects of the workers' activities, on the reduction of youth arrests. We try to answer two sets of questions in some interrelated fashion: what specific patterns of program services/contacts are associated with the youth's reduction of specific categories of arrests, especially for violence and drug crime?; and what elements of the youth's life experience and social adaptation are affected by program staff, (structure and efforts) which in turn contribute to the reduction of arrests?

We assume that changes in the individual program youth's delinquent or deviant behavior are a function of changes in his relationship to his social circumstances, which may be influenced by Project workers. In other words, the program probably operates through a variety of mediating effects. In the course of counseling, the youth may decide to leave the gang, obtain a legitimate job, spend more time with a wife or girlfriend rather than gang members, lower job and income aspirations to realistic levels, and perceive the community as a good (or better) place to live, any of which may more directly affect his pattern of criminal behavior. The strategy, quantity and quality of the workers' efforts may affect these relationship changes, which may be then directly associated with changes in the youth's deviancy patterns. The interrelationship of these variables may predict or explain the youth's reduction of gang-related crime.

Based on the findings of the analysis in the previous three chapters, we conclude that program youth lowered their levels of specific categories of crime during the program period,

either absolutely or relatively, in comparison with similar non-program gang youth. The Project was a test of a comprehensive (or at least a coordinated) multiple-services-and-workers approach to the gang problem. We need to know whether a particular type of worker contact or service accounts for a reduction in crime – particularly arrests for violence – based on certain life-space and life-course changes. Arrests become our key dependent variable because arrest data is available for all youth in our samples, and arrest histories cover a longer pre-program and program period than interview self-report data.

One of the first things we need to determine is how well program worker-tracking records reflect appropriate targeting of youth who are hardcore gang members based on arrest data. Next we have to determine the relationship of the youth's life-space and life-course changes to changes in their arrest patterns. Finally, we explore which specific worker contacts and services are related to, and indeed predict, successful life-space and life-course changes. The worker-tracking instrument proved to be valid for determining the effect of contacts/services on the different kinds of youth in the Project.

#### Arrest Changes Based on Worker-Tracking Forms

We start our examination of the relation of program services/contacts to outcome based on police arrests, using as much worker-tracking program data as we have available. While we have complete police history and interview data for 153 program youth, we have no worker tracking data for 17 of these youth. Since we were not as sure about the quality and sufficiency of services data as we were about interview and police data, we tried to be as inclusive as possible in our first attempt at relating program service/worker contacts to outcome police-arrest

variables. We used *the number of annual worker tracking forms completed* as an independent variable. We classified youth based on whether we collected 0, 1, or 2 or more completed worker tracking forms. On each form we asked members of the Project team a series of questions about the types of services or activities provided: duration, frequency, perceived response to his (the worker's) efforts, and what the worker saw as the resultant outcome in terms of change in patterns of delinquent or criminal behavior.

We considered that the varying number of worker tracking forms could be a result of different Project-worker interests or efficiency in recording information about services provided to youth; it could also reflect different levels of worker attention to certain categories of youth. For example, the fewer worker tracking forms available and the less services recorded could mean a youth was not, or was no longer, involved in violent gang activity and therefore not to be targeted. The Project objective was to pay most attention to the very violent youth. Such youth were supposed to have been provided with more services and controls, therefore, more tracking data should have been available for them than was the case for less violent and less gang-involved youth.

Overall, our analysis revealed that most youth for whom we had both interview and police data indeed had tracking information. Only 17 (11.1%) of these youths had 0, or no, tracking information; 45 (29.4%) had one tracking form; and 91 (59.5%) had two or more tracking forms. Furthermore, at program entry, the 0-tracked youth had considerably fewer arrests for every category of offense than the tracked youth. The youth who were tracked only once generally had similar types of, but slightly fewer, arrests than youth who were tracked twice (Table 12.1).

The program group with 0 tracking contained disproportionately younger youth (58.8%) than the group with one tracking form (31.1%) and the group with two or more tracking forms (37.4%). Ordinarily, the younger the age of the youth, the fewer arrests he had in the pre-program period. The group with 0 tracking also had the smallest percentage of 17- and 18-year-olds (11.8%) – the age group at peak levels of gang crime – compared to the 1-time tracking group (33.3%) and the 2-times tracking group (34.1%). Also, the 0-tracked 17- and 18-year-olds had no record of arrests for violence, drug or alcohol offenses. The proportions of youth 19-and-over in the different tracking groups were: 0 = 29.4%, 1 = 35.6%, and 2 or more = 28.6%. We may conclude that the youth in the 0-tracked group were appropriately not targeted, or targeted only for a brief period of time, because they were less violent and possibly less gang-involved and delinquent.

We conducted a multivariate analysis using a General Linear Model procedure to determine whether there might still be different patterns of arrest change for the three different groups of tracked youth. Our key independent or program variable was *number of sets of worker tracking forms* – 0, 1, 2 or more; the control variables were: *age group* (16 and under, 17 and 18, and 19 and older), and *pre-program category of arrests* (high, low, medium, none, for each of the different categories of arrests – *total arrests*, *arrests for serious violence*, *arrests for total violence*, *arrests for property crime*, and *arrests for drug crime*). Our interaction terms were *age and program tracking group*, *age and pre-program arrest record*, and *pre-program arrest record and program tracking group*. Our dependent or outcome variable in each model was *charges in arrests for specific types of offenses during the program period*.

The results were as follows: the *tracking group* variable was not statistically significant

when the outcome variable was *changes in total arrests*. None of the types of tracking groups did better than the other in respect to changes in total arrests, although the youth in the 0-tracked group reduced their frequency of total arrests while the 1-time and 2-or-more-times tracked groups increased their frequency of total arrests. Only *age group* ( $p = 0.005$ ) and *pre-program arrests* ( $p = 0.001$ ) were significant predictors. The model accounted for 49% of total variance.

However, when the dependent variable was *serious violence arrests*, the tracking variable was significant ( $p = 0.042$ ), as was *pre-program arrests for serious violence* ( $p = 0.001$ ). We could not estimate a change score for the 0-tracked group, but the 2-or-more-times tracked group showed a significantly greater reduction in level of serious violence arrests compared to the 1-time tracked group ( $p = 0.015$ ). The highest violence arrest subgroup in the 2-or-more-times tracked group also did significantly better than the comparable subgroup in the 1-time tracked group ( $p = 0.013$ ). This model accounted for 56% of total variance.

The pattern of results was similar in the next model, when the dependent variable was *changes in total violence arrests*. Only *pre-program arrests for total violence* was a significant predictor ( $p = 0.001$ ). All age groups showed declines in total violence arrests, as did all of the three levels of tracking groups. There were also no significant differences by particular subgroup based on the pre-program arrest levels of violent offenders. The model accounted for 56% of variance.

There were interesting differences in the effects of the three levels of tracking on property arrests during the program period, particularly between the 0-tracked and the 1-time tracked and 2-or-more-times tracked groups. All variables, except the interaction term *age and tracking group*, were significant in the model. The most significant factors were *age* ( $p = 0.001$ )

and *pre-program arrests for property offenses* ( $p = 0.001$ ). *Tracking group* also significantly predicted the level of property arrests ( $p = 0.02$ ). The 0-tracked group showed a significant decline compared to the 1-time tracked group ( $p = 0.005$ ) and the 2-or-more-times tracked group ( $p = 0.010$ ). This model accounted for 48% of total variance.

Only the youngest age group (16 and under) across all tracking groups increased their levels of arrests, compared to the two older age groups whose property-arrest levels generally declined. The differences were highly significant ( $p = 0.001$ ) when comparing the youngest to either of the older two groups. Also, the 0-tracked, 17-to-18-year-old group showed a greater decline than the 17-to-18-year-old groups who were tracked one or two times. This decline was significantly greater for the 0-tracked group than for the 1-time tracked group ( $p = 0.04$ ). The 0-tracked group also had a significantly greater decline for the high-level, pre-program property-arrest subgroup compared to the comparable 1-time tracked subgroup ( $p = 0.003$ ) and 2-or-more-times tracked subgroup ( $p = 0.02$ ).

In our model predicting changes in arrests for drug crimes, only the *pre-program drug arrests* variable entered the General Linear Model at a significant statistical level ( $p = 0.04$ ). We could not estimate differences among *age*, *tracking group*, or *tracking subgroups with high drug-arrest levels*. However, the 0-tracked group showed a small decline in mean drug arrests, compared to the other two tracking groups during the program period. The model accounted for 25% of total variance.

These findings strongly suggest that the 0-tracked group was indeed generally less violent and also less delinquent, and that not targeting this group was appropriate for purposes of the Project. This smaller number of youth ( $n = 17$ ) in the 0-tracked group also reduced their

delinquency patterns over the program period, despite the fact that they were provided with the least amount of services and attention. They probably shouldn't have been targeted in the first place.

### Life-Space Changes, Program Services and Arrest Reduction

Based on field observations, as well as program worker-tracking records, it was anticipated that the GVRP would affect youth through a series of worker activities. The workers would do certain things that modify the youth's specific relationship to his social circumstances or his social space, e.g., help the youth get a job, complete his education, settle down with a wife or girlfriend, become more selective in his choice of peers, change his status in the gang, and more realistically assess his future income or career possibilities. It is these changes in his social environment, or life course, that would be directly associated with, and modify, deviancy patterns.

We ask: what were the strongest factors in the youth's life-space or social-relationship patterns that made for changes in his arrest rates?; and then: what were the specific program-service elements which best account for changes in his life-space or specific social relationships? The model for the analysis may be diagramed in simple linear fashion as follows:

*program services/contacts ! life-space changes ! changes in arrest patterns*

To test this model, we use individual-level data from our three major instruments: *gang member survey*, *worker tracking form*, and *police arrest history*. We use multivariate analysis statistical procedures to test the model. We start with Multiple Regression models to explain variance, and to predict the effect of the youth's changes in life space (particularly social



relationships influencing his life course) on changes in his arrest patterns. We next use Logistic Regression models to explain variance, and to predict the influence of the different program contact/service approaches on changes in the youth's life-space (social relationships) patterns.

Our focus is on change. The program contacts/service period varies for individual program youth. Change in life-space patterns, based on interview data from the Gang Member Survey, is measured between a six-month time period prior to the youth's first interview at entry into the program (Time I) – i.e., a six-month period before his first year of program service – and a six-month period prior to his third interview (Time III), a period before his third year (in a few cases, the second year) of program service.

Our dependent variable *changes in arrests* covers a longer period – 4½ years before program start, and 4½ years during program exposure (or equivalent adjusted period, if the youth was in the program for less than the 4½-year period). We first conducted our analysis focusing on Time III social patterns as predictive of arrest changes in the 4½-year program period, controlling for pre-program criminal history. This procedure produced exceedingly strong equations, in part because most of our predictors were from the third interview period (Time III). In the following analysis, we opt for a conservative and more reality-based procedure, focused on measures of change in life-space (social relationship) patterns at both the Time I and Time III interview periods.

In the first part of the analysis, we select those life-space change variables that best predict the dependent variable in each of the models: *total arrests*, *serious violence arrests*, *total violence arrests*, and *drug crime arrests*. These predictors are similar to those that were statistically significant in the earlier models in Chapter 10, when we used gang-member-survey

and self-reported-offense variables. A large number of theoretically relevant variables enters each of the following models. Concepts from ecological, social disorganization, anomie, opportunity, socialization, and maturational theory again appear to be useful in explaining the findings.

### Total Arrests

Most of the variables in this model are derived from Time III interview data. The following variables are predictive of reduced total arrests for program youth: *the more the youth sees and is concerned with the high level of gang activities in the community*, e.g., drug selling, fighting, gang intimidation and recruitment ( $p = 0.001$ ). This is probably more likely to occur for: *the youth who has become a peripheral gang member and is less involved with the gang at Time III* ( $p = 0.001$ ); *the youth who had a job at Time I* ( $p = 0.001$ ); *the youth who had heard of the Project* ( $p = 0.004$ ). If *the youth is deriving income from illegal sources*, an increase in arrests is likely to occur ( $p = 0.007$ ). A series of personal and family status characteristics is important. *Close, positive relationships with his mother at Time I* ( $p = 0.051$ ), *with his father at Time III* ( $p = 0.002$ ) and especially *with his siblings at Time III* ( $p = 0.001$ ) surprisingly predicts an increase in arrests. This may be due to the socially disorganized nature of family life. Also, *the presence of fewer gang members in the household* predicts a reduced likelihood of arrests ( $p = 0.007$ ). The twelve variables that are significantly related to total arrests enter this model, and account for 52.0 % of variance (Table 12.2).

Of special interest are the relationships that the youth develops with members of the opposite sex, and his expectations to settle down and get married. At Time I, the youth does not

get along well with his girlfriend ( $p = 0.009$ ), and this relationship is associated with a reduction in arrests. In this Time I period, he also does not expect to get married or settle down, and this fact is related to an increase in arrests ( $p = 0.043$ ). On the other hand, at Time III, the same youth does plan to get married, and this change is associated with a reduction in arrests ( $p = 0.006$ ).

The concepts which most strongly predict a decrease in arrests are *maturation*, *social control*, and *access to opportunities*. The youth may have achieved high status in the gang and is now ready to leave and settle down. The youth also has become aware of the destructive influences in the neighborhood, where things are getting worse, and he no longer wants to be a part of gang-related or criminal activities. He has obtained a job at an early point in the program, and this is conducive to a reduction in arrests over time. Close family relationships and identifications, possibly not satisfactory earlier, spur increased likelihood of arrests, but the youth is now ready to undertake a new set of relationships (albeit conflictual at times) with a steady girlfriend or wife, which nevertheless lead to a reduction in arrests.

Finally, it is possible the youth perceives that the Project may have some effect on his activities at the Time I interview. Project activities and the evaluation research were highly street-based. Since the youth may not have known at first that he was being targeted by the GVRP, the fact that he perceives the presence of the GVRP in the community may suggest some level of readiness for change in his delinquent behavior pattern. The program youth knowing of the existence of the Project at Time I is a predictor that he will lower his arrest rate ( $p = 0.004$ ).

### Serious Violence Arrests

Again, most variables are derived from Time III interview data. The following variables predict reduced arrests for serious violence: *the more satisfied the youth is with his community and its activities at Time III* ( $p = 0.001$ ). This is probably more likely to occur for the *youth who has become a peripheral gang member, and is less involved with the gang at Time III* ( $p = 0.001$ ). The *youth who has obtained a GED, or high school equivalency, at Time III* is also highly likely to show a substantial reduction in arrests for serious violence ( $p = 0.001$ ). The *youth who has become more realistic in his aspirations and expectations for the future* is less likely to be arrested for serious violence ( $p = 0.001$ ). On the other hand, the *more gang friends he has*, the more likely he is to increase his arrests for serious violence ( $p = 0.003$ ).

The nature of family experiences is particularly important, and can contribute to the reduction of serious gang violence. The *fewer household members who have had a gang experience at Time III* ( $p = 0.001$ ), the less the likelihood of the youths' arrests for serious violence. But surprisingly, the *more members of the household employed at Time I* (the median figure is two) ( $p = 0.003$ ), the greater the increase in the youths' arrests. *Positive relationships with a sibling at Time III* ( $p = 0.002$ ), a *steady girlfriend or wife at Time I* ( $p = 0.002$ ), and the *youth having had children in the past year* ( $p = 0.002$ ) are all conducive to an increase in arrests for serious violence. However, if the *youth is currently married at Time III*, this contributes to a very significant reduction in his arrests for serious violence ( $p = 0.001$ ).

The last variable to enter this model is a "yes" from the program youth to the question "*has the Gang Violence Reduction Project affected your gang section in any way?*" This variable is statistically significant ( $p = 0.019$ ) in its contribution to lowering rates of serious violence at Time III, controlling for all of the other variables in the equation. Twelve variables

that are significantly related to arrests for serious violence (*homicides, aggravated batteries, and aggravated assaults*) enter this model and account for 56.0 % of variance (Table 12.3).

There is a slightly different set of variables which seem to predict reduced changes in arrests for serious violence than those which predict reduced total arrests. Neighborhood influences are still extremely important. The nature of opportunities are somewhat more important. Maturation continues to be very important. A different pattern of family influence or social control occurs, related to the youth breaking away from his family, but he is still close to his siblings, which influences his continued engagement in serious violence. But identification with a steady girlfriend or wife, and being a father, have mixed effects at different time periods. The Project itself, with its combined emphasis on opportunity, social intervention, and suppression, also appears to have a greater effect on the reduction of arrests for serious violence than on other kinds of arrests.

### Total Violence Arrests

The model for total violence arrests is similar to that for serious violence arrests. Again, the majority of predictor variables are derived from Time III interview data. There are some changes in weighting of particular variables, and we identify additional variables. The *opportunity* variable (GED achievement) is stronger ( $p = 0.001$ ), as is the *anomie* (or disjunction between aspirations and expectations) variable ( $p = 0.001$ ). The *presence of a steady girlfriend or wife at Time III*, rather than at Time I, now predicts a reduction in arrests for serious violence ( $p = 0.002$ ). However, relationships with a steady girlfriend or wife are still unstable. If the *youth gets along with his girlfriend/wife at Time I*, this predicts a decrease in arrests for violence

( $p = 0.032$ ), but a *positive relationship with a girlfriend/wife at Time III* predicts an increase in arrests for violence ( $p = 0.001$ ). We also observe that the variable that indicates influence of the Project is not in this model. The Project's comprehensive orientation to both social intervention and suppression may be more important in influencing the reduction of serious violence arrests than less-serious violence arrests. The fourteen-variable model predicts 61% of variation (Table 12.4).

### Drug Arrests

The model for drug arrests is different from the previous three models. Several of the variables that enter the equation are the same, but predict in an opposite direction. Several new variables are in the model. The majority of variables are derived from Time I interview data. Two variables strongly predict increased levels of drug arrests: the *perceived larger scope of gang crime in the neighborhood at Time I* ( $p = 0.001$ ) and *possession of a GED or high school equivalency certificate at Time I* ( $p = 0.001$ ). Three variables strongly predict lower levels of drug arrests: the *number of household members currently in jail at Time I* ( $p = 0.001$ ), *whether the youth has a job at Time III* ( $p = 0.001$ ) and *whether he plans to marry at Time III* ( $p = 0.001$ ). The *youth employed at Time I* ( $p = 0.003$ ) is a further inducement to reduced levels of drug arrests ( $p = 0.003$ ). Also, the *more household members employed* ( $p = 0.003$ ) predicts lower levels of arrests for drug crimes. On the other hand, a series of variables predicts increased levels of arrests for drug crime: *satisfaction with conditions in the community* ( $p = 0.010$ ), the *smaller the size of the gang section* (perhaps now more focused on drug dealing) ( $p = 0.010$ ), the *larger number of members of his household* ( $p = 0.002$ ) and surprisingly, the fact that *he has*

*gone through a treatment program* ( $p = 0.026$ ). Possible Project-related treatment effects have not been helpful. The eleven-variable model predicts 44.0% of variance (Table 12.5).

A combination of *opportunity, deterrent, social-control, and differential-association* variables seems to provide the best predictors for reduced levels of drug arrests.  *Holding a job* is important.  *The more household members who have gone to jail* provides a deterrent effect.  *Seeking to settle down with a girlfriend or marriage partner* again is a positive motivating factor.  *The gang youth who is satisfied with [conditions in] the community* is a candidate for increased drug crime arrests. Higher levels of  *educational opportunities* do not necessarily contribute to reduced drug crime.

In sum,  *employment* seems universally to reduce delinquency and crime, including drug arrests.  *Marriage or a steady girlfriend* seem to be strong factors in the reduction of both violence and drug arrests. The Project appears to have had a considerable direct effect in lowering rates of total arrests and serious violence arrests but not drug arrests, at least based on predictors derived from our gang-member survey and police-arrest data. We find the same lack of Project success when we more closely examine different service effects on different types of program youth in Chapter 14.

There is no magic bullet, or single set of life circumstances, for the reduction of gang crime. Thus, a somewhat different cluster of program strategies and elements may be required to facilitate legitimate conventional socialization and maturation in the life space, or social relationships, of gang youth who may have different problems at different time periods.

#### Influence of the Program on Key Life-Space/Life-Course Variables

We try to identify those specific components of the program important in achieving Project objectives, particularly those related to reduction of particular types of crime. We already have evidence, presented in Tables 12.2 and 12.3, that the Project may have had some direct influence in lowering the total arrests and serious violence arrests of individual gang youth, at least based on interview responses related to various social-space and relationship factors. The Project may have directly and significantly contributed to modification of these factors.

We now turn briefly to the question of what direct effects the Project may have had on the life-space and social-relationship factors that, in turn, contributed to reductions in various types of crime by program youth. We ask: what elements of the program induced youths to give up certain dysfunctional attitudes and behaviors? Also: what concepts are relevant in explaining the transition process of gang youth to legitimate roles in society? Using program characteristics described in Chapter 9, we identify variables, or combinations of variables, that predict those specific life-space/life-course changes important in lowering levels of crime – *total arrests*, *arrests for serious violence*, *arrests for all types of violence*, and *drug arrests* (refer to Table 12.6 subtables).

We are limited by the categorical nature of program data collected through the worker-tracking instrument, but many of our program and life-space/life-course variables are also of a categorical nature. We employ Logistic Regression analysis to determine which particular program elements are particularly useful in predicting successful life-space/life-course changes and developments that contribute to higher proportions of youth with reduced arrests. We include *age* as a covariate in these change models. We know that the youth gang problem is



powerfully associated with various youth age-relevant or maturation factors. When age is used in the following models, it is always the older age category, 19-and-over, which is most significant in contributing to more youth making positive changes in their life-space environment.

Four types of program variables are statistically significant in predicting success by program youth in life-space/life-course changes: *suppression* (particularly by police), *job referrals*, *school referrals*, and *program dosage* (particularly by youth workers).

Suppression (mainly by police) makes for a slight likelihood of success in more program youth reducing gang status (odds ratio = 1.07,  $p = 0.695$ ), but more importantly, suppression is significantly associated with more youth reducing their status from leader, core number and regular member to peripheral gang member (odds ratio = 1.99,  $p = 0.044$ ), regardless of age (Table 12.6.A-1). Suppression (mainly by police) powerfully aids more program youth, particularly older youth (odds ratio = 1.64,  $p = 0.008$ ), to realistically face the world of making a living. Suppression is useful in getting more youth to reduce the gap between monetary aspirations and expectations. The youth may no longer have unrealistically high income level aspirations (odds ratio = 2.71,  $p = 0.006$ ) (Table 12.6.A-2).

Suppression contributes to enforced socialization of the gang youth through pressure for less attachment to the gang, and more realistic appraisal of future income possibilities. Threat of arrest can make for changes in life space and career goals. Law enforcement, through threat of arrest, may have deterrent and socially-maturing effects, which may reduce the gang youth's involvement in crime. This is particularly so for the older youth.

Job Referral success (mainly by youth workers), particularly job placement, predicts the

likelihood of more youth spending less time with gang friends (odds ratio = 0.45,  $p = 0.021$ ). Again, this is likely to occur more with older than younger youth (odds ratio = 0.707,  $p = 0.064$ ) (Table 12.6.B-1). In addition, job referral success (mainly by youth workers) contributes powerfully to the probability that more youth will spend more time with wives or steady girlfriends (odds ratio = 2.48,  $p = 0.009$ ). It is not clear that this process produces more success with older than younger youth (odds ratio = 1.324,  $p = 0.185$ ) (Table 12.6.B-2).

We know from earlier analyses that time spent with a wife or girlfriend is a strong predictor of lower arrests for almost all types of crime, including violence and drug crime. This tends to occur across age categories. A good deal of tension develops in these relationships, as the wife or girlfriend encourages (or nags) the program youth in particular to get a job and spend less time (or no time) with his gang friends.

Successful School Referrals or school contacts (mainly by youth workers), may produce a slightly positive effect on the likelihood of more youth graduating from high school or achieving high school equivalency (odds ratio = 1.74,  $p = 0.150$ ). This is more effective with the older than younger youth, when they belatedly become aware of the importance of an education in obtaining a job and pursuing a successful career (odds ratio = 0.498,  $p = 0.003$ ) (Table 12.6.C).

The Program Dosage of service by all workers together – youth workers, police, probation, and neighborhood workers (but especially youth workers) – has a significant effect on certain life-space/life-course variables that in turn may be expected to contribute to lower arrest rates. *Greater frequency of contact*, i.e., the greater the number of contacts with a youth by team members (odds ratio = 1.31,  $p = 0.044$ ) (Table 12.6-D), *greater length of service contact in*

*months* (odds ratio = 1.14,  $p = 0.316$ ) (Table 12.6.E-1), and *total contacts per month* (odds ratio = 1.34,  $p = 0.039$ ) (Table 12.6.E-2) contribute to more youth reducing the gap between monetary aspirations and expectations, which serves to reduce the youth's alienation or separation from economic reality. In each case, reality factors affect the older youth, 19-and-over, more than younger youth. The age factor may contribute indirectly – through sheer dosage of services – as well as directly to lower levels of arrests by gang youth.

Finally, program service dosage contributes to more program youth decreasing the number of close gang friends they have. The *greater length of months of service provided* to the youth (odds ratio = 1.59,  $p = 0.004$ ) (Table 12.6.F.1) and the *greater the total contacts per month* for the youth (odds ratio = 1.52,  $p = 0.011$ ) (Table 12.6.F.2) the greater the likelihood of more youth reducing the number of gang friends. This effect seems to occur across age categories.

Social intervention, suppression, and provision of social opportunities, in some comprehensive or combined framework of strategies, appear to be the basis for effective change in the gang youth's behavior in his social environment. These strategies are probably based on concepts of anomie, differential opportunity, social control, and differential association in interactive ways. Project-worker success in getting more youth to change their patterns life-space and life-course behaviors may be directly and indirectly related to reduction in patterns of criminal behavior, particularly arrests for serious violence.

### Summary

In this chapter we examined mainly indirect effects of program elements (i.e., specific strategies and services) on life-space/life-course factors that probably influence individual youth

outcome, using police arrest data for particular types of crime. In Chapter 10 and 11, we looked at direct effects of program elements that were associated with, or predicted, a change in gang crime patterns of program youth. In this chapter, indirect effects referred to specific program elements that predicted success in greater numbers of youth changing critical characteristics of the life-space/life-course circumstances which were directly associated with changes in their arrest patterns.

In an initial examination of the available worker-tracking records, we found that the more worker-tracking records for a youth, the more the youth had a history of serious delinquency (particularly violence) at program entry. Worker-tracking records were a valid basis for measuring specific program effects. The program team targeted the right group for services and control contacts.

We identified those specific life-space/life-course factors that contributed to a lowering of arrest rates by program youth, and then we sought those specific program-service factors that affected the critical life-space/life-course variables.

Many variables entered the first set of models using a Multiple Regression statistical procedure. Of special interest was the finding that *completion of a high school degree* (or its equivalent) *holding a job, reducing contact with gang friends, the presence of persons in the household who are in jail, spending more time with a wife or girlfriend, and a more realistic set of monetary aspirations relative to realistic expectations* for a future career were important predictors of reduced arrests across each of the different types of arrests in the analysis.

In the second set of models – Logistic Regression analysis – we identified those service factors which were successful and significant predictors of more youth making positive life-

space/life-course changes, which in our earlier analysis was associated with reduced arrests. They included *suppression, referral or contacts for youth to obtain a job, helping youth to complete his high school education, and encouraging him to more realistically align his future monetary aspirations and expectations*. Of special importance was service dosage – the frequency, duration, and amount of contact by Project workers (mainly youth workers and police) – in getting more youth to focus on those life-space/life-course factors that would lead to reduced arrests generally, and specifically violence arrests. A set of comprehensive strategies proved to be useful in getting youth to change their behaviors, which could lead to a reduction of arrests.

Based on the analyses conducted thus far, it is difficult to conclude that one type of service approach fits all gang youth who have delinquency problems. It is possible that gang youth in our samples have different types of delinquency or crime problems, at least based on arrest data. Different types of gang youth possibly respond to different types or combinations of program worker contacts and services. We explore this possibility in the next chapter.

Table 12.1  
Pre-Program<sup>a</sup> Arrest Patterns for Youth With Different Numbers of Worker Tracking Forms  
Means and Standard Deviations

Arrest Category	No Tracking (n = 17)		Tracked One Time (n = 45)		Tracked Two or More Times (n = 91)	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Total Arrests	2.8	2.87	4.70	5.33	4.86	5.23
Serious Violence	0.53	0.72	0.83	1.09	0.82	1.75
Total Violence	0.59	0.87	1.07	1.53	1.12	1.99
Property	1.06	1.30	1.68	2.55	1.39	2.17
Drug/Alcohol	0.35	1.06	0.23	0.43	0.55	0.96
Other	0.82	1.33	1.71	2.45	1.78	2.22

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<sup>a</sup> The pre-program period was 4½ years prior to entry into the program.

Table 12.2  
Best Model Predicting Change In Total Arrests<sup>a</sup>  
Between Pre-program and Program Periods

Variable	Beta	F	Probability > F
Number of gang activities (0-6) <sup>b</sup> an individual has witnessed in the last six months at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview	-1.12	13.37	0.001
Individual knows of the Gang Violence Reduction Project at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview. Yes (=1), Missing (=0), or No (=1)	-2.61	8.86	0.004
Individual's position in the gang at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Leader (=4), Core (=3), Regular (=2), or Peripheral Member (=1)	2.17	26.42	0.001
Individual gets along with his mother at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	2.85	3.92	0.051
Number of relatives (0-2) in a gang currently living with the individual at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview	-3.51	7.75	0.007
Individual's total illegal household yearly income (0-7) <sup>c</sup> at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview	1.19	7.51	0.007
Individual gets along with his father at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	3.60	9.77	0.002
Individual gets along with his siblings at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	4.33	11.25	0.001
Individual had a job in the past year at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	-5.27	19.15	0.001
Individual gets along with his wife/girlfriend at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	-2.97	7.02	0.009
Individual expects to get married at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview. Yes or Possibly (=1) vs No (=0)	2.47	4.20	0.043
Individual expects to get married at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Yes or Possibly (=1) vs No (=0)	-3.22	8.01	0.006

Overall R square for the model = 0.52

N=111

df=12

<sup>a</sup> Total arrests includes serious violence, violence, property, drug and other arrests.

<sup>b</sup> Includes 6 gang activities: someone selling drugs, fights between gang members in own gang and different gangs, a drive-by shooting, gang intimidation, and gang recruiting.

<sup>c</sup> Includes 8 categories: 0=\$0, 1=\$1-\$10,000, 2=\$10,001-\$20,000, 3=\$20,001-\$30,000, 4=\$30,001-\$40,000, 5=\$40,001-\$50,000, 6=\$50,001-\$60,000, 7=\$60,001 and More.

Table 12.3  
Best Model Predicting Change in Serious Violence Arrests<sup>a</sup>  
Between Pre-Program and Program Periods

Variable	Beta	F	Probability > F
Individual is Satisfied (=1) vs Dissatisfied (=0) with his community at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview	-1.26	17.82	0.001
Individual's position in the gang at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Leader (=4), Core (=3), Regular (=2), or Peripheral Member (=1)	0.47	19.03	0.001
Individual thinks the Gang Violence Reduction Project has affected his section in some way at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Yes (=1), Missing (=0), or No (=1)	-0.47	5.69	0.019
Number of relatives (0-6) employed currently living with the individual at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview	0.35	9.66	0.003
Number of relatives (0-2) in a gang currently living with the individual at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview	-1.58	22.69	0.001
Individual gets along with his siblings at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	1.02	10.24	0.002
Monetary Expectation-Aspiration Difference <sup>b</sup> at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview: Large (=2), Small (=1), Missing (=0), Same (=1)	0.64	11.45	0.001
Individual has a wife/steady girlfriend at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	0.86	6.86	0.010
Individual has received a GED certificate at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview: Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	-6.82	19.11	0.001
Individual had children in the past year at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview: Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	1.12	9.86	0.002
Number of close friends (0-30) who are gang members at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview	-0.12	9.13	0.003
Individual current marital status at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Never Married (=1), Married (=2), Divorced (=3), or Separated (=4)	-1.40	26.47	0.001

Overall R square for the model = 0.56

N=111

df=12

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<sup>a</sup> Serious Violence includes homicide, battery, aggravated battery, assault, aggravated assault, robbery and armed robbery.

<sup>b</sup> Both expectation and aspiration include 8 categories: 0=\$0, 1=\$1-\$10,000, 2=\$10,001-\$20,000, 3=\$20,001-\$30,000, 4=\$30,001-\$40,000, 5=\$40,001-\$50,000, 6=\$50,001-\$60,000, 7=\$60,001 and More.



Table 12.4  
Best Model Predicting Change In Self-Reported Total Violence Arrests<sup>a</sup>  
Between Pre-Program and Program Periods

Variable	Beta	F	Probability > F
Individual is Satisfied (=1) vs Dissatisfied (=0) with his community at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview	-1.52	20.78	0.001
Individual's position in the gang at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Leader (=4), Core (=3), Regular (=2), or Peripheral Member (=1)	0.66	30.70	0.001
Number of relatives (0-6) employed currently living with the individual at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview	0.41	9.81	0.002
Number of relatives (0-2) in a gang currently living with the individual at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview	-1.33	13.29	0.001
Individual gets along with his siblings at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	1.35	14.17	0.001
Monetary Expectation-Aspiration Difference <sup>b</sup> at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview: Large (=2), Small (=1), Missing (=0), Same (=1)	0.91	19.23	0.001
Individual has a wife/steady girlfriend at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	1.33	10.04	0.002
Individual gets along with his wife/girlfriend at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	-0.80	4.74	0.032
Individual has received a GED certificate at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview: Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	-9.21	28.34	0.001
Individual has a wife/steady girlfriend at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	-1.19	10.39	0.002
Individual gets along with his wife/girlfriend at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	1.28	11.29	0.001
Individual had children in the past year at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview: Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	1.29	10.68	0.002
Number of close friends (0-30) who are gang members at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview	-0.10	5.35	0.023
Individual current marital status at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Never Married (=1), Married (=2), Divorced (=3), or Separated (=4)	-1.58	27.33	0.001

Overall R square for the model = 0.61  
N=111  
df=14

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<sup>a</sup> Total Violence includes arrests for homicide, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, simple battery, simple assault, and weapons possession.

<sup>b</sup> Both expectation and aspiration include 8 categories: 0=\$0, 1=\$1-\$10,000, 2=\$10,001-\$20,000, 3=\$20,001-\$30,000, 4=\$30,001-\$40,000, 5=\$40,001-\$50,000, 6=\$50,001-\$60,000, 7=\$60,001 and More.

Table 12.5  
Best Model Predicting Change In Total Drug Arrests<sup>a</sup>  
Between Pre-Program and Program Periods

Variable	Beta	F	Probability > F
Number of gang activities (0-6) <sup>b</sup> an individual has witnessed in the last six months at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview	0.29	15.12	0.001
Individual is Satisfied (=1) vs Dissatisfied (=0) with his community at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview	0.75	6.91	0.010
Individual's gang section has changed at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Smaller (=1), Same (=0), Larger (=1)	0.51	6.89	0.010
Number of relatives (0-7) currently living with the individual at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview	0.30	10.13	0.002
Number of relatives (0-3) employed currently living with the individual at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview	-0.27	4.83	0.030
Number of relatives (0-3) incarcerated in the past year currently living with the individual at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview	-0.96	17.84	0.001
Individual has undergone treatment for drug, alcohol, physical or mental health problem at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	0.93	5.12	0.026
Individual has received a GED certificate at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview: Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	2.64	14.81	0.001
Individual is currently employed at the 1 <sup>st</sup> Interview: Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	-0.90	9.04	0.003
Individual had a job in the past year at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	-1.24	14.82	0.001
Individual expects to get married at the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Interview. Yes or Possibly (=1) vs No (=0)	-1.08	12.58	0.001

Overall R square for the model = 0.44

N=111

df=11

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<sup>a</sup> Drug arrests include almost exclusively arrests for possession or sale of marijuana and/or cocaine.

<sup>b</sup> Includes 6 gang activities: someone selling drugs, fights between gang members in own gang and different gangs, a drive-by shooting, gang intimidation, and gang recruiting.

Table 12.6

Summary of Logistic Regression of Program Youth (N=148) Life-Space/Life-Course Characteristics on Age and Service Variables

12.6.A-1 Suppression Contact Success by Workers (Model  $P^2$  for covariates = 3.689 with 2 *df*,  $p = 0.158$ )

Outcome	Predictor	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $P^2$	Odds Ratio
Individual's Gang Status Change <sup>a</sup> (0-4)	Age 19 & Over (=0), 17-18 (=1), 16 & Under (=2)	1	-0.067	0.170	0.695	0.936
	Suppression Contact Success by Workers Yes (=1) vs No or Missing (=0)	1	0.686	0.341	0.044*	1.986

12.6.A-2 Suppression Contact Success by Workers (Model  $P^2$  for covariates = 12.162 with 2 *df*,  $p = 0.002$ )\*\*

Outcome	Predictor	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $P^2$	Odds Ratio
Change in Monetary Expectation-Aspiration Difference (0-4) <sup>b</sup>	Age 19 & Over (=0), 17-18 (=1), 16 & Under (=2)	1	-0.491	0.185	0.008**	0.612
	Suppression Contact Success by Workers Yes (=1) vs No or Missing (=0)	1	0.998	0.362	0.006**	2.712

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ .

<sup>a</sup> Individual's Gang Status Change (0-4) indicates a difference in status (4 ranks include: leader, core, regular and peripheral member) between interview Time 1 and Time 3: 0=increase 2 ranks, 1=increase 1 rank, 2=no change, 3=decrease 1 rank, and 4=decrease 2 ranks.

<sup>b</sup> Change in Monetary Expectation-Aspiration Difference (0-4) indicates a positive or negative change in Monetary Aspiration-Expectation difference (4 levels include: no difference, missing, low and high difference) between interview Time 1 and Time 3: 0=increase 2 levels, 1=increase 1 level, 2=no change, 3=decrease 1 level, and 4=decrease 2 levels.

12.6.B-1 Job Referral Success by Workers<sup>c</sup> (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates = 8.338 with 2 df, p = 0.016)\*

Outcome	Predictor	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio
Spending Free Time <sup>d</sup> at Time III (1-4)	Age 19 & Over (=0), 17-18 (=1), 16 & Under (=2)	1	-0.350	0.187	0.064	0.707
	Job Referral Success by Workers Yes (=1) vs No or Missing (=0)	1	-0.810	0.351	0.021*	0.445

12.6.B-2 Job Referral Success by Workers (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=8.431 with 2 df, p=0.015)\*

Outcome	Predictor	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio
Spending Time (at least a few hrs.) With Wife /Steady Girlfriend <sup>e</sup> at Time III Yes (=1) vs No or Missing (=0)	Age 19 & Over (=0), 17-18 (=1), 16 & Under (=2)	1	0.280	0.211	0.185	1.324
	Job Referral Success by Workers Yes (=1) vs No or Missing (=0)	1	0.907	0.347	0.009**	2.478

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01 .

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<sup>c</sup> Almost all referrals made by youth workers.

<sup>d</sup> Spending Free Time (1-4) includes 4 categories: girlfriend/wife (= 4), non-gang friends (= 3), gang friends (= 2), and alone (= 1).

<sup>e</sup> Spending Free Time With Wife/Steady Girlfriend includes: spending a few hours and most of the day.

12.6.C School Referral Success by Workers (Model  $P^2$  for covariates = 10.428 with 2 *df*,  $p = 0.005$ )\*\*

Outcome	Predictor	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $P^2$	Odds Ratio
Individual has graduated high school or received a GED certificate at Time III Yes (=1) vs No (=0)	Age 19 & Over (=0), 17-18 (=1), 16 & Under (=2)	1	-0.696	0.231	0.003**	0.498
	School Referral Success by Workers Yes (=1) vs No or Missing (=0)	1	0.554	0.385	0.150	1.740

12.6.D Total Frequency of Contact<sup>f</sup> (Model  $P^2$  for covariates = 9.093 with 2 *df*,  $p = 0.011$ )\*

Outcome	Predictor	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $P^2$	Odds Ratio
Change in Monetary Expectation-Aspiration Difference (0-4) <sup>g</sup>	Age 19 & Over (=0), 17-18 (=1), 16 & Under (=2)	1	-0.461	0.184	0.012*	0.630
	Total Frequency of Contact (Number of Contacts) 321 & Over (=4), 151-320 (=3), 41-150 (=2), or 1-40 (=1)	1	0.272	0.135	0.044*	1.313

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  .

<sup>f</sup> Total Frequency of Contact (1-4) indicates total number of contacts being provided by all workers (i.e. Police and Probation officers, Youth and NAGV workers) during the program period. However, most contacts were made by youth workers.

<sup>g</sup> Change in Monetary Expectation-Aspiration Difference (0-4) indicates a positive or negative change in Monetary Aspiration-Expectation difference (4 levels include: no difference, missing, low and high difference) between interview Time 1 and Time 3: 0=increase 2 levels, 1=increase 1 level, 2=no change, 3=decrease 1 level, and 4=decrease 2 levels.

12.6.E-1 Length of Service Contact (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates = 6.444 with 2 df, p = 0.040)\*

Outcome	Predictor	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio
Change in Monetary Expectation-Aspiration Difference (0-4) <sup>g</sup>	Age 19 & Over (=0), 17-18 (=1), 16 & Under (=2)	1	-0.424	0.183	0.021*	0.654
	Length of Service Contact <sup>f</sup> (Number of Months) 33 & More (=4), 22-32 (=3), 10-21 (=2), or 1-9 (1)	1	0.132	0.132	0.316	1.141

12.6.E-2 Total Contacts per Month<sup>h</sup> (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=9.435 with 2 df, p=0.009)\*\*

Outcome	Predictor	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio
Change in Monetary Expectation-Aspiration Difference (0-4) <sup>g</sup>	Age 19 & Over (=0), 17-18 (=1), 16 & Under (=2)	1	-0.415	0.183	0.024*	0.660
	Total Contacts per Month (Number of Contacts) 5 & More (=4), 3-4 (=3), 2 (=2), or 1 (1)	1	0.289	0.138	0.037*	1.335

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01 .

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<sup>g</sup> Change in Monetary Expectation-Aspiration Difference (0-4) indicates a positive or negative change in Monetary Aspiration-Expectation difference (4 levels include: no difference, missing, low and high difference) between interview Time 1 and Time 3: 0=increase 2 levels, 1=increase 1 level, 2=no change, 3=decrease 1 level, and 4=decrease 2 levels.

<sup>h</sup> Total Contacts per Month (1-4) indicates sum of averaged number of contacts being served by all workers (i.e. Police and Probation officers, Youth and NAGV workers) during the program period. Most contacts were by youth workers.

12.6.F-1 Length of Service Contact<sup>h</sup> (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates = 8.744 with 2 df, p = 0.013)\*

Outcome	Predictor	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio
Change in Number of Close Gang Friends  Decrease (=1) vs Increase or Same (=0)	Age 19 & Over (=0), 17-18 (=1), 16 & Under (=2)	1	0.121	0.219	0.581	1.129
	Length of Service Contact (Number of Months) 33 & More (=4), 22-32 (=3), 10-21 (=2), or 1-9 (1)	1	0.462	0.162	0.004**	1.587

(12.6.F-2) Total Contacts per Month<sup>i</sup> (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates = 6.964 with 2 df, p = 0.031)\*

Outcome	Predictor	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio
Change in Number of Close Gang Friends  Decrease (=1) vs Increase or Same (=0)	Age 19 & Over (=0), 17-18 (=1), 16 & Under (=2)	1	0.147	0.218	0.500	1.159
	Total Contacts per Month (Number of Contacts) 5 & More (=4), 3-4 (=3), 2 (=2), or 1 (1)	1	0.417	0.163	0.011*	1.517

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01 .

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<sup>h</sup> Length of Service Contact (1-4) indicates total number of months being served by all workers (i.e. Police and Probation officers, Youth and NAGV workers) during the program period. Most youths were served by youth workers.

<sup>i</sup> Total Contacts per Month (1-4) indicates sum of averaged number of contacts being served by all workers (i.e. Police and Probation officers, Youth and NAGV workers) during the program period. Most contacts were by youth workers.

## Chapter 13

### Typology of Gang Youth

For purposes of the present analysis our question is: to what extent do the gangs in the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project comprise youth who commit different configurations of violence, drug crimes, and combinations of violence and drugs and/or other offenses or crimes? We explore whether youth in the two gangs, the Latin Kings and Two Six in Little Village, comprised different types of gang youth based on career arrest or offense patterns. We propose that gang youth cannot be adequately characterized as committing “cafeteria”-style offenses or as specializing in particular types of offenses. Rather, they commit a limited range (or a distinctive configuration) of crimes characterized by their career arrest and offense patterns which may be a function of a variety of personality, gang, demographic, family and other factors in different communities. Youth with different configurations of offenses or arrests are present in both gangs. Furthermore, the character of the various gangs may differ based on the distribution of youth with these distinctive configurations.

Our analysis in this chapter of the possible types of youth in the program and comparison samples is based mainly on the youth’s criminal arrest history, both during the pre-program and program periods. It is a first step in the development of a conception of the gang member as a distinctive young person, not identified simply as a gang member who commits a specific crime, but rather a specific pattern of crimes for a complex of reasons and circumstances (which we do not address in the chapter’s discussion). First we attempt to develop a typology of gang youth based on arrest records. We test the utility of the typology using the self-reports of program youth.



In Chapter 14 we will explore whether the Project was more successful with certain types of youth than with other types of youth based on arrest configurations. We also ask whether there was continuity in patterns of arrests for the youth in the three samples who were incarcerated in the four-year period (1997-2001) after Project termination.

### Research on Types of Gang Youth

Research on gangs demonstrates that gang-delinquent youth generally are more delinquent than non-gang delinquent youth in respect to a range of deviant behaviors and crimes such as drug-use, drug-selling, and especially violence, during the period when they are affiliated with the gang or are active gang members (Hill, Howell, Hawkins 1996; Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Chard-Wierchem 1993; Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Smith, Tobin 2003); more serious and chronic arrest patterns may continue into their adult post-street-gang careers (Tracy 1982). Nevertheless, there has been limited inquiry into differences in delinquent or criminal behavior patterns among gang youth within or across gangs in the same or different communities.

With the spread or development of youth gangs and gang problems in many locales throughout the country, more attention is required to the analysis of diverse patterns of gang behavior and what their distributions may be. Youth gangs are described as comprising youth hanging on street corners or elsewhere, and/or engaged in minor acts of mischief, and/or participating in major acts of interpersonal and gang violence, and/or organized into entrepreneurial drug activity. Prevailing views among law enforcement officers and the media in most large urban centers are that gang youth are engaged in a great deal of both violence and drug crime, and that intergang conflict is often a result of competition for control of drug

markets, resulting in high levels of homicide. Such views may not be consistent with research findings, however.

While there is evidence for the view that there are drug gangs and gangs engaged in turf violence, the precise connection or interaction between the two forms of behavior and crime by gang members has not been made (Howell, Decker 1999). There may be substantial numbers of delinquent youth in so-called violent or drug gangs not engaged in violence or drug activity. Little attention has been paid to the question of whether members of the same gangs may be engaged in both gang conflict and drug sales. It may be that not all gang members are delinquent or engaged in violent and/or drug-dealing activity. For example, recent evaluations of comprehensive community-wide gang prevention, intervention and suppression programs found that certain youth identified as gang members in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois and Mesa, Arizona, had no arrest records or self-report histories of delinquency. Some were primarily status offenders (i.e., truants or runaways), and few were persistent violent offenders (Spergel, Wa, Sosa 2001, 2002).

Relationship of gang violence to drug crime has been of special research interest in recent decades (Skolnick 1992; Klein 1995; Maxson 1995; Meehan, O'Carroll 1992; De La Rosa, Lambert, Gropper 1990; Block, Christakos, Jacob, Przybulski 1996; Moore 1990; Spergel 1995; Howell, Decker 1999; Curry, Decker 2003). Studies to clarify and determine the possible causes and connections between violence and drug crime have made use of various sources of data and research methods: aggregate or community-level police arrest or incident data (Block, Christakos, Jacob, Przybulski 1996; Howell, Egley, Gleason 2002); community or school-wide individual youth self-reports, often as part of longitudinal cohort studies (Hill, Howell, Hawkins

1996; Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Chard-Wierchem 1993; Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Smith, Tobin 2003); gang-member and gang-leadership studies, using police arrest data (Tracy 1982; Huff 1998); comparative gang studies based on youth self-reports (Fagan 1989, 1990); historical analyses (Klein 1995; Spergel 1995); and case studies based on field observations (Moore 1978, 1991; Spergel 1969; Taylor 1990; Jankowski 1991).

The range and interrelationship of delinquent behaviors, particularly violence and drug possession, drug use and drug dealing by members of the same gang, or parts of a large gang in a particular neighborhood or across neighborhoods over an extended period of time, has not been systematically examined using arrest and/or self-report data. Klein (1971, 1995) has studied the group structural characteristics of gangs, such as size, leadership, cohesion, clique or subgrouping, and their changes over time, but with little attention paid to distinctive patterns of delinquent or criminal behaviors manifested by subgroups of the gang. Criminal justice system decision-making is usually based on aggregate-level gang delinquency and/or individual gang-member behavior, with some attention paid to gang structure, but little to distinctive subgroupings or gang-member cluster behavior.

It is possible that the delinquent or criminal-behavioral characteristics of members of gangs, particularly its subgroups, may substantially vary from the overall reputation or characterization of the gang, e.g., as a drug, violent, combination of violent/drug, or other type of delinquent gang. Individual youth who identify themselves (or are identified by others) as gang members may be part of a subgroup or cluster of individuals involved in distinctive configurations of delinquent and/or non-delinquent behaviors. In the following discussion, we identify what appear to be persistent patterns of delinquent behaviors among clusters of

individual gang youth in our Little Village samples. We do not, however, observe or examine the nature of clique or subgroup structures of these individuals which may or may not be related to distinctive patterns of their delinquent behavior. Particular cliques or subgroup structure in groups may be quite temporary, while behavior patterns of gang individuals or clusters of gang individuals may be enduring.

In our examination of the nature of the arrests of youth in our samples (program, comparison, and quasi-program), we identify patterns of arrests and self-reported delinquent behavior that seem to persist over time within certain subsamples. Further, we ask whether youth in different subsamples associated with specific patterns of delinquent or criminal behaviors are more or less likely to be rearrested for the same types of crimes. Is a gang youth whose current arrest configuration is not violence or drug crime but other types of crime less likely to be rearrested than a gang youth whose arrest configuration is violence or drugs, or both? Also, is a gang youth whose arrest configuration is violence but not drug crime more or less likely to be arrested than a gang youth whose arrest configuration is drug crime but not violence?

### Constructing the Subsample Typology

A key question for the analysis of the results of the Little Village Project is whether arrested gang youth are primarily involved in drug crimes, violence crimes, both, or neither. This is not to deny that gang youth arrested for violence and/or drug crime may also be involved in a range of other types of crimes, such as property crime, disorderly conduct, obstruction of justice, mob action, loitering, etc., i.e., crimes other than violence and/or drug crimes. To answer this question, information on arrests of individual youth in the Little Village samples is

examined over an extended period of time – on average six years, including the pre-program and program periods.

The 418 youth in our sample were classified and placed in particular arrest-charge categories based on data derived from Chicago Police Department RAP sheets, which summarize charges taken from the arresting officer's arrest report. Our analysis of a sample of RAP sheets and police arrest reports indicate that in 95% or more of the cases, the arrest charge(s) is (are) listed exactly the same way in both sets of records. Occasionally two charges are listed on the original arrest report, but only one charge – either the more serious or the one listed first – appears on the RAP sheet. Even less frequently, an arrest for a minor crime (e.g., disorderly conduct) appears on the arrest report, but may not appear on the RAP sheet. For analysis purposes, we conclude that information derived from the RAP sheets is a reliable enough basis for classifying arrest charges of youth, particularly the more serious charges. Our analysis is based on 4153 arrests and 4277 charges.

Youth in each of the samples had multiple arrests over the combined six-year pre-program and program periods: program youth = 9.7 mean arrests; comparison youth = 8.3 mean arrests; quasi-program youth = 13.9 mean arrests. In the great majority of cases, there is only one charge per arrest on the RAP sheet: program youth = 89.0%; comparison youth 91.7%; quasi-program youth = 78.8%. Quasi-program youth were relatively more likely to have two charges listed per arrest than either program or comparison youth.

The focus of our classification was on youth arrested and charged with either violence or drug crime, although some youth were arrested for crimes other than violence and/or drug crimes. All youth arrested over time for violence and/or drug crimes were also arrested for

“other” crimes. Nevertheless, for our purposes, youth in our samples can be classified into four arrestee types: *violence/no-drug arrestees*, *drug/no-violence arrestees*, *violence and drug arrestees*, and “other,” i.e., *no-violence/no-drug arrestees*.

Again, youth in each of the samples (program, comparison, and quasi-program) were from the two major gang constellations in Little Village – the Latin Kings and the Two Six. The samples, each containing male youth from the two gangs, were divided into three age categories (12 to 16, 17 and 18, 19 to 24). Program youth were provided with a full range of Project services and worker contacts. Quasi-program youth were only partially involved in the program, mainly through athletic services. The comparison youth were not provided with any program services or worker contacts. The program and comparison samples, when stratified by age and cohort, had similar but not statistically different pre-program arrest backgrounds based on particular categories of arrests – total arrests, total violence arrests, serious-violence arrests, property arrests, and other arrests. However, quasi-program youth, as indicated, had more pre-program arrests.

Our classification task was to determine whether we could assign arrested youth from each of the samples to subsamples of youth with arrest histories of: 1) violence exclusive of drug charges; 2) drugs exclusive of violence charges; 3) both drug and violence charges, and 4) other types of charges. The youth in the three samples for whom we had arrest histories over the pre-program and program periods consisted of: program youth (N = 154), comparison youth (N = 180) and quasi-program youth (N = 84). Our focus in the analysis was on the percentages of youth in each of the four arrestee subgroups of the typology.

The largest proportions of youth in the three samples are in the following categories or

subsamples: *violence/no-drug arrestees* – program = 41.6%, comparison = 38.3%, and quasi-program = 40.5%; *violence and drug arrestees* – program = 35.0%, comparison = 22.8%, and quasi-program = 45.2%. The next largest proportions of youth are those in the “other,” *no-violence/no-drug arrestee* subsamples – program = 16.9%, comparison = 32.8%, and quasi-program = 13.1%. The remaining and smallest proportions of youth are in the *drug/no-violence arrestee* subsamples – program = 6.5%, comparison = 6.1%, and quasi-program = 1.2%.

Apparently, we have few gang members in any of our samples who were specialized to arrests for drug crimes but not violence.

The “other,” *no-violence/no-drug arrestee* subsample of comparison youth (32.8%) is actually larger than the *violence and drug arrestee* subsample of comparison youth (22.8%), and considerably larger than the “other,” *no-violence/no-drug arrestee* subsamples of program youth (16.9%) and quasi-program youth (13.1%). This suggests different patterns of arrests for youth in the samples, especially between the program/quasi-program samples and the comparison sample (Table 13.1). The types of subsample youth in the program and comparison samples may have been quite different, although arrest patterns appeared to be similar when we looked at mean arrests comparing the two samples, each as a whole, for particular offenses of youth (see Chapter 8).

While youth in the program, comparison and quasi-program samples were reasonably well matched in our earlier analyses using separate categories of arrests, they are not as well matched in this analysis using configurations of arrests or arrestee types. Also important to note is that youth within the arrestee subsamples in each of the program, comparison, and quasi-comparison samples were, nevertheless, most often arrested for *other* types of crime. For each

type of youth-arrestee subsample, it is clear that *other* types of crime comprise the largest proportion of crime committed by youth.

The program and quasi-program samples contained relatively higher proportions of *violence/no-drug* and *violence and drug arrestees* (76.6% and 85.7%, respectively) than the comparison sample (61.1%). More comparison-sample youth were involved in “other,” *no-violence/no-drug* crimes. Although there were somewhat different proportions of youth in each of these arrestee subgroups in the three samples, the greatest proportions of youth still clustered in the *violence/no-drug arrestee* and *violence and drug arrestee* subsamples across the three samples.

#### Different Proportions of Arrests by Arrestee Subsample

The differing proportions of youth in each of the arrestee subgroups suggested that youth in each of the samples may not have had the same incidences of crime, at least based on arrest data. Mean levels of total arrests were generally highest for the *violence and drug arrestee* subsamples and lowest for the “other,” *no-violence/no-drug arrestee* subsamples, except in the quasi-program sample, where they were higher for the “other,” *no-violence/no-drug arrestee* than for the *drugs/no-violence arrestee* subsample.

The tendency to a “specialization” effect still existed. The proportions of serious-violence arrests or total violence arrests to total arrests was higher in the *violence/no-drug arrestee* subsample than in the *violence and drug arrestee* subsample across the three samples, and particularly in the program period. The proportion of drug arrests to total arrests for the *drug/no-violence arrestee* subsample was higher than for the *violence and drug arrestee*



subsample, except for quasi-program youth in the program period.

Change in Arrests (Means). Since our youth classification was based on arrest patterns over both the pre-program and program periods, there is no change in numbers of youth in each arrestee subsample between the pre-program and the program periods. However, we find a substantial increase in violence arrests, mainly for the program and quasi-program *violence/no-drug arrestee* subsamples in the program period compared to the pre-program period. The increase in violence arrests is less marked for the *violence and drug arrestee* program and quasi-program subsamples. There is less of an increase in violence arrests in the comparison *violence/no-drug arrestee* subsample, and in fact a slight decrease in violence arrests in the comparison *violence and drug arrestee* subsample (Table 13.2).

Drug arrests, however, increase substantially more in the comparison *drug/no-violence arrestee* subsample than for the equivalent program *drug/no-violence arrestee* subsample, and not at all for the equivalent quasi-program *drug/no-violence arrestee* subsample (which shows no arrests for drugs). Total arrests, particularly property-crime and other non-violent arrests, increase sharply more in the program and quasi-program *violence/no-drug arrestee* subsamples, relative to the equivalent comparison subsample. There is an increase in drug arrests in all of the *violence and drug arrestee* subsamples. Mean violence arrests increase in the program *violence and drug arrestee* subsample, stabilize in the equivalent quasi-program subsample, and actually decrease in the comparison subsample.

In other words, based on yearly (mean) arrests, we see an increase or a “specialization” effect toward violence, especially serious violence, in the program and quasi-program samples,

and a greater increase or “specialization” effect to drugs and other (mainly property but no violence) arrests in the comparison sample. While the quasi-program sample remains the most delinquent or criminal sample in terms of total arrests, its pattern of violence arrests abates somewhat in several of its arrestee subsamples. All of the arrestee subsamples continue in their delinquent or criminal patterns, with violent behavior increasing (or stabilizing), but drug arrests relatively decreasing (or not increasing) in the program and quasi-program subsamples; however, a reverse effect is occurring for the comparison subsamples, particularly in terms of a decline in serious-violence and total violence arrests, and an increase (or stabilization) in drug arrests.

The changes in mean arrest patterns indicate the increasing “specialization” of arrest configurations occurring for the samples and their arrestee subsamples. Mean total arrests decline for the program *no-violence/no-drug arrestee* subsample, but increase for the comparison and quasi-program *no-violence/no-drug arrestee* subsamples. While total arrests increase in all three of the *violence/no-drug arrestee* subsamples, they increase more in the program and quasi-program subsamples. Total arrests increase more sharply for youth in the comparison *drug/no-violence arrestee* subsample than for youth in the equivalent program subsample, and actually decline for youth in the equivalent quasi-program subsample. Increases in total arrests in the program *violence and drug arrestee* subsample are greater than for the equivalent comparison subsample. Mean arrests for violence increase for youth in the program *violence and drug arrestee* subsample, abate in the equivalent quasi-program subsample, and decline in the comparison subsample.

The largest increase is for drug arrests in the *violence and drug arrestee* subsamples in all of the samples – program, comparison, and quasi-program. The increase in ratios of drug arrests

to total arrests in the *violence and drug arrestee* subsamples ranges from 2.7 in the program subsample to 2.9 in the comparison subsample and 3.5 in the quasi-program subsample. In other words, the highest rate of increase in drug arrests is in the quasi-program subsample; it is slightly lower in the program *violence and drug arrestee* subsample than in the comparison subsample. Nevertheless, youth in the comparison *violence and drug arrestee* subsample have the highest mean drug arrests compared to equivalent subsamples in the program and quasi-program samples, during both the pre-program and program periods.

Program-Youth Arrest and Self-Reported Offense Patterns. A comparison of arrest and self-report data for the program sample again provides evidence of a similar tendency to “specialization” by program youth. (Interview and self-report data were not obtained from the comparison and quasi-program youth.) The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project focused on the gang violence problem. Based on the targeting efforts of the Project workers and the youth self-selection processes of certain members of the Latin Kings and Two Six, the Project engaged primarily those gang members who were more violent and less drug-crime oriented, rather than those who were relatively more active in drug and property crime. These latter youth probably remained (by youth self-selection) in the comparison and the quasi-program sample. We were not able to test these program-targeting and program youth self-selection propositions.

We compared Time I and Time III interview<sup>1</sup> data obtained for 116 program youth for whom we also had relatively complete self-report offense data (Table 13.3). Most but not all of

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<sup>1</sup> Individual gang-member interviews were administered to program youth in three waves (Time I, Time II and Time III) at approximately 1 to 1½-year intervals during the program period.

these youth were represented in the program arrestee typology (n = 105). We imposed the arrestee classification on the youth self-report data, i.e., “other,” *no-violence/no-drug*, *violence/no-drug*, *drug/no-violence*, and *violence and drug arrestees*. The relative percentage of youth in the four subsamples who had various types of self-reported offenses was remarkably similar to the percentage of youth with arrests, despite the fact that the interviewed-youth sample (n = 116) was smaller than the arrest sample (N = 154), and the data covered approximately a three- to four-year program period, while the arrest-sample data covered approximately a six-year (three-year pre-program and three-year program) risk period (on average) for each of the youth. In addition, we identified a fifth self-report subsample: 11 youth (9.5%)<sup>2</sup> in the program sample who did not have arrest records during the pre-program or program periods, but who self-reported a variety of offenses or crimes committed during the program period.

Most program youth with self-reports were either in the *violence/no-drug* subsample (36.2%) or in the *violence and drug* subsample (29.3%). The equivalent police-arrest subsamples were the *violence/no-drugs* subsample (41.6%) and the *violence and drug* subsample (35.0%), each subsample somewhat larger than the equivalent self-report subsamples. The subsample of program youth with the highest relative ratio of drug-selling offenses to total self-reported offenses and the highest absolute means for drug-selling offenses was in the equivalent *drug/no-violence* offense subsample (6.9%) which was equivalent to the *drug/no-violence* arrest subsample (6.5%). The *no-violence/no-drug* offense subsample (18.1%) was almost equivalent

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<sup>2</sup> Fourteen of the Time I-Time III-interviewed youth had no arrest histories. The other 105 youth were part of the program arrest sample (N = 154). Therefore, 49 of the arrestee program youth had only a Time I but no Time III interview.

to the police arrest subsample (16.9%). The “no-arrest”<sup>3</sup> offense subsample (9.5%) had lower levels of self-reported offenses than the *no-violence/no-drug offense*, *violence/no-drug offense*, and *violence/no-drug offense* subsamples at the Time I interview (but not the *drug/no-violence* offense subsample) in respect to total offenses and violence offenses. The “no-arrest” offense subsample had slightly lower levels of drug offenses than the *violence and drug* self-report offense subsample (Table 13.3).

The pattern of offenses of program youth in the self-report subsamples was comparable to their pattern of arrests, comparing the Time-I-interview and pre-program arrest-period data. Mean offenses for violence were highest for program youth in the offense subsamples of *violence/no-drugs* and the *violence and drugs*. Mean offenses for drug selling were highest in the *drug/no-violence* offense subsample. The youth in the *no-arrest* subsample had a fairly high level of self-reported drug selling.

It was difficult to establish the meaning of changes in specific types of offenses among program youth between the Time I and Time III interviews, compared to changes between program and pre-program arrests. Offense-pattern change was based on differences between the Time I and Time III interviews (approximately three to four years) during the program period. Arrest-pattern change was based on differences between the three-year pre-program and three-year program period. Also, the range of self-reported offenses (n = 26 items) was more limited than the range of arrest charges (n < 100). The self-report gang offense questions focused relatively more on violence arrests; the arrest charges included all types of arrests. Further, it is possible to question the reliability of self-report responses; program youth reported a very high

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<sup>3</sup> The “no arrest” subsample did in fact have self-reported offenses.

number of offenses at Time I, but an extremely low number at Time III.

Nevertheless, based on the self-reported offense data, program youth were engaged in a great deal of delinquent or criminal behavior, far greater than what they were arrested for. While the self-report data may be less reliable than arrest data, there are striking similarities in the patterning of self-report offense data and the patterning of arrest data within the same youth subsamples. Subsamples of gang members from the same gang were engaged in different configurations of delinquent offenses and arrests. Those youth involved in the commission (or reporting) of violence offenses were more likely to be arrested for these offenses than those self-reporting other types of offenses. Gang youth who self-reported drug selling offenses were probably not as likely to be arrested as youth who self-reported violence offenses. (Drug selling was more a covert offense than a violent act.) To what extent a gang youth arrestee typology has value in understanding Project effectiveness, and in the development of policy and program planning regarding the provision of services or controls, we explore in the next section, and especially in Chapter 14.

### Changes in Arrest Levels

In this section, we address briefly the extent to which youth in the different arrestee subsamples increase or reduce specific levels of configurations of arrests between the pre-program and program periods. Certain subsamples of youth across the three samples – program, comparison, and quasi-program – were more likely to reduce their patterns of arrests than were other subsamples. Based on our earlier analysis, we know that the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project contributed to the reduction of specific violence and drug arrests by youth in

the program sample. Youth in the comparison and quasi-program samples showed an increase in drug arrests; youth in the program samples showed a reduction. The changes were often significantly greater in the program sample than in the comparison or quasi-program samples.

We conducted a General Linear Modeling analysis with the same variables as we did earlier, but introduced the *subsample arrestee typology* variable. The following control variables were entered into the models: *age group* (16 years and under, 17 and 18 years, 19 years and over), *gang* (Two Six and Latin Kings), *subsample arrestee typology* (*no-violence/no-drug*, *violence/no-drug*, *drug/no-violence*, and *violence and drug*); *pre-program level of arrests* (none, low, medium, and high), and the *Project* variable (whether the youth was in the program, comparison, or quasi-program sample). The dependent variables in the different models were *differences in total arrests, serious-violence arrests, total violence arrests* (serious and less serious), *drug arrests*, and *other arrests* (i.e., non-violence and non-drug arrests, including property arrests, alcohol arrests, etc.) *between the pre-program and program periods*.

In the following analysis, we focus on the two main effects (Project sample and subsample arrestee typology and their interaction) in exploring changes in arrests in the dependent variable. In each model (as in Chapter 11) the strongest effects are *pre-program arrest category* (a regression effect) and the *age category* (the older the youth the greater the reduction in arrests). There are no significant effects of the *gang* (Latin Kings, Two Six) variable. In general (as in the earlier models), program youth show more positive changes or reduced levels of arrests than comparison and quasi-program youth. Nevertheless, there are differences in respect to subsample changes within and across samples, which are of particular interest in this analysis.

Total Arrests. In the model with the dependent variable *total arrests*, the arrestee typology variable is highly significant as a main effect ( $p = 0.001$ ). The LS mean varies for the different arrestee subsamples across the three samples: “other,” *no-violence/no-drug* (-2.28), *drug/no-violence* (-1.46), *violence/no-drug* (+1.25), and *violence and drug* (+33.84). The youth in the subsample characterized by *no-violence/no-drug* arrests do best in reducing total arrests compared to the *violence/no-drug* subsample ( $p = 0.001$ ) and the *violence and drug* subsample ( $p < 0.001$ ). The *drug/no-violence* subsample does better than the *violence and drug* subsample ( $p = 0.041$ ), and the *violence and drug* subsample does worst, with an increase in total arrests. There are no statistically significant differences in change patterns for *total arrests* of youth in the equivalent subsamples across the program, comparison, and quasi-program samples. Again, we find that while youth in the program and quasi-program *drug/no-violence* subsample reduce their total arrests, the youth in the equivalent comparison subsample increase their total arrests. In contrast, while the youth in the comparison *violence/no-drug* subsample reduce their total arrests, the equivalent program and quasi-program subsamples increase their total arrests in the program period (Table 13.4).

With regard to the *Project* main effect and the *Project*  $\times$  *age* interaction effect, most of the pairwise comparisons are insignificant. In most cases, the program sample does better than the comparison sample. Older program youth (17 and older) do better than similar-age comparison youth.

Serious-Violence Arrests. Although youth in the program sample do better than youth in the comparison sample ( $p = 0.07$ ) and the comparison sample does better than the quasi-program



sample ( $p = 0.04$ ) in reducing serious-violence arrests, the *subsample arrestee typology* variable is not a significant main effect. However, the youth in the program *violence/no-drug* subsample and *violence and drug* subsample do respectively better in the reduction of serious-violence arrests than youth in the equivalent subsamples of the comparison and quasi-program sample. In terms of reduction of serious-violence arrests, program youth in the *violence and drug* subsample do almost significantly better than the equivalent comparison subsample ( $p = 0.095$ ), and significantly better than the equivalent quasi-program subsample ( $p = 0.015$ ) (Table 13.5). Again, with regard to the *Project* main effect and the *Project*  $\times$  *age* interaction effect, most of the pairwise comparisons are insignificant. In all cases, the program sample does better than the comparison and quasi-program samples.

Total Violence Arrests. The program sample reduces its level of total violence arrests (serious and less serious) while the comparison and quasi-program samples increase theirs. Differences are almost statistically significant between the program and the comparison samples ( $p = 0.09$ ), and statistically significant between the program and the quasi-program samples ( $p = 0.002$ ). We find somewhat similar results in the *violence/no-drug* and *violence and drug* subsamples (Table 13.6). The program youth in the *violence and drug* subsample reduce their level of total violence arrests compared to youth in the equivalent comparison and quasi-program subsamples. The reduction is statistically significant in comparison with the quasi-program *violence and drug arrestee* subsample, which shows an increase in the total violence arrests.

As with serious-violence arrests, the program sample does better (not significantly) than the comparison and quasi-program samples in reducing total violence arrests in all age groups.

The 19-and-over program sample also does significantly better than the 19-and-over quasi-program sample.

Drug Arrests. Youth in the program sample reduce their levels of drug arrests, while the comparison and quasi-program youth increase their levels of drug arrests. The differences are not statistically significant. Also, program youth in the *drug/no-violence* and *violence and drug* subsamples reduce their levels of drug arrests compared to the equivalent comparison and quasi-program subsamples, but these differences again are not statistically significant. With different age groups, the program youth do better (but not significantly) than the comparison youth.

From our previous analyses, we know that youth in the various samples and subsamples had very few drug arrests in the pre-program or program periods. Nevertheless, the LS means reduction in total drug arrests was six times greater for youth in the program *drug/no-violence* subsample than for youth in the equivalent comparison subsample. While youth in the program *violence and drug* subsample decreased their LS mean drug arrests by more than one third, youth in the equivalent comparison subsample increased their LS mean drug arrests by more than fifty percent (Table 13.7).

Other Arrests. The subsample arrestee typology shows up as a significant ( $p = 0.012$ ) main effect in the GLM equation with *other* arrests (non-violence arrests, non-drug arrests, and arrests including property, alcohol, etc.). Youth in each of the samples reduce their levels of *other* arrests. The differences are by type of arrestee subsample within each of the samples, rather than by type of arrestee subsample across the three samples – program, comparison, and quasi-

program. The most significant difference is the larger magnitude of the reduction of *other* arrests for youth in the *no-violence/no-drug arrestee* subsamples compared to that of youth in the *violence and drug arrestee* subsamples ( $p = 0.002$ ). The youth in the *violence/no-drug arrestee* subsamples generally do significantly better than youth in the *violence and drug* subsamples ( $p = 0.029$ ) in reducing their level of *other* arrests (Table 13.8). Across the samples, the youth in the program and comparison *violence/no-drug* subsamples do better than the youth in the equivalent quasi-program subsample in reducing arrests for a variety of crimes other than violence or drugs.

### Summary

The arrestee typology does contribute to greater specificity in identifying subgroups of youth in the various samples who are likely to increase or reduce their arrests for particular types of crimes between the pre-program and program periods. The typology variable is significant as a main effect in our GLM models with *total arrests* and *other arrests* as dependent variables. In almost all cases, program youth do better in lowering their levels of arrests than comparison or quasi-program youth. Of special interest is that program youth in the subsamples of *violence/no-drugs* and *violence and drugs* do better in lowering their arrests for serious violence, total violence, and drugs than do the equivalent comparison and quasi-program subsamples. However, there is no statistical difference among the program, comparison and quasi-program samples in respect to lowering *other* arrests. Also of interest is the slightly stronger effect of the program in lowering violence arrests for the *violence and drug* subsample than for the *violence/no-drug* subsample. In Chapter 14, we examine the impact of specific services on these two subsamples of arrestees.

We find similar and proportionate differences in patterns for the program sample, whether we use self-reported arrests or offenses (self-report data were not available for the comparison or quasi-program samples).

Table 13.1  
 Typology of Gang-Youth Arrestees  
 Program, Comparison and Quasi-Program Samples

Arrestee Typology	Youth Samples – N and (%)		
	Program N=154	Comparison N=180	Quasi-Program N=84
No-Violence/ No-Drug	26 (16.9)	59 (32.8)	11 (13.1)
Violence/ No-Drug	64 (41.6)	69 (38.3)	34 (40.5)
Drug/ No-Violence	10 (6.5)	11 (6.1)	1 (1.2)
Violence and Drug	54 (35.0)	41 (22.8)	38 (45.2)

Table 13.2  
 Yearly Arrests of Youth in the Arrestee Subsamples  
 Means and Standard Deviations (S.D.)  
 Program (N = 154), Comparison (N = 180) and Quasi-Program (N = 84) Youth Samples<sup>a</sup>

Arrestee Typology	Arrest Category	Pre-Program Period			Program Period			Mean Change		
		P	C	Q	P	C	Q	P	C	Q
		Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)
No-Violence/ No-Drug	Total Arrests	0.46 (0.92)	0.25 (0.39)	0.51 (0.69)	0.39 (0.37)	0.57 (0.79)	0.92 (1.15)	-0.07 (1.01)	0.33 (0.88)	0.41 (0.57)
Violence/ No-Drug	Total Arrests	1.28 (1.36)	1.15 (1.61)	1.16 (1.60)	1.78 (1.38)	1.22 (1.08)	2.20 (2.09)	0.50 (1.96)	0.07 (2.04)	1.04 (2.49)
	Serious-Violence	0.22 (0.33)	0.23 (0.38)	0.21 (0.27)	0.41 (0.57)	0.24 (0.41)	0.38 (0.53)	0.19 (0.66)	0.01 (0.51)	0.17 (0.63)
	Total Violence	0.31 (0.38)	0.36 (0.60)	0.33 (0.40)	0.55 (0.58)	0.42 (0.46)	0.59 (0.55)	0.24 (0.68)	0.06 (0.71)	0.26 (0.64)
Drug/ No-Violence	Total Arrests	0.39 (0.41)	0.20 (0.33)	1.11 (—)	0.82 (0.80)	1.91 (1.71)	0.49 (—)	0.43 (0.91)	1.71 (1.64)	-0.62 (—)
	Drug	0.16 (0.30)	0.05 (0.15)	0.22 (—)	0.28 (0.18)	0.49 (0.45)	0.00 (—)	0.12 (0.46)	0.45 (0.52)	-0.22 (—)
Violence and Drug	Total Arrests	1.77 (1.52)	2.56 (2.02)	3.52 (2.77)	2.62 (2.50)	3.17 (2.66)	3.27 (2.33)	0.85 (3.09)	0.63 (2.79)	-0.25 (2.72)
	Serious-Violence	0.32 (0.45)	0.55 (0.54)	0.59 (0.55)	0.42 (0.52)	0.50 (0.62)	0.62 (0.79)	0.10 (0.79)	-0.04 (0.72)	0.03 (0.84)
	Total Violence	0.39 (0.51)	0.79 (0.74)	0.87 (0.69)	0.52 (0.57)	0.77 (0.78)	0.91 (0.79)	0.12 (0.89)	-0.02 (0.97)	0.05 (1.05)
	Drug	0.14 (0.25)	0.20 (0.32)	0.18 (0.27)	0.56 (0.63)	0.72 (0.82)	0.58 (0.55)	0.42 (0.73)	0.52 (0.85)	0.39 (0.61)

<sup>a</sup> P = Program sample; C = comparison sample; Q = quasi-program sample.

Table 13.3  
Yearly Police Arrest (PA)<sup>a</sup> (N=154) and Self-Report (SR)<sup>b</sup> Offense (N=119) Patterns  
by Arrestee/Offender Typology

Arrestee Typology	Sample Size N <sub>SR</sub> (% <sub>SR</sub> ) vs N <sub>PA</sub> (% <sub>PA</sub> )	Self-Report Offenses <sup>d</sup> vs Police Arrests	Pre-Program Period		Program Period		Mean Change	
			Time I Offenses Mean	Pre-Program Arrests Mean	Time III Offenses Mean	Program Arrests Mean	Time III/ Time I Mean	Program/ Pre-Program Mean
No Arrest Histories	e11 (9.5) vs 0 (0.0)	Total Crime	19.57	—	9.0	—	-10.57	—
		Serious-Violence	7.50	—	4.86	—	-2.64	—
		Total Violence	12.00	—	8.07	—	-3.93	—
		Drug-Selling	4.38 <sup>f</sup>	—	3.21	—	-0.92	—
No-Violence/No-Drug	21 (18.1) vs 26 (16.9)	Total Crime	32.86	0.46	6.95	0.39	-25.90	-0.07
		Serious-Violence	13.62	—	2.19	—	-11.43	—
		Total Violence	17.48	—	4.52	—	-12.95	—
		Drug-Selling	3.43	—	2.79	—	-0.64	—
Violence/No-Drug	42 (36.2) vs 64 (41.6)	Total Crime	70.26	1.28	9.93	1.78	-60.33	0.50
		Serious-Violence	21.71	0.22	3.31	0.41	-18.40	0.19
		Total Violence	39.50	0.31	6.50	0.55	-33.00	0.24
		Drug-Selling	4.38	—	2.05	—	-2.03	—
Drug/No-Violence	8 (6.9) vs 10 (6.5)	Total Crime	16.38	0.39	7.75	0.82	-8.63	0.43
		Serious-Violence	5.63	—	1.38	—	-4.25	—
		Total Violence	8.88	—	4.63	—	-4.25	—
		Drug-Selling	5.13	0.16	2.50	0.28	-2.63	0.12
Violence and Drug	34 (29.3) vs 54 (35.0)	Total Crime	61.68	1.77	11.09	2.62	-50.59	0.85
		Serious-Violence	22.59	0.32	4.74	0.42	-17.85	0.10
		Violence	30.21	0.39	7.91	0.52	-22.29	0.12
		Drug-Selling	4.12	0.14	3.51	0.56	-0.61	0.42

See footnotes, page 13.24.

Table 13.3 continued  
Footnotes

- <sup>a</sup> Arrest data are derived from Chicago Police Department records. The arrest data cover a 4½-year program period (1987-1992) and a 4½-year program period (1992-1997) for Cohorts I and II, but only a 2-year pre-program (1993-1995) and 2-year program (1995-1997) period for Cohort III.
- <sup>b</sup> Self-report data are derived from three interviews obtained from program youth during the program period. The interval between the Time I and Time III interview was two years. The Time I interviews were conducted mainly in the period 1992-1996; the Time III interviews were conducted between 1993 and 1996. The interview time periods (as the police report periods) vary for each program youth depending on his Cohort.
- <sup>c</sup>  $N_{SR}$  (%  $_{SR}$ ) and  $N_{PA}$  (%  $_{PA}$ ) represent sample sizes (percents) of two unmatched samples from self-report offense and police-arrest data.
- <sup>d</sup> Self-report offenses = number of offenses in the six-month period prior to the particular Time I, Time II or Time III interview. Total self-report offenses exclude drug-selling. Some youth had missing responses in the Drug-Selling items in the interviews.
- <sup>e</sup> The 11 interviewed youth with *no arrest histories* were not included in the police arrest data.



Table 13.4  
Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Arrests  
Controlling for Yearly Total Arrests in the Pre-Program Period

13.4(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.372)\*\*\*

Variables	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program, Quasi-Program Sample	2	9.957	0.27	0.763
Age: 16 & Under, 17 to 18, 19 & Over	2	431.499	11.72***	0.000
Gang: Latin King, Two Six	1	0.983	0.03	0.870
Arrestee Typology: No-Violence/No-Drug, Violence/No-Drug, Drug/No-Violence, Violence and Drug	3	325.820	8.85***	0.000
Pre-program Yearly Total Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	1379.198	37.47***	0.000
Project V Age	4	98.170	2.67*	0.032
Project V Arrestee Typology	6	50.453	1.37	0.225
Project V Pre-program Yearly Total Arrests	6	27.723	0.75	0.607
Within error	390	36.810	—	—
Total	417	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

13.4(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Age Main Effect

Age	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
16 & Under	164	2.396	0.786	1	—	0.000***	0.000***
17 & 18	123	-1.067	0.827	2		—	0.621
19 & Over	131	-0.658	0.743	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

13.4(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Arrestee Typology Main Effect

Arrestee Typology	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
No-Violence/ No-Drug	96	-2.277	0.833	1	—	0.736	0.000***	0.000***
Violence/ No-Drug	167	1.249	0.508	3			—	0.010**
Drug/ No-Violence	22	-1.462	2.284	2		—	0.249	0.041*
Violence and Drug	133	3.384	0.631	4				—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

13.4(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Project Main Effect

Project	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Program Sample	154	0.156	0.656	1	—	0.529	0.838
Comparison Sample	180	0.727	0.624	2		—	0.601
Quasi-Program Sample	84	-0.212	1.679	3			—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

13.4(e) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project V Arrestee Typology Interaction

Arrestee Typology	Project <sup>a</sup>	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)												
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
No-Violence/ No-Drug	P	-2.745	1.267	26	1	—						*		‡	‡	‡	*
	C	-2.209	0.943	59	2		—					†		‡	‡	‡	*
	Q	-1.877	1.934	11	3			—					*	†	†		
Violence/ No-Drug	P	1.076	0.792	10	7							—			*	*	
	C	-0.146	0.740	11	8								—	*	‡	‡	
	Q	2.818	1.074	1	9									—			
Drug/ No-Violence	P	-1.558	2.008	64	4				—						*	†	
	C	0.870	1.946	69	5					—							
	Q	-3.697	6.261	34	6						—						
Violence and Drug	P	3.850	0.870	54	10										—		
	C	4.396	1.043	41	11											—	
	Q	1.907	1.313	38	12												—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$ .

<sup>a</sup> P = Program Sample; C = Comparison Sample; Q = Quasi-Program Sample.

13.4(f) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project V Age Interaction

Age	Project <sup>a</sup>	Adjust -ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)									
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
16 & Under	P	3.293	1.008	58	1	—			‡		†	‡	†	
	C	1.431	0.840	73	2		—		*		*	*		
	Q	2.464	1.959	33	3			—			†			
17 & 18	P	-1.250	0.983	48	4				—					
	C	0.999	0.996	50	5					—				
	Q	-2.951	2.055	25	6						—			
19 & Over	P	-1.576	0.930	48	7							—		
	C	-0.248	0.885	57	8								—	
	Q	-0.150	1.826	26	9									—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$ .

<sup>a</sup> P = Program Sample; C = Comparison Sample; Q = Quasi-Program Sample.

**Table 13.5**  
**Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Serious-Violence Arrests**  
**Controlling for Yearly Serious-Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period**

**13.5(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.376)\*\*\***

Variables	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program, Quasi-Program Sample	2	11.805	2.67	0.071
Age: 16 & Under, 17 to 18, 19 & Over	2	6.681	1.51	0.223
Gang: Latin King, Two Six	1	0.071	0.02	0.900
Arrestee Typology: Violence/No-Drug, Violence and Drug	1	8.457	1.91	0.168
Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	147.581	33.39***	0.000
Project V Age	4	3.664	0.83	0.508
Project V Arrestee Typology	2	3.295	0.75	0.476
Project V Pre-Program Serious-Violence Arrests	6	6.991	1.58	0.153
Within error	237	4.420	—	—
Total	258	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**13.5(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious-Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and  
Pairwise *t* Test for the Arrestee Typology Main Effect**

Arrestee Typology	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2
Violence/No-Drug	138	-0.461	0.210	0.168
Violence and Drug	121	-0.052	0.210	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

13.5(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious-Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Project Main Effect

Project	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Program Sample	106	-0.726	0.240	1	—	0.068	0.039*
Comparison Sample	87	-0.067	0.267	2		—	0.811
Quasi-Program Sample	66	0.024	0.271	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

13.5(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious-Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project V Arrestee Typology Interaction

Arrestee Typology	Project <sup>a</sup>	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
Violence/No-Drug	P	-0.721	0.327	56	1	—					*
	C	-0.246	0.331	51	2		—				
	Q	-0.415	0.431	31	3			—			
Violence and Drug	P	-0.730	0.316	50	4				—		*
	C	0.111	0.393	36	5					—	
	Q	0.463	0.372	35	6						—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$  .

<sup>a</sup> P = Program Sample; C = Comparison Sample; Q = Quasi-Program Sample.

13.5(e) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious-Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project V Age Interaction

Age	Project <sup>a</sup>	Adjust -ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)									
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
16 & Under	P	-0.632	0.422	47	1	—					*			
	C	-0.241	0.451	27	2		—							
	Q	-0.298	0.466	24	3			—						
17 & 18	P	-0.583	0.398	32	4				—		*			
	C	-0.001	0.437	25	5					—				
	Q	0.842	0.446	23	6						—	†		*
19 & Over	P	-0.962	0.416	27	7							—		
	C	0.041	0.387	35	8								—	
	Q	-0.472	0.490	19	9									—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$ .

<sup>a</sup> P = Program Sample; C = Comparison Sample; Q = Quasi-Program Sample.

**Table 13.6**  
**Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests**  
**Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period**

**13.6(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.367)\*\*\***

Variables	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program, Quasi-Program Sample	2	27.120	4.91**	0.008
Age: 16 & Under, 17 to 18, 19 & Over	2	2.576	0.47	0.628
Gang: Latin King, Two Six	1	0.051	0.01	0.923
Arrestee Typology: Violence/No-Drug, Violence and Drug	1	12.125	2.19	0.140
Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	211.719	38.30***	0.000
Project V Age	4	1.934	0.35	0.844
Project V Arrestee Typology	2	4.515	0.82	0.443
Project V Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests	6	7.923	1.43	0.202
Within error	278	5.528	—	—
Total	299	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**13.6(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and  
Pairwise *t* Test for the Arrestee Typology Main Effect**

Arrestee Typology	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2
Violence/No-Drug	167	-0.130	0.213	0.140
Violence and Drug	133	0.330	0.233	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .



13.6(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Project Main Effect

Project	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Program Sample	118	-0.523	0.239	1	—	0.090	0.002**
Comparison Sample	110	0.081	0.262	2		—	0.129
Quasi-Program Sample	72	0.740	0.332	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

13.6(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project V Arrestee Typology Interaction

Arrestee Typology	Project <sup>a</sup>	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
Violence/No-Drug	P	-0.500	0.321	64	1	—					†
	C	-0.274	0.323	69	2		—				*
	Q	0.384	0.456	34	3			—			
Violence and Drug	P	-0.546	0.333	54	4				—		†
	C	0.436	0.400	41	5					—	
	Q	1.096	0.462	38	6						—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$  .

<sup>a</sup> P = Program Sample; C = Comparison Sample; Q = Quasi-Program Sample.

13.6(e) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project V Age Interaction

Age	Project <sup>a</sup>	Adjust -ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)										
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
16 & Under	P	-0.249	0.419	49	1	—									
	C	0.065	0.411	40	2		—								
	Q	0.646	0.472	28	3			—				†			
17 & 18	P	-0.396	0.429	35	4				—		†				
	C	0.038	0.449	32	5					—					
	Q	1.092	0.550	23	6						—	†			
19 & Over	P	-0.924	0.410	34	7							—		*	
	C	0.140	0.397	38	8								—		
	Q	0.484	0.549	21	9									—	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$ .

<sup>a</sup> P = Program Sample; C = Comparison Sample; Q = Quasi-Program Sample.

**Table 13.7**  
**Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests**  
**Controlling for Yearly Drug Arrests in the Pre-Program Period**

**13.7(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.218)\***

Variables	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program, Quasi-Program Sample	2	3.066	0.54	0.587
Age: 16 & Under, 17 to 18, 19 & Over	2	1.198	0.21	0.812
Gang: Latin King, Two Six	1	13.454	2.35	0.128
Arrestee Typology: Drug/No Violence, Violence and Drug	1	5.795	1.01	0.316
Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	31.049	5.42***	0.002
Project V Age	4	2.209	0.39	0.819
Project V Arrestee Typology	2	0.094	0.02	0.984
Project V Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests	6	8.211	1.43	0.206
Within error	133	5.728	—	—
Total	154	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

**13.7(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Arrestee Typology Main Effect**

Arrestee Typology	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2
Drug/No-Violence	22	-0.621	0.991	0.316
Violence and Drug	133	0.328	0.430	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

13.7(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Project Main Effect

Project	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Program Sample	64	-0.851	0.708	1	—	0.346	0.501
Comparison Sample	52	0.179	0.823	2		—	0.975
Quasi-Program Sample	39	0.232	1.441	3			—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

13.7(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project V Arrestee Typology Interaction

Arrestee Typology	Project <sup>a</sup>	Adjust-ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
Drug/No-Violence	P	-1.314	0.922	10	1	—					
	C	-0.200	1.091	11	2		—				
	Q	-0.348	2.617	1	3			—			
Violence and Drug	P	-0.388	0.735	54	4				—		
	C	0.559	0.741	41	5					—	
	Q	0.813	0.740	38	6						—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$  .

<sup>a</sup> P = Program Sample; C = Comparison Sample; Q = Quasi-Program Sample.

13.7(e) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project V Age Interaction

Age	Project <sup>a</sup>	Adjust -ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)										
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
16 & Under	P	-0.978	0.902	20	1	—									
	C	0.386	0.988	18	2		—								
	Q	0.414	1.581	13	3			—							
17 & 18	P	-1.241	0.874	18	4				—						
	C	0.244	1.095	12	5					—					
	Q	-0.038	1.660	11	6						—				
19 & Over	P	-0.333	0.726	26	7							—			
	C	-0.092	0.805	22	8								—		
	Q	0.322	1.425	15	9									—	

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$ .

<sup>a</sup> P = Program Sample; C = Comparison Sample; Q = Quasi-Program Sample.

Table 13.8  
 Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly *Other* Arrests  
 Controlling for Yearly *Other* Arrests in the Pre-Program Period

13.8(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.436)\*\*\*

Variables	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program, Quasi-Program Sample	2	0.074	0.01	0.993
Age: 16 & Under, 17 to 18, 19 & Over	2	230.882	22.51***	0.000
Gang: Latin King, Two Six	1	0.013	0.00	0.972
Arrestee Typology: No-Violence/No-Drug, Violence/No-Drug, Drug/No-Violence, Violence and Drug	3	38.118	3.72*	0.012
Pre-Program Yearly <i>Other</i> Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	390.701	38.09***	0.000
Project V Age	4	24.672	2.41*	0.049
Project V Arrest Typology	6	16.423	1.60	0.146
Project V Pre-Program Yearly <i>Other</i> Arrests	6	6.886	0.67	0.673
Within error	325	10.257	—	—
Total	352	—	—	—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

13.8(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly *Other* Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test  
 for Age Main Effect

Age	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				<i>i/j</i>	1	2	3
16 & Under	149	0.474	0.472	1	—	0.000***	0.000***
17 and 18	100	-2.079	0.512	2		—	0.949
19 & Over	104	-2.047	0.487	3			—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

13.8(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly *Other Arrests* (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Arrestee Typology Main Effect

Arrestee Typology	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
No-Violence/ No-Drug	71	-1.998	0.565	1	—	0.837	0.112	0.002**
Violence/ No-Drug	140	-1.064	0.371	3			—	0.029*
Drug/No-Violence	18	-1.730	1.243	2		—	0.567	0.192
Violence and Drug	124	-0.078	0.339	4				—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

13.8(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly *Other Arrests* (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Project Main Effect

Project	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Program Sample	136	-1.158	0.497	1	—	0.941	0.911
Comparison Sample	144	-1.217	0.613	2		—	0.957
Quasi-Program Sample	73	-1.277	0.943	3			—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

13.8(e) Adjusted Mean Yearly *Other* Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project V Arrestee Typology Interaction

Arrestee Typology	Project <sup>a</sup>	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)													
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
No-Violence/ No-Drug	P	-1.821	0.807	21	1	—											*	
	C	-2.598	0.760	43	2		—						†	*	‡	*		
	Q	-1.576	1.285	7	3			—										
Violence/ No-Drug	P	-1.423	0.541	9	7							—					*	
	C	-1.949	0.674	8	8								—	*	*	‡		
	Q	0.181	0.714	1	9									—				
Drug/ No-Violence	P	-1.181	1.154	57	4				—									
	C	-0.978	1.323	55	5					—								
	Q	-3.030	3.294	28	6						—							
Violence and Drug	P	-0.208	0.536	49	10										—			
	C	0.659	0.639	38	11												—	
	Q	-0.684	0.569	37	12													—

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 .

<sup>a</sup> P = Program Sample; C = Comparison Sample; Q = Quasi-Program Sample.



13.8(f) Adjusted Mean Yearly *Other* Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project V Age Interaction

Age	Project <sup>a</sup>	Adjust -ed Mean	Std Err	N	Pr >  T  Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)									
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
16 & Under	P	0.944	0.648	54	1	—			‡	*	†	‡	†	*
	C	-0.484	0.667	65	2		—					*		
	Q	0.962	1.072	30	3			—	*		†	†	*	†
17 & 18	P	-1.958	0.615	42	4				—					
	C	-1.463	0.803	37	5					—				
	Q	-2.817	1.160	21	6						—			
19 & Over	P	-2.461	0.663	40	7							—		
	C	-1.704	0.720	42	8								—	
	Q	-1.977	1.084	22	9									—

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; †  $p < .01$ ; and ‡  $p < .001$ .

<sup>a</sup> P = Program Sample; C = Comparison Sample; Q = Quasi-Program Sample.

## Chapter 14

### The Effectiveness of the Youth Worker

In this chapter we ask how successful the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project was – particularly its youth-worker component – in contributing to the reduction of violence arrests, drug arrests or combined violence and drug arrests for the different types of program youth. We believe a typology based on arrest variables, rather than a single arrest characteristic or outcome variable, better approximates the gang youth's behavioral complexity and is more likely to be useful for determining the success of intervention and control efforts. We test the value of youth worker's specific services and strategies in reducing the gang youth's pattern of delinquency or crime during the program period compared to the pre-program period. We ask: what did the youth worker do that effectively resulted in the youth's reducing his specific pattern of arrests?

We ask further what the worker's odds of success to failure were in reducing arrests through the provision of specific kinds of services to differing types of youth, i.e., youth with different arrest histories. Essentially, we interrelate type of youth, program service variables and outcome (i.e., probability of success in reduction of arrest patterns) in the Logistic Regression models that follow. Also, after the discussion of the effects of worker strategies and services on types of program youth in terms of changes in particular arrest patterns, we briefly examine the longer-term arrest patterns of program youth ( $n = 21$ ), comparison youth ( $n = 23$ ) and quasi-program youth ( $n = 18$ ) who were incarcerated in the post-Project period, 1997-2001. Our intent in the brief incarceration analysis is to determine whether arrest patterns persist for particular types of youth, and, to the extent possible based on small sample size and limited information,

whether certain youth were doing better or worse in the post-Project period.

The Little Village model of youth-worker outreach emphasized social intervention and providing access to opportunities (particularly counseling, jobs and education) for gang youth, within a framework of collaboration with criminal-justice-system and local neighborhood-organization personnel. The Little Village model of youth work differed from the so-called “traditional” models, which stressed group work, formal club meetings, recreation and/or peace meetings between feuding gangs. The evaluations of many of these “traditional” gang programs deemphasized the worker’s assistance with jobs and education, minimized the worker’s efforts to reintegrate youth into mainstream society through counseling, and claimed the youth worker may have been responsible for cohering the gang and increasing the gang-youth’s commitment to delinquent behaviors (Klein 1971, 1995).

Gang-program evaluations have not generally considered factors which interactively influence individual-youth outcome, i.e., the youth’s age and distinctive developmental, arrest-history, gang, and subgroup characteristics. A major weakness of gang evaluations also has been a failure to relate specific patterns of services or worker activities to outcome for different youth under statistically controlled conditions in order to truly judge the success or failure of the program. We have controlled for these factors in our evaluation of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction program.

#### Effects of Services Provided to Gang Youth

We have already demonstrated that the program as a whole was associated with the reduction of arrests for different types of youth. We now examine the odds of success to failure

of the specific types of services provided by the Project youth workers in reducing patterns of arrests for the different types of program youth.

In this analysis, we use data from the larger worker-tracking-record subsample of youth (n = 154) (for whom we also have police arrest data), rather than from the smaller debriefing-interview subsample of youth (n = 65). Using summary worker-tracking data provides a representative sample of program youth and youth-worker efforts. The tracking data were collected at three points in time during the entire Project period, although with less narrative detail than the debriefing data. However, we must eliminate 26 of the 154 youth in the worker-tracking sample since they have no violence or drug arrests (although they self-reported a variety of offenses, including violence and drugs – usually at a lower level of frequency than arrested youth). This leaves us with a sample of 128 youth from the two targeted groups in Little Village – Latin Kings (n = 60) and Two Six (n = 68) – for whom we have both arrest and program-service data.

### Success and Failure Rates of Program Youth

Before we present our Logistic Regression models of the odds of success to failure of different types of gang youth in reducing their arrests in response to specific program services and strategies, we provide summary findings on the success and failure rates of all youth (including program, comparison and quasi-program youth: N = 410) in lowering arrests – without examining the effects of specific services provided. We apply multivariate controls for the youth's *age*, *gang-affiliation* and *arrestee typology*, but not *pre-program arrests*, since our sample size is too small to accommodate all of our control variables and we already know that

*pre-program arrests* (a regression factor) correlates significantly with *age*.

Violence-Arrest Change. *Violence/no-drug arrestees* and *violence and drug arrestees* included 118 youth who had violence arrests during the program period. More older youth (19 and over) were successful in reducing their level of violence arrests (61.8% of n = 34) compared to 17- and 18-year-olds (40.0% of n = 35), or to youth 16 years and younger (10.2% of n = 39). The Latin Kings were relatively more successful (43.6% of n = 55) than the Two Six (40.0% of n = 63). Less than a majority of total youth in both gangs succeeded in reducing their level of violence arrests. However, the category of youth with career histories of both drug and violence arrests seemed to do better (55.0% of n = 54) than the category of youth with career histories of violence arrests only (45.0% of n = 64).

Drug-Arrest Change. *Drug/no-violence arrestees* and *drug and violence arrestees* included 64 youth who had drug arrests during the program period. Overall, the career drug-arrestees had the lowest level of success in reducing drug arrests. More 17- and 18-year-olds were relatively successful (33.3% of n = 18) than 19-and-over youth (23.1% of n = 26), and even more successful than 16-and-under youth (10.0% of n = 20). The Two Six were relatively more successful (24.0% of n = 29) than the Latin Kings (20.0% of n = 35). The category of youth with career histories of both drug and violence arrests did slightly better (21.9% of n = 54) than the category of youth with career histories of drug arrests only (20.0% of n = 10).

Combined Violence-and-Drug-Arrest Change. *Violence and drug arrestees* included 128 youth who had both drug and violence arrests during the program period. More older youth (19 and over) reduced their level of arrests for both drugs and violence (50% of n = 40) than the 17- and 18-year-olds (35.1% of n = 37), and more than the 16-and-under youth (10.8% of n = 51).

The success rate was relatively higher for the Latin Kings (35.0% of n = 60) than for the Two Six (23.5% of n = 68).

Across these three categories or subsamples of youth, more of the *drug and violence arrestees* (31.5% of n = 54) were successful and did better than both the *violence/no-drug arrestees* (28.1% of n = 64) and the *drug/no-violence arrestees* (20.0% of n = 10) in lowering their various combinations of violence and drug arrests during the program period. In general, without introducing the program variables of *types of services*, the older youth, the Latin Kings, and youth in the *violence and drug-arrestee* subsample had higher ratios of success to failure in reducing different types of arrests than the younger youth, the Two Six, and the *violence/no-drug arrestee* subsample.

#### Logistic Regression Analysis – Specific Services

We use Logistic Regression models to predict ratios of success-to-failure outcomes, in response to specific services, by program youth with different career arrest patterns. Successful outcome is defined as the youth reducing his level of a particular type of arrest – violence arrests, drug arrests, or a combination of violence and drug arrests. Unsuccessful (or failed) outcome is defined as the youth increasing his level of a particular type of arrest, or remaining at the same level of arrest. (Youth who are not arrested in either the program or pre-program period are excluded from the analysis.) Statistically controlling for *age*, *gang*, and *arrestee typology* of youth, we determine whether different types of services or opportunities-provision for different types of youth were associated with different rates of success in reducing their violence arrests, drug arrests, or a combination of violence and drugs arrests during the program period, compared

to the pre-program period.

In the models, for each of the services or strategies used by the youth worker (and by the Project police in one model), we construct a program variable of “*effective*” *service* (as reported or perceived by the worker). The services or activities are related to key individual youth-related issues: school; job placement or referral; opportunities provision (a combination of school and/or job contacts); individual-youth counseling; family; suppression. The worker had the option of reporting his particular service contact as “very effective,” “somewhat effective,” “hardly effective,” or “not at all effective,” at any of the three summary reporting periods. Only a “very effective” service is included as the predictor-variable in the Logistic Regression models.

Each Logistic Regression model that follows contains three control variables: *age category* (16-and-under, 17 and 18, 19-and-over), a *gang identifier* (Latin King or Two Six), the three *arrestee typology* categories of youth (*violence/no-drug*, *drugs/no-violence* and the combined *violence and drug*), and the “*very effective*” *service* variable. The dependent variable in the model is either (*total*) *violence-only arrest change*, *drug-only arrest change*, or *drug and (total) violence arrest change* between the pre-program and program period. The *arrestee typology* control variable in all of the models indicates whether the *violence and drug arrestee* has a higher or lower odds ratio of success to failure than the *violence/no-drug arrestee* and the *drug/no-violence arrestee* in respect to outcome measures (i.e., violence-only, drug-only, and violence and drug arrests together). In other words, the success-to-failure odds ratios of the *violence and drug arrestees* is compared to the success-to-failure odds ratios of the *violence/no-drug arrestees* and the *drug/no-violence arrestees*, for different arrests.

When we compare the odds ratios of success to failure of the various arrestee categories

in respect to the outcome or dependent-variables, we refer to arrest types separately, that is, we compare the odds ratio of success to failure in reducing only violence arrests for the *violence and drug arrestees* versus the *violence/no-drug arrestees*. Similarly, we compare the odds ratio of success to failure in reducing only drug arrests for the *violence and drug arrestees* versus the *drug/no-violence arrestees*. It is important to note that we distinguish between type of arrest and arrestee category.

#### “Very Effective” School Contacts/Referrals

School services, even when well-delivered, did not help the large majority of program youth reduce their levels of either violence arrests, drug arrests or violence and drug arrests in any of the youth-arrestee categories. For the change in violence arrests, the youth worker’s school-service contact was associated with a 50% greater odds ratio of failure to success,<sup>1</sup> particularly for the younger age groups (odds ratio = 3.91) and the Two Six (odds ratio = 1.69). Controlling for age and gang affiliation, the *violence and drug arrestees* had an 18.9% better odds ratio of success to failure than the *violence/no-drug arrestees* in reducing their level of violence arrests, in response to the worker’s school-related contacts (Table 14.1).

For change in violence and drug arrests, the worker’s school contacts were associated with a more than 2½ times greater odds ratio of failure to success in reducing both violence and drug arrests during the program period, particularly for the younger youth (odds ratio = 3.07) and the Two Six (odds ratio = 1.40). The *violence and drug arrestees* had a 23.8% better odds ratio of success to failure than the *violence/no-drug arrestees* in reducing their arrests for violence in

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<sup>1</sup> The odds ratio of failure to success is the reciprocal of the odds ratio of success to failure.



response to the worker's school contacts (Table 14.2). Again, we are comparing the success-to-failure ratios in reducing only violence arrests between the *violence and drug arrestees* and the *violence/no-drug arrestees*.

For change in drug arrests, the worker's school contacts were associated with a 94% greater odds ratio of success to failure, particularly for older youth compared to younger youth (odds ratio = 1.48). Two Six *drug/no-violence arrestees* had a higher ratio of success to failure (odds ratio = 1.24) compared to the Latin Kings (Table 14.3). However, the *violence and drug arrestees* still had a 45% better ratio of success to failure than the *drug/no-violence arrestees* in reducing their levels of drug arrests. Again, we are comparing the success-to-failure ratios in reducing only drug arrests between the *violence and drug arrestees* and the *drug/no-violence arrestees*.

#### “Very Effective” Job Contacts/Referrals

In contrast to the general failure of worker efforts at helping youth with school problems, worker efforts at helping youth with jobs resulted in higher ratios of success to failure for the youth. The majority of youth in the program were 17 years of age and older, and were far more interested in jobs than in school achievement. However, the success-to-failure ratios of youth reducing levels of violence arrests, drug arrests, or combined violence and drug arrests, varied by the type of arrestee who was provided with job services.

For change in violence arrests, the worker's job efforts were associated with a greater odds ratio of success to failure (2.6 times greater). The difference was almost statistically significant ( $p = 0.07$ ). In particular, the older age group compared to the younger age group

(odds ratio = 3.31) and the Latin Kings compared to the Two Six (odds ratio = 1.32) were associated with higher odds ratios in the youth reducing their violence arrests during the program period. However, the *violence and drug arrestees* had a 25.7% higher odds ratio of success to failure in reducing their violence arrests than the *violence/no-drug arrestees* (Table 14.4).

For change in a combination of violence and drug arrests, the worker's efforts around jobs were associated with a 37.8% greater odds ratio of success to failure in youth reducing their levels of combined violence and drug arrests. Again, the younger age group (odds ratio = 3.04) and the Two Six (odds ratio = 1.12) were associated with higher failure-to-success ratios in response to worker job efforts. The *violence and drug arrestees* had a 20.6% greater odds ratio of success to failure in reducing their levels of violence arrests than either the *violence/no-drug arrestees* and the *drug/no-violence arrestees* (Table 14.5).

For change in drug arrests, the worker's job efforts were associated with a 22.5% greater ratio of failure to success in reducing drug arrests. The worker's probabilities of success in delivering job services were greater for the older youth than the younger youth (odds ratio = 1.49) and for the Two Six than the Latin Kings (odds ratio = 1.33). The *violence and drug arrestees* had a 37.0% higher odds ratio of success to failure than the *drug/no-violence arrestees*. Youth workers did relatively better in reducing drug arrests for older rather than younger youth when providing education or job-related help (Table 14.6).

#### “Very Effective” Opportunity-Provision Services

Opportunity-provision services included effective school and/or job contacts for youth. The Logistic Regression model tests the success-to-failure ratio of both types of services in

contributing to the youth's reduction of various types of arrests.

For change in violence arrests, the worker's opportunity-provision efforts were associated with a greater (2.5) odds ratio of success to failure. Again, the difference was almost statistically significant ( $p = 0.06$ ). The older age group (odds ratio = 3.39) in particular, but also the Latin Kings (odds ratio = 1.30) were associated with higher success-to-failure ratios of youth reducing their violence arrests. However, the *violence and drug arrestees* again had a 40.0% higher odds ratio of success to failure than the *violence/no-drug arrestees* (Table 14.7).

For change in violence and drug arrests, the worker's opportunity-provision efforts were associated with a 28.8% greater odds ratio of success to failure in reducing levels of both violence and drug arrests. The older age group (odds ratio = 3.06) and the Latin Kings (odds ratio = 1.14) again were associated with higher success-to-failure ratios in response to the worker's opportunity-provision efforts. The *violence and drug arrestees* had a 22.2% greater odds ratio of success to failure than the *violence/no-drug arrestees* (Table 14.8).

For change in drug arrests, the worker's opportunity provision efforts were associated with a 36.1% greater odds ratio of failure to success in reducing drug arrests. The *violence and drug arrestees* had a 38.0% better ratio of success to failure in reducing drug arrests than the *drug/no-violence arrestees*. Older youth (odds ratio = 1.49) and the Two Six (odds ratio = 1.29) appeared to be more successful than the younger youth and the Latin Kings, regardless of the worker's opportunity-provision efforts (Table 14.9).

#### “Very Effective” Counseling Services

Counseling youth about various issues, particularly leaving the gang but also reducing

violent behavior, was associated with a reduction in arrests of program youth.

For change in violence arrests, the worker's counseling efforts were associated with a greater (2.6) odds ratio of success to failure. The difference was statistically significant ( $p = 0.04$ ). Counseling seemed to be even more effective than job placement or referral for these youth. The older age group (odds ratio = 3.52) and the Latin Kings (odds ratio = 1.23) were associated with higher success-to-failure ratios of worker-counseling services reducing violence arrests. The *violence and drug arrestees* still had a 24.9% higher odds ratio of success to failure than the *violence/no-drug arrestees* (Table 14.10).

For change in violence and drug arrests, the worker's counseling efforts were associated with a 2.1-times-better odds ratio of success to failure in youth reducing their levels of both violence and drug arrests. The difference was almost statistically significant ( $p = 0.10$ ). The older age group (odds ratio = 3.17) and the Two Six (odds ratio = 1.02) were associated with higher success-to-failure ratios in a model together with the worker's counseling efforts. However, the *violence and drug arrestees* had a 17.9% greater odds ratio of success to failure in reducing their levels of violence arrests than the *violence/no-drug arrestees* (Table 14.11).

For change in drug arrests, the worker's counseling efforts were associated with a 35% greater success to failure ratio in reducing drug arrests. The odds ratio of success to failure with "very effective" counseling appeared to be even greater than the odds ratio of success to failure with "very effective" jobs services, education services, or a combination of the two, in contributing to reducing drug arrests. The success-to-failure ratio for the *violence and drug arrestees* was 29.0% higher than for the *drug/no-violence arrestees*. Older youth had a 47% higher odds ratio of success to failure than younger youth in reducing their drug arrests. Also,

the Two Six *drug/no-violence arrestees* had a 49.0 % better odds ratio of success to failure than the Latin King *drug/no-violence arrestees* in reducing drug arrests during the program period (Table 14.12). Counseling seemed to be a particularly useful approach for the worker in reducing the Two Six drug arrests.

#### “Very Effective” Family Services

Family services included contacts by the youth worker with the youth’s family, and occasionally with his spouse or girlfriend, usually about the youth’s gang involvement and related problems. Family contacts were most frequently initiated by the worker, but sometimes by a family member, spouse or girlfriend. Such contacts included brief counseling or advice, and at times referring the family member, spouse, or girlfriend for services.

For change in violence arrests, family contacts by the workers were associated with a 32.0% greater odds ratio of success to failure in youth reducing their violence arrests. The difference was not statistically significant. However, the older age group (odds ratio = 3.39) in particular, but also the Latin Kings (odds ratio = 1.48) were associated with higher success-to-failure odds ratios of youth reducing their violence arrests. The *violence and drug arrestees* had a 23.6% higher odds ratio of success to failure in reducing violence arrests than the *violence/no-drug arrestees* (Table 14.13).

For change in violence and drug arrests, family services were associated with a 72.0% greater odds ratio of success to failure in youth reducing their levels of violence and drug arrests. Again, the older age group (odds ratio = 3.13) and the Latin Kings (odds ratio = 1.07) were associated with higher success-to-failure ratios of youth reducing their levels of violence and

drug arrests, in a model together with the worker's family-services efforts. The *violence and drug arrestees* had a 16.7% greater odds ratio of success to failure in reducing their levels of violence arrests than the *violence/no-drug arrestees* (Table 14.14).

For change in drug arrests, the worker's family services were associated with a 49% greater success-to-failure ratio in reducing drug arrests. The success-to-failure ratio for the younger age group was 47.0% higher than for the older age group, and the Two Six had an odds ratio of success to failure that was 53% higher than for the Latin Kings, in a model with the youth worker's family-services efforts. In the provision of "very effective" family services, the success-to-failure ratio for the *violence and drug arrestees* was 20.0% higher than for the *drug/no-violence arrestees* (Table 14.15).

#### "Very Effective" Suppression Contacts

In this set of Logistic Regression models, based on worker-tracking data, we could obtain responses only from Project police and probation workers about suppression contacts, i.e., warnings, arrests, probation violations, etc. The worker-tracking form did not include a question or provide for a response about the youth-worker's efforts in direct-suppression or suppression-related contacts. (The debriefing form did provide a question about the scope and nature of the youth worker's efforts in collaboration with police and probation around suppression, which we described earlier, in Chapter 9.) "Very effective" suppression efforts by the police and probation workers were used in this model in association with the odds ratio of the various arrestee-types of youth reducing different kinds of arrests during the program period.

For change in violence arrests, police and probation workers' suppression contacts were

associated with a 67% greater success-to-failure ratio of youth reducing their violence arrests. The oldest age category (odds ratio = 3.45) was associated with a significantly higher success-to-failure ratio than the two younger age categories, and the Latin Kings (odds ratio = 1.50) were associated with a higher success-to-failure ratio than the Two Six. The *violence and drug arrestees* had a 22.0% higher odds ratio of success to failure in reducing violence arrests than the *violence/no-drug arrestees* (Table 14.16).

For change in violence and drug arrests, police and probation workers' contacts with program youth were associated with a 7% greater odds ratio of failure to success in youth reducing their levels of both violence and drug arrests. Suppression apparently made no contribution to the success or failure of youth reducing their violence and drug arrests. The older age group's odds ratio (3.04) was significant. The Latin Kings' odds ratio (1.20) was associated with higher success-to-failure ratios in reducing violence and drug arrests. The *violence and drug arrestees* had a 23.0% greater odds ratio of success to failure in reducing levels of violence arrests than the *violence/no-drug arrestees* (Table 14.17).

For change in drug arrests, the police and probation workers' suppression contacts were associated with an odds ratio of failure to success in reducing drug arrests in the program period that was more than twice as high as for no-suppression contacts. However, the older age category (odds ratio = 1.45) and the Two Six (odds ratio = 1.34) had a higher success-to-failure ratio in reducing drug arrests. The *violence and drug arrestees* had a 57% better odds of success to failure in reducing drug arrests than the *drug/no-violence arrestees* (Table 14.18).

## Summary

In general, “very effective” job and counseling services from youth workers around gang-related problems appeared to predict a higher odds ratio of success to failure than other types of services in reducing arrests among program youth during the program period. The “least effective” service, (i.e., higher ratios of failure to success for workers in reducing all types of arrests) was educational service, e.g., assisting the youth to return to school or advance his school achievement. “Very effective” job, opportunity-provision (a combination of job and educational services) and counseling services had high ratios of success to failure in reducing violence arrests. “Very effective” family services and counseling services had relatively higher ratios of success to failure in reducing drug arrests. In general, the odds of success to failure of effective service contacts in regard to drug arrests were relatively higher for the Two Six, and for youth who had histories of both violence and drug arrests, than for other types of arrestees.

Based on our Logistic Regression analysis, the youth worker had greater odds of success in reducing the gang youth’s violence arrests than his drug arrests. Older youth compared to younger youth, and Latin Kings compared to Two Six, had relatively higher levels of success when provided with “highly effective” services, particularly if youth had arrest histories of violence-only, and especially violence and drug arrests. Older youth compared to younger youth generally had a significantly higher ratio of success to failure in response to all types of services.

Why the *violence and drug arrestees* had higher odds ratios of success to failure than both the *drug/no-violence arrestees* and the *violence/no-drug arrestees* in all of the models is not entirely clear. It could be that relatively more of the youth in the *violence and drug arrestee* subsample were older and/or Latin Kings, and responded better to service contacts in part



because they were no longer as preoccupied with violence as were youth in the *violence/no-drug arrestee* subsample, and were possibly less committed to drug crimes exclusively than youth in the *drug/no-violence arrestee* subsample. We explore these issues further in our examination of post-Project arrests for different types of youth.

### Summary of Odds Ratios: Services, Worker Effectiveness, and Outcomes

We have three objectives in the following summary analysis. The first is to discover whether a particular service, provided or not, makes a difference in outcome for program youth (N = 128). The second is to determine whether a “very effective” or “less-than-very-effective” service makes a difference in outcome. The third is to find out whether more contacts for a particular service are better in enhancing service effectiveness, which in turn reduces arrests. We again use odds ratios to test the value of community youth-worker services in reducing different arrests – violence arrests, violence and drugs arrests, and drug arrests. The Logistic Regression models similarly control for age category, gang identity, and arrestee type, but we do not present the odds ratios of these control variables in Table 14.19.

The specific services or activities predictive of the arrest outcomes are, again, education, jobs, opportunity-provision (a combination of contacts for education and job services), individual-youth counseling, family contacts, and suppression activities (by Project police and probation workers). In Table 14.19A, we compare worker-service contacts versus no worker-service contacts with youth relative to three types of outcome – violence arrests, violence and drug arrests, and drug arrests. In general, we find that worker-service contacts produce higher odds ratios (i.e., a ratio greater than 1) of success to failure in respect to the different outcomes

than do non-services contacts. The best overall results are for service contacts related to jobs and opportunity-provision, i.e., both jobs and education. Educational-service contacts per se produce higher ratios of failure to success than do non-service contacts.

More specifically, worker contacts with youth for jobs, opportunity-provision or counseling have higher odds ratios of success to failure in reducing violence arrests, violence and drug arrests, and (to some extent), drug-only arrests than do non-contacts for these same services. However, worker contacts for education services or suppression generally produce greater odds ratios of failure to success in reducing those patterns of arrests than do non-contacts. In other words, youth with contacts for educational services and suppression show greater ratios of failure to success in reducing drug and violence arrests and drug-only arrests. Nevertheless, education and suppression contacts may be very slightly better than no contacts in respect to the odds of reducing only violence arrests (Table 14.19A).

In Table 14.19B, we present data on the quality of service effects for the same sample of program youth. We ask: which quality of that service – “very effective,” “somewhat effective,” “less-than-very-effective,” “hardly effective,” or “no referral service” – results in a greater odds ratio of success to failure in reducing arrests, mainly violence arrests, drug arrests, and a combination of violence and drug arrests? There are similarities and differences in the odds ratios when we compare outcomes for specific services (Tables 14.19A and 14.19B). The “very effective” service versus the “less-than-very-effective” service, including “no referral” service produces higher ratios of success to failure in the reduction of arrests, particularly when the service contact is for jobs, opportunity-provision and counseling (but now also for suppression), especially when the outcome is reduction of violence arrests. The only case when a “very

effective” service produces a lower success-to-failure ratio in arrests is in respect to educational services. In this analysis, “very effective” delivery of family services produces better results than “less-than-very-effective” and “no referral” services, particularly in reducing all types of arrests. Overall, “very effective” delivery of education and suppression services still produces the lowest odds ratios of success to failure of all the services in reducing arrests.

In sum, service contacts are better than no-service contacts, and “very effective” services are better than “less-than-very-effective” and “no referral” services, especially in respect to jobs and counseling, and even to a somewhat greater extent when “very effective” counseling and family contacts are made with or on behalf of program youth.

### Number and Effectiveness of Services

We now ask a worker-productivity question: to what extent is the number (or amount) of service-contacts-per-youth made by the community youth worker during the program period related to the effectiveness of contacts, at least as perceived by the community youth worker? We explore the relationship between highly effective services and the number of service-contacts made, but we do not directly assess the next step in the relationship, the effectiveness of service on outcome.

number of services<sup>o</sup> increased effectiveness of service<sup>o</sup> higher odds ratio of success to failure in arrest outcome.

To some extent we have addressed the relation of level of service-effectiveness to specific outcomes in the discussion above (Table 14.19B).

Our focus in Table 14.20 is on the relationship between the number of service contacts

per youth, and the perceptions by the workers of higher levels of effectiveness of services with the program youth. Are more service contacts associated with more effective services? We examine this relationship for all youth (N = 184) in the program who were provided with services, regardless of whether the youth had an arrest history. We do not look at arrest outcomes, but simply propose that more contacts by the youth worker increased the effectiveness of services, at least as perceived by the worker.

Table 14.20 presents five types of key services provided mainly by youth workers to program youth: school or education, job, individual-youth counseling, family, and suppression services (i.e., by police and probation workers). (We do not include the category of *opportunity-provision* services [the combination of school and job services] in this analysis.) The percentage of youth who were provided with particular types of services may be rank-ordered as follows: counseling (93.5%), family (60.3%), jobs (59.2%), school/education (45.7%) and suppression (26.1%). In other words, more than a majority of all program youth were provided with counseling, family, and job services. A little less than a majority of youth were provided with school or educational services, because most program youth were 18 years of age or over, and out of school. A smaller percentage of youth were provided with suppression contacts based on the fact that Project police and probation caseloads were considerably smaller than those of the youth workers, and the limited number of police and probation worker-tracking records completed (Chapter 9).

The majority of youth contacted were provided with more than one type of service during the program period. The youth worker provided the same types of services to youth on multiple occasions. The frequency of multiple contacts for a particular service was anywhere from 2 to 5

times per youth during the program period. Multiple contacts for a particular service were most frequently made with those youth selected for suppression contacts (50.0% of n = 48), counseling services (39.0% of n = 172), and family services (36.9% of n = 111).

There was some variation in the workers' perceived effectiveness of the particular services provided relative to the number of contacts made. Multiple contacts had to include at least one contact which was perceived as "very effective." While 48.6% of program youth (n = 111) were perceived as having been provided with at least one "very effective" family-service contact, only 34.5% of program youth (n = 84) were perceived as having been provided with at least one "very effective" school/educational contact. Youth workers also reported that they provided "very effective" counseling to 42.4% of the youth (n = 172) and "very effective" job services to 41.3% of the youth (n = 109). Police and probation workers indicated that they provided "very effective" suppression services to 39.6% of the youth (n = 48) in their caseloads.

Perhaps most important for program-development accountability purposes, the more contacts provided to youth, the more likely the service was viewed by workers as "very effective." Youth workers estimated that they achieved "very effective" contacts with those youth most frequently contacted for job and family services. Youth workers were somewhat less confident that a high frequency of school and counseling contacts was associated with "very effective" results; police and probation workers were even less confident that high frequencies of contacts were associated with "very effective" results (Table 14.20).

In sum, the results of this and the above two Logistic Regression analyses suggest that Project-worker contacts with program youth, particularly for jobs, counseling, and family-related services, were more effective than no contacts in increasing ratios of success to failure in

reducing violence arrests, and violence and drugs arrests, but not drug arrests. Project-worker contacts for school and suppression services had lower odds ratios of success to failure, and were generally likely to contribute to a higher ratio of failure to success in reducing arrests – drug-only arrests, and some combination of violence and drugs arrests, but not violence arrests, where there was a slightly higher ratio of success to failure. It was clear that the more frequently certain services were delivered (particularly job and family-related services) the more likely the efforts of workers were perceived as being “very effective.” Services perceived as being “very effective” with program youth – particularly in regard to jobs, counseling, and family contacts – contributed to higher ratios of success to failure in reducing arrests for the vast majority of program youth in the Little Village Project.

#### Post-Project Incarceration Patterns (1997-2001)

We were interested in the extent to which differences in arrest rates and patterns of arrests were sustained among the three samples (program, comparison, and quasi-program) after the Project ended. We were not able to obtain police arrest data for youth in the samples during the 1997-2001 post-Project period, but we were able to obtain Illinois Department of Corrections incarceration data and the sentencing charges (generally the more serious charges) that led to incarceration. The total number of youth (N = 65) from of the three samples who were incarcerated (program, n = 24; comparison, n = 23; quasi-program, n = 18) was too small and data were insufficient for a complex multivariate analysis. Although several youth (n = 6) had multiple incarcerations, we could not establish the significance of single versus multiple incarcerations since a single incarceration may have reflected a longer sentence, compared to

shorter sentences for multiple incarcerations.

We knew what the youth's arrestee type and his gang identity were during the Project period. We did not know about factors of interim life experiences and services that could also be important in accounting for the differential arrest and incarceration patterns among the three samples of youth. A higher proportion of the original sample of program youth (15.6%) and of quasi-program youth (21.4%) than comparison youth (12.8%) were incarcerated in Illinois between 1997 and 2001. One might expect simply that the youth from the more-delinquent or seriously-delinquent samples (in terms of patterns of prior arrests) were more likely to be incarcerated, which was true.

Most-Serious Sentencing Charge.<sup>2</sup> Across the three samples, the most serious charge for which youth were incarcerated was serious or felony violence (41.5%), followed by drug crime (23.1%), non-violence/non-drug (mainly property) crime (21.5%) and less-serious or misdemeanor violence (13.8%). Program youth evidently continued to be relatively more involved in serious violence than other types of crime in relation to comparison or quasi-program youth. On the other hand, comparison youth were relatively more involved in drug crimes that led to post-Project-period incarcerations than were youth from the other two samples. Comparison youth were also relatively more involved in less-serious violence than program and quasi-program youth. There was less difference among the samples in proportions of youth involved in non-violence/non-drug crimes that led to incarceration (Table 14.21). Program youth's continuing priority commitment to violence and comparison youth's commitment to drug crime were reflected in their respective sentencing charges. Nevertheless, we cannot

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<sup>2</sup> The most-serious sentencing charge was the same as the original arrest charge in almost all cases.

assume, because of small size, that the post-Project incarceration subsamples are fully representative of the original program-period samples.

Age Categories of Incarcerated Youth. It is possible to argue that the different patterns of arrests and incarcerations were a function of the original age differences among Project youth who were incarcerated. Based on our previous analysis of program effects, we know that younger youth (16 and under) increased their arrests, and older youth (19 and over) invariably decreased their arrests between the pre-program and program periods. It is quite clear from the data in Table 14.22 that incarcerated program and quasi-program youth tended to be relatively younger than incarcerated comparison youth. In any comparative evaluation of the effects of the program on incarceration, we need to control for age, which we were unable to do because of small subsample size.

Nevertheless, we note interesting age-pattern differences among the incarcerated Latin King and Two Six program-sample youth relative to those in the comparison sample. There are relatively more Two Six ( $n = 13$ ) than Latin King ( $n = 11$ ) incarcerated program youth, but more Two Six ( $n = 13$ ) program than Two Six comparison incarcerated youth ( $n = 8$ ). On the other hand, fewer Latin King program youth (11) than Latin King comparison youth (15) were incarcerated.

Our Logistic Regression models earlier in this chapter indicated that ratios of success to failure of the different services in reducing arrest patterns were generally higher for the Latin Kings and for older youth. Again, because of lack of data, we cannot determine whether the higher success-to-failure ratios of youth-worker efforts with younger youth and the Two Six during the program period were related somehow to (possibly) a similar pattern of arrests that



led to incarcerations for the younger youth and the Two Six during the post-Project period.

We know that younger youth (16 and under), particularly in the third Cohort, generally had a shorter period of service (during the last two years of the program), while youth 17 and older generally had a longer period of service (during the entire five-year program period). It is also possible that the Latin King youth workers had more effective service relationships with their targeted youth than did the Two Six workers. Latin King workers were older, and had higher former gang status (including greater incarceration experience) than the Two Six workers.

Arrestee Types of Incarcerated Youth. There is some evidence, nevertheless, that the pattern of arrests of the different types of arrestee subsamples across the samples during the pre-program and program period may be related to the patterns of arrests for which the youth were incarcerated in the post-Project period. The four *no-violence/no-drug arrestees* (i.e., those who were arrested for property crimes, disorderly conduct, mob action, etc.) in the pre-program and program periods accounted for only 6.6% of all youth who were incarcerated in the post-Project period. Three of these youth were in the comparison sample. The smallest number of incarcerated youth in all three samples in the pre-program and program periods was in the *drug/no-violence arrestee* subsample. Only one (1.6%) *drug/no-violence arrestee* (in the program sample) was sentenced for a drug crime and also incarcerated (Table 14.23).

The largest percentages of youth incarcerated in all three samples were in the *violence/no-drug arrestee* subsamples (44.3%) and the *violence and drug arrestee* subsamples (47.5%). The largest percentage of youth in the *violence and drug arrestee* subsample was in the comparison subsample (55.0%) and the quasi-program subsample (52.9%), compared to the

program subsample (39.1%). Also, the largest percentage of youth sentenced for violence, especially serious violence, was in the program *violence/no-drug arrestee* subsample (56.5%), compared to the quasi-program (44.4%) and comparison (30.0%) *violence/no-drug arrestee* subsample (Table 14.23).

There were interesting continuities and discontinuities in the arrest patterns of youth in the three samples before and after the Project terminated. While the dominant arrest patterns (based on the sentencing charge) were violence/no-drug and drug/no-violence arrests in the incarceration period, there were differences in the proportion of youth in each of the samples who continued with their earlier program and pre-program arrest patterns. A limitation of this exploratory analysis, however, is that we are comparing patterns of youth based on multiple arrests in the program and pre-program periods with single arrests in the post-Project period. Of the 65 youth in our post-Project incarceration sample, 58 were incarcerated once, 5 were incarcerated twice, and 1 youth was incarcerated three times (Table 14.21).

First we observe that while all of the program youth in this sample had been arrested for a drug and/or violence crime in the program or pre-program period, six of these youth were arrested for other, i.e., no-violence/no-drug crimes in the post-Project incarceration period. Also, only one quasi-program youth earlier had a no-violence/no-drug arrest pattern; three more youth were sentenced for other, i.e., no-violence/no-drug crimes in the post-Project incarceration period. The pattern for comparison youth is different, in that there was less change in arrestee-type pattern: three comparison youth had a no-violence/no-drug arrest pattern in the earlier periods, and four youth showed this arrest pattern in the post-Project incarceration period.

It is possible that youth in the program and quasi-program samples may have developed

somewhat less serious crime and arrest patterns than was the case during the program period. Among all program youth incarcerated ( $N = 23$ )<sup>3</sup> who earlier had been violence and/or drug arrestees, 6 youth (as indicated above) were arrested and sentenced in the post-Project incarceration period for lesser, no-violence/no-drug crimes; 4 other program youth changed their patterns from either drug/no-violence to violence/no-drug, violence/no-drug to drug/no-violence, or to violence and drug arrests; and the remaining 13 program youth retained their earlier arrest pattern(s), i.e., some variation of violence and/or drug arrests (Table 14.24).

Among the incarcerated comparison sample ( $N = 20$ )<sup>4</sup>, only one had earlier been arrested for a no-violence/no-drug crime; 3 comparison youth were incarcerated in the post-Project period possibly for more-serious or equivalent-serious crimes (two youth who were no-violence/no-drug arrestees were incarcerated for violence and 1 violence/no-drug arrestee was incarcerated for a drug crime); the remaining 16 comparison youth did not change their earlier patterns of violence and/or drug arrests in the post-Project incarceration period.

Among the incarcerated quasi-program youth ( $N = 18$ ), three earlier violence/no-drug youth were incarcerated in the post-Project period for no-violence/no-drug crimes; the remaining 15 youth did not change their patterns of crimes which led to incarceration in the post-Project period. We could not adequately provide the sentencing arrest charge(s) for youth in the post-Project period, because as a rule only a single sentencing arrest charge was identified.

Thus, the majority of youth in each of the samples remained true to their arrestee type in the program and pre-program periods. They continued to “specialize,” based on earlier arrest

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote c, Table 14.24.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote c, Table 14.24.

patterns, in particular types or combinations of crime, especially violence and/or drug crimes. This assumes that violence and/or drug arrests constitute more serious arrests than no-violence/no-drug arrests. If this is so, then the odds ratios of the youth changing toward a less-serious relative to a more-serious arrest (or the same type of arrest) are greater for the program sample (0.35) and for the quasi-program sample (0.20) than for the comparison sample (0.05). In other words, the arrest pattern, in terms of less severity of crimes, is 7 times “improved” for the program sample compared to the comparison sample, and 1.75 times “improved” compared to the quasi-program sample.

Again, it is important to note that we do not have complete arrest histories for any youth in the post-Project period. Our conclusions must remain speculative, because of small sample sizes, limited data, and inadequate age, gang, and other statistical controls. Yet it is quite possible that the Project contributed to more restrained patterns of arrests for violence and drugs for program and, to some extent, quasi-program youth than for comparison youth in the post-Project period.

Summary. Post-Project sentencing and related incarceration patterns for program, comparison, and quasi-program youth seemed to be generally consistent with pre-program and program-period arrest patterns. We could not account for the larger number of incarcerations in the program compared to the comparison samples, except for the fact that more of the program and quasi-program youth were violence-arrest types, and also a relatively larger number of younger youth and Two Six youth in the program and quasi-program samples than in the comparison sample were incarcerated. The likelihood of arrest and incarceration for violence was greater for

younger, and, to some extent, for Two Six youth in the program period as well. In the final analysis we cannot determine whether program effects contributed to greater or lesser incarceration rates for program youth compared to equivalent comparison and quasi-program youth, because of the absence of larger samples and adequate statistical controls for age, gang identity, and arrest records. But there appeared to be a very considerable degree of continuity between earlier and later arrest patterns, even during the post-Project period.

Table 14.1  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Violence Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” School Contacts/Referrals

14.1(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Violence Arrests)

School Contacts/Referrals	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	7	14	21
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	33	64	97
Total	40	78	118

14.1(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $P^2$  for covariates=25.954 \*\*\* with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	1.333	0.844	0.114	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over, 1=17 to 18, 2=16 & Under)	1	-1.228	0.286	0.000***	0.293
Gang (0=Latin King, 1=Two Six)	1	-0.525	0.463	0.257	0.591
Arrestee Typology (0=Violence/No-Drug, 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.173	0.451	0.701	1.189
School Referrals (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	-0.406	0.591	0.492	0.666

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.2  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Combined Violence and Drug Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” School Contacts/Referrals

14.2(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Combined Violence and Drug Arrests)

School Contacts/Referrals	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	4	17	21
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	33	74	107
Total	37	91	128

14.2(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=22.551 \*\*\* with 4 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	0.712	0.740	0.336	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-1.125	0.276	0.000***	0.325
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	-0.337	0.449	0.453	0.714
Arrestee Typology (-1=Drug/No-Violence, 0=Violence/No-Drug, 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.214	0.332	0.521	1.238
School Referrals (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	-0.974	0.652	0.135	0.378

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.3  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Drug Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” School Contacts/Referrals

14.3(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Drug Arrests)

School Contacts/Referrals	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	1	6	7
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	13	44	57
Total	14	50	64

14.3(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=1.676 with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	-1.489	1.256	0.236	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-0.419	0.378	0.266	0.657
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	0.215	0.642	0.737	1.240
Arrestee Typology (0=Drug/No-Violence, 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.371	0.883	0.675	1.449
School Referrals (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	-0.665	1.193	0.577	0.515

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.



Table 14.4  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Violence Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Job Contacts/Referrals

14.4(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Violence Arrests)

Job Contacts/Referrals	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	15	12	27
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	25	66	91
Total	40	78	118

14.4(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=28.367 \*\*\* with 4 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	0.588	0.824	0.475	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-1.199	0.292	0.000***	0.302
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	-0.279	0.463	0.547	0.757
Arrestee Typology (0=Violence/No-Drug, 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.228	0.453	0.614	1.257
Job Referrals (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	0.939	0.511	0.066	2.558

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.5  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Combined Violence and Drug Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Job Contacts/Referrals

14.5(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Combined Violence and Drug Arrests)

Job Contacts/Referrals	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	11	18	29
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	26	73	99
Total	37	91	128

14.5(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=20.683 \*\*\* with 4 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	0.149	0.737	0.839	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-1.111	0.277	0.000***	0.329
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	-0.118	0.444	0.791	0.889
Arrestee Typology (-1=Drug/No-Violence, 0=Violence/No-Drug, 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.187	0.332	0.574	1.206
Job Referrals (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	0.334	0.495	0.500	0.378

For differences between groups: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; and \*\*\* p < .001 .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.6  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Drug Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Job Contacts/Referrals

14.6(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Drug Arrests)

Job Contacts/Referrals	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	3	13	16
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	11	37	48
Total	14	50	64

14.6(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=1.408 with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	-1.578	1.279	0.217	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-0.398	0.378	0.292	0.672
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	0.287	0.638	0.652	1.333
Arrestee Typology (0=Drug/No-Violence; 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.311	0.880	0.724	1.365
Job Referrals (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	-0.203	0.762	0.790	0.816

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.7  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Violence Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Opportunity Services

14.7(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Violence Arrests)

Opportunity Services	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	18	18	36
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	22	60	82
Total	40	78	118

14.7(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $P^2$  for covariates=28.213 \*\*\* with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $P^2$	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	0.458	0.848	0.589	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-1.220	0.294	0.000***	0.295
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	-0.260	0.463	0.575	0.771
Arrestee Typology (0=Violence/No-Drug; 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.337	0.458	0.462	1.400
Opportunity Services (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	0.903	0.479	0.060	2.468

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.8  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Combined Violence and Drug Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Opportunity Services

14.8(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Combined Violence and Drug Arrests)

Opportunity Services	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	13	25	38
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	24	66	90
Total	37	91	128

14.8(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $P^2$  for covariates=20.501 \*\*\* with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $P^2$	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	0.168	0.746	0.822	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-1.119	0.278	0.000***	0.327
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	-0.127	0.444	0.776	0.881
Arrestee Typology (-1=Drug/No-Violence; 0=Violence/No-Drug, 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.201	0.332	0.546	1.222
Opportunity Services (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	0.253	0.462	0.584	1.288

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.9  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Drug Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Opportunity Services

14.9(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Drug Arrests)

Opportunity Services	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	3	14	17
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	11	36	47
Total	14	50	64

14.9(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=1.498 with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	-1.518	1.282	0.237	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-0.397	0.378	0.294	0.673
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	0.256	0.642	0.690	1.292
Arrestee Typology (0=Drug/No-Violence; 1=Violence/No-Drug)	1	0.325	0.882	0.713	1.384
Opportunity Services (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	-0.308	0.764	0.687	0.735

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.10  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Violence Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Counseling Services

14.10(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Violence Arrests)

Counseling Services	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	21	23	44
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	19	55	74
Total	40	78	118

14.10(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=28.883 \*\*\* with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	0.395	0.847	0.641	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-1.260	0.299	0.000***	0.284
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	-0.209	0.471	0.657	0.811
Arrestee Typology (0=Violence/No-Drug; 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.222	0.455	0.625	1.249
Counseling Services (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	0.959	0.471	0.042*	2.608

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.11  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Combined Violence and Drug Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Counseling Services

14.11(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Combined Violence and Drug Arrests)

Counseling Services	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	18	29	47
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	19	62	81
Total	37	91	128

14.11(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=22.489 \*\*\* with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	-0.218	0.773	0.778	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-1.157	0.286	0.000***	0.315
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	0.017	0.457	0.971	1.017
Arrestee Typology (-1=Drug/No-Violence, 0=Violence/No-Drug, 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.165	0.336	0.624	1.179
Counseling Services (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	0.740	0.456	0.105	2.095

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.



Table 14.12  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Drug Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Counseling Services

14.12(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Drug Arrests)

Counseling Services	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	6	18	24
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	8	32	40
Total	14	50	64

14.12(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=1.537 with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	-1.867	1.300	0.151	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-0.388	0.380	0.307	0.678
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	0.398	0.635	0.531	1.489
Arrestee Typology (0=Drug/No-Violence; 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.252	0.876	0.774	1.286
Counseling Services (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	0.303	0.643	0.637	1.354

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.13  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Violence Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Family Services

14.13(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Violence Arrests)

Family Services	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	15	21	36
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	25	57	82
Total	40	78	118

15.13(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=25.649 \*\*\* with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	0.939	0.827	0.256	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-1.220	0.288	0.000***	0.295
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	-0.392	0.457	0.391	0.676
Arrestee Typology (0=Violence/No-Drug, 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.212	0.447	0.636	1.236
Family Services (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	0.274	0.470	0.560	1.315

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.14  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Combined Violence and Drug Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Family Services

14.14(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Combined Violence and Drug Arrests)

Family Services	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	14	23	37
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	23	68	91
Total	37	91	128

14.14(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=21.209 \*\*\* with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	0.022	0.739	0.976	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-1.144	0.285	0.000***	0.319
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	-0.069	0.446	0.876	0.933
Arrestee Typology (-1=Drug/No-Violence; 0=Violence/No-Drug; 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.154	0.336	0.646	1.167
Family Services (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	0.545	0.466	0.242	1.724

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.15  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Drug Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Family Services

14.15(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Drug Arrests)

Family Services	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	5	14	19
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	9	36	45
Total	14	50	64

14.15(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=1.656 with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	-1.865	1.279	0.145	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-0.386	0.381	0.312	0.680
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	0.428	0.642	0.505	1.534
Arrestee Typology (0=Drug/No-Violence, 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.186	0.894	0.835	1.204
Family Services (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	0.402	0.690	0.561	1.494

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.16  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Violence Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Suppression Contacts

14.16(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Violence Arrests)

Suppression Contacts	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	12	16	28
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	28	62	90
Total	40	78	118

14.16(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $P^2$  for covariates=26.174 \*\*\* with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $P^2$	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	0.942	0.792	0.234	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-1.239	0.290	0.000***	0.290
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	-0.405	0.450	0.368	0.667
Arrestee Typology (0=Violence/No-Drug, 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.197	0.448	0.659	1.218
Suppression Contacts (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	0.512	0.501	0.307	1.668

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.17  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Combined Violence and Drug Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Suppression Contacts

14.17(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Combined Violence and Drug Arrests)

Suppression Contacts	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	8	20	28
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	29	71	100
Total	37	91	128

14.17(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model  $P^2$  for covariates=20.362 \*\*\* with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > $P^2$	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	0.339	0.707	0.632	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-1.112	0.276	0.000***	0.329
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	-0.182	0.436	0.676	0.834
Arrestee Typology (-1=Drug/No-Violence; 0=Violence/No-Drug, 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.208	0.335	0.534	1.232
Suppression Contacts (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	-0.067	0.518	0.898	0.936

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.18  
 Summary of Logistic Regression  
 Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Drug Arrests  
 Youth With and Without “Effective” Suppression Contacts

14.18(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect (Drug Arrests)

Suppression Contacts	Project Success	Project Failure	Total
Effective <sup>a</sup>	2	13	15
Otherwise <sup>b</sup>	12	37	49
Total	14	50	64

14.18(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P<sup>2</sup> for covariates=2.110 with 4 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr >P <sup>2</sup>	Odds Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	1	-1.635	1.233	0.185	—
Age at Program Entry (0=19 & Over; 1=17 to 18; 2=16 & Under)	1	-0.370	0.378	0.328	0.691
Gang (0=Latin King; 1=Two Six)	1	0.296	0.621	0.634	1.344
Arrestee Typology (0=Drug/No-Violence; 1=Violence and Drug)	1	0.451	0.887	0.611	1.570
Suppression Contacts (0=Otherwise; 1=Effective)	1	-0.737	0.851	0.387	0.478

For differences between groups: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; and \*\*\*  $p < .001$  .

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<sup>a</sup> Effective corresponds to “Very Much” success as perceived by youth worker.

<sup>b</sup> Otherwise corresponds to “Some”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success as perceived by youth worker, as well as “No Service/Contact.”

<sup>c</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.

Table 14.19  
 Comparison of Odds Ratios From 2 Sets of Logistic Models  
 Using Worker-Tracking Data  
 Worker Contacts/Referrals and “Effective” Worker Contacts/Referrals

Logistic Models <sup>^</sup> Predictor <sup>o</sup> Outcome <sup>^^</sup>		14.19-A Worker Contacts/Referrals <sup>1</sup>			14.19-B “Effective” Worker Contacts/Referrals <sup>2</sup>		
<i>Service Type</i>	Change in Arrests	Std.Err.	<i>p</i>	Odds Ratio <sup>3</sup>	Std.Err.	<i>p</i>	Odds Ratio <sup>3</sup>
<i>Education</i>	Violence	0.461	0.645	1.032	0.591	0.492	0.666
	Violence and Drug	0.460	0.166	0.529	0.652	0.122	0.364
	Drug	0.701	0.164	0.377	1.193	0.577	0.515
<i>Job</i>	Violence	0.470	0.037*	2.665	0.511	0.066	2.558
	Violence and Drug	0.444	0.141	1.923	0.493	0.472	1.426
	Drug	0.638	0.681	1.299	0.762	0.790	0.816
<i>Opportunity</i>	Violence	0.498	0.137	2.097	0.479	0.060	2.468
	Violence and Drug	0.462	0.766	1.148	0.463	0.614	1.263
	Drug	0.681	0.922	1.069	0.764	0.687	0.735
<i>Family</i>	Violence	0.458	0.861	0.923	0.470	0.560	1.315
	Violence and Drug	0.441	0.753	1.149	0.461	0.209	1.786
	Drug	0.657	0.634	1.368	0.690	0.561	1.494
<i>Counseling</i>	Violence	0.660	0.115	2.831	0.471	0.042*	2.608
	Violence and Drug	0.565	0.619	1.325	0.456	0.094	2.150
	Drug	0.789	0.259	0.411	0.643	0.637	1.354
<i>Suppression</i>	Violence	0.224	0.645	1.108	0.504	0.307	1.668
	Violence and Drug	0.448	0.801	0.893	0.514	0.985	0.990
	Drug	0.687	0.594	0.693	0.851	0.387	0.478

\*  $p < .05$ .

<sup>^</sup> Together with the *Service* predictor, all Logistic Regression models controlled for Age (19 & Over; 17 and 18; 16 & Under), Gang (Latin King; Two Six), and Arrestee Typology (Violence/No-Drug; Violence and Drug; Drug/No-Violence).

<sup>^^</sup> Number of subjects with arrests: Violence (118), Violence and Drug (128), and Drug (64).

<sup>1</sup> Worker Contacts/Referrals = youth either with or without contacts/referrals.

<sup>2</sup> “Effective” Contacts/Referrals are those services perceived by the youth worker as either Effective (i.e. “Very Much” success) or Otherwise (i.e. “Somewhat”, “Little”, and “Not At All” success, as well as “No Contact/Referral”).

<sup>3</sup> This ratio indicates the success-to-failure odds. The failure-to-success odds is the reciprocal of the odds of success to failure.



Table 14.20  
Worker Contacts/Services and Effectiveness  
Frequency (N) and Percent (%) of Youth with Services/Contacts (N=184)

Type of Service	Number of Contacts <sup>a</sup> (C)	Worker Contact/Service		Contact/Service Effectiveness	
		N (%)	% <sup>b</sup> of C\$1	N <sub>e</sub>	% <sup>c</sup> = $\frac{N_e}{N} \times 100$ <sup>d</sup>
Education	0	100 (54.3)	—	—	—
	1	65 (35.3)	77.3	18	27.7
	2	15 (8.2)	17.9	8	53.3
	\$3	4 (2.2)	4.8	3	75.0
Job	0	75 (40.7)	—	—	—
	1	78 (42.4)	71.6	22	28.2
	2	23 (12.5)	21.1	15	65.2
	\$3	8 (4.4)	7.3	8	100.0
Counseling	0	12 (6.5)	—	—	—
	1	105 (57.1)	61.0	33	31.4
	2	51 (27.7)	29.7	27	52.9
	\$3	16 (8.7)	9.3	13	81.3
Family	0	73 (39.7)	—	—	—
	1	70 (38.0)	63.1	21	30.0
	2	35 (19.0)	31.5	27	77.1
	\$3	6 (3.3)	5.4	6	100.0
Suppression	0	136 (73.9)	—	—	—
	1	24 (13.0)	50.0	9	37.5
	2	13 (7.1)	27.1	9	69.2
	\$3	11 (6.0)	22.9	10	90.9

<sup>a</sup> All contacts by all youth workers during the program period.

<sup>b</sup> % = total number of youth with contacts/services (i.e 184 less youth with no contacts/services).

<sup>c</sup> % = total number of youth with specific number of contacts by service type.

<sup>d</sup> N<sub>e</sub> = number of youth with effective contacts divided by number of contacts.

Table 14.21  
 Most Serious Sentencing Charge<sup>a</sup> (Leading to Incarceration: 1997-2001)

Samples	Crime Type									
	Serious Violence		Less-Serious Violence		Drug		Non-Violence Non-Drug		Row Total	
	N <sub>1</sub>	% <sub>1</sub>	N <sub>2</sub>	% <sub>2</sub>	N <sub>3</sub>	% <sub>3</sub>	N <sub>4</sub>	% <sub>4</sub>	N <sub>T</sub>	% <sub>T</sub>
Program	13	54.2	1	4.2	4	16.7	6	25.0	24	100.0
Comparison	7	30.4	5	21.7	7	30.4	4	17.4	23	100.0
Quasi-Program	7	38.9	3	16.7	4	22.2	4	22.2	18	100.0
Total <sup>b</sup>	27	41.5	9	13.8	15	23.1	14	21.5	65	100.0

Note that  $N_T = N_1 + N_2 + N_3 + N_4$  and  $\%_T = \%_1 + \%_2 + \%_3 + \%_4 = 100\%$ .

<sup>a</sup> Only the most serious sentencing charge leading to incarceration in the post-Project period is used for identifying crime type.

<sup>b</sup> Of the total 65 youth, 6 had more than one incarceration (5 youth were incarcerated twice, and 1 youth was incarcerated three times in this period). Among them, 2 program and 1 comparison youth were included in *Serious Violence*, while 1 program and 2 comparison youth were included in *Drug*.

Table 14.22  
 Incarcerated Program, Comparison and Quasi-Program Youth (N = 65) By Gang and by Age

Gang and Youth Sample <sup>a</sup>	Age (N and %)						Row Total	
	19 and Over		17 and 18		16 and Under			
<u>Latin King</u>								
- Program	3	27.2	4	36.4	4	36.4	11	100.0
- Comparison	5	33.3	6	40.0	4	26.7	15	100.0
- Quasi-program	1	16.7	2	33.3	3	50.0	6	100.0
<u>Two Six</u>								
- Program	3	23.1	4	30.8	6	46.2	13	100.0
- Comparison	3	37.5	3	37.5	2	25.0	8	100.0
- Quasi-program	3	25.0	3	25.0	6	50.0	12	100.0

<sup>a</sup> Youth with arrests leading to incarceration: Program (n=24); Comparison (n=23); Quasi-Program (n=18).

Table 14.23  
 Arrestee Typology of Youth  
 Project Period<sup>1</sup> (1992-1997) and Post-Project Incarceration Period<sup>2</sup> (1997-2001)

Sample	Arrestee Typology															
	No-Violence/No-Drug				Violence/No-Drug				Drug/No-Violence				Violence and Drug			
	Program Period		Incarceration Period		Program Period		Incarceration Period		Program Period		Incarceration Period		Program Period		Incarceration Period	
	N <sub>P1</sub>	% <sub>P1</sub>	N <sub>I1</sub>	% <sub>I1</sub>	N <sub>P2</sub>	% <sub>P2</sub>	N <sub>I2</sub>	% <sub>I2</sub>	N <sub>P3</sub>	% <sub>P3</sub>	N <sub>I3</sub>	% <sub>I3</sub>	N <sub>P4</sub>	% <sub>P4</sub>	N <sub>I4</sub>	% <sub>I4</sub>
Program	25	16.2	0	0	46	29.9	13	56.5	11	7.1	1	4.3	72	46.8	9	39.1
Comparison	54	30.0	3	15.0	53	29.4	6	30.0	16	8.9	0	0	57	31.8	11	55.0
Quasi-Program	9	10.7	1	5.6	28	33.3	8	44.4	3	3.6	0	0	44	52.4	9	50.0
All 3 Samples	88	26.0	4	6.6	127	37.6	27	44.3	30	8.9	1	1.6	173	51.2	29	47.5

Note that %<sub>P1</sub>+%<sub>P2</sub>+%<sub>P3</sub>+%<sub>P4</sub> = 100%, and %<sub>I1</sub>+%<sub>I2</sub>+%<sub>I3</sub>+%<sub>I4</sub> = 100%.

<sup>1</sup> Youth with arrest histories within program period: Program (n=154), Comparison (n=180), Quasi-Program (n=84).

<sup>2</sup> Youth with arrests in the post-Project incarceration period: Program (n=24); Comparison (n=23); Quasi-Program (n=18).

Table 14.24  
Youth Arrestee Typology by Youth Samples (N = 65)  
Program and Pre-Program Period (1987-1997) vs Post-Project Incarceration Period<sup>a</sup> (1997-2001)

Arrestee Typology 1987-1997	Post-Project Arrest Pattern <sup>b</sup> (1997-2001) – N and (%)											
	Program Youth Sample				Comparison Youth Sample				Quasi-Program Youth Sample			
	N-V N-D	Viol	Drug	V-D	N-V N-D	Viol	Drug	V-D	N-V N-D	Viol	Drug	V-D
Excluded youth <sup>c</sup>	0 (0.0)	1 (4.2)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (4.3)	2 (8.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
No-Violence/No-Drug	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (4.3)	2 (8.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (5.5)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Violence/No-Drug	5 (20.8)	5 (20.8)	2 (8.3)	1 (4.2)	1 (4.3)	4 (17.4)	1 (4.3)	0 (0.0)	3 (16.7)	5 (27.8)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Drug/No-Violence	0 (0.0)	1 (4.2)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Violence and Drug	1 (4.2)	5 (20.8)	3 (12.5)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	5 (21.7)	6 (26.1)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	4 (22.2)	5 (27.8)	0 (0.0)
Total	24 (100%)				23 (100%)				18 (100%)			

Note: Post-Project arrest/incarceration patterns consist of non-violence/non-drug (N-V/N-D), violence-only (Viol), drug-only (Drug) and violence-and-drug (V-D) .

<sup>a</sup> It was not possible to identify the violence and drug pattern of arrests for youth, since few youth were incarcerated more than once in the post-Project period.

<sup>b</sup> Arrest patterns in the post-Project period are based on the most serious charge leading to incarceration.

<sup>c</sup> Four youth from the original program and comparison samples were excluded from our earlier evaluation analysis because they received long prison sentences during the program, and were no longer at risk for arrest in the community during the Project period.

## Chapter 15

### Aggregate-Level Changes In Gang Crime

with Ayad Jacob

In the design of the Gang Violence Reduction Project, we proposed that a relative reduction of gang violence by sufficient numbers of targeted program youth – key violent gang youth – would contribute to an absolute or relative lowering of the overall Little Village-area gang violence prevalence rate, compared to similar high gang-violence Hispanic communities in Chicago. We expected that the level of gang violence would be relatively lower in the Chicago police district beats comprising the Project area, compared to a set of equivalent beats in six other community area police districts with similar demographic and socio-economic makeup and very high gang violence problems. We could not, of course, control for significant ecological, social, and environmental changes that could have occurred in the communities, including major population shifts, non-equivalent age and race/ethnicity distributions, or gentrification.

We expected that the most realistic and valid differences relevant to the effects of the Project would most likely occur by the end of the second or third program year, and possibly over the longer five-year program period, given the community-level changes taking place in different parts of the city. We thought that changes over the short-term would more likely be due to program factors. Since the two targeted gangs, the Latin Kings and the Two Six, are reported to account for 75% of the serious violent gang crime in Little Village, and we served an estimated 15% (N = 195) of the total membership and probably 50% to 60% of the hardcore violent members of the two gangs in the area, we anticipated limited effects of the Project, particularly in lowering serious gang-related violence.

Our indicators of serious gang violence and gang crime were based on Chicago Police Department data. Data on gang incidents and offenders in particular clusters of the six 10<sup>th</sup> Police District (Little Village) beats were of chief interest. Incidents of serious gang violence were classified by type of gang offense, and offender characteristics, i.e., ethnicity, age, gender and gang affiliation (in Little Village). For cross-community as well as pre-program and program year comparisons, we were interested mainly in older adolescents or young adults, those 17 to 24 years of age (since they were most likely to participate in heavy gang violence), but also in gang youth 16 years of age and younger, especially during the fourth and fifth years, when they were more sharply targeted in the program. We expected some influence of older youth on the behavior of younger gang youth. However, much also depended on changes in age distributions of the gang population at the area level, which we could not control.

### Methodology

First we describe incident, offender and percent changes in gang crime, especially serious gang violence, across the comparable police beat clusters in all seven Districts. Then we present more controlled graphical and “hot spot” analyses, followed by changes in prevalence rates. We focus especially on a comparison of the two most similar high gang-problem community areas, Little Village and Pilsen. The different data-gathering and analytic methods we use are discussed at the beginning of each section of this chapter. However, the sampling frames and key sources of data are the same for each analysis.

### Comparable Police Districts and Beats

The Little Village community, the target area, includes six beats of Chicago Police Department District 10 (Beats 1013, 1024, 1031, 1032, 1033, 1034), which were the major serious violent gang-incident locations, and hangouts of the two key gangs. Prior to the start of the program, we also identified comparable beats in six other police Districts where Latino gang violence was very high: District 8 (Beats 822, 823, 824, 825, 831, 832), District 9 (Beats 914, 915, 921, 922, 931, 932, 933, 934), District 12 (Beats 1222, 1223, 1233), District 13 (Beats 1311, 1312, 1313, 1322, 1323, 1324), District 14 (1411, 1412, 1413, 1414, 1421, 1422, 1423, 1424, 1431, 1434), and District 25 (all beats). Two of the districts were contiguous to Little Village and Pilsen. These districts included three selected beats in District 12, located in the adjacent community of Pilsen, which is the most comparable to Little Village (based on demographic and socioeconomic factors as well as traditions of gang activity); and eight selected beats in District 9, a community contiguous to Little Village and Pilsen, which includes an increasing Latino population and a decreasing African-American, low-income, public housing population.

All the beat clusters had particularly high levels of gang violence between 1990-1992, and contained mainly an Hispanic population. All of the beats were contiguous in each of the seven districts. Socioeconomically, none of these communities were among the poorest in the city, based on 1990 Census data. Each was an area of concentration of first- and second-generation Hispanics, although the proportion of different Hispanic and/or Latino ethnic groups (i.e., Mexican, Mexican-American, and Puerto Rican), varied in the seven districts. However, the ethnic composition of the population in Little Village and Pilsen was almost identical,



comprising mainly Mexicans and Mexican-Americans. It is important to note that over the course of the program period Pilsen was undergoing some gentrification.

The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (ICJIA) provided aggregate incident data on gang crimes for both the program and comparison areas. ICJIA's Early Warning System/Geo-archive data set is one of the most reliable and comprehensive data sets on gang activity in the country. It is based on information from case and supplemental reports of the Chicago Police Department and contains information both at the incident and offender level. The incident data includes all gang offenses verified by the Chicago Police Department, and provides the most complete and accurate picture available of the total amount of gang crime being committed in the city. The incident-level data includes information on the type of offense committed, date, time and location of the incident, and the number of victims and offenders involved along with their corresponding gang affiliations. Offender-level data provides demographic information on those individuals involved in the reported gang incident. However, offender-level data may not be entirely complete, since all offenders involved in a particular incident are not always identified or arrested. Nevertheless, useful information concerning the age, race, and gender of the involved offenders is available, and, when used in conjunction with incident-level data, provides a measure of considerable and important detail.<sup>1</sup>

A key criterion for measuring Project impact at the aggregate level was serious gang-motivated violence. An index was constructed by combining reports of incidents of the most serious violent gang offenses: *homicides, aggravated batteries with a handgun or other firearm,*

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<sup>1</sup> Data for all non-lethal violent incidents for one month, December of 1994, are missing across all Districts. Also, in some instances, there were offender data but no incident data. In these cases, since it was not clear why these discrepancies occurred, we included only offender data for which we also had incident data.

and *aggravated assaults with a handgun or other firearm*. Our rationale for the use of a gang violence index was to provide a measure of serious gang violence that is both comprehensive and focused, and would overcome certain reporting limitations. Often the distinction between aggravated battery and aggravated assault is not clearly defined in many law enforcement jurisdictions. In addition, though gang homicide is the best indicator of the most severe case of gang violence, the event may occur infrequently over relatively short time periods. Therefore, a combination of these three types of violent gang incidents would appear to be a useful index for measuring serious gang violence, and changes that might be occurring.

The following discussion focuses on the differences in the violence index for the selected areas over time. We also address changes occurring within District 10 for the two targeted gangs, including incidents and arrests for all the Latin Kings and the Two Six (including program and quasi-program youth), with special interest in changes across age groups. In addition, we provide an analysis of other specific gang-motivated violent and non-violent offenses, such as armed robbery, weapons violations, and drug and alcohol offenses, as well as female gang activity. Finally, we examine briefly the changes in the non-gang violence index, which is comprised of the same serious violent offenses (homicides, aggravated batteries, and aggravated assaults), to determine whether displacement or re-labeling effects have occurred during the course of the Project.

To minimize considerable fluctuation in gang incidents within and across Districts over short periods of time, the data are compared in five year periods – the pre-program period (August 1987 through July 1992) and the program period (August 1992 through July 1997). Since it is possible that the Project had stronger effects earlier rather than later in Project

development, we also refer to the first three-year program period (August 1992 through July 1995) and a comparable three-year pre-program period (August 1989 through July 1992). Gentrification in District 12 and considerable population movement in District 9, combined with a great deal of staff anxiety over Project continuation in the last two years of the program, and a staff crisis in the fifth year, may have affected the comparative area assessment of Project effects.

In Section I of this chapter, the absolute number of incidents in the various crime categories, and the percent change across pre-program and program time periods are calculated. When comparisons are made across the seven Districts by beat clusters, the changes are also ranked from one to seven, with *one* indicating the District (community) area with the greatest relative decrease (or lowest rate of increase) for the particular type of gang crime, and *seven* indicating the area with the highest relative increase. In Section II, we utilize a ratio measure in which change in the level of serious gang violence in the target area of Little Village is related to changes in levels of serious gang violence in the beat clusters of the other six Districts, both in the pre-program and program periods. We also graph those changes. In Section III, we briefly report on a “hot spot” analysis of gang violence by incident location, comparing the size, concentration, and dispersion of incidents in areas within Little Village and Pilsen over the five-year pre-program and program periods. In Section IV, we examine differences in prevalence rates of gang violence in Little Village compared to Pilsen, during the first three years of the Project.

## Section I

[Refer to Tables 15.1 to 15.27]

### Gang Crime Incident Patterns Across Districts

Gang Violence Index. Table 15.1 presents combined incident data for gang *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms, and aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms*, across all Districts, for the five-year pre-program period, 1987-1992, and for the five-year program period, 1992-1997. All Districts experienced an increase in the absolute number of serious violent gang crimes. The rate of increase for the target area (District 10) was substantially lower – 55.7% – than the average of all the other Districts combined – 94.8%. Individually, Districts 9 and 12 had slightly lower increases in the violence index crimes than the target area, 50.3% and 53.5% respectively. However, in the three-year pre-program and program analysis, the Little Village target area had the lowest rate of increase – 35.4% – compared to increases of 65.9% for District 9 and 72.0% for District 12 (Table not presented, but see Section II). Demographic factors (loss of population) in District 9 and gentrification factors (upgrading of status in housing and population) in District 12 may have accounted for the relative improvement in these two Districts as compared to District 10 in the five-year analysis.

Trends in *homicides*, when analyzed separately from the combined violence index, reveal an increase in the number of homicides for the program area as well as the comparison areas, across the pre-program and program periods (Table 15.2). The program area of District 10 had the second highest number of gang homicides in the pre-program period, and the second highest number of gang homicides in the program period. This represented an increase of 53.9%. The

District with the lowest increase in gang homicides – 30.0% – was Pilsen. However, in the three-year comparison, the Little Village gang homicide rate increased by 6.9%, but the increase in Pilsen was 53.3%.

In the case of *aggravated batteries with a handgun or other firearm*, which account for most of the serious gang violence, Little Village had the third lowest rate of increase across time periods (Table 15.3). Pilsen had the lowest rate of increase of all the areas. This is in contrast to the ranking in the third year of the program, when Little Village had the lowest increase in aggravated batteries and Pilsen ranked third.

The target area maintained the lowest percentage of increase in *aggravated assaults with a handgun or other firearm* (Table 15.4) over the five-year program period. The rate of increase – 39.5% – was considerably lower than all other comparison areas except District 9, which also showed a relatively small increase in aggravated assaults. In the three-year analysis, Little Village actually showed no increase in aggravated assaults.

Gang Drug Arrests. Table 15.5 looks at drug arrests for the seven Districts across the two time periods. All districts underwent very large increases in drug arrests over the five-year program period. The increases were substantial both in terms of absolute numbers and relative change. Four of the seven Districts, including Little Village, experienced an increase of over 600.0%. Gang drug arrest activity at the aggregated level did not abate in District 10. However, we note that, based on individual-level arrest data for targeted youth in the program, there was in fact a reduction in arrests for drug crimes, while there was an increase in drug arrests for the comparison youth. Program effects at the individual level did not necessarily translate into area effects, at least in terms of drug arrests.

It is also important to note that less than eight percent of all drug arrests across the target and comparison Districts involved the manufacture and/or delivery of drugs. Rather, over 90.0% of all drug arrests during the pre-program and program periods stemmed from drug possession. Drug dealing in Latino communities with gang violence problems had not yet reached the level of drug dealing that reportedly predominated in certain high-crime African-American neighborhoods in Chicago.

Finally, we observe no clear relationship between drug crime and serious gang violence at the aggregate level. We are not sure whether increases or decreases in serious gang violence are necessarily related to changes in drug crime. Our individual-level data suggests that a decrease in gang-related serious violence arrests may in fact also be associated with a decrease in gang-related drug crime arrests.

Gang Violence Crime Patterns Within District 10. In the following discussion we shift our focus from incident data at the area level to offenses committed by particular gangs within District 10. Incidents of violent crime by specific gangs in the other Districts are not discussed. Table 15.6 contains the gang violence index for the targeted gangs, the Latin Kings and Two Six, including program and non-program youth (we note again that the program did not reach all of the youth in these two gangs). The two gangs are analyzed separately, and in combination, in comparison to other Latino and African-American gangs not targeted or served within Little Village. Individual-youth program effects may not necessarily translate into, or correlate with, either gang effects or area effects.

Both the Latin Kings and the Two Six experienced an increase in the number of violence-index offenses during the program period. This is not consistent with self-report and official

police arrest data on program youth, which showed a significant decrease in violent gang (and presumably violent non-gang) behavior. Nevertheless, at the gang-incident level, the findings show a general increase in serious gang violence, with the Two Six increasing by 68.8% – higher than that of the Latin Kings (32.5%) and the other Latin gangs in the program area. Other Latino gangs in District 10 had the lowest rate of increase – 9.8% – while African-American gangs had the largest increase – 228.6% (albeit from a small base of 7 to 23 incidents). Table 15.6 also reveals that, overall, the increase in serious violence incidents for the two targeted gangs together – 43.0% – was somewhat larger than for all other gangs together – 36.2%.

The two program gangs continued to account for the greatest proportion of all serious violent gang crimes in both time periods – 74.0% in the pre-program period and 75.2% in the program period. The Latin Kings and Two Six, the dominant gangs in Little Village, ordinarily did not permit other gangs to operate in their areas, except on border streets. Most gang violence in the area continued to be between the Latin Kings and the Two Six. While the Project targeted as many violent members of these two gangs as possible, our estimate is that this still did not involve more than 15% (including those we contacted but for whom no data exists) of the members of the two gangs. Also, the Project had essentially no contact with any of the other gangs or gang members in the Project area.

At the same time, we should observe that, at the end of the first three years of program operations, the situation was reversed. The targeted gangs together showed a 25.6% increase, while the non-targeted gang constellations showed an increase of 37.1%. The increase in serious gang violence incidents was lowest for the Latin Kings (18.5%) compared to the other Latino gangs in the area (25.8%). Possibly there was a deterioration in the impact of the Project on the

target gangs during the last two years.

### Gang Offender Data

Similarly to the above discussion comparing incident patterns, we now compare offender patterns for the gangs in Little Village. Offender data is based on youth identified who are involved in gang incidents – as reported by the police – whether the youth involved were arrested or not. It represents a more precise, or focused, indicator of the level of crime in relation to police activity. Using the same violence index described earlier, but now focused on offenders, we find a pattern similar to the incident reports, although the ranking and level of improvement for Little Village is higher than that achieved using the incident measures (Table 15.7).

District 10 experienced the next-to-the-smallest increase – 43.5% – of any of the Districts. The District 12 (Pilsen) offender violence index rose to 49.4%, somewhat higher than that of District 10. The increase in District 10 was considerably lower (25.57%, the lowest of any of the other District comparison areas) in the earlier three-year comparative offender analysis – between 1989 and 1992 (the pre-program period), and between 1992 and 1995 (the program period).

Since the target gangs in Little Village were primarily, if not exclusively, Latino, a comparison of other Latino gang offenders may more sharply indicate the impact of the Project. The data in Table 15.8 deal with serious violence arrests for Latino offenders only. The results are similar to that described above. District 10 has the second smallest relative increase during the five-year program period – 35.2%. The principal comparison area of Pilsen again



experienced a greater increase – 47.6%. District 9 had a decrease for violent Latino gang offenders (-9.3%). This could have been a function of gentrification, and general population movement or decrease.

Comparison By Age Groups. An analysis of data on serious violent gang-related offenders was also conducted by specific ages, to determine the degree and nature of changes occurring in the area. As shown in Table 15.9, all seven Districts experienced increases during the program period for offenders 17 to 24 years of age. Though the absolute number of incidents in Little Village during the program period was relatively high, the rate of increase – 44.5% – was smaller than that in all other Districts, except District 9. This increase in District 10, however, was considerably higher than the 28.6% increase in the first three years of the program, when District 10 ranked first among the seven Districts for the smallest increase in serious violent incidents involving the 17- to 24-year-olds.

Data for offenders under 16, and those over 25, are presented in Table 15.10 and Table 15.11. The number of offenders involved in, or arrested for, serious gang violence in Little Village was smaller for youth under 16 than for those offenders 17 to 24. The increase was from 110 to 119 offenders – 8.2% – the lowest increase for this age group of all the comparison Districts. It was even lower than the increase in the three-year analysis – 11.1%. All other Districts generally experienced large increases in the number of serious violent offenders 16 and younger – as high as a 161.1% increase.

District 10, however, did experience an increase in serious violent offenders 25 and older during the program period (see Table 15.11). The percentage increase was sizable – 160.0%. The increase was from 10 to 26 youth over the five-year comparison period, considerably more

than the average percentage increase for the other Districts – 96.6%.

The number of reported serious violent offenders, classified by gang in Little Village, is presented in Table 15.12. These data are a little different from those in Table 15.6. As was the case using the incident data, the Latin Kings continued to be involved in the majority of serious gang-violent incidents, but experienced a lower relative increase in the number of offenders compared to the Two Six. The increase for both Latin Kings and Two Six together was lower than for the other Latino and African-American gangs in the area. The increase for the Latin Kings – 14.4% – was considerably less than for the Two Six – 71.3%; but not as low as for the other Latino gangs – 10.0% – at the end of the five-year program period.

Age Comparisons. Table 15.13 indicates that, for both the Latin Kings and the Two Six, there was a relatively greater increase in offenders 17 to 24 years old, than for younger offenders (16 and under). In fact, as noted above, there was a large decrease (-33.9%) in younger Latin King offenders (16 and under) in the five-year program period. The younger age group (16 and under) became a major program target in the fourth year of the Project, although they were served in smaller numbers from the start of the program. For Latin Kings 16 and under, there was in fact a substantial decrease in serious violent offenders. There was a large percentage increase in reported offenders for the 25-and-older group, although from a very small number base (from 4 to 17 for both gangs). The key age of offenders was still the 17- to 24-year-old group. The increase was about five times greater for the Two Six – 77.1% – than for the Latin Kings – 15.1%. Some of the difference can be explained by the age distributions of the gangs. The Latin Kings were older.

## Types of Gang Offenses In District 10

Further analysis of serious-violence offenders was conducted, using *type of gang offense* to clarify the specific pattern of change in offenders which occurred in both the targeted and non-targeted gangs in District 10.

Gang Homicides. Analysis of homicides (Table 15.14) indicates that members of the two targeted gangs together were involved as offenders in homicides more than were members of the other, non-targeted gangs. However, the greatest increase in gang homicides involved offenders from the African-American gangs. We should observe that each of the gangs, to some extent, had its own distinctive violence character. In absolute numbers, the Latin Kings were the most violent gang in the area, committing the greatest number of murders. The Two Six were inclined toward relatively less lethal forms of gang violence; retaliating more often but overall with less force. Other Latino gangs often attacked non-targeted gangs in Little Village border areas and engaged in less lethal, hit-and-run forms of gang aggression.

Gang Aggravated Batteries. Arrest reports of gang offenders involved in aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms (Table 15.15), the predominant component of serious gang violence, revealed more of the underlying nature of the change in gang violence in Little Village than did other components of the gang violence index. The two targeted gangs together experienced a slightly lower rate of violence increase than did the non-targeted gangs combined. The Latin King increase – 16.9% – was the lowest of the Latin gangs in the area over the five-year program period.

Gang Aggravated Assaults. Gang offenders were less involved in aggravated assaults or threats with handguns or other firearms, than in aggravated batteries with a firearm. The total

number of offenders in the District increased only from 91 to 102 (Table 15.16). The largest decrease occurred for the combined other Latino gangs (-44.4%), followed by no change at all for Latin King offenders (0.0%). The number of Two Six offenders rose. As with aggravated batteries involving a firearm, the combined targeted gangs had a slightly smaller percentage increase in offenders for aggravated assault across the program period, compared to other Latino and African-American gangs combined (11.3% versus 13.8%).

### Other Offenses, By Gang

In addition to looking at the gang-motivated violence index offenses in Little Village, we examined gang offender trends in District 10 across gangs to determine whether other gang-motivated criminal activities showed an increase or decrease in offenders. Gang-offender data are presented rather than incident data, to allow for comparison by specific age and gang-affiliation characteristics of offenders.

Armed Robberies. Table 15.17 contains offender information on gang-motivated armed robbery. The data indicate that an overall increase in the number of offenders – 163.2% – occurred over the program period; the larger increase being among members of other Latino and African-American gangs. The Latin Kings showed the lowest increase in this crime category – 52.4%. The increase for the Two Six was very large, but this is mainly an artifact of the low number of robbery offenders (n = 1) attributed to the Two Six in the pre-program period.

Damage To Property/Trespass. The largest number of offenders involved in criminal damage to property/trespass-related offenses (probably mainly graffiti) were from the targeted gangs (Table 15.18). The largest change occurred for the Two Six, whose offenders increased

277.8% over the program period. The only group that showed an absolute decrease within Little Village was the other Latino gangs, dropping from 72 to 62 offenders (-13.9%).

Weapons-Related Offenses. In Table 15.19, the data for gang-related weapons offenses indicate that the number of offenders in all the gangs in Little Village increased substantially. Other Latino and African-American gangs together experienced a change of 1033.33%, although from a relatively small base. The increase for the targeted gangs was quite substantial – 718.0%. The Two Six experienced the smallest degree of change – 575.0%. The increase was largest for the African-American gangs – 1366.7% – again from a very small base. Latin King offenders still accounted for the majority of such offenders.

Mob Action. In contrast to the other categories examined, the number of arrests for mob action generally declined (by -5.5%) (Table 15.20). All the gangs experienced decreases, with the exception of the Two Six, which increased considerably – 155.0%. Although the number of offenders for the targeted gangs as a group dropped (-2.7%), the other non-targeted gangs experienced a greater decrease (-17.3%). The Two Six in the program period had relatively more younger members or recruits than the Latin Kings, and as a result were considerably more prone to engage in brick and bottle throwing (sometimes directed against other sections of the Two Six), as well as hanging on the streets and engaging in public nuisance conduct.

Drug And Alcohol Arrests. The data in Table 15.21 indicate that, as with weapons offenses, gang-related drug arrests increased greatly over the program period. The greatest relative increase (from a small base) occurred for the Two Six, followed by the Latin Kings, who were mainly responsible for drug arrests in the area. Compared to African-American and other Latino gangs combined, the targeted gangs increased substantially more in number of offenders

involved in drug arrests. Again, a comparison with individual-level police data provides a different picture, which shows that there was in fact a decrease in drug arrests for program targeted youth over the program period.

Table 15.22 has information on alcohol-related gang offender arrests. The data indicate a substantial increase overall, though the absolute numbers were quite small, particularly for African-American offenders. Again, the greatest growth occurred among the Two Six – 2533.3% – from a very small base. Though the rate of change for the Latin King offenders was less than that for the Two Six, the number of Latin King alcohol offenders during both periods was much larger than for all other area gangs combined. Other Latino gang offenders were the only group in the District that experienced a decrease in alcohol offenses (-24.0%).

Table 15.23 contains further analysis of changes in both drug and alcohol offenders, by age group for the two targeted gangs. The largest group of offenders across the two time periods were the 17-to-24-year-olds. Greater increases occurred in all age groups for the Two Six than for the Latin Kings, albeit from a very much smaller numerical basis. The largest increases, on a percentage basis, for the Two Six occurred among those youth 16-and-under and 17-to-24 years. The largest increase for the Latin Kings was for the oldest, 25-and-over, group. Nevertheless, the Latin King offenders were far more involved in drug and alcohol arrests than were the Two Six.

### Gender Differences

In Tables 15.24, 15.25 and 15.26 we return to a comparative analysis of offenders across the target and comparison Districts, with special attention to gender differences. Analysis of the

data indicates that most offenders in all of the Districts were male. Indeed, less than 2.0% of all offenders in violence index gang-crimes in the Districts in the pre-program period were female, but this percentage had risen to 3.0% in the program period. Nonetheless, even though we mainly targeted males, it was possible that a similar increase in violence was occurring among female gang offenders. To determine if patterns were similar, we examined the offender data looking at female offenders.

Gang Violence Index. Table 15.24 presents comparative information on female offenders for the serious violence index crimes across the seven Districts. Very few female offenders were involved in serious violence crimes in any of the districts. Females in District 10 showed no increase in the program period, remaining at seven offenders. Although District 10 had the best change record, it is hard to determine whether this was related to Project effect, since the numbers are exceedingly small and the Project did not target female gang members.

All Gang-Related Offenses. Because so few females were involved in violent gang crime, further analysis was conducted on female offenders involved in other types of gang crimes (Table 15.25). The number involved in all gang-related incidents combined increased substantially over the five-year program period, particularly in Districts 10 and 8. While serious violent gang crime was still overwhelmingly a male activity, non-violent and less serious gang crime had increased substantially for females.

Table 15.26 presents information on the proportion of male and female offenders in District 10 who fell into various crime categories in the pre-program and program periods. The data indicate that female offenders in Little Village experienced a greater percentage increase between the two periods in all categories except the violence index offenses. Still, this pattern

accounted for only a small increase in the number of females as a proportion of all gang offenders, from 2.5% to 6.0% of total gang-related crime. The proportion of female offenders involved in violence-index crimes declined from 1.7% to 1.2%. However, the proportion of female offenders involved in drug/alcohol offenses increased from 3.4% to 4.5%.

### Non-Gang Violence Index Offenses

Table 15.27 contains information on non-gang incidents for District 10 and the comparison Districts. A two-year period rather than the five-year interval was used because we only had information on non-gang incidents dating back to 1990.<sup>2</sup> The same three non-gang-motivated violent offenses – *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms,* and *aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms* – were included in the analysis.

The data indicate that, within District 10, there was virtually no change in the number of non-gang-related serious violence incidents over the two time periods. It is therefore unlikely that any changes in gang-motivated serious violence offenses within Little Village can be explained by an increase in non-gang serious violence incidents. That is, there is no evidence of spill-over, or crime re-labeling effects – a serious gang-motivated violence crime being labeled a non-gang violence crime. In fact, given demographic changes (i.e., an increase in population) a re-labeling process in the other direction was possible in Little Village. In the program period, non-gang offenses could have been labeled gang offenses. We note that District 12 had the largest rate of increase in non-gang serious violence incidents (+25.2%) compared to all other

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<sup>2</sup> This data was provided directly from the Chicago Police Department and tends to vary slightly from the data provided through the Early Warning System, in that it is not updated or corrected as consistently. Nonetheless, it is our only source of non-gang data at the present time, and there is no reason to think that errors in the data are more likely to occur in any one District versus another.



Districts.

In sum, it is difficult to conclude from the data that the Project had a significant influence on the pattern of aggregate-level gang crime (including serious gang violence) in the program area. Evidence is clear that serious gang violence continued at a high level in Little Village, but it also continued at an even higher level in most of the comparison Districts. Findings presented in the next sections of this chapter will indicate that the Project, in fact, did have a positive effect in the relative reduction of serious gang violence at the aggregate, or area, level. However, the program may have had more of a positive impact in the control of serious violent gang crime during the first three years of the program period than in the last two years of the five-year program period.

In terms of specific gang-level and age-related changes within Little Village, patterns of serious violent gang crime seemed to abate relatively more for the younger age group, 16 and under, compared to the older group, 17 to 24 and older. This pattern was particularly marked for the Latin Kings. However, this change could have been partially due to the fact that the Latin Kings was a larger and older group than the Two Six. Across both gangs, there was little evidence of any dramatic shift in serious gang violence incidents by age categories of offenders. The age group committing most serious violence offenses was still the 17- to 24-year-old males. Also, the drug problem generally worsened in District 10, as it did in the comparison areas, based on aggregate-level crime data. Finally, there is little evidence that the Project was associated with any effect on female gang crime or non-gang serious violent crime.

Table 15.1<sup>a</sup>  
Gang Incident Data – Violence Index<sup>b</sup> by District

District	August 87 - July 92	August 92 - July 97	Percent Change	Rank
<b>10 Little Village</b>	237	369	55.70%	3
<b>8</b>	58	151	160.34%	7
<b>9</b>	197	296	50.25%	1
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	198	304	53.54%	2
<b>13</b>	143	306	113.99%	5
<b>14</b>	292	573	96.23%	4
<b>25</b>	174	439	152.30%	6
<b>Subtotal Without District 10</b>	1062	2069	94.82%	
<b>Total</b>	1299	2438	87.68%	

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<sup>a</sup>A decision was made to include all beats in District 25, rather than only the highest serious gang violence crime beats, because of a radical change in beat boundaries in the District in 1993. The overall boundaries of the District were not changed. December 1994 data is missing for Table 15.1, except for homicides.

<sup>b</sup> Includes *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms and aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms*

Table 15.2  
 Gang Incident Data – Total Homicides by District

<b>District</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>10 Little Village</b>	39	60	53.85%	5
<b>8</b>	4	16	300.00%	7
<b>9</b>	33	56	69.70%	6
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	30	39	30.00%	1
<b>13</b>	19	25	31.58%	2
<b>14</b>	43	61	41.86%	4
<b>25</b>	31	41	32.26%	3
<b>Subtotal Without District 10</b>	160	238	48.75%	
<b>Total</b>	199	298	49.75%	

Table 15.3<sup>a</sup>

Gang Incident Data - Total Aggravated Batteries with a Handgun or Other Firearm by District

District	August 87 - July 92	August 92 - July 97	Percent Change	Rank
<b>10 Little Village</b>	155	249	60.65%	3
<b>8</b>	41	100	143.90%	6
<b>9</b>	127	186	46.46%	2
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	140	193	37.86%	1
<b>13</b>	108	220	103.70%	5
<b>14</b>	206	399	93.69%	4
<b>25</b>	94	300	219.15%	7
<b>Subtotal Without District 10</b>	716	1398	95.25%	
<b>Total</b>	871	1647	89.09%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data.

Table 15.4<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Incident Data - Total Aggravated Assaults with a Handgun or other Firearm by District

<b>District</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>10 Little Village</b>	43	60	39.53%	1
<b>8</b>	13	35	169.23%	6
<b>9</b>	37	54	45.95%	2
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	28	72	157.14%	4
<b>13</b>	16	61	281.25%	7
<b>14</b>	43	113	162.79%	5
<b>25</b>	49	98	100.00%	3
<b>Subtotal Without District 10</b>	186	433	132.80%	
<b>Total</b>	229	493	115.28%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data.

Table 15.5<sup>a</sup>  
Gang Incident Data – Drug Arrests by District

<b>District</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>10 Little Village</b>	106	929	776.42%	5
<b>8</b>	65	913	1304.62%	7
<b>9</b>	280	2646	845.00%	6
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	116	656	465.52%	3
<b>13</b>	168	832	395.24%	2
<b>14</b>	819	2339	185.59%	1
<b>25</b>	243	1813	646.09%	4
<b>Subtotal Without District 10</b>	1691	9199	444.00%	
<b>Total</b>	1797	10128	463.61%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data.

Table 15.6<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Incident Data – Violence Index<sup>b</sup> by Gang – District 10 Only

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92'</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>Latin King</b>	117	155	32.48%	2
<b>Two Six</b>	48	81	68.75%	3
<b>Other Latino Gangs</b>	51	56	9.80%	1
<b>African-American Gangs</b>	7	23	228.57%	4
<b>Total</b>	223	315	41.26%	

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>Latin King/Two Six</b>	165	236	43.03%	2
<b>Other Latino &amp; African-American Gangs</b>	58	79	36.21%	1
<b>Total</b>	223	315	41.26%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data, except for homicides.

<sup>b</sup>Includes *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms and aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms.*

Table 15.7<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Violence Index<sup>b</sup> by District

District	August 87 - July 92	August 92 - July 97	Percent Change	Rank
<b>10 Little Village</b>	425	610	43.53%	2
<b>8</b>	127	295	132.28%	6
<b>9</b>	425	525	23.53%	1
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	348	520	49.43%	3
<b>13</b>	276	536	94.20%	5
<b>14</b>	529	975	84.31%	4
<b>25</b>	309	848	174.43%	7
<b>Subtotal Without District 10</b>	2014	3699	83.66%	
<b>Total</b>	2439	4309	76.67%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994, data except for homicides.

<sup>b</sup>Includes *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms and aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms.*



Table 15.8<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Violence Index<sup>b</sup> by District – Latino Offenders Only

<b>District</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>10 Little Village</b>	367	496	35.15%	2
<b>8</b>	66	142	115.15%	6
<b>9</b>	216	196	-9.26%	1
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	330	487	47.58%	3
<b>13</b>	210	398	89.52%	5
<b>14</b>	383	714	86.42%	4
<b>25</b>	204	529	159.31%	7
<b>Subtotal Without District 10</b>	1409	2466	75.02%	
<b>Total</b>	1776	2962	66.78%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data, except for homicides.

<sup>b</sup>Includes *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms and aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms.*

Table 15.9<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Violence Index<sup>b</sup> by District – Offenders Aged 17 to 24 Only

<b>District</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>10 Little Village</b>	256	370	44.53%	2
<b>8</b>	65	145	123.08%	6
<b>9</b>	242	295	21.90%	1
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	211	313	48.34%	3
<b>13</b>	172	302	75.58%	5
<b>14</b>	319	536	68.03%	4
<b>25</b>	187	525	180.75%	7
<b>Subtotal Without District 10</b>	1196	2116	76.92%	
<b>Total</b>	1452	2486	71.21%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data, except for homicides.

<sup>b</sup>Includes *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms and aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms.*

Table 15.10<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Violence Index<sup>b</sup> by District – Offenders Aged 16 and Under Only

District	August 87 - July 92	August 92 - July 97	Percent Change	Rank
<b>10 Little Village</b>	110	119	8.18%	1
<b>8</b>	36	94	161.11%	7
<b>9</b>	122	145	18.85%	2
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	77	103	33.77%	3
<b>13</b>	49	126	157.14%	6
<b>14</b>	94	146	55.32%	4
<b>25</b>	61	150	145.90%	5
<b>Subtotal Without District 10</b>	439	764	74.03%	
<b>Total</b>	549	883	60.84%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data, except for homicides.

<sup>b</sup>Includes *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms and aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms.*

Table 15.11<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Violence Index<sup>b</sup> by District – Offenders Aged 25 and Over Only

District	August 87 - July 92	August 92 - July 97	Percent Change	Rank
<b>10 Little Village</b>	10	26	160.00%	5
<b>8</b>	5	18	260.00%	7
<b>9</b>	21	21	0.00%	1
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	18	37	105.56%	3
<b>13</b>	19	25	31.58%	2
<b>14</b>	31	81	161.29%	6
<b>25</b>	22	46	109.09%	4
<b>Subtotal Without District 10</b>	116	228	96.55%	
<b>Total</b>	126	254	101.59%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data, except for homicides.

<sup>b</sup>Includes *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms and aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms.*

Table 15.12<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Violence Index<sup>b</sup> by Gang – District 10 Only

<b>Little Village Violence Index by Gang – Offender Data*</b>				
<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>Latin King</b>	208	238	14.42%	2
<b>Two Six</b>	87	149	71.26%	3
<b>Other Latino Gangs</b>	90	99	10.00%	1
<b>African-American Gangs</b>	21	57	171.43%	4
<b>Total</b>	406	543	33.74%	

<b>Little Village Violence Index by Gang – Offender Data*</b>				
<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>Latin King/Two Six</b>	295	387	31.19%	1
<b>Other Latino and African-American Gangs</b>	111	156	40.54%	2
<b>Total</b>	406	543	33.74%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data, except for homicides.

<sup>b</sup>Includes *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms and aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms.*

Table 15.13<sup>a</sup>

Gang Offender Data – Latin King and Two Six Violence Index<sup>b</sup> by Age Distributions - District10

<b>Latin Kings</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>16 and Under</b>	62	41	-33.87%
<b>17 to 24</b>	126	145	15.08%
<b>25 and Over</b>	2	11	450.00%

<b>Two Six</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>16 and Under</b>	26	36	38.46%
<b>17 to 24</b>	48	85	77.08%
<b>25 and Over</b>	2	6	200.00%

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data, except for homicides.

<sup>b</sup>Includes *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms and aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms.*

Table 15.14  
 Gang Offender Data – Homicides by Gang – District 10

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>Latin King</b>	28	35	25.00%	2
<b>Two Six</b>	10	22	120.00%	3
<b>Other Latino Gangs</b>	18	20	11.11%	1
<b>African-American Gangs</b>	3	18	500.00%	4
<b>Total</b>	59	95	61.02%	

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>Latin King/Two Six</b>	38	57	50.00%	1
<b>Other Latino and African-American Gangs</b>	21	38	80.95%	2
<b>Total</b>	59	95	61.02%	

Table 15.15<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Aggravated Batteries with a Handgun or Other Firearms – District 10

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>Latin King</b>	136	159	16.91%	1
<b>Two Six</b>	59	102	72.88%	4
<b>Other Latino Gangs</b>	45	64	42.22%	3
<b>African-American Gangs</b>	16	21	31.25%	2
<b>Total</b>	256	346	35.16%	

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>Latin King/Two Six</b>	195	261	33.85%	1
<b>Other Latino and African-American Gangs</b>	61	85	39.34%	2
<b>Total</b>	256	346	35.16%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data.



Table 15.16<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Aggravated Assaults with a Handgun or Other Firearm – District 10

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>Latin King</b>	44	44	0.00%	2
<b>Two Six</b>	18	25	38.89%	3
<b>Other Latino Gangs</b>	27	15	-44.44%	1
<b>African-American Gangs</b>	2	18	800.00%	4
<b>Total</b>	91	102	12.09%	

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>Latin King/Two Six</b>	62	69	11.29%	1
<b>Other Latino and African-American Gangs</b>	29	33	13.79%	2
<b>Total</b>	91	102	12.09%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data.

Table 15.17<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Armed Robberies – District 10

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>Latin King</b>	59	90	52.54%
<b>Two Six</b>	1	63	6200.00%
<b>Other Latino Gangs</b>	11	36	227.27%
<b>African-American Gangs</b>	5	11	120.00%
<b>Total</b>	76	200	163.16%

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>Latin King/Two Six</b>	60	153	155.00%
<b>Other Latino and African-American Gangs</b>	16	47	193.75%
<b>Total</b>	76	200	163.16%

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data.

Table 15.18<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Damage to Property/Trespassing – District 10

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>Latin King</b>	211	390	84.83%
<b>Two Six</b>	54	204	277.78%
<b>Other Latino Gangs</b>	72	62	-13.89%
<b>African-American Gangs</b>	5	12	140.00%
<b>Total</b>	342	668	95.32%

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>Latin King/Two Six</b>	265	594	124.15%
<b>Other Latino and African-American Gangs</b>	77	74	-3.90%
<b>Total</b>	342	668	95.32%

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data.

Table 15.19<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Weapons-Related Offenses – District 10

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>Latin King</b>	27	238	781.48%
<b>Two Six</b>	12	81	575.00%
<b>Other Latino Gangs</b>	9	92	922.22%
<b>African-American Gangs</b>	3	44	1366.67%
<b>Total</b>	51	455	792.16%

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>Latin King/Two Six</b>	39	319	717.95%
<b>Other Latino and African-American Gangs</b>	12	136	1033.33%
<b>Total</b>	51	455	792.16%

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data.

Table 15.20<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Mob Action – District 10

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>Latin King</b>	200	163	-18.50%
<b>Two Six</b>	20	51	155.00%
<b>Other Latino Gangs</b>	35	28	-20.00%
<b>African-American Gangs</b>	17	15	-11.76%
<b>Total</b>	272	257	-5.51%

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>Latin King/Two Six</b>	220	214	-2.73%
<b>Other Latino and African-American Gangs</b>	52	43	-17.31%
<b>Total</b>	272	257	-5.51%

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data.

Table 15.21<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Drug Arrests – District 10

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>Latin King</b>	65	692	964.62%
<b>Two Six</b>	8	189	2262.50%
<b>Other Latino Gangs</b>	46	123	167.39%
<b>African-American Gangs</b>	20	165	725.00%
<b>Total</b>	139	1169	741.01%

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>Latin King/Two Six</b>	73	881	1106.85%
<b>Other Latino and African-American Gangs</b>	66	288	336.36%
<b>Total</b>	139	1169	741.01%

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<sup>a</sup> Excludes December 1994 data.

Table 15.22<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data - Alcohol Arrests - District 10

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>Latin King</b>	153	309	101.96%
<b>Two Six</b>	3	79	2533.33%
<b>Other Latino Gangs</b>	50	38	-24.00%
<b>African-American Gangs</b>	0	2	200.00%
<b>Total</b>	206	428	107.77%

<b>Gang</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>Latin King/Two Six</b>	156	388	148.72%
<b>Other Latino and African-American Gangs</b>	50	40	-20.00%
<b>Total</b>	206	428	107.77%

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<sup>a</sup> Excludes December 1994 data.

Table 15.23<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data - Drug and Alcohol Arrests  
 District 10 Latin King and Two Six Age Distributions

<b>Latin Kings</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>16 and Under</b>	49	206	320.41%
<b>17 to 24</b>	153	667	335.95%
<b>25 and Over</b>	13	116	792.31%
<b>Total</b>	215	989	360.00%

<b>Two Six</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>
<b>16 and Under</b>	2	57	2750.00%
<b>17 to 24</b>	7	182	2500.00%
<b>25 and Over</b>	2	25	1150.00%
<b>Total</b>	11	264	2300.00%

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<sup>a</sup> Excludes December 1994 data.



Table 15.24<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Female Offenders: Violence Index<sup>b</sup> by District

District	August 87 - July 92	August 92 - July 97	Percent Change	Rank
<b>10 Little Village</b>	7	7	0.00%	1
<b>8</b>	1	5	400.00%	6
<b>9</b>	8	13	62.50%	3
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	6	10	66.67%	4
<b>13</b>	3	4	33.33%	2
<b>14</b>	9	20	122.22%	5
<b>25</b>	1	15	1400.00%	7
<b>Total</b>	35	74	111.43%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data, except for homicides.

<sup>b</sup>Includes *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms and aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms.*

Table 15.25<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Female Offenders: All Gang-Related Offenses<sup>b</sup> by District

<b>District</b>	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>	<b>August 92 - July 97</b>	<b>Percent Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>10 Little Village</b>	55	313	469.09%	6
<b>8</b>	37	391	956.76%	7
<b>9</b>	191	472	147.12%	1
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	57	258	352.63%	5
<b>13</b>	44	154	250.00%	4
<b>14</b>	159	489	207.55%	2
<b>25</b>	104	336	223.08%	3
<b>Total</b>	647	2413	272.95%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data, except for homicides.

<sup>b</sup>Includes *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms* and *aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms*.

Table 15.26<sup>a</sup>  
 Gang Offender Data – Gender Breakdowns – District 10

	<b>August 87 - July 92</b>		<b>August 92 - July 97</b>		<b>Percent Change</b>	
	<b>% Male</b>	<b>% Female</b>	<b>% Male</b>	<b>% Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
<b>All Gang-Related Offenses</b>	97.5% (N=2165)	2.5% (N=55)	94.0% (N=4918)	6.0% (N=313)	81.0%	469.0%
<b>Violence Index Offenses</b>	98.3% (N=417)	1.7% (N=7)	98.8% (N=599)	1.2% (N=7)	43.6%	0.0%
<b>Drug/Alcohol Offenses</b>	96.6% (N=342)	3.4% (N=12)	95.5% (N=1577)	4.5% (N=74)	361.1%	517.0%

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data, except for homicides.

Table 15.27<sup>a</sup>  
 Non-Gang Incidents – Violence Offenses<sup>b</sup> Index  
 Two-Year Pre-Program and Two-Year Program Periods

<b>District</b>	<b>Aug. 90 - July 92</b>	<b>Aug. 92 - July 94</b>	<b>% Change</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>10 Little Village</b>	372	371	-0.3%	5
<b>8</b>	380	446	+17.4%	6
<b>9</b>	882	785	-11.0%	3
<b>12 Pilsen</b>	155	194	+25.2%	7
<b>13</b>	320	318	-0.6%	4
<b>14</b>	716	618	-13.7%	2
<b>25</b>	687	583	-15.1%	1
<b>Total</b>	3512	3315	-5.6%	

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<sup>a</sup>Excludes December 1994 data, except for homicides.

<sup>b</sup>Includes non-gang *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or other firearms and aggravated assaults with handguns or other firearms.*

## Section II

[Refer to Tables 15.1A – 15.2B and Figures 15.1A – 15.3B]

### Ratio and Graph Analysis

Using the same data from Table 15.1 in Section I, “Gang Incident Data – Violence Index by District,” we attempt, through ratio measures and graphs, to more precisely determine the scope of change in serious gang violence in Little Village compared to the other areas. We employ means and standard deviations in the numbers of reported serious violence incidents for the five- and three-year program and pre-program periods. We create ratio scores to reflect changes in mean scores for each of the Districts, in relation to the other Districts, between the pre-program and program periods. In other words, we explore not only the level of serious violence changes for each of the different Districts from year to year, but also the level of change for Districts in relation to each other during the pre-program and program periods.

We know that serious gang crime incidents increased in each of the areas over the five-year program period. Now we consider by how much they changed, in relation to the average or mean score for each of the other Districts, by computing ratio scores. We do this first for the five-year program period as compared to the five-year pre-program period, and then for the three-year program period as compared to the three-year pre-program period. Finally, we graph these changes for both the five- and three-year periods.

The five- and three-year comparison periods enable us to assess relatively long-term and short-term changes that may be associated with program effects. To some extent this also enables us to more precisely examine whether the Project was more effective in the first three

years of its existence than in the last two years. The graph analysis also permits us to look at trends by District over the different periods.

### Five-Year Analysis

Table 15.1A of the five-year analysis reveals that the smallest mean increases in serious violence occurred in Districts 9, 10, and 12. Much larger increases occurred in the other four Districts. The changes were not markedly different in Little Village (District 10), compared to Pilsen (District 12), and to District 9.

Table 15.2A is based on mean serious gang violent crime ratios across the five-year pre-program and program periods, indicating essentially the same pattern, but now in relative terms. We find that, relative to all of the Districts selected, the level of gang serious violent crime in Districts 9, 10, and 12 in fact declines, by 20.4%, 16.0%, and 21.7% respectively. These declines are not statistically different.

Figure 15.1A provides us with a summary version of Table 15.1A, in graph form, comparing serious gang violent crime for the seven Police Districts. We observe again that the increase in mean incidents is lower in Districts 9, 10, and 12 than in Districts 8, 13, 14 and 25. The level of mean gang serious violent incidents is highest in District 14 in the pre-program and program periods. It is second highest in Little Village in the pre-program period, but now is third highest in the five-year program period. Declines in relative position are also evident for Districts 9 and 12.

Figure 15.2A shows these same changes in ratio terms. The slopes of Districts 9, 10, 12 are in similar decline; Little Village simply has a higher number and proportion of serious gang

violent incidents than Districts 9 and 12 in the pre-program and program periods.

If we examine these ratios on a year-to-year basis over ten years for all of the Districts, as presented in Figure 15.3A, the Little Village decline relative to the other areas appears to be more consistent from 1988 through 1995. The pattern in District 9 seems to run from a relatively-high to a low level. The District 12 pattern is more erratic, starting low, rising in the pre-program period, then declining and rising again in the program period. Overall, there is little to distinguish the year-to-year patterns in Districts 9, 10, and 12. Fluctuations in District 12 are greater than in Districts 9 and 10. Sharp changes in population movement and housing patterns in Districts 9 and 12 may account for some of these patterns.

### Three-Year Analysis

The three-year pattern of program effect (i.e., differences between the first three-year program period and the three-year pre-program period) is favorable to Little Village. The smallest increase in mean serious violent incidents occurs in District 10 (Table 15.1B). The sharpest ratio decline also occurs in District 10 (Table 15.2B). The increases are clearly evident in Figure 15.1B and the relative declines are evident in Figure 15.2B. Again, we observe a gradual and consistent decline in gang serious violent crime ratios for Little Village over the three-year program period.

It is apparent that the decline in serious gang violence in District 10, relative to the other Districts, began prior to the start of the program. The pattern of serious gang violence incidents shows little change in District 9, but again, there is considerable fluctuation in District 12 during the three-year program and pre-program periods. However, the ratio decline in gang violent

crime is best sustained during both the program and pre-program periods in District 10 (Figure 15.3B).

Thus, although we can make a case for a relative lowering of the gang serious violence incident rate in Little Village over the five-year program period, we can make a similar case for ratio decline for Districts 9 and 12. Little Village does best in the three-year program period versus the three-year pre-program period, and clearly demonstrates the largest ratio decline in mean gang serious violence compared to all of the other Districts.

It is still not clear that the relative decline in aggregate serious gang violence is necessarily associated with a Project effect in Little Village in the first three years of the program period. The trend in aggregate serious gang violence was downward in Little Village at the start of the program, and continued downward for a succeeding three-year period. What we can possibly claim is that the level, or slope, of decline was best sustained in Little Village compared to the other Districts during the earlier program period.



Five-Year Analysis  
Pre-Program versus Program Period

Table 15.1A Mean Gang Serious Violent Crime Incidents

District	Pre-program		Program		Change	
	(n=5)		(n=5)		(n=5)	
	m	sd	m	sd	m	%
8	11.6	8.91	30.2	13.24	18.6	160.3
9	39.4	10.26	59.2	27.33	19.8	50.3
10	47.4	11.74	73.8	11.99	26.4	55.7
12	39.6	7.23	60.8	15.59	21.2	53.5
13	28.6	10.41	61.2	7.92	32.6	114.0
14	58.4	8.88	114.6	16.52	56.2	96.2
25	34.8	11.01	87.8	18.14	53.0	152.3

m = mean crime incidents  
sd = standard deviation  
% = percentage change

Table 15.2A Mean Gang Serious Violent Crime Ratios

District	Pre-program		Program		Change	
	(n=5)		(n=5)		(n=5)	
	r	sd	r	sd	r	%
8	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.02	43.2
9	0.15	0.03	0.12	0.05	-0.03	-20.4
10	0.18	0.02	0.15	0.02	-0.03	-16.0
12	0.16	0.05	0.12	0.02	-0.03	-21.7
13	0.11	0.03	0.13	0.02	0.02	16.5
14	0.23	0.01	0.24	0.03	0.01	4.9
25	0.13	0.03	0.18	0.03	0.05	35.1

r = mean crime ratio  
sd = standard deviation  
% = percentage change

Figure 15.1A  
Comparison of Average Yearly Total Incidents (10-Year Period)  
5 Pre-Program vs 5 Program Years




Figure 15.2A  
Comparison of Average Yearly Ratios (10-Year Period)  
5 Pre-Program vs 5 Program Years





Figure 15.3A  
Ten-Year Trend of Gang Serious Violent Crime Ratios



Three-Year Analysis  
Pre-Program versus Program Period

15.1B Mean Gang Serious Violent Crime Incidents

District	Pre-program		Program		Change	
	(n=3)		(n=3)		(n=3)	
	<u>m</u>	<u>sd</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>sd</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>%</u>
8	17.3	5.86	37.7	10.79	20.3	117.3
9	45.0	7.55	74.7	10.60	29.7	65.9
10	53.7	11.15	72.7	10.02	19.0	35.4
12	35.7	6.81	61.3	19.63	25.7	72.0
13	35.3	6.66	63.7	8.50	28.3	80.2
14	64.0	5.57	111.0	21.17	47.0	73.4
25	37.3	14.22	79.7	19.86	42.3	113.4

m = mean crime incidents  
sd = standard deviation  
% = percentage change

15.2B Mean Gang Serious Violent Crime Ratios

District	Pre-program		Program		Change	
	(n=3)		(n=3)		(n=3)	
	<u>r</u>	<u>sd</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>sd</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>%</u>
8	0.06	0.03	0.07	0.01	0.01	21.3
9	0.16	0.04	0.15	0.01	-0.01	-5.0
10	0.18	0.03	0.15	0.01	-0.04	-21.1
12	0.12	0.02	0.12	0.02	0.00	-2.0
13	0.12	0.03	0.13	0.02	0.00	3.9
14	0.22	0.00	0.22	0.04	0.00	0.5
25	0.13	0.04	0.16	0.01	0.03	23.8

r = mean crime ratio  
sd = standard deviation  
% = percentage change

Figure 15.1B  
Comparison of Average Yearly Total Incidents (6-Year Period)  
3 Pre-Program vs 3 Program Years




Figure 15.2B  
 Comparison of Average Yearly Ratios (6-Year Period)  
 3 Pre-Program vs 3 Program Years





Figure 15.3B  
Six-Year Trend of Gang Serious Violent Crime Ratios





### Section III

#### Graph Analysis: “Hot Spots”

Using graphs, we mapped the violence index offenses (now including armed robberies) by year for the Little Village and Pilsen areas (Districts 10 and 12), identifying the densest areas of criminal activity. Concentrations of incidents were determined using STAC (Spatial and Temporal Analysis of Crime) software, developed by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. Our primary interest was to determine whether the location and clustering patterns of violence index offenses changed in Little Village during the program period; and, if so, were the changes related to the effects of the Project? To more clearly determine whether such effects might be program-related, we also compared pattern changes that occurred in Pilsen during the program and pre-program periods.

The patterns of clustering, or concentration, of serious violent gang incidents varies somewhat between Pilsen and Little Village. This may be due in part to the size of each of the communities. The Little Village program area contains six police beats; the Pilsen area has three. Little Village possessed a larger population, 60,829 persons, compared to Pilsen’s 35,433 (based on U.S. Census data for 1990). The two major gangs in Little Village generally had their own, relatively separated turf areas; the several major gangs in Pilsen were situated very close to each other.

There was little change in the cluster patterns of serious violent gang incidents across the years in both Little Village and Pilsen during the pre-program and program periods. In general, the clusters in Little Village were smaller, less dense and more spread out than those in Pilsen; those patterns changed only a little between the pre-program and program periods. The size of

the gang problem (i.e., number of serious gang violence incidents) increased in both Little Village and Pilsen, although there was a difference in the size of the increase. The increase took a somewhat different form in the two communities over time. In the larger Little Village community, the number of cluster patterns increased slightly, but their sizes were generally smaller, and they were distributed more widely. The number of cluster patterns did not increase in Pilsen, but the areas of concentration grew somewhat larger and were located in the central part of the three-police-beat area.

The spatial distribution of serious violent gang incidents in Little Village changed slightly during the program period. The Project may have had some impact on dispersing the concentration of incidents during the first four program years. Also, we note there was little to indicate that serious gang violence was concentrated in border communities or in school areas, especially high schools. High school areas were only one of the centers of concentration of serious gang violence activity, in Little Village and Pilsen. In sum, the Project did not seem to have a significant influence on the spacial patterning of serious violence in Little Village compared to Pilsen. There may have been some redistribution or decentralization effect in Little Village, and some concentration effect in Pilsen.

Whatever spatial changes occurred were probably due to the interaction of demographic and territorial factors. There was an increase in population and gang crime incidents in both Little Village and Pilsen during the ten-year pre-program and program period, 1987-1997. The gang problem tended to spread spatially in Little Village, a territorially larger community. It could only spread marginally at its current gang locations in Pilsen, a territorially smaller community.

The Project had no impact on the spatial distribution, but some influence on limiting the growth of the youth gang problem. The gang problem in Little Village was a function of ecological forces – sharp population growth, immigration, poverty (no gentrification) and ghettoization – as well as distinctive institutional and political arrangements in Chicago. The Project was not designed to deal with the larger forces, or to influence accepted institutional or political arrangements probably generating and contributing to the gang problem. The Project was intended to address a limited, youth-specific part of the problem, through a team service and a nominal interorganizational and community organizational approach. Its potential for changing significant aspects of the gang problem, at least of institutional and community arrangements, was not developed (see Chapter 17).

## Section IV

with Rolando V. Sosa

### Incident Rates of Crime Per 100,000 Individuals

We were interested in the possible effects of the Project which could be associated with changes in U.S. Census-based prevalence rates of serious gang violent crime incidents by Project-equivalent community areas, particularly for 17-to-25-year-old males (essentially the target age group). For this purpose, we again selected Pilsen (District 12) as the comparison area.

We needed to determine how many males, 17 to 25 years of age, in each of the two comparable areas were at risk for gang membership and serious gang violence during the Project developmental period. Such base-population data were obtained from the 1990 U.S. Census. We decided to compare the prevalence rate changes in serious violent incidents per 100,000 males, 17 to 25 years old, between the three-year pre-program and three-year program periods (i.e., close to the time the 1990 Census was carried out). We wanted to limit age redistribution effects, as well as fluctuations in serious gang violence over longer periods. We wanted to better associate rate changes with what we considered optimum program effects, if they occurred.

We computed a ratio between the number of serious violent gang crime incidents (i.e., *homicides, aggravated batteries with handguns or firearms, and aggravated assaults with handguns or firearms*) occurring in the three year pre-program and program periods, and the proportion of 17- to 25-year-old males per 100,000 individuals in the total population of each community, assuming no major age redistribution effects over these periods.

According to the 1990 Census, there were approximately 9000 males, aged 17 to 25, per 100,000 individuals in Little Village, compared to slightly more than 9800 males, aged 17 to 25, per 100,000 individuals in Pilsen. Thus, Pilsen had a higher density of males in the high-risk, serious-violence, gang-age category than Little Village. In the pre-program period, however, there were 197 incidents (or 1 incident for every 45.7 males, 17 to 25) in Little Village, compared to 152 incidents (or 1 for every 64.9 males, 17 to 25) in Pilsen. In other words, the prevalence rate of gang violence was higher in Little Village.

In the three-year program period, there were 269 incidents of serious violent gang crime in Little Village, so the rate increased to 1 in 33.4. The number of incidents in Pilsen for this period also increased to 230, as did the rate, to 1 in 42.9. At both time periods, then, the incident rate per youth at highest risk was greater in Little Village. However, the increase in the rate over time in Little Village was not so great as that in Pilsen. (The Little Village rate increased by 12.3 incidents, versus 22.0 incidents in Pilsen.) In other words, the serious gang violence prevalence rate – incidents per older-youth gang members – increased relatively more, about 55.9% more, in Pilsen than in Little Village during the first three program years.

All of this suggests that the Project was associated with a relatively greater reduction in serious gang violent incidents in Little Village, compared to Pilsen, other things being equal (e.g., offenders per incident and incarceration rates, as District police practices and undocumented immigration patterns were similar).

## Summary

The aggregate patterns of change in violence index offenses over the five-year program period, compared to the five-year pre-program period, indicated that the target area of Little Village experienced a lower rate of increase in combined serious violent gang incidents, compared to the rate of increase in the average of the other six Districts combined. The Project appeared to have been relatively most successful during the first three years of its existence.

The age of gang offenders was considered to be an important variable, since the majority of the serious violent gang crimes was committed by those 17 to 24 years of age. The data show that the program-targeted age group in the selected beats of District 10 experienced a relatively lower rate of increase in serious gang violence compared to other Districts in the sample, particularly in the first three program years. The reduction of serious gang violent crime was particularly evident for youth 16-and-under, and to a considerable extent for youth aged 17 to 24 years. All Districts, including District 10, experienced very large increases in drug-related arrests across time periods. The increase was particularly large in Little Village. This did not match Program individual-level data for program youth, where we found a decrease in drug arrests.

Attention was also given to the changes within Little Village affecting the targeted and non-targeted gangs, at the offender level. The Latin Kings and the Two Six were still responsible for the preponderance of serious gang violent crimes in the area, but generally experienced a smaller combined increase in homicides, aggravated batteries, and aggravated assaults, compared to other Latino and African-American gangs in the area. The relative number of offenders for armed robberies and weapons offenses, for Latin Kings and Two Six combined,

did not rise as rapidly as it did for the other non-targeted gangs in Little Village. This was not so for other crimes, such as damage/trespass to property and mob action, where the relative numbers rose compared to a decrease in other Latino (and, to some extent, African-American) gangs in Little Village. The Two Six, a younger gang than the Latin Kings, had major increases in the numbers of offenders involved in each of these types of crimes, across time periods.

Though females were not mainly responsible for violent crimes (or even for non-violent crimes) in Little Village, they were responsible for relative increases in non-violent crimes (including drug and alcohol offenses) across time. While the Project primarily targeted males, aged 17 to 24 years (and later 16 years and younger), it was not clear that females would experience some degree of change through indirect or secondary program effects. The finding was that both female and male gang members in District 10 became more involved in non-violent, drug-related criminal activities, but less involved in serious gang violent crimes, over the course of the program. We also observed that there was probably no displacement effect from gang to non-gang violent crimes, although the possibility exists that some crimes, particularly violent crime labeled as non-gang motivated, may have been defined as gang-motivated during the program period.

A special analysis was conducted to determine whether the ratio of serious violent gang crimes in Little Village, relative to serious violent gang crimes in the other Districts, increased or decreased. Based on a five-year pre-program and program analysis, we found that the serious violent gang crimes ratio decreased in Districts 9, 10, and 12, but increased in the other four comparison Districts. However, the analysis for a three-year period indicated that in Little

Village the serious gang violence ratio probably declined more sharply than in any other of the six Districts.

In a spatial/temporal analysis of gang crime, we found that the spatial patterning of serious violent gang crime in Little Village did not vary substantially between the five-year program period and the five-year pre-program period, except for the possibility that clusters of serious violent gang incidents were now smaller and dispersed across a wider area within the District. Serious gang violence was increasingly concentrated in Pilsen, the most equivalent comparison area. One additional aggregate-level analysis was conducted during the early years of the Project. Using Census data and police incident data, we found that the prevalence rate of serious violent gang crime for 17- to 25-year-old males increased in Little Village, but at a considerably lower rate than in the comparable Pilsen community, during the first three program years.

In general, there was evidence of some relative deceleration of the serious gang violence problem at the community level in Little Village compared to other similar communities, particularly during the first three years of the program. A limitation of the aggregate-level analysis is the variability of key community-level characteristics, which makes comparison of changes in the prevalence rates of serious gang violence across different communities and gangs over time especially difficult. We cannot as persuasively attribute Project effects on the gang problem at the community level as we can at the individual program-youth level.



## Chapter 16

### Changes in Perceptions of the Gang Problem:

#### Community Resident and Organization Respondents

with Susan Grossman

### **Introduction**

This chapter addresses changes in the gang problem at the community level from the perspective of local residents and representatives of agencies and organizations in the Little Village community, as well as in the comparison community of Pilsen.<sup>1</sup> The Chicago Police Department requested that part of the evaluation of the Gang Violence Reduction Project (GVRP) include a community survey(s) to determine whether the Little Village community perceived a change in the gang problem that could be associated with the presence of the Project. While we could not propose a direct, causal relationship between changes in the behavior of program youth and changes in local residents' and organizations' perceptions of the gang problem, the GVRP was the intervention project that was most likely to have contributed to any change that occurred. We were not in a position to assess citywide or national economic, social, and political factors and public policy initiatives that could have differentially affected the Little Village and Pilsen gang problem.

Pilsen and Little Village are probably more like each other than any two other communities in Chicago which have concentrations of recently-arrived populations of Mexican origin. Each of the two communities has developed along very similar lines, but each has distinctive problems, community-development issues, and institutions. Some social, economic,

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<sup>1</sup> The comparison community is demographically and socio-economically similar to the Project target community, but did not receive any Project services.

cultural, and health institutions serve both communities. Generally different sets of gangs exist in each community, with very little interaction among them across community borders. A greater number of different gangs (but not necessarily more gang sections or gang members) is concentrated in Pilsen.

Table 16.1 presents a list of demographic, socio-economic and housing characteristics of the two communities, based on 1990 census data. Officially, Little Village had an approximately 40% larger population (60,829) than Pilsen (35,433), and a rate of gang violence which was somewhat larger at the beginning of the Project (see Chapter 15). The population figures were an undercount in a population that included an unknown (likely high) number of undocumented immigrants. There was substantially more home ownership, and slightly more married couples with children under 18 in Little Village. Characteristics of ethnicity, gender, income, education, and unemployment were similar, and both communities had a very high and similar ratio of males to females in the Project-targeted 17- to 25-year-old age category.

Data were collected from 195 resident respondents and 114 organization respondents in these two communities at two interview periods, two years apart. Initial (Time I) interviews were conducted in the Winter and Spring of 1992-1993; follow-up (Time II) interviews in the Winter and Spring of 1994-1995, approximately two years after the initial interviews. The data presented here are based on analysis of interview responses at Time I and Time II.

We first consider responses from the community residents, and how these responses differ across the two communities. We then look at responses from residents living in each of the two target gang territories in Little Village – those of the Latin Kings and Two Six. Finally, we discuss findings related to responses from organization representatives from Little Village

and Pilsen. We did not expect that changes in the perceptions of the organization respondents would be as marked as those of the resident respondents, who were more directly affected by the gang problem and by the various socialization and control efforts of the Program's outreach youth workers, police, and probation officers.

### **Resident Respondents**

Sampling Design. To develop the initial community resident sample, local households were selected on a cluster-sampling basis from the streets (and sections of streets) with the highest gang violence activity. Data determining violence activity were obtained from local Chicago Police District police officers, the Chicago Police Department's Gang Crime Unit, the Early Warning System ("Hot Spot") homicide project directed by Dr. Carolyn Block of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, the opinions of key local community-organization staff, the observations of Project community youth gang workers, and from the pinpointing of gang youth hang-outs and concentrations of graffiti by senior Project researchers. There was a high degree of consensus as to which blocks and segments of blocks were the locations of the most frequent and serious gang activities. Approximately 10 street locations were selected in each community. Project interviewers from the community went to preassigned buildings or houses to interview heads-of-households in residences in the selected streets. Almost all interviews were conducted in Spanish. The initial (Time I) response rate for all households contacted in our purposive and stratified sample was approximately 65% in each community.

Resident Interviews. The initial plan was to interview the same residents at Time I and at Time

II. While every attempt was made to locate Time I respondents at Time II, this was not always possible. Of the 194 resident respondents interviewed at Time II – 97 from each community – a total of 66 (35 from Little Village and 31 from Pilsen) were from households where someone had been interviewed at Time I. Of these 66 individuals, 52 were the same individual interviewed at Time I, while the other 14 were spouses or adult children of those Time I respondents.

The nature of the sample was examined at Time I and Time II, in each community and in each gang territory. The results suggest that, with few exceptions, there were no significant demographic differences between the Time-I and Time-II samples. The differences which did exist suggested that the Time-II resident sample may have been somewhat more residentially stable. Whether this would have made them more concerned about, or accepting of, community problems is unclear, and several other indicators of economic status (such as income and employment) did not differ significantly across time periods or across communities.

Furthermore, the sample characteristics of those interviewed at Time I or Time II only, and those interviewed at both Time I and Time II, suggest generally that some differences did exist, mostly related to more concerns about victimization, perceptions of overall crime and some gang-related activities, by those interviewed only once. These groups of respondents were quite similar in a number of other areas, including feelings about the community changing for the worse, the likelihood of moving out of the community, fear at night and safety in general.

Data Analysis. The analysis of resident data is in the form of two sets of comparisons: Little Village residents versus Pilsen residents as a whole, and those Little Village residents living in Latin King territory versus those living in Two Six territory. The first set of analyses allows us

to determine if there is a difference between communities; the second tells us if changes within Little Village have been similar in the two gang territories. The Latin King territory contained more gang members than the Two Six territory. Residents in Latin King territory more often lived in three- or four-story tenement buildings; residents in the Two Six territory more often lived in single family bungalows. More residents were interviewed in Latin King territory (n = 60) than in Two Six territory (n = 35). Residents in Latin King territory comprised 62.5 % of the total Little Village gang-territory sample; the Two Six comprised 37.5% of that sample.

### Findings

#### Resident Respondents – Little Village Community

Satisfaction with the Community. A number of questions dealt with general community satisfaction, perceived problems in the community and changes in respondents' perceptions of the quality of life in the community. Many questions related specifically to the gang problem. (Because those interviewed were living in areas characterized by high gang violence, even some of the more general questions took on significance in terms of the impact of the gang problem.)

Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which the community had changed in the past two years – had it had gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse? The data indicate that a change occurred in the perceptions of the Little Village respondents and, to a lesser extent, of the Pilsen respondents. At Time I, only 6.3% of Little Village resident respondents felt that the community was a better place than it had been two years ago; at Time II, 21.9% felt it was better. This change was statistically significant (Chisquare = 9.532, df = 1, p # 0.01). Similarly, the proportion of respondents in Little Village who believed that the community had gotten

worse had dropped by almost half between Time I and Time II – from 63.2% at Time I to 34.4% at Time II (Chisquare = 15.834, df = 1, p # 0.001).

Pilsen respondents were significantly more likely than Little Village respondents to rate their community as “better” at Time I (24.7% versus 6.3% ; Chisquare = 12.361, df = 1, p # 0.001), and significantly less likely to rate it as “worse” (34.0% versus 63.2%; Chisquare = 16.313, df = 1, p # 0.001). Pilsen respondents saw their community as “better,” both at Time I and at Time II, and only slightly fewer respondents believed the community had gotten “worse.” Neither of these changes was statistically significant. Because of the greater change among the Little Village respondents, statistically significant differences between the two communities no longer existed at Time II (Table 16.2).

Of the 45 respondents in both communities who thought their communities were “better” at Time II, the greatest proportion ascribed this to “improved safety factors” (62.2%)<sup>2</sup> and “less gang activity” (33.3%). “Less gang violence” was mentioned only by Little Village respondents (9.5% versus 0% in Pilsen), and Little Village respondents were almost twice as likely to mention reasons related to “improved safety factors” – 80.9% (n = 21) versus 45.8% (n = 24) (Chisquare = 5.877, df = 1, p = 0.015). In Pilsen, “better community relations,” “economic development,” and “improved city services” were also important (factors which were either not mentioned at all by Little Village respondents, or mentioned only to a very limited extent).

In addition to questions about satisfaction, respondents considered the statement: “All communities have problems. In your opinion, what are the most serious problems in this

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<sup>2</sup> Responses in this category included statements such as “less crime,” “crime has gone down,” “more police in the neighborhood,” and “police come more often.”

community?” Respondents were asked to identify up to five problems and rank them in order of seriousness.

Respondents in both communities most often mentioned gangs as a problem, both at Time I and Time II. Pilsen respondents were more likely to do so at both time periods. Given that respondents were aware of the purpose of the survey – to get some sense of the seriousness of the gang problem in the community – it is perhaps not surprising that this should have been the most common response. Nonetheless, there was a statistically significant decrease in mentioning gangs as a community problem in both communities (from 80.2% to 64.9% in Little Village,  $\chi^2 = 5.604$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ; and from 92.8% to 73.7% in Pilsen,  $\chi^2 = 12.605$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ).

General crime and safety-related issues<sup>3</sup> were the next most frequently mentioned problems at both time periods, significantly more so by Little Village respondents. Other areas of concern, in both communities at both time periods, included drugs and lack of social services. Alcohol-related problems were of moderate importance: for residents of Little Village, they were mentioned significantly more often at Time I than at Time II (18.7% at Time I versus 6.7% at Time II;  $\chi^2 = 6.582$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), while the opposite trend existed in Pilsen – an increase from 7.2% at Time I to 16.8% at Time II ( $\chi^2 = 4.217$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). Pilsen respondents were significantly more likely than Little Village respondents to mention educational problems at Time I (16.5% versus 4.2%;  $\chi^2 = 7.894$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), but

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<sup>3</sup> Responses in this category included answers such as “graffiti,” “gun shots,” “police harassment,” “too much violence in the area,” and “lack of police protection.”

few respondents in either community mentioned them at Time II (7.5% in Little Village versus 6.3% in Pilsen) (Table 16.3).

Crime and Safety Factors. The data on community problems indicate that crime and safety were of concern to members of both communities, more so in Little Village than in Pilsen. Several questions addressed: the extent to which individuals were satisfied with the safety of their communities; their perceptions of the safety of their neighborhoods at night; whether or not they were afraid to walk alone in the six-block area surrounding their residences; their degree of worry that a family member might be a victim of crime in the coming year; and whether they or their family members had, in fact, been victims of some type of crime in the six months prior to the interview.

Ratings related to *safety at night* indicated an improvement in both communities, especially among respondents in Little Village. At Time I, 58.3% of respondents in Little Village felt that their neighborhood was very dangerous, as did 39.4% of respondents in Pilsen. The difference between the two communities was statistically significant (Chisquare = 6.998,  $df = 1$ ,  $p \neq 0.01$ ). At Time II, the difference no longer existed, due primarily to a much larger decline in the proportion of respondents in Little Village who rated their community as “very dangerous” (30% in Little Village; 29.2% in Pilsen). This decline (reflecting an improved feeling of safety, although a still somewhat guarded one) was significant for respondents in Little Village (Chisquare = 14.509,  $df = 1$ ,  $p \neq 0.001$ ), but not for those in Pilsen.

Responses to questions about *fear of walking alone* also indicated an improvement in Little Village, but a slight deterioration in Pilsen. At Time I, almost all respondents in Little Village (92.7%) said they were afraid to walk alone within the area six blocks from their homes.



Slightly less than three quarters of all Pilsen respondents also were afraid, and the difference between the communities was statistically significant (63.6% versus 31.6%; Chisquare = 13.517,  $df = 1$ ,  $p \# 0.001$ ). At Time II, a significant difference still existed between the two communities (Chisquare = 4.570,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = 0.033$ ), but the trend was reversed: 59.8% of all Little Village respondents reported that they were afraid, compared to 74.3% in Pilsen. This shift between Time I and Time II was statistically significant for Little Village respondents (Chisquare= 28.794,  $df = 1$ ,  $p \# 0.001$ ), while the slight increase in Pilsen was not.

Concern about *family members potentially being victims of crime* followed a similar pattern. At Time I, twice the proportion of respondents in Little Village felt that there was a high likelihood that a member of their family would be victimized (Chisquare = 18.847,  $df = 1$ ,  $p \# 0.001$ ), while the two communities were virtually identical at Time II, with approximately one quarter of all respondents in both communities fearing potential family victimization. The improvement was statistically significant for respondents in Little Village (Chisquare = 27.117,  $df = 1$ ,  $p \# 0.001$ ), but not for those in Pilsen, who experienced very limited change.

The data relating to the proportion of *respondents who were themselves – or whose family members were – victims of crime* in the previous six months also reflect an improvement in both communities, but again, the greater change occurred in Little Village. At Time I, almost three-quarters of the Little Village respondents and slightly less than two-thirds of the Pilsen respondents had themselves been, or had family members who had been, victims of a crime. These proportions are astounding, and perhaps reflect situations unique to blocks characterized by very high violent-gang-crime levels. At Time II, the proportion of respondents in both communities who had been victims declined to under 50% (45.4% in Little Village and 47.4% in

Pilsen). These declines between time periods were also statistically significant for both communities, but the change was greater for respondents in Little Village (Chisquare = 15.153,  $df = 1$ ,  $p \neq 0.001$ ) than in Pilsen (Chisquare = 4.578,  $df = 1$ ,  $p \neq 0.05$ ).

Respondents were also asked to give reasons for the amount of crime they perceived, both at Time I and Time II. Several categories of responses emerged from answers to this open-ended question. Of particular note is that there was a decrease in both communities in the proportion of respondents who held *gangs* responsible for crime. At Time I, 62.7% of the sample ( $N = 193$ ) mentioned gangs as a reason for the amount of crime in their communities. At Time II, the proportion had fallen to 48.6% ( $N = 175$ ). The decrease among Little Village respondents in particular was statistically significant – from 58.3% at Time I to 42.9% at Time II (Chisquare = 4.294,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = 0.038$ ). Among Pilsen respondents, the change was smaller but still impressive – from 67.0% at Time I to 53.9% at Time II. Pilsen respondents were slightly more likely to mention *drugs* as a reason for crime at Time II (34.1%;  $n = 92$ ) than at Time I (27.8%;  $n = 97$ ). There was a small decrease in the mention of drugs as a reason for crime among Little Village respondents – 38.5% ( $n = 96$ ) at Time I; 28.6% ( $n = 84$ ) at Time II.

Gangs and Gang Crime. Resident respondents were asked a number of questions about gang-motivated crime, and particularly about gang-motivated violence. Gang-motivated crime designates those criminal acts of gang members that are a function of gang-as-a-unit interests (e.g., gang violence), in contrast to criminal acts committed by an individual gang member strictly for his personal purposes (e.g., theft, burglary). The Chicago Police Department, as well as the resident and organization respondents in Little Village and Pilsen, made these definitional distinctions.

A large proportion of respondents in each of the two communities felt there was “a lot “ of gang-motivated property crime and gang-motivated violence. At Time I, more than two thirds of all respondents felt there was “a lot” of gang-motivated property crime, and more than three quarters felt there was “a lot” of gang-motivated violence. There were some declines in these proportions in both communities at Time II, but they were greater and of statistical significance in Little Village only (Chisquare = 12.709, df = 1, p # 0.001 for changes relating to gang-motivated property crime; Chisquare = 7.071, df = 1, p # 0.01 for changes relating to gang-motivated violence) (Table 16.4).

A slightly different pattern emerged when non gang-motivated crimes were considered. The average ratings at both Time I and Time II for both communities were lower than ratings for gang-motivated crime, indicating that gang-motivated crime was seen as more of a problem by residents in these high gang-violence areas. Ratings for gang-motivated crime declined significantly in both communities, although the declines were slightly greater in Little Village. In addition, although ratings improved also for non gang-motivated crime among respondents in both communities, these changes were not statistically significant in either community (Table 16.5).

Drugs were perceived as a serious concern for slightly more than 20% of the sample in each community at Time II, but they were viewed as an increasingly serious problem in Little Village. When asked about causes of the gang problem, *drugs* (using or selling) were mentioned by Little Village respondents almost twice as often at Time II compared to Time I – 16.7% (n = 96) versus 29.1% (n = 86). This difference was statistically significant (Chisquare = 3.999, df = 1, p # 0.05). There was a slight decrease in the mention of drugs in Pilsen – from 23.4% at Time

I (n = 94) to 20.0% at Time II (n = 90).<sup>4</sup> It was not uncommon in both communities for children to be involved in selling drugs, in part to add to the marginal income of families. While at least twice as many Pilsen as Little Village respondents generally knew of such families, both at Time I and Time II, the proportion in Little Village respondents who knew such families increased 8.6 % to 12.5% (change was imperceptible in Pilsen) (Table 16.6).

Community Groups, Police and Probation. Respondents were also asked their opinions about community groups and organizations which were dealing with the gang problem in their neighborhoods. At Time II, there was an increase in the proportion of respondents in both communities who were aware of a group or organization addressing the gang problem. The increase was greater in Little Village (20.8% to 33.0%) compared to Pilsen (36.1% to 37.1%). At Time I, a significantly smaller proportion of Little Village respondents was aware of such a group or organization (Chisquare = 5.506, df = 1, p # 0.05), but by Time II the two communities were almost identical. Further, fewer respondents in both communities at Time II reported that they did not know if there was such a group, but in Little Village the decrease was greater.

In addition to asking whether residents had knowledge of community groups and organizations dealing with the gang problem, resident respondents were also asked a series of questions about the activities of the police and probation in their communities. Few residents in either community knew a probation officer who was dealing with the gang problem at either time period – 2.7% of the sample.

Table 16.7 has information about respondent perceptions of certain selected police

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<sup>4</sup> A comparison of drug-crime arrests at the general-community and gang levels showed especially sharp increases in both Little Village and Pilsen during the Project period. However, the trend was reversed for youth directly targeted by the Project.

activities at the two time periods. In general, residents had a more positive view of police activities at Time II than at Time I. However, the proportion of residents who had seen the police involved in these activities – particularly activities related to policing of gang members – increased to a greater degree in Little Village than in Pilsen. The proportion of Little Village respondents who had seen police *harassing gang members* increased from 33.7% at Time I to 53.9% at Time II (Chisquare = 7.113, df = 1, p # 0.01). In Pilsen, the increase was more modest: from 35.8% to 40.7%. Similarly, the proportion of individuals in Little Village at Time I who believed that the police were trying to *effectively address the gang problem* was only 16.7%; by Time II, it had increased to 47.6% (Chisquare = 19.769, df = 1, p # 0.001). In Pilsen, the proportion had changed by slightly less than 10% (from 29.9% to 39.3%).

Other changes which were larger, or of a higher level of statistical significance, in Little Village compared to Pilsen related to the proportion of individuals who said the police were trying to *solve other community problems*, those who had seen police *respond quickly to gang incidents* and those who had seen police *arrest known gang members*. The changes in both communities were similar with respect to the proportion who saw police *arrest known criminals* and “troublemakers.” There were slightly larger increases in Pilsen than in Little Village among those who saw police *walking the streets* and *patrolling in cars*.

At Time II, there was a significant difference between the communities in the proportion of respondents who had seen the police *arrest known gang members*; more than half of all Little Village respondents, compared to 40.7% of Pilsen respondents (Chisquare = 3.794, df = 1, p # 0.05). While Little Village respondents at Time I were significantly less likely to see the police as trying to *effectively address the gang problem* compared to Pilsen respondents

(Chisquare = 4.723, df = 1, p # 0.05), they were more likely to view the police as involved in such activity at Time II. The view of police functioning appeared to be greater in respect to *harassment of gang members*, and, especially, *effectively addressing the gang problem* in Little Village.

### Resident Respondents – Little Village Gang Territories

As noted in the Introduction, we compared differences between resident respondents in Little Village as a whole, and those living in the Latin King and Two Six gang territories within Little Village. We wanted to determine if changes in Little Village were similar across the whole community, or if one gang area had been affected by the Project more than the other. There were significant differences in responses in respect to community changes and gang crime by residents in the two different Little Village gang areas. In some respects, the responses of Little Village residents living in Two Six territory were more similar to those of the resident respondents in Pilsen, than to those of the resident respondents living in Little Village Latin King territory.

Satisfaction with the Community. Relatively more respondents in Latin King territory perceived a greater improvement in community conditions than did respondents in Two Six territory. Both communities saw an improvement, but the change was statistically significant for the Latin King-area respondents only – from 5.1% to 25.0% (Chisquare = 9.190, df = 1, p = 0.002). On the other hand, relatively fewer of the Two Six respondents felt that the community was getting worse – from 77.8% to 38.9% (Chisquare = 11.2, df = 1, p # 0.001). In sum, both sets of respondents saw their areas as getting better, and fewer saw them as getting

worse.

There were a few notable differences in the two gang territories regarding perceived problems in the community (Table 16.8). Most of the differences between time periods were related to concerns about *gangs* in Latin King territory. *Gangs* emerged as the most serious problem at both time periods for respondents in both gang territories. However, at Time I, 81.7% of the sample in Latin King territory mentioned gangs, compared to 55.0% at Time II. This difference between time periods was statistically significant (Chisquare = 9.859, df = 1, p # 0.01). At Time II, respondents in Latin King territory were significantly less likely to mention *gangs* as a community problem compared to respondents in Two Six territory (Chisquare = 7.127, df = 1, p # 0.01), where in fact there was a slight increase – from 77.8% at Time I to 82.3% at Time II.

There was a similar pattern between time periods in those mentioning *crime and safety* issues. There was a statistically significant decrease in the proportion of respondents in Latin King territory mentioning such problems – from 66.7% to 48.3% (Chisquare = 4.126, df = 1, p # 0.05), but there was an increase in Two Six territory – from 55.6% to 61.8%.

There were differences in the two territories regarding the mention of *drugs* as a problem. Respondents in Latin King territory experienced little change in the mention of drug-related problems; the increase was slight – from 21.7% to 26.7%. In Two Six territory, there was a statistically significant decrease in the proportion who listed drug-related problems – from 47.2% to 11.8% (Chisquare = 10.468, df = 1, p # 0.001). At Time I, those in Two Six territory were significantly more likely to mention drugs, compared to those in Latin King territory (Chisquare = 6.840, df = 1, p # 0.01). By Time II (reflecting a large decrease in Two Six

territory), there was no longer a significant difference between respondents in the two areas. Both communities reflected decreases in the proportions mentioning *alcohol-related* problems, but the decrease was statistically significant between Time I and Time II in Latin King territory only. There was a significant increase in Latin King territory in the perception of *unemployment* as a problem – from 1.7% to 11.7% ( $p \neq 0.05$ ), but a non-significant decrease in Two Six territory – from 11.1% to 5.9%.

The same types of pattern changes were apparent in another set of questions regarding concerns about *family members being victims of crime* in the coming year. At Time II, a smaller proportion of respondents in both territories was very worried about family members being victimized, but the decline was slightly greater and of higher statistical significance in Latin King territory than in Two Six territory (Chisquare = 19.480,  $df = 1$ ,  $p \neq 0.001$  versus Chisquare = 7.968,  $df = 1$ ,  $p \neq 0.01$ ). Further, the decline in the proportion of respondents who said they were *afraid to walk alone* in areas close to their homes was much greater in Latin King territory than in Two Six territory. The proportion of concerned Latin King-territory respondents dropped by almost half between Time I and Time II – from 95.0% to 50.8% – and was of high statistical significance (Chisquare = 29.767,  $df = 1$ ,  $p \neq 0.001$ ).

A decrease in the proportion of respondents who reported that they or their family members were *victims of some type of crime* in the previous six months was much greater in Two Six territory than in Latin King territory. At Time I, almost all residents interviewed in Two Six territory reported that they or a family member had been a victim – 91.7%, compared to 61.7% in Latin King territory. This difference was statistically significant (Chisquare = 10.254,  $df = 1$ ,  $p \neq 0.01$ ). At Time II, the proportion of respondents who were victims had decreased to 47.2%



in Two Six territory and 44.3% in Latin King territory. This decrease was statistically significant in Two Six territory (Chisquare = 16.756, df = 1, p # 0.001), but fell just short of significance in Latin King territory (Chisquare = 3.677, df = 1, p = 0.055).

Gangs and Gang Crime. Time-I data indicate that respondents in both gang territories were fairly alike in feeling that there was “a lot” of gang-motivated violence and gang-motivated property crime in their areas (Table 16.9). Differences between Time I and Time II were much greater for respondents in Latin King territory. The proportion of those who felt there was “a lot” of gang-motivated violence fell from 80% to 50% between Time I and Time II; and, for gang-motivated property crime, from 75% to 37%. These changes were statistically significant for both gang-motivated violence (Chisquare = 11.868, df = 1, p # 0.001) and gang-motivated property crime (Chisquare = 16.713, df = 1, p # 0.001). Changes in Two Six territory were very different. There was actually a small increase in the proportion who said there was “a lot” of gang-motivated violence at Time II, compared to Time I, and only a small decline in “a lot” of gang-motivated property crime. The differences between the communities at Time II were statistically significant for both gang-motivated violence (Chisquare = 7.259, df = 1, p # 0.01) and gang-motivated property crime (Chisquare = 4.581, df = 1, p # 0.05).

Drugs. There was concern about an increase in the drug problem in both parts of the Little Village community. It is noteworthy that a very large increase in Two Six respondents mentioned *drugs* as a cause of the gang problem – 16.7% (n = 36) at Time I, compared to 40.6% (n = 32) at Time II (Chisquare = 4.830, df = 1, p # 0.05). There was also an increase in the proportion of respondents in Latin King territory who saw drugs as a cause of the gang problem, but it was not very large – from 16.7% (n = 60) at Time I to 22.2% (n = 54) at Time II. The

increase in Little Village can be accounted for primarily by changes within Two Six territory. Respondents in Two Six territory were also somewhat more likely than those in Latin King territory to know a family where a child was selling drugs, both at Time I and Time II (Table 16.10). These differences generally mirrored observations of Project field-workers (particularly by the youth workers) that gang members, and especially their families, were more involved in drug selling in Two Six than in Latin King territory.

Police. Table 16.11 compares respondents in both gang territories who had seen the police engaged in a variety of activities related to dealing with the gang problem. The proportion of Little Village respondents who had seen the police involved in these activities increased notably at Time II, particularly for those activities directly relating to gang members (i.e., *arresting known gang members*, *harassing gang members*, and *effectively addressing the gang problem*). These changes in perception were reflected in both gang territories. Increases related to activities such as *walking the streets*, *arresting known criminals*, *arresting known gang members*, *effectively addressing the gang problem*, and *solving other community problems* were large, and statistically significant for respondents in both areas. The increases were statistically significant for respondents in both gang territories, more in reference to those police practices directly related to the gang problem than to general policing problems. At both time periods, there were only small increases – in both gang territories – in those who had seen police *patrolling in cars*, which was already at a very high level.

Experience with the Gang Violence Reduction Project. Of the Little Village residents surveyed at Time II, only about a quarter had heard of the GVRP.<sup>5</sup> This finding held true

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<sup>5</sup> Pilsen respondents were not asked questions concerning the GVRP.

regardless of the gang territory respondents lived in: 25.0% in Latin King territory and 25.7% in Two Six territory had heard of the Project. Among the respondents who had heard of the GVRP (n = 24), very few (n = 19) could describe what they thought the Project did. They most often cited “intervene in gang violence.” Only a few mentioned family counseling, community organizing, and working with police.

The respondents who were familiar with the Project were also asked which agencies were involved with the GVRP. Although the numbers were small, relatively more of the Little Village Latin King respondents knew that youth workers were involved in the Project, while relatively more of the Two Six-territory respondents knew specific Project staff members.

### **Organization Respondents**

Sampling Design. A different selection process was used for organization respondents. Lists of organizations were obtained from various local sources: youth agencies, churches, and major community organizations. Interviews were sought with leaders or administrators of organizations who had contact with gang youth and their families, or knowledge of “hot spot” locations, i.e., where gang violence problems were concentrated. The first set of leaders of agencies and community groups contacted and agreeing to be interviewed also referred us to other organizations. Eventually, a snowball sample of organizations concerned with the gang problem emerged. Organization interviews took more time to develop and obtain than resident interviews, but, ultimately, very few of the organizations targeted refused to participate.

Organization Interviews. Fifty-seven (57) organization respondents were interviewed, both at

Time I and Time II. Slightly more organization respondents were interviewed at Time II in Little Village (n = 31) than in Pilsen (n = 26).<sup>6</sup> Analysis of the organization sample revealed few sampling biases related to interview period or number of interviews completed by respondents. There were some differences in demographic characteristics and large differences in educational levels among those interviewed at both Time I and Time II. Still, because many of the questions in the organization survey asked about organization views, practices, and involvement in dealing with the gang problem, variations in the characteristics of respondents are less problematic to the validity of the analysis.

Table 16.12 identifies the types of organizations included in the sample at each time period. The data at both time periods show that slightly more than a quarter of the sample in Little Village, and 20% of the sample in Pilsen, were school or education-related agencies. At Time II, significantly more businesses were interviewed in Pilsen (35.1%) than in Little Village (17.0%) (Chisquare = 4.638, df = 1, p # 0.05). More block clubs were interviewed in Little Village than in Pilsen at both time periods (at Time I, Chisquare = 4.182, df = 1, Fisher's exact p = 0.051; at Time II, Chisquare = 7.705, df = 1, Fisher's exact p = 0.00672). Similar proportions of respondents in both communities classified the remainder of their organizations the same way: churches, health clinics, youth agencies, community organizations, social service agencies, city organizations, wards, or employment training centers.

To further distinguish the agencies by types of services offered, we asked what their chief

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<sup>6</sup> We note that the proportions of the total sample that were interviewed at Time I only, Time II only, and at both Time I and Time II were virtually identical in each of the two communities. About one third of the sample fell into each category in both Little Village and Pilsen. Therefore, even if there were differences between those who were interviewed only once (at either time period) and those who were interviewed twice, there is no reason to assume that their greater representation in one of the two communities influenced the outcomes reported here.

activities were. Most organizations in both communities considered education to be one of their primary services (47.3% at Time I; 46.3% at Time II). Other predominant activities were business and social services (e.g., food and clothing, counseling, and recreation). The only significant difference between communities was that Little Village organizations were much more involved in community enhancement (e.g., cleaning the neighborhood, painting over graffiti) at both Time I and Time II.

Data Analysis. The analysis of organization respondents examines differences only between Little Village and Pilsen, since organizations and agencies are not clearly related to, or focused on, one gang territory rather than another. We did not systematically compare organization and resident responses within or across communities. In general, the perceptions and experiences reported by organization respondents (particularly about the gang problem) were similar to those of residents within the communities, only more shallow, i.e., with less variation within or across time periods.

We asked the organization representatives in Little Village and Pilsen the same questions relating to community and gang crime changes we asked the resident respondents.

Organizations in each community were concerned with, and generally addressed, the problems and needs of each community as a whole. There was little formal reference to, or identification with, the interests of specific gang territories, either in Little Village or Pilsen. Nevertheless, organizations located deep within one gang territory were likely to be dealing most often with residents and gang members from that territory, rather than from another territory. In the following analysis, we address differences between Little Village and Pilsen organizations which

can be associated with the GVRP (particularly during the first three years of the Project).

### Findings

Satisfaction With Community. Overall, organization respondents felt that their communities had become better places to live. Pilsen respondents saw a more positive change over the previous two years – 27.6% felt their community was a better place at Time I, and 55.4% felt so at Time II (Chisquare = 9.068, df = 1, p # 0.01). There was also an increase in positive perceptions among Little Village respondents, but the change was not statistically significant – from 33.9% at Time I to 38.5% at Time II. While fewer respondents in both communities thought that their areas had gotten worse, the decrease was greater, and of statistical significance, in Pilsen only – from 39.7% at Time I, to 12.5% at Time II (Chisquare = 10.835, df = 1, p # 0.001) (Table 16.13).

Organization representatives were also asked to consider the statement: “All communities have problems. In your opinion, what are the serious problems this community faces?” (Table 16.14). As with the resident respondents, *gangs, crime and safety* issues, and *drugs* were cited by a large proportion of the organization sample. Issues such as *poor education* and *unemployment* were mentioned more often by the organization respondents than by the residents. *Lack of social services* was mentioned more often by organizations in Pilsen. By Time II, significantly more of the Pilsen organization respondents thought that the *economy* had become a problem (Chisquare = 6.077, df = 1, p # 0.01). On the other hand, by Time II, significantly fewer of the Little Village organization respondents believed that *unemployment* was a serious problem (Chisquare = 6.437, df = 1, p # 0.01). Concern with *ineffective parenting* increased in both communities (in Little Village, Chisquare = 7.654, df = 1, p # 0.01; in Pilsen,

Chisquare = 6.589, df = 1, p # 0.01), while concern with the quality of *education* declined substantially in Little Village (Chisquare = 12.998, df = 1, p. # 0.001), and also be not significantly in Pilsen.

In addition to community problems, organization respondents were also asked: “What kinds of community, social, or mental health problems does your organization encounter most frequently?” The most frequently encountered problems, at both time periods, were related to *alcohol and drug abuse, child abuse and neglect, family problems, health problems, and poverty*. The gang problem apparently was less directly encountered (or perhaps dealt with) at Time I, and even less so at Time II, particularly in Little Village (23.1% at Time I; 6.4% at Time II). This difference between time periods was statistically significant (Chisquare = 5.352, df = 1, p # 0.05). The problem of gangs was of far less concern (in terms of mission and program development) to organizations than to residents.

Dealing with *community disorganization* (e.g., “keeping the organization together,” “cultural factors,” “language barriers,” “people don't attend meetings,” “getting neighbors organized”) was cited more often by Little Village organization respondents at Time II (23.4%) than at Time I (7.7%). This difference was statistically significant (Chisquare = 4.741, df = 1, p # 0.05). At Time II, the Little Village respondents were also significantly more likely to mention dealing with community disorganization than were Pilsen respondents (23.4% in Little Village versus 3.6% in Pilsen; Chisquare = 8.905, df = 1, p # 0.01). At Time I, respondents in Little Village mentioned *racism* as a problem significantly more often than Pilsen respondents – 13.5% in Little Village versus 0% in Pilsen (Chisquare = 6.808, df = 1, p # 0.01). At Time II, however, none of the organization respondents in Little Village mentioned racism, while 1.8% of

Pilsen respondents did. Pilsen representatives were less likely to mention *health-related problems* – 32.6% at Time I versus 9.1% at Time II.

Organizations and local residents were not apparently in the same space in regard to what priority community problems needed to be dealt with. While organizations and residents had similar perceptions about the most serious problems in the community, organization policy and program-development priorities were not consistent with perceived community problems, by either organization representatives or local residents.

Crime And Safety Factors. Organization respondents also rated the safety of their communities, using a 4 point scale (1 = “very satisfied” to 4 = “very dissatisfied”), with results similar to those found among the resident respondents. At Time I, a greater proportion of respondents in Little Village (44.6%) rated the community as *very dangerous at night*, compared to Pilsen respondents (26.3%). There was a decline in both communities, but it was much greater and of statistical significance in Little Village only (from 44.6% to 13.2%; Chisquare = 12.974, df = 1, p # 0.001). By Time II, the proportion of organization respondents in both communities who felt the neighborhood was very dangerous at night was virtually the same (13.2% in Little Village and 14.5% in Pilsen).

Along with the feeling that the community was becoming safer at night, organization respondents grew less dissatisfied with *safety in the community in general*. The proportion of “very dissatisfied” respondents declined in both communities between the two time periods (Little Village: Chisquare = 6.915, df = 1, p # 0.01; Pilsen: Chisquare = 6.597, df = 1, p# 0.01). There was very little difference in both communities among those who were “very dissatisfied,” at both time periods.



Fewer organization respondents were *afraid to walk alone* in their neighborhoods at Time II than at Time I (p # 0.01). Changes were statistically significant for respondents in Little Village (Chisquare = 8.017, df = 1, p # 0.01). Almost three-quarters (72.2%) of Little Village respondents were afraid at Time I; at Time II, less than half (43.5%). Organization respondents were asked about *victimization* as it related to themselves, to other staff members, or to clients. As was true of the resident sample, there were more victims of some type of crime<sup>7</sup> in both communities at Time I (93.0%) than at Time II (78.2%). The greater shift occurred in Little Village, where the average number of victimizations went from 2.34 at Time I to 1.36 at Time II (T = 4.561, df = 107, p # 0.001). In Pilsen, the averages decreased from 1.98 to 1.37 between Times I and II (T = 3.141, df = 113, p # 0.01).

Despite the fact that many saw the community as getting safer, organization respondents did not perceive changes (to any statistically significant degree) in the amount of *crime in general* in their neighborhoods. At both time periods, about 50% of all organization respondents in Pilsen felt there was “a lot” of general crime; Little Village started off at Time I with a higher proportion (62.5%) feeling there was “a lot” of general crime, but by Time II the proportion had dropped to 47.2%. These changes were not statistically significant.

When asked questions about the amount of *property crime* and *personal crime* – not yet distinguishing between gang-motivated and non gang-motivated crimes – there was a statistically significant decrease in the proportion who said there was “a lot” of *property crime* in the community: from 69.6% to 44.2% in Little Village (Chisquare = 7.121, df = 1, p # 0.01),

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<sup>7</sup> The specific crimes included breaking and entering the premises, theft, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery.

and from 84.5% to 67.3% in Pilsen (Chisquare = 4.598, df = 1, p # 0.05). At both Time I and Time II, more respondents in Pilsen thought there was as “a lot” of property crime than did those in Little Village. At Time I, this difference was of borderline statistical significance (Chisquare = 3.564, df = 1, p = 0.059); it was statistically significant by Time II (Chisquare = 5.762, df = 1, p # 0.05).

At Time I, more organization respondents in Little Village (58.9%) were likely to think there was “a lot” of *personal crime*, compared to respondents in Pilsen (41.4%). The trend was similar to that of property crime. The proportion of those who thought there was “a lot” of personal crime declined in both communities, but the change was greater and of statistical significance in Little Village only (from 58.9% at Time I to 34.6% at Time II; Chisquare = 6.395, df = 1, p # 0.01).

Gangs and Gang Crime. Organization respondents assessed the amount of *gang-motivated violence* and *gang-motivated property crime* in their communities (Table 16.15). At Time I, almost all respondents in Little Village (91.1%) felt there was “a lot” of *gang-motivated violence*, as did a large proportion of respondents in Pilsen (77.2%). The difference between the two communities at Time I was statistically significant (Chisquare = 4.063, df = 1, p # 0.05). At Time II, there were small declines in both communities, but three-quarters or more of all organization respondents still felt that there was “a lot.” Similarly, *gang-motivated property crime* was rated quite high in both communities, both at Time I and Time II. While there were declines – to a greater and statistically significant degree in Little Village only (Chisquare = 5.634, df = 1, p # 0.05) – both communities viewed gang-motivated property crime as quite serious at both time periods.

Organization respondents were asked to what extent they thought gang members were responsible for most of the violence in their communities (battery, drive-by shootings, robbery, etc.) – not just gang-motivated violence. At Time I, it is evident that a large proportion saw gangs as being “very much to blame” for violent crime in general (more than 80% of respondents in both communities). By Time II, there was a decline in this view in both communities, but the decline was greater and of statistical significance only in Little Village (from 85.7% at Time I to 66.0% at Time II; Chisquare = 5.804, df = 1, p # 0.05).

The trend was similar with respect to gang-motivated property crime, although in Pilsen the proportion of respondents who felt that gangs were “very much to blame” for property crime declined only slightly between the two time periods – from 77.6% to 73.2%. In Little Village, the decline was again large, and of statistical significance – from 83.6% to 56.6%; Chisquare = 9.460, df = 1, p # 0.01).

Drugs. The presence of drug dealing in the neighborhood was a major concern to organization respondents. They considered it one of the reasons that youth join gangs, as well as a cause of the gang problem overall. When presented with the statement : “Community children are at risk of becoming involved with drugs,” respondents were asked to rate it as either “mostly true” or “mostly false.” At Time I, practically all (95.6%) of the respondents (n = 113) said that the statement was “mostly true;” 92.2% thought so at Time II (n = 102). In Pilsen, 96.6% felt it was “mostly true” at Time I (n = 58), and 96.3% felt so at Time II (n = 54).

Community Groups, Police and Probation. Organization respondents often mentioned *coordinated community efforts* as being necessary in dealing with the gang problem. Issues of better law enforcement and a stricter (or tougher) justice system were also mentioned as ways to

reduce the presence of gangs in the community. Police and Probation were considered to be primarily responsible for addressing the gang problem. To gauge respondents' perceptions, we asked a series of questions concerning the police and probation departments' efforts to reduce the gang problem.

Overall, the organization respondents perceived a greater police presence in both communities at Time II (Table 16.16). When comparing the two communities, there were significant increases between Time I and Time II in the proportion of Little Village organization respondents who had seen police *walking the streets* (Chisquare = 7.656, df = 1, p # 0.01), *arresting known criminals* (Chisquare = 9.476, df = 1, p # 0.01), *arresting known gang members* (Chisquare = 6.247, df = 1, p # 0.01), *effectively addressing the gang problem* (Chisquare = 4.865, df = 1, p # 0.05), and *solving other community problems* (Chisquare = 19.935, df = 1, p # 0.001). Among Pilsen respondents, positive changes also occurred, but at slightly lower levels of statistical significance for police *walking the streets* (Chisquare = 11.715, df = 1, p # 0.001), *arresting known gang members* (Chisquare = 5.954, df = 1, p # 0.05), *effectively addressing the gang problem* (Chisquare = 5.310, df = 1, p # 0.05), and *solving other community problems* (Chisquare = 5.517, df = 1, p # 0.05). While at Time II Pilsen respondents were significantly more likely than Little Village respondents to have seen the police *walking the streets* (Chisquare = 4.351, df = 1, p # 0.05), Little Village respondents were significantly more likely to believe that the police were *solving other community problems* (Chisquare = 4.351, df = 1, p # 0.05).

Organization respondents were also asked whether they had known any probation officers who had dealt with the gang problem during the previous year. Only a small percentage

in both communities knew probation officers at Time I – 14.4%, as opposed to 37.0% at Time II. This change between time periods was statistically significant (Chisquare = 14.720, df = 1, p # 0.001). The overall increase in knowledge of probation officers at Time II was attributable entirely to Little Village responses. At Time I, only 14.3% knew a probation officer; at Time II it was 50%. The change was highly statistically significant (Chisquare = 15.944, df = 1, p # 0.001), and this could have been related to the fact that Adult Probation was not only part of the Gang Violence Reduction Project but physically situated in Little Village.

Respondents were also asked about types of intervention and counseling supplied by Probation (Table 16.17).<sup>8</sup> At Time I, only 12.5% in Little Village thought that probation officers did a good job *supervising probationers*, compared to 35.7% at Time II (Chisquare = 7.43, df = 1, p # 0.01). At Time II, more Little Village than Pilsen respondents felt that probation officers helped with *drug-use problems, personal problems, school problems, and assisted with finding a job*. In all areas, particularly job assistance, increases were greater in the proportion of Little Village respondents compared to Pilsen respondents who saw positive change that was statistically significant. After 2½ years of Project operation, Little Village organization respondents were more positive in their view of Probation than were the Pilsen respondents.

Few significant changes occurred between time periods when respondents in both communities were asked: “What do you think should be done about the gang problem?” They could give up to five answers, ranking them in order of importance. *Better police and law enforcement, better parenting, and stricter laws and punishment* were the most frequent answers,

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<sup>8</sup> For purposes of analysis, respondents who answered “no” when asked whether they knew a probation officer were then recorded as answering “no” to the subsequent questions regarding types of intervention and counseling.

followed by *improved schools, increased job opportunities, and better community coordination*. The only significant change was that fewer respondents at Time II listed *recreational activities* as a way to reduce the gang problem: at Time I, 43.8% of the total sample (n = 112) said that more activities were needed, compared to 29.5% at Time II (n = 105) (Chisquare = 4.712, df = 1, p # 0.05). There were no statistically significant differences when comparing Little Village to Pilsen.

Experience with the Gang Violence Reduction Project. Little Village organization respondents were asked the same questions as the resident respondents regarding their knowledge of and/or experiences with the GVRP.<sup>9</sup> A larger proportion (46.4%) of Little Village organization representatives had heard of the Project, compared to resident respondents.

However, of the organization respondents familiar with the Project (n = 56), 33.9% thought only youth workers, 32.1% thought only police, and 23.2% thought only Probation officers were involved in the Project; only 25.0% of the respondents knew Project staff members; 17.6% said they collaborated with the Project; and 16.1% believed that the Project had accomplished its objectives. The Little Village organization respondents also identified the areas in which the Project could most improve: *providing more feedback to the neighborhood, expanding Project services, and providing more street workers*.

### Summary

In determining the general impact of the Project, we were interested not only in changes in self-reported behavior and arrest patterns of individual program youth and changes in

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<sup>9</sup> Pilsen respondents were not asked questions concerning GVRP.

aggregate statistical levels of arrests and incidents of gang crime (especially gang-motivated violence), but also in changes in the communities' perceptions of the gang problem. In both Little Village and the comparison community of Pilsen we interviewed approximately 100 community residents concentrated in high-gang-violence street blocks, and representatives of 50 local community organizations, in two separate interviews administered two years apart. We analyzed the residents' responses both at the community level in Little Village and Pilsen, and at the gang-territory level (Latin King and Two Six) in Little Village only.

Regardless of how the analyses were conducted, Little Village residents, especially those living in Latin King territory, reported significantly greater improvement in community conditions. Their experiences with and perceptions of the scope and severity of the gang problem were reduced. They became generally more positive about local conditions than those living in Two Six territory, or those living in Pilsen.

Between the two interview periods – Time I and Time II – significantly more Little Village respondents thought their community was better; there was a perception of increased safety, less fear of walking the streets of the neighborhood, and decreased worry about possible victimization. They felt there had been a significant reduction in gang violence and property crime. Pilsen residents also grew less concerned about safety and different types of crime, but the change was not generally so sharp or to the same statistically significant degree. More residents in Little Village perceived the Police dealing effectively with the gang problem. This was more generally the case in the Latin King than in the Two Six territory; residents in Two Six territory approximated the more neutral or muted positive response of Pilsen residents.

At Time II, Little Village residents as a whole, and those living in Latin King territory in

particular, were less afraid in their communities, and rated gang crime as less problematic than they had at Time I. Also at Time II, those living in Latin King territory were less likely to see gang violence and gang property crime levels as high as at Time I. These results suggest that respondents living in the Little Village community, especially in Latin King territory, saw significantly more improvement in the gang crime situation than did those living in Two Six territory, or those living in Pilsen. The effect of the Project was the only factor that we could identify that could consistently account for this difference. More youth-worker and Project attention was directed to the Latin Kings than to the Two Six, and it is likely that youth workers had better or more positive relationships with Latin King than with Two Six gang members. These Little Village findings are very similar to those obtained from individual gang-member interviews and self-reports, as well as from the aggregate-level and individual-level police data analyses, at least during the first three years of the program period.

In general, changes in the perceptions and experiences of the organization respondents were similar to those of the resident respondents in their respective communities, but less pronounced and less statistically significant across time periods. A range of organizations was interviewed in each community, including block clubs, churches and church organizations, health agencies, schools and other educational or youth agencies, social service organizations, businesses, community organizations, employment and job training agencies, city public service agencies, and political and ward organizations. There was little difference in the relative numbers and kinds of organizations interviewed across communities, except that more block clubs were interviewed in Little Village, and more businesses were interviewed in Pilsen. The key activities of the organizations, as reported by their representatives, were education,



community organization and recreation.

A greater proportion of organization respondents thought that the quality of life in their communities was generally better at Time II compared to Time I, both in Pilsen and in Little Village. Organization respondents in both communities reported an increased feeling of safety and less fear, with somewhat greater improvement reported in Little Village. Property and personal crime were perceived as decreasing significantly, more in Little Village than in Pilsen. In both communities, gangs were seen as the chief reason for crime, and the pattern did not change across time periods.

In general, organization respondents in both communities (particularly in Little Village) perceived an improvement in certain policing activities. An even greater improvement was reported in Little Village regarding probation officers. Also in Little Village, more of the organization respondents (46.4%) had heard of the GVRP than had the resident respondents (25.3%). More of the organization respondents (33.0%) knew who the different types of staff members associated with the Project were than did the resident respondents (17.0%).

The perceptions of community residents and organization representatives in Little Village about the reduction of gang violence was strongly associated with the presence of the GVRP, particularly during the first three years of the Project. Based on findings derived from the community surveys and from individual-level and aggregate-level police data, the Project appeared to be effective in the reduction of gang crime, especially gang violence.

Table 16.1  
Community Characteristics – 1990 Census  
Little Village and Pilsen

Census Characteristics	Little Village		Pilsen	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Population	60,829		35,433	
Households	14,287		8,985	
Males	32,211	52.9%	18,934	53.3%
Females	28,684	47.1%	16,558	46.7%
Gender Ratio	113 Males to 100 Females		114 Males to 100 Females	
Mexican	52,781	86.8%	30,920	87.3%
White	3,269	5.4%	2,465	6.9%
African-American	1,479	2.4%	317	0.9%
Home Ownership	5,525	48.4%	2,149	23.6%
Total Housing Units	15,579		10,258	
Housing Units Built 1939 or Earlier	8,339	53.5%	7,863	76.6%
Mean Household Income	\$22,974		\$22,259	
Mean Family Income	\$23,445		\$22,494	
Per Capita Income	\$6,480		\$6,345	
Married Couples With Own Children Under 18	7,089	49.6%	3,728	41.5%
Male Unemployment	2,051	11.3%	1,397	13.2%
Males 17-25 Years of Age	5,471	24.03%	3,495	26.38%
Education: Less Than 9th Grade	15,199	53.0%	8,899	53.6%
Education: 9th to 12th Grade	5,367	18.7%	2,710	16.3%
Education: College	1,929	6.7%	1,284	7.7%

Table 16.2  
Changes in the Community for the Worse/Better – Resident Respondents

Community	% Who Think Community is Better Time I	% Who Think Community is Better Time II	% Who Think Community is Worse Time I	% Who Think Community is Worse Time II
Little Village	6.3% *** (95)	21.9% (96)	63.2% *** (95)	34.4% (96)
Pilsen	24.7% (97)	25.0% (96)	34.0% (97)	28.1% (96)
Total	15.6% (192)	23.4% (192)	48.4% (192)	31.3% (192)

For differences between communities within time periods: \*\*\* p. # 0.001

Table 16.3  
Problems in the Community – Resident Respondents  
percent and (n)

Type of Problem	Little Village		Pilsen	
	Time I (96)	Time II (94)	Time I (97)	Time II (95)
Gangs	80.2% **	64.9% #	92.8%	73.7% ###
Economy	3.1%	0%	3.1%	2.1%
Unemployment	5.2%	9.6%	9.3%	7.4%
No Organized Youth Activities	3.1%	8.5%	4.1%	10.5%
Lack of Moral Values	1.0%	2.1%	0%	2.1%
Housing	5.2%	2.1%	2.1%	3.2%
Ineffective Parents	7.3%	5.3%	3.1%	4.2%
Lack of Social Services	28.1%	23.4%	27.8%	30.5%
Drugs	31.3%	21.3%	26.8%	21.1%
Alcohol	18.7% *	6.7% * ##	7.2%	16.8% #
Poor Education	4.2% **	7.5%	16.5%	6.3% #
Crime and Safety	62.5% **	53.2% *	41.2%	38.9%
Personal Disorganization	0%	0%	0%	0%
Community Organization	3.1%	5.3%	4.1%	5.3%
Other	3.1%	5.3%	3.1%	1.1%
No Problems	1.0%	0%	0%	0%

For difference between communities within time periods: \*p# 0.05 \*\*p # 0.01

For difference between time periods within communities: #p # 0.05 ##p # 0.01 ###p # 0.001

Table 16.4  
Amount of Gang-Motivated Violence and Gang-Motivated Property Crime  
in the Community<sup>a</sup> – Resident Respondents  
percent and (n)

“A Lot” of Gang-Motivated ...	Little Village		Pilsen	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Violence	78.1% (96)	60.4% ## (96)	77.8% (99)	65.6% @ (96)
Property Crime	71.9% (96)	46.0 ### (87)	67.4% (98)	58.3% (84)

For difference between time periods within communities: ##p # 0.01    ###p # 0.001    @p = 0.059

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<sup>a</sup> Based on a 3 point scale: 1 = a lot; 2 = some; 3 = little or none.

Table 16.5  
 Gang-Motivated and Non Gang-Motivated Crime Scales<sup>a</sup> – Resident Respondents  
 percent and (n)

Type of Crime	Little Village – Mean Scores			Pilsen – Mean Scores		
	Time I	Time II	Total	Time I	Time II	Total
Gang-Motivated	3.53*** (96)	2.82### (96)	3.17 (192)	3.24 (99)	2.90### (95)	3.07 (194)
Non Gang-Motivated	2.33 (96)	2.14 (94)	2.24 (190)	2.17 (99)	2.02 (86)	2.10 (185)

For difference between communities within time periods: \*\*\*p # 0.001

For difference between time periods within communities: ###p # 0.001

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<sup>a</sup> Based on a 4 point scale: 1 = no problem; 2 = some problem; 3 = serious problem; 4 = very serious problem.

Table 16.6  
 Knowledge of Families With a Child Selling Drugs – Resident Respondents  
 percent and (n)

<b>Little Village</b>		<b>Pilsen</b>	
<b>Time I</b>	<b>Time II</b>	<b>Time I</b>	<b>Time II</b>
8.6% ** (93)	12.5% * (96)	24.0% (96)	25.8% (93)

For difference between communities within time periods: \*p # 0.05    \*\*p # 0.01

Table 16.7  
 What Police Do to Deal with the Gang Problem in the Community – Resident Respondents  
 percent and (n)

What Police Do	Little Village		Pilsen	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Walk Streets	32.3% (96)	51.0%## (96)	36.1% (97)	60.4%### (96)
Patrol in Cars	80.2% (96)	85.1% (94)	73.2% (97)	83.2% (95)
Arrest Known Criminals	18.9% (95)	51.2%### (86)	11.6% (95)	43.7%### (87)
Arrest Known Gang Members	13.7% (95)	55.8% @ ### (86)	14.6% (96)	40.7%### (80)
Arrest Troublemakers	60.0% (95)	70.6% (85)	58.3% (96)	67.1% (85)
Harass Gangs	33.7% (95)	53.9%## (78)	35.8% (95)	40.7% (81)
Respond Quickly to Gang Incidents	18.1% (94)	31.5%# (89)	21.1% (95)	23.2% (82)
Effectively Address the Gang Problem	16.7% * (96)	47.6% ### (82)	29.9% (97)	39.3% (84)
Solve Other Community Problems	16.7% (96)	43.4% ### (76)	22.6% (93)	42.2%## (83)

For difference between communities within time periods: \*p # 0.05 @ p # 0.051

For difference between time periods within communities: #p # 0.05 ##p # 0.01 ###p # 0.001



Table 16.8  
Problems in the Community – Resident Respondents in Gang Territories  
percent and (n)

Problems in the Community	Latin King Territory		Two Six Territory	
	Time I (60)	Time II (60)	Time I (36)	Time II (34)
Gangs	81.7%	55.0% ** ##	77.8%	82.3%
Economy	3.3%	0%	2.8%	0%
Unemployment	1.7%	11.7%#	11.1%	5.9%
No Organized Youth Activities	1.7%	10.0%	5.6%	5.9%
Lack of Moral Values	0%	3.3%	2.8%	0%
Housing	6.7%	3.3%	2.8%	0%
Ineffective Parents	3.3%	5.0%	13.9%	5.9%
Lack of Social Services	33.3%	18.3%	19.4%	32.3%
Drugs	21.7%**	26.7%	47.2%	11.8%###
Alcohol	18.3%	5.0%#	19.4%	8.8%
Poor Education	3.3%	6.7%	5.6%	8.8%
Crime and Safety	66.7%	48.3%#	55.6%	61.8%
Personal Disorganization	0%	0%	0%	0%
Community Disorganization	3.3%	8.3%	2.8%	0%
Other	3.3%	3.3%	2.8%	8.8%

For difference between territories within time periods: \*\*p # 0.01

For difference between time periods within territories: # p # 0.05 ##p # 0.01 ###p # 0.001

Table 16.9  
Amount of Gang-Motivated Violence and Gang-Motivated Property Crime  
in the Community<sup>a</sup> – Resident Respondents in Gang Territories  
percent and (n)

“A Lot” of Gang-Motivated...	Latin Kings		Two Six	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Violence	80.0% (60)	50.0% ** (60)###	75.0% (36)	77.8% (36)
Property Crime	75.0% (60)	37.0% * (54)###	66.7% (36)	60.6% (33)

For difference between territories within time periods: \*p # 0.05 \*\*p # 0.01

For difference between time periods within territories: ###p # 0.001

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<sup>a</sup> Based on a 3 point scale: 1 = a lot; 2 = some; 3 = little or none.

Table 16.10  
 Knowledge of Families with a Child Selling Drugs –  
 Resident Respondents in Gang Territories  
 percent and (n)

<b>Latin Kings</b>		<b>Two Six</b>	
<b>Time I</b>	<b>Time II</b>	<b>Time I</b>	<b>Time II</b>
5.3% (57)	10.0% (60)	13.9% (36)	16.7% (36)

Table 16.11  
 What Police Do to Deal with the Gang Problem in the Community –  
 Resident Respondents in Gang Territories  
 percent and (n)

What Police Do	Latin Kings		Two Six	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Walk Streets	35.0% (60)	49.2% (61)	27.8% (36)	54.3%# (35)
Patrol in Cars	76.7% (60)	82.8% (58)	86.1% (36)	88.9% (36)
Arrest Known Criminals	25.0% (60)	58.5%### (53)	8.6% (35)	39.4%## (33)
Arrest Known Gang Members	17.0% (59)	60.0%### (55)	8.3% (36)	48.4%### (31)
Arrest Troublemakers	54.2% (59)	67.3% (55)	69.4% (36)	76.7% (30)
Harass Gangs	35.6% (59)	54.0%@ (50)	30.6% (36)	53.6% (28)
Respond Quickly to Gang Incidents	15.2% (59)	25.9% (58)	22.9% (35)	41.9% (31)
Effectively Address the Gang Problem	20.0% (60)	44.2%## (52)	11.1% (36)	53.3%### (30)
Solve Other Community Problems	16.7% (60)	43.8%## (48)	16.7% (36)	42.9%# (28)

For difference between territories within time periods: @ p = 0.054

For difference between time periods within territories: #p # 0.05 ##p # 0.01 ###p # 0.001

Table 16.12  
Types of Organizations Sampled: by Community  
percent and (n)

Types of Organizations	Little Village		Pilsen	
	Time I (56)	Time II (53)	Time I (58)	Time II (57)
Block Clubs	14.3% @	17.0% **	3.4%	1.8%
Church/Church Organizations	10.7%	11.3%	15.5%	12.3%
Health Agencies/Clinics	1.8%	1.9%	8.6%	7.0%
Schools/Educational Agencies	26.8%	28.3%	19.0%	21.0%
Youth Agencies	14.3%	7.6%	6.9%	3.5%
Businesses	16.1%	17.0% *	29.3%	35.1%
Community Organizations	8.9%	7.6%	5.2%	10.5%
Social Service Organizations	1.8%	7.6%	6.9%	5.3%
City Organizations	1.8%	0%	3.4%	1.8%
Ward Organizations	1.8%	1.9%	0%	0%
Employment Training Organizations	1.8%	0.9%	1.7%	1.7%

For difference between communities within time periods: \*p # 0.05 \*\* p # 0.01 @ Fisher's Exact, p = 0.0510

Table 16.13  
Organizations Believe Community Has Changed For the Better/Worse

Community	% Believe Community is Better at Time I	% Believe Community is Better at Time II	% Believe Community is Worse at Time I	% Believe Community is Worse at Time II
Little Village	33.9% (56)	38.5% (52)	42.9% ### (56)	19.2% (52)
Pilsen	27.6% ## (58)	55.4% (56)	32.8% (58)	12.5% (56)
Total	30.7% (114)	47.2% (108)	37.7% (114)	15.7% (108)

For differences between time periods within communities: ## p. # 0.01 ### p. # 0.001

Table 16.14  
 Problems Perceived in the Community – Organization Respondents  
 percent and (n)

Problems in the Community	Little Village		Pilsen	
	Time I (56)	Time II (53)	Time I (58)	Time II (56)
Gangs	80.4%	73.6%	77.6%	75.0%
Economy	17.9%	15.1%	10.3%	28.6%##
Unemployment	33.9%	13.2%##	31.0%	25.0%
No Organized Youth Activities	16.1%	20.8%	6.9%	3.6%
Lack of Moral Values	5.4%	3.8%	5.2%	1.8%
Housing	10.7%	13.2%	22.4%	12.5%
Ineffective Parents	3.6%	20.8%##	5.2%	21.4%##
Lack of Social Services	25.0%	15.1%	39.7%	25.0%
Drugs	21.4%*	30.2%	41.4%	28.6%
Alcohol	10.7%	18.9%	13.8%	16.1%
Poor Education	60.7%*	26.4%###	41.4%	32.1%
Crime and Safety	53.6%	37.7%	48.3%	44.6%
Personal Disorganization	3.6%	0%	0%	0%
Community Disorganization	17.9%	18.9%	12.1%	17.9%
Other	1.8%	1.9%	0%	3.6%

For difference between communities within time periods: \* p # 0.05

For difference between time periods within communities: ##p # 0.01 ###p # 0.001

Table 16.15  
Amount of Gang-Motivated Violence and Gang-Motivated Property Crime  
in the Community<sup>a</sup> – Organization Respondents  
percent and (n)

“A Lot” of Gang-Motivated...	Little Village		Pilsen	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Violence	91.1%* (56)	84.6% (52)	77.2% (57)	75.0% (56)
Property Crime	87.5% (56)	68.6%# (51)	84.5% (58)	75.9% (54)

For difference between communities within time periods: \*p # 0.05

For difference between time periods within communities: #p # 0.05

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<sup>a</sup> Based on a 3 point scale: 1 = a lot; 2 = some; 3 = little or none.



Table 16.16  
 What Police Do to Deal with the Gang Problem in the Community –  
 Organization Respondents  
 percent and (n)

What Police Do	Little Village		Pilsen	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Walk Streets	30.4% (56)	57.1%* (49)##	44.8% (58)	76.4%### (55)
Patrol in Cars	82.1% (56)	92.3% (52)	81.0% (58)	92.9% (56)
Arrest Known Criminals	7.7%** (52)	32.6%## (43)	29.1% (55)	40.9% (44)
Arrest Known Gang Members	7.6% (53)	26.1%## (46)	12.3% (57)	31.9%## (47)
Arrest Troublemakers	67.3% (55)	72.3% (47)	72.4% (58)	76.1% (46)
Harass Gangs	45.3% (53)	61.2% (49)	39.3% (56)	46.7% (45)
Respond Quickly to Gang Incidents	26.8% (56)	34.7% (49)	25.0% (56)	39.2% (51)
Effectively Address the Gang Problem	16.1% (56)	34.7%# (49)	15.5% (58)	34.7%# (49)
Solve Other Community Problems	28.6% (56)	72.0%* (50)###	29.8% (57)	51.9%# (52)

For difference between communities within time periods: \*p# 0.05 \*\*p # 0.01

For difference between time periods within communities: #p # 0.05 ##p # 0.01 ###p # 0.001

Table 16.17  
 What Probation Officers Do to Deal with the Gang Problem in the Community –  
 Organization Respondents  
 percent and (n)

What Probation Officers Do	Little Village		Pilsen	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Good Supervision of Probationers	12.5% (56)	35.7%* (42)##	7.6% (53)	16.7% (54)
Stop Drug Use	2.0% (51)	16.7%# (36)	3.8% (52)	8.7% (46)
Personal Problem Counseling	14.3% (56)	34.1%** (44)#	3.8% (53)	11.8% (51)
School Problem Counseling	8.9% (56)	28.9%@ (45)##	5.7% (53)	13.5% (52)
Help Get Jobs	3.7% (54)	20.9%** (43)##	3.8% (53)	4.2% (48)

For difference between communities within time periods: \*p # 0.05 \*\*p # 0.01

For difference between time periods within communities: #p # 0.05 ##p # 0.01 @ p = 0.061

## Chapter 17

### Conclusion

Community-based gang projects that require institutional change are highly vulnerable to failure. Few innovative programs survive or develop further unless they serve organizational and political interests. Factors which give rise to a project – whether political, social, economic, scientific, ideological, and/or organizational – intersect differently to determine whether a particular Project approach survives, is institutionalized, or dies. The success of the Little Village program, i.e, the reduction of gang crime, was not sufficient for Project survivability and/or the insitutionalization of the “comprehensive” community-based approach. Program effectiveness and project survivability were factors independent of each other, particularly in a context of imbedded organizational myths, mayoral political interest, and local community disorganization.

Institutionalization of the Gang Violence Reduction Project – or its approach – did not occur in Little Village. The death of the Little Village Project could probably have been predicted by the end of the first year of its operations, although the program lasted five years. The following discussion is organized around three community-organizational themes: Project transition; crisis and termination; and Project assessment.

The original agreement between the Chicago Police Department (CPD), the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, and the University of Chicago Professor at the School of Social Service Administration was that the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project would be funded for one year. The Professor agreed to assist with the development of the Project. By default of adequate Chicago Police Department interest and administrative support,

he quickly assumed coordination and direction (to a major extent) of Project operations for a five-year period. The expectation that the CPD would make a decision early-on about whether to continue the Project was not fulfilled. The program proved successful in terms of absolute or relative reduction of gang crime, particularly violence and drug offenses at individual, aggregate and community-perceptual levels, and the CPD continued to seek funding for the Project for five years, but then decided not to continue the Project or integrate it into police department operations (although three years of funding remained).

We attempt to answer the question “why,” using data derived from monthly reports of the Project Coordinator submitted to the CPD, bi-weekly staff meeting minutes, letters to and from the CPD and the Coordinator, memoranda and special crisis reports. Together, they trace and attempt to explain the sequence of expectations, plans and actions related to Project continuance, institutionalization and termination.

### Project Transition

In December 1994, a little more than two years after the Project began, the Coordinator provided “thoughts about Project transition” in a memo to the Project Neighborhood Relations Sergeant of the 10<sup>th</sup> Police District:

“Based on the feasibility and effectiveness of the Project, thus far, I would recommend continued if not primary responsibility for administration and coordination [of the Project] by the Chicago Police Department, particularly the present neighborhood relations unit, with the aid of the special tactical unit and close liaison with narcotics and organized crime units, since a sharp rise in drug possession and drug dealing at the street level is occurring.

In this process [of expansion] the University of Chicago

would gradually reduce its commitment to administer and supervise the community youth-work unit. The Chicago Police Department should consider contracting youth-work services targeted to older hardcore gang youth from Neighbors Against Gang Violence, with close oversight from the [new]10<sup>th</sup> District Gang Violence Reduction Project Coordinator.

The University of Chicago would expect to terminate fully its coordination and provision of youth work services by August 30,1995. It would begin to transfer coordination and supervision of the youth worker unit in February 1995, but retain oversight and funding responsibility for the youth-work unit until August 30<sup>th</sup>.”

The problem of transfer of the Project remained unsolved, pending promised meetings among representatives of the Chicago Police Department, the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, and the University of Chicago.

In a memo of February 1996, to the Director of the Research and Development Division (R & D) of the CPD, the Acting Director (C. K.) of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority summarized the February 7<sup>th</sup> GVRP meeting with the assistant R & D Director held at the Little Village Adult Probation Project Office, as follows:

“I found our discussion revolved around the following things:

- Team approach: Over and over again, everyone stressed the importance of the Project being a collaborative effort. It appeared the feeling of the group was that the whole was greater than the sum of parts. Each Project team member believes he or she is better equipped to do his or her job because of the participation of other members of the team.
- Information: It was clear to me that those present felt they had access to more information which assisted them in the performance of their jobs than they would if the team was not in place. Information was gathered both in general and relative to specific incidents. I found it particularly noteworthy that police officers G.S. and R.C. are viewed as “resources” by other police agencies (FBI, ATF, County Sheriff).

- Communication: Perhaps more important than gathering information is sharing it. Because team members are in constant contact with one another there are numerous opportunities for passing along information which is directly related to a particular gang member or incident or may fit into an investigation at some future time.
- Program features: The program has two primary elements - intervention with the target population (to divert them from the gang or remove them from the streets) and intelligence gathering (to solve crimes or reduce the chance they'll be committed). I, for one, underestimated the significance of intelligence gathering when the program design was first completed. It's also important to be mindful of:

Needs/motivation of gang members who become involved in a gang and why.

Targeting of resources toward a particular problem or group of offenders. In this case, we were hoping to reduce incidents of violent crime, so the target population included those who were committing violent crimes or causing them to be committed.

The community as a partner - the success of this type of program will be effected by the extent to which the community is on board and able to do its part. That is, residents need to work with the team and services need to be in place to be drawn on by the team.

The members of the team. Needless to say, these should be people who believe in what they will be asked to do and committed to doing the best they can. This is particularly true because they will need to confront and overcome problems between the participating agencies and within their own agencies. A special mention should be made about the outreach workers - both their value to the program and their characteristics. The coordinator should be asked to elaborate in particular on the latter along with their hiring and supervision.

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Hopefully, I’ve captured at least the highlights of our meeting. I trust the forthcoming data reports (and those which have already been submitted) demonstrate the program’s positive impact and provide further motivation for continuing it in some form. Let me know if you have any questions.

In a June 1996 monthly report of the Coordinator to the Director of Research and Development, CPD, he writes:

“Plans to transfer the Project continue. Our Lady of Tepyac Catholic Church and Latino Youth also indicate interest in taking responsibility for the Project. The Coordinator indicates that he will request only a six-month Project continuation to facilitate such Project transfer. The Chicago Police Department should provide as soon as possible a key managerial officer to assist with this process as well as ideally take over responsibility for further development of the Little Village Project, which could include initiation and testing of a similar Project in a high gang violence local Chicago African-American community,” [for example, in the northern sector of District 10 and/or District 11].

In an August 1996 monthly report the Coordinator writes:

“Additional agencies have expressed interest in “running” the Project, including Latino Youth, BUILD, Cook County Adult Probation and Juvenile Court Intensive Probation. These organizations are particularly interested in the youth work component. OJJDP copied a letter to the Coordinator dated August 16<sup>th</sup> sent by the administrator of OJJDP to the Director of Research and Development, Chicago Police Department, inviting her to submit an application to support the continued implementation of the Project:

Specifically, we would consider your proposal for the enhancement of the existing Project in Little Village and potentially the expansion of this Project to other neighborhoods through a twenty-four month Project with \$100,000 available for the first twelve months. In the second twelve months, we would consider a similar or enhanced level of funding.... We are excited about the possibility of partnering with you and the Little Village Protect and look forward

to your proposal.”

In a November 1996 monthly report, the Project Coordinator writes:

“A meeting of key CPD headquarters administration personnel, the 10<sup>th</sup> District Commander and GVRP sergeant, administrative representatives of Adult Probation, the Acting Director of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority and the Project Coordinator was held downtown to discuss the future direction of the Project. In the course of discussion, considerable concern was expressed by heads of the various police divisions that the CPD was not a social agency and not primarily interested in organizing the Little Village community around the gang problem. The CPD Director had recommended that CPD should not support expansion of the Project. The Director of Research and Development raised the issue of cost of the Project if it went city wide. The Deputy Superintendent, however, expressed qualified support for the Project idea. He stated that the CPD would in the immediate future focus on the development of a police coordinator role. A full-time sergeant would be assigned to GVRP from the Deputy Superintendent’s office to explore the possibility of managing the Project. The Deputy Superintendent and the Director of the R and D division also emphasized the importance of determining the feasibility of the Project as a citywide model. This should be done as quickly as possible.”

In a January 1997 monthly report, the Coordinator writes:

“The sergeant, out of the Deputy Superintendent’s office, joined the Project, but did not appear to be especially interested in its operations. He did not meet with youth workers or probation officers. He did tour the neighborhood with the Project police. He was most interested in available research reports, especially on Project outcome. After examining them, he acknowledged the positive effect of the Project on older youth but raised questions about the effect on juveniles, only recently the focus of operations and not the primary target of the Project. He failed to recognize that program juveniles, although with slightly increased arrests for gang crime, were still doing significantly better than similar unserved gang youth.

While he agreed with the finding of superior performance of the 10<sup>th</sup> District in regard to lowering the level of gang violence compared to six other Districts, he was not sure that comparison including the 8<sup>th</sup> District, one of the comparison districts, was a fair one, because the community was in the midst of rapid population change.

The sergeant was interested in the involvement of the public schools in



addressing the problem of younger youth about to become gang members. He was also interested in a closer relationship between police and adult probation. The sergeant appeared less interested in preserving or developing a comprehensive approach to the gang problem than in discovering those elements of the Project that would be useful in coordinating efforts to squash gang crime through justice-system approaches in the city.

In several discussions with the sergeant after his visit from the Deputy Superintendent's office, the key question among staff, including Project police, was whether the sergeant's presence represented an effort to develop and expand, or torpedo, the Project."

By the end of December 1996, there was still no clear evidence that the Chicago Police Department was committed to sustaining, modifying and/or expanding the Project. Nevertheless, support for the Project was expressed from a variety of sources. Seven agencies and community organizations were interested in assuming responsibility for the Project, mainly the youth-worker component. The Project Coordinator had announced that after five years, he would no longer manage the Project. He was an academic and a researcher and not primarily an agency or program director. His original commitment had been as Coordinator for one year. His attempts to induce the CPD to take over the Project, or partner with some appropriate set of organizations to do so, had not to date borne fruit.

Preliminary evidence also suggested that Project outcome at the individual or aggregate community level was good, particularly relative to the growth of the gang problem in other comparable communities during the first three or four year Project period, based on available police data. But this appeared not to be sufficient to convince the CPD that the Project was effective and feasible. The issue of feasibility, in particular the cost of the program, was raised. But the only major additional cost would be sustaining the youth-work component, which could be borne by a youth-work agency(ies) and supported through funds from the United Way,

foundations, and other sources. The key objection was that the CPD was not prepared to manage an approach to the gang problem that required significant modification of its suppression philosophy. It was to some extent willing to consider coordination of its suppression activities with adult probation. The CPD was clearly not interested in use of youth workers. Community policing was sufficient for CPD community-organization purposes, particularly to aid in its suppression mission.

### Crisis and Termination

A GVRP staff crisis occurred in early 1997, which became closely associated with a decision by the CPD Superintendent not to continue the Project. Three more years of funding (1.5 million dollars) from the current block grant of the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Justice Programs and additional funding from the office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention were available, but not sufficient to induce to the CPD to support the Project model. As the liaison lieutenant from the R&D stated in the first year of the Project, "the CPD has 'deep pockets.' The CPD does not need grant funds from the federal government to develop or sustain any Project it is interested in."

Efforts by the Project Coordinator and the Acting Director of the ICJIA continued to seek expanded involvement of agencies in the program and bring about an effective transfer of the Project. Meetings were held in January and February 1997 with the Pupil Services Section of the Board of Education about their provision of one full-time and one half-time crisis caseworker, closely related to the Project, to address the gang problem in elementary and middle schools in Little Village. Specifics were to be worked out based on budget decisions of the

Chicago Board of Education in March.

A meeting was scheduled with Judge H., presiding judge of the juvenile court, and his administrative probation and court-services staff to discuss how the juvenile court could be more fully involved in the Project. Also, discussions were initiated with two local organizations – La Villita Community Church and Latino Youth – to jointly operate the Little Village Project (particularly the youth-outreach component) and enhance social services, in collaboration with police law-enforcement and probation supervision.

A citizen's group in the northern section of the 10<sup>th</sup> District, concerned with the gang violence problem of African-American youth, held discussions with the Project Coordinator and the Deputy Police Superintendent about extending the Project to that area. The local alderman and congressman of that community expressed their support for expansion of the Project into the area.

### Crisis

On February 11, 1997, a letter from the CPD Director of Research and Development faxed to the Project Coordinator signaled the beginning of a major Project crisis. Its basis may have developed earlier with a minor Project administrative change. The Coordinator expanded supervisory responsibilities of the youth-work Supervisor to include collection of time cards from youth-work staff. This had been the exclusive responsibility of the Coordinator until he assumed responsibility for another Project. Unbeknownst to the Coordinator, the youth-work Supervisor, a graduate of a criminal-justice program at a local university, began to allocate more hours of work to certain part-time workers than was appropriate. This was done without the

knowledge or permission of the Coordinator. When the Coordinator became aware of the problem, he corrected it but he was not aware of other problems that were related to it.

There were growing tensions between the youth-work Supervisor and one of the senior research staff assistants, who was a close friend of M. L. G. (the former neighborhood organizer, whose contract with the GVRP had now been severed). M. L. G. and the youth-work Supervisor had been extremely close and friendly earlier, but were now were in sharp conflict with each other. M. L. G. and the senior research assistant became aware of intimidation and alteration of time cards by the youth-work Supervisor that involved one of the part-time youth workers. This information was not revealed to the Coordinator: it came first to the attention of B. M. of the R&D Division of the Chicago Police Department, who then relayed it to the Coordinator. The charges proved to be correct, and the youth-work Supervisor was suspended and then terminated from the Project.

### Termination

An investigation by the University of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department, however, could not find sufficient evidence for criminal action against the terminated youth-work Supervisor. All Project property in the Supervisor's possession was returned and malfeasance costs (approximately \$10,000) were adjusted in the Gang Violence Reduction Project grant. Despite the staff crisis, Project efforts continued. A new youth-work Supervisor was appointed within two weeks. Project youth workers, and Project police and probation officers continued to conduct their normal Project routines. An additional youth worker was employed. Weekly youth-worker and bi-weekly Project team meetings continued (Pastor N.C.,

the part-time neighborhood organizer, was not particularly active, however).

The key issue of transfer and possible elaboration of the Project remained. Latino Youth and the La Villita Community Church – both in Little Village and both familiar with and participants in Project operations – seemed to be the viable local organizations to take over. A series of meetings were held between Sergeant L. of the CPD Deputy Superintendent's office, C.K. (now the Director of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority) and the Project Coordinator, with Pastor N.C. and the Director of Latino Youth. Each was prepared to take over certain components of the Project, but not the entire Project. Neither organization was particularly interested in coordination with police and probation. The CPD in turn still had not made a decision as to what to do about the Project. In a series of discussions with Sergeant L., it became clear that his function was to investigate and explore alternatives to the Project, e.g., the development of a citywide project, with emphasis on police and probation collaboration, and possibly a closer involvement with the elementary and middle schools around the issue of gang prevention.

In April 1997, Sergeant L. indicated to the Coordinator that the Chicago Police Department would not extend or transfer the Project to include its current components. A letter to the Coordinator from the Police Superintendent terminating the Project would come a month later:

Dear Dr. S:

I have recently signed the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (ICJIA) Interagency Agreement which funds the Gang Violence Reduction Project in Little Village through July 17, 1997. At this time, we are contemplating not requesting additional funds for the program beyond this year,

although we expect to expand many elements of the model into each of our remaining twenty-four districts in July without the use of grant funds.

I have followed the progress of the Little Village pilot over the past four years via the quarterly reports that you and others have supplied to the Department as well as through briefings from my staff. Thanks in large part to your efforts, the program has certainly involved some ground breaking activity. As you are aware, it has been our intent to learn from the experiences of this pilot and to apply the “best practices” from the program to the work of the other twenty-four district gang tactical teams. To that end, I asked my staff to design a gang tactical strategy that combines and incorporates the strengths of the Little Village Program and CAPS model.

I am reviewing an alternative version of the Little Village Program that would capitalize on our current partnerships with other criminal justice agencies as well as the community involvement promoted by CAPS, but that does not include the outreach workers that are currently part of the existing agreement. I wanted to share with you our initial thoughts about what this citywide program might look like.

We have benefitted a great deal from our involvement in the Project. As part of our commitment to expand a gang tactical model citywide, we are currently fine tuning a pilot in a police area in July. This model incorporates the elements of information sharing, team work and the targeting and tracking of the most violent gang members. Probation has agreed to continue to provide this population referral to social services as well. We will also be talking with the Illinois Department of Corrections Adult Parole Services and the Office of the Cook County State’s Attorney about possible linkages in this effort.

I want to personally thank you for your hard work and dedication in the Little Village Project. I believe that your efforts will lead us to a future model that contains a more focused and effective response to violent gang members in Chicago. I would be happy to hear any thoughts that you might have that would assist us in our expansion efforts.

Sincerely,  
M. R.

On May 9<sup>th</sup>, the Coordinator responded to the Superintendent’s letter as follows:

Dear Superintendent R:

Thank you for your letter of May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1997. I appreciate your interest in the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Program, particularly based on our

monthly (we did not submit quarterly) reports and extensive research reports.

I agree with you that the Project has involved “ground breaking activity”, by addressing the serious problem of gang violence in a fairly comprehensive way in one high gang violence Chicago community through the sharing of information, interaction with and coordination of certain key elements of the justice system, youth workers, and local community institutions, especially churches, youth agencies, job providers and to some extent schools.

My present concern is that your future development of policy and administration may not be based sufficiently on the complexity of the serious gang problem and the need of police leadership to address it in a comprehensive manner... It is important not only to build partnerships with other criminal justice agencies, but also to enhance internal police department coordination and to work closely with the community educational and employment systems as well as with the social service system. Lack of coordination with these non-criminal justice units is part of the complex gang problem.

The use of outreach workers is difficult, but also highly relevant to dealing with the gang problem in an effective way. An appropriate local agency structure must be found in the community to utilize indigenous and professional human service workers as well as former gang members, under close supervision, to address the problem. This is very difficult and risky, but an essential part of the task of law enforcement and gang crime reduction. A focused criminal justice approach with only a nominal community involvement, will be inadequate.

There were major design flaws in the Gang Violence Reduction Project. Perhaps you can rectify them in your future planning. While Project staff functioned well on their own, there was a serious lack of support by various levels of police administration in integrating CAPS [Community Alternative Policing Strategy, i.e., community policing] and the Project, or elements of it, into the 10<sup>th</sup> Police District operations. The Project was a relatively isolated effort in the department for over a four year period. It could be that CAPS, as yet, does not deal with hard-core gang youth in a manner that serves both to control and mainstream them. Unless you contribute to the development of a more comprehensive focus in your design, I believe the Chicago Police Department will be stuck with a suppression approach which will probably not be effective ...

I thank you for permitting us to conduct the Gang Violence Reduction Pilot program these past years.

Sincerely yours,  
I. S.

Project staff were notified of program termination, effective July 17, 1997. Project police and probation were not informed until the end of June, 1997 of the termination of their assignments to the GVRP and what their new assignments would be. Officer R. C. began planning to transfer to a day shift with the narcotics division downtown. Officer G. S. hoped to remain with the 10<sup>th</sup> District tactical unit. Rumor was filtering down that the Little Village probation unit would remain intact and expand as part of a new 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> cooperative district police and probation unit to combat gang crime. Each of the youth work staff quickly found employment. One final effort by Pastor N. C. to mount a community-resident and local-agency protest meeting to sustain the Project was not successful.

The new cooperative police and probation arrangement was delayed and interrupted several times. As of Fall 1999, specific policy arrangements for integrating the efforts of the Cook County Adult Probation Department with the Chicago Police Department around the gang problem had still not been made. The District 10 Commander telephoned the Coordinator in late November, 1997 for an appointment to discuss the increasingly serious gang-violence problem in Little Village. He wanted to know more about the use of youth workers. T.F., the adult probation supervisor, also agreed to appear at the meeting. He noted that, since Project termination, the probation officers did not know what was happening with gangs on the streets of Little Village.

In June 2003, almost six years after Project termination, a cooperative relationship between the CPD and the CCDAP around the gang problem had not yet occurred. The Mayor and the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department had not developed an effective



approach to reduce homicides, particularly gang homicides. The rate of homicides in Chicago now exceeded that of any other city in the United States with a million or more people. The Superintendent's new plan to solve the homicide problem remained "red hot." Its focus was

“ ‘Gang strategy teams’ in each of the Police Department’s patrol areas to meet every week to share information and discuss crime-fighting strategies”

(Washburn, *Chicago Tribune* 2003).

The Mayor and his Superintendent of Police still had not learned that the gang problem could not simply be resolved by a hard-line suppression strategy alone.

#### Project Assessment

The Chicago Police Department delayed a decision for four and a half years about whether to sustain and institutionalize the Project approach. There was ongoing discussion between the Project Coordinator, the Director of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority and the Director of the Research and Development Division of the CPD about incorporating the Project into regular police operations as part of community policing. Despite the success of the program, police department suppression ideology was too great to overcome. Top levels of city government – particularly the Mayor – citywide social agencies and other criminal-justice agencies, as well as the media, remained silent during the course of the Project.

The most successful element of the Project was probably the team structure and the relationships which developed between the different staff members at the street level, including

police, probation and youth workers, and to a lesser extent the neighborhood organizer. The team approach, however, did not translate into involvement and support by administrators of police and probation once the Project was underway. There was relatively limited direct communication and involvement between the street-level staff and administrators from the Chicago Police Department and Cook County Department of Adult Probation. The CPD and CCDAP probably did not clearly know or understand what the street-level staff were doing. The police tactical team and probation officers on the Project were largely on their own and did not have sufficient backup and supervision.

The close interaction between police and youth workers on the Project served not only to provide better targeted police-suppression efforts, but also helped the Project police to become aware of and focus on the needs of gang youth for social assistance and service. The close interaction of team members also required the youth workers to take greater responsibility for directly supervising and controlling gang youth behavior, alerting Project police to gang incidents, and at times assisting police directly and indirectly with their law-enforcement role. The probation officers had a close relationship with police on the Project early on, and often went on patrol with them. In the later years of the Project, the probation officers participated less in joint patrolling with police, probably due to increased rigidity of probation agency policy, in part due to a failure to work out general collaboration arrangements with the CPD.

A major limitation of the Project was a lack of commitment to community organizing and interagency coordination in regard to the gang problem at the citywide level. Local agency and neighborhood organization efforts were weak, and resources too limited for effective grassroots and interagency work. Community organization efforts should have been carried out by both

local and citywide groups and organizations (particularly in violent and high gang-crime areas of the city) under the auspices of the Mayor's office, with the Chicago Police Department as the lead agency. More time and resources should have been allocated to support services for target gang youth and coordination efforts among local agencies.

Another key factor contributing to the lack of full development and implementation of the GVRP model was the failure by the Project Coordinator and the Chicago Police Department to stimulate the creation of an interagency set of administrators as an integral component of a steering committee for the Project, particularly agencies providing staff to the Project. The Project Coordinator was too involved in the day-to-day development and oversight of the GVRP, and should have more strongly insisted from the start that the CPD and the CCAPD meet its leadership and administrative responsibilities for supporting the Project. Efforts should have been made by the CPD to integrate community policing with the GVRP, involving the area and District Commanders, as well as other police units such as the youth and narcotics divisions. A community-based and interagency project cannot be created without considerable commitment and involvement, not only of top community political leaders, but also of mid-level leadership.

High-level policy discussions should have been undertaken with city government and political leaders, particularly with the Mayor, before the Project began; discussions which fully involved the Mayor throughout its development. A strategic political error may have been the assumption by the academic, the leader of a state planning agency, and the head of a research and development of a major city criminal justice agency, that the achievement of Project goals and objectives (and even the availability of funding) was sufficient to sustain a gang program. The fact is that the Project and its positive achievements did not make sense in political and

ideological terms between 1992 and 1997, and still don't in 2003. Chicago's political and police-department leadership may not have been ready for a successful program to reduce the gang problem.

Fighting the gang problem only through persistent campaigns of police suppression did make traditional political sense in Chicago, despite the fact that such campaigns had nothing to do with resolving the problem. The city's policy of exclusive police suppression against gangs and gang members was the Mayor's means of gaining the support of the "good" people in the African-American, Latino, white and other racial and ethnic communities, as well as of businesses, churches, the media and other institutions. These groups might disagree with the Mayor on other issues, but supported him and his police department in arresting and incarcerating the bad guys, defined as gang members.

This meant that the Mayor could divert city residents' and many organizations' and groups' attention and efforts from more basic city, economic, educational, health, housing, lack-of-social-services, racial and other problems not due to gangs. Yet these other problems contributed to the creation and sustenance of the gang problem. The Project's approach of multiple, interrelated strategies directed to gang youth could also have, on a limited basis, begun to address these more basic problems.

## Chapter 18

### Conclusion

Projects that require institutional change, especially in respect to a gang problem, are highly vulnerable to failure. Few survive or develop unless they can be incorporated into existing institutional frameworks and interests. Factors – whether political, social, economic, cultural, and/or organizational – intersect in a particular place and time to determine whether a Project approach survives, and how. Program success, i.e, the reduction of gang crime, may not be sufficient for Project survivability and insitutionalization. It is likely that program effectiveness and Project survivability are factors independent of each other, particularly in a context of conflicting values, imbedded organizational myths, politics, and community disorganization.

Institutionalization of the Gang Violence Reduction Project or its approach did not occur in Little Village. The death of the Little Village Project could probably have been predicted by the end of the first year of the Project, although the Project lasted five years. The discussion is organized around three themes: Project transition, crisis and termination, and Project assessment.

### Project Assessment

The original arrangement between the Chicago Police Department and the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority was that the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project would be funded for one year. The coordinator, the professor at the School of Social Service Administration, agreed to assist with development of the Project. He assumed, by default of full Chicago Police Department (CPD) interest and administration, a role of

responsibility of Project operations for a five-year period. The expectation was that the CPD would make a decision to continue, adapt, and incorporate the Project, if it were successful, into its ongoing operations. The expectation was not fulfilled, however, the CPD continued to apply for funds to support the Project without making a decision until four and a half years later whether or not to integrate the Project into ongoing police operations.

The following discussion is based on excerpts from monthly progress reports submitted by the coordinator to the Chicago Police Department, bi-weekly staff meeting minutes, letters and memos, and special crisis reports. Together they trace the sequence of expectations, plans and actions related to Project continuation, institutionalization, and finally Project termination. Specific dates of documents and events are supplied.

### Project Transition

In a December 1994 memo to the Project neighborhood relations sergeant, the coordinator provided “thoughts about Project transition”:

“Based on the feasibility and effectiveness of the Project, thus far, I would recommend continued if not primary responsibility for administration and coordination (of the Project) by the Chicago Police Department, particularly the present neighborhood relations unit, with the aid of the special tactical unit and close liaison with narcotics and organized crime units, since a sharp rise in drug possession and drug dealing at the street level is occurring.

In this process (of expansion) the University of Chicago would gradually reduce its commitment to administer and supervise the community youth work unit. The Chicago Police Department should consider contracting community youth work services targeted to older hardcore gang youth from Neighbors Against Gang Violence, with close oversight from the (new)10<sup>th</sup> District Gang Violence Reduction Program coordinator.

The University of Chicago would expect to terminate fully its coordination and provision of community youth work services by August 30, 1995. It would begin to transfer coordination and supervision of the community youth worker unit in February 1995, but retain oversight and funding responsibility for the community youth work unit until August 30<sup>th</sup>.

The problem of transfer of the Project remained unsolved, pending promised meetings among Chicago Police Department, Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, and University of Chicago.

In a memo of February 1996, to the director of the Research and Development Division, CPD, the acting director, (CK) of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority summarized the February 7<sup>th</sup> GVRP meeting with the assistant R & D director held at the Little Village Adult Probation Project Office, as follows:

“I found our discussion revolved around the following things:

- Team approach: Over and over again, everyone stressed the importance of the Project` being a collaborative effort. It appeared the feeling of the group was that the whole was greater than the sum of parts. Each Project team member believes he or she is better equipped to do his or her job because of the participation of other members of the team.
- Information: It was clear to me that those present felt they had access to more information which assisted them in the performance of their jobs than they would if the team was not in place. Information was both gathered in general and relative to specific incidents. I found it particularly noteworthy that police officers G.S. and R.C. are viewed as “resources” by other police agencies (FBI, ATF, County Sheriff).
- Communication: Perhaps more important than gathering information is sharing it. Because team members are in constant contact with one another there are numerous opportunities for passing along information which is directly related to a particular gang member or incident or may fit into an investigation at some future time.

- Program features: The program has two primary elements - intervention with the target population (to divert them from the gang or remove them from the streets) and intelligence gathering (to solve crimes or reduce the chance they'll be committed). I, for one, underestimated the significance of intelligence gathering when the program design was first completed. It's also important to be mindful of:

Needs/motivation of gang members who become involved in a gang and why.

Targeting of resources toward a particular problem or group of offenders. In this case, we were hoping to reduce incidents of violent crime, so the target population included those who were committing violent crimes or causing them to be committed.

The community as a partner - the success of this type of program will be effected by the extent to which the community is on board and able to do its part. That is, residents need to work with the team and services need to be in place to be drawn on by the team.

The members of the team. Needless to say, these should be people who believe in what they will be asked to do and committed to doing the best they can. This is particularly true because they will need to confront and overcome problems between the participating agencies and within their own agencies. A special mention should be made about the outreach workers - both their value to the program and their characteristics. The coordinator should be asked to elaborate in particular on the latter along with their hiring and supervision.

A neutral leader. One of the reasons the program has been effective is the coordinator. He has been exclusively focused on getting the program to work. All team members know that and respect him for it.

Data collection. Documentation of impact and on-going crime analysis have been limited by a lack of available data. I am hopeful some of the Department's new efforts in this area - especially ICAM (a new computer program)- will be a help here.

- New Approach/New Rules: The police officers present noted it was sometimes hard to take a new approach to their jobs when supervisors were holding them to the "old" performance standards. Sound familiar?



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The sergeant was interested in the involvement of the public schools in addressing the problem of younger youth about to become gang

members. He was also interested in a closer relationship between police and adult probation. The sergeant appeared less interested in preserving or developing a comprehensive approach to the gang problem than in discovering those elements of the Project that would be useful in coordinating effort to squash gang crime through justice system approaches in the city. After several discussions with the sergeant, the key question among staff, including Project police, was whether the sergeant's presence represented an effort to develop and expand, or torpedo, the Project.

By the end of December 1996, there was still no clear evidence that the Chicago Police Department was committed to sustaining, modifying and/or expanding the Project. Support was expressed for the Project from a variety of sources. At least seven agencies and community organizations were interested in assuming responsibility for the Project, mainly the youth-worker component. The Project coordinator had decided that after five years, he would no longer manage the Project. He was an academic and a researcher and not primarily an agency or program director. His original commitment had been as coordinator for one year. His attempts to induce the CPD to take over the Project or partner with some appropriate set of organizations to do so, had not yet borne fruit.

Preliminary evidence also suggested that Project outcome at the individual or aggregate community level was good, particularly relative to the growth of the gang problem in other comparable communities during the first three or four year Project period, based on available police data. But this appeared not to be sufficient to convince the CPD that the Project was effective and feasible. The issue of feasibility i.e., particularly the traditional role of police suppression and the cost of the program, appeared to be most important. CPD was not prepared to manage an approach to the gang problem that required significant modification of its suppression philosophy. It was apparently willing to consider coordination of its suppression

activities with adult probation. The CPD was clearly not interested in use of community youth workers. Community policing was sufficient for this purpose.

### Crisis and Termination

A GVRP staff crisis occurred in early 1997 which became closely associated with a decision by the CPD superintendent not to continue the Project. Three more years of funding (1.5 million dollars) from the current block grant of the U.S. Justice Department and additional funding from the office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention were available but not sufficient to induce the CPD to support the Project model. As the liaison lieutenant from the R and D in the first year of the Project stated, the CPD has “deep pockets” and does not need grant funds from the federal government to develop or sustain any Project it is interested in.

### Staff Crisis

Project efforts to expand involvement of agencies in the program and bring about an effective transfer of the Project continued throughout the staff crisis. Meetings were again held in January and February 1997 with the Pupil Services Section of the Board of Education about their provision of one full-time and one half-time crisis case workers to elementary and middle schools in Little Village, and also closely related to the Project to address the gang problem. Specifics were to be worked out based on budget decisions in March. A meeting was scheduled with Judge H., presiding judge of the juvenile court, and his administrative probation and court-services staff to discuss how the juvenile court could be more fully involved in the Project. Also, discussions were initiated with two local organizations, La Villita Community Church and

Latino Youth to jointly operate the Little Village Project, particularly the youth-outreach and social-services component, in collaboration with police law enforcement and probation supervision. [last sentence is unclear – supervision from police and probation supervisors?] A citizen's group in the northern section of the 10<sup>th</sup> District - a separate African-American community - concerned with the gang violence problem held discussions with the Project coordinator and the deputy police superintendent about GVRP and CPD extending the Project to that area. The local alderman and congressman of that community also expressed interest in expansion of the Project to the area.

On February 11, 1997, a letter from the Director of Research and Development faxed to the coordinator signaled the beginning of a major Project crisis. Its basis may have developed earlier with a minor Project administrative change. The coordinator expanded responsibilities for the community youth work supervisor to include collection of time cards from community youth-work staff. This had been the exclusive responsibility of the coordinator until he assumed responsibility for another Project. Unbeknownst to the coordinator, the youth work field supervisor began to allocate more hours of work to certain part-time workers than was appropriate. This was done without knowledge or permission of the coordinator. When the coordinator became aware of the problem, he corrected it but he was not aware of other problems that had become related to it.

There were growing tensions between the youth work supervisor and one of the senior research staff assistants. The senior research assistant was a close friend of MLG, the former community organizer, whose contact with the GVRP had now been severed. MLG and the youth work supervisor had been extremely close and friendly earlier, but were now were in sharp

conflict with each other. MLG and the senior researcher became aware of information of intimidation and alteration of time cards by the youth work supervisor for one or two of the part-time youth workers. This information was not revealed directly to the coordinator. It came first to the attention of B.M. of the Research and Development Division of the Chicago Police Department and then relayed to the coordinator. The charges proved to be correct and the youth-work supervisor was terminated from the Project.

### Termination

A lengthy investigation by the University of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department could not find sufficient evidence for criminal action against the terminated youth work supervisor. All Project property in J.A.'s possession was returned and appropriate malfeasance costs, approximately \$10,000, to the Project were adjusted in the Gang Violence Reduction Project grant. Despite the crisis, Project efforts continued. A new field supervisor was appointed within a matter of weeks. Contacts with Project youth continued by community youth workers. Project police and probation officers conducted their normal Project routines. An additional community youth worker was employed. Weekly youth worker and bi-weekly Project team meetings continued Pastor NC was now the part-time community organizer but was not particularly active.

The key issue remained transferring and elaborating the Project. Latino Youth and the La Villita Community Church, both in Little Village and most familiar with Project operations, seemed to be the viable local organizations to take over. A series of meetings were held between Sergeant L. of the CPD Deputy Superintendent's office, C.K. (now the director of the Illinois

Criminal Justice Information Authority) and the coordinator with Pastor N.C. and the director of Latino Youth. Each organization of the two local organizations was prepared to take over components but not the entire Project. Neither organization was particularly interested in coordination with police and probation. The CPD in turn still had not made a decision as to what to do about the Project. In a series of discussions with Sergeant L, it became clear that his function was to investigate and explore alternatives to the Project, e.g., the development of a city-wide project, with emphasis on police and probation collaboration and possibly a closer involvement with the elementary and middle schools around the issue of gang prevention.

In April 1997, informal word filtered to the Project via Sergeant L. that the Chicago Police Department would not extend or transfer the Project to include its current components. A letter from the Police Superintendent terminating the Project came forth a month later.

Dear Dr. S:

I have recently signed the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (ICJIA) Interagency Agreement which funds the Gang Violence Reduction Program in Little Village through July 17, 1997. At this time, we are contemplating not requesting additional funds for the program beyond this year, although we expect to expand many elements of the model into each of our remaining twenty-four districts in July without the use of grant funds.

I have followed the progress of the Little Village pilot over the past four years via the quarterly reports that you and others have supplied to the Department as well as through briefings from my staff. Thanks, in large part to your efforts, the program has certainly involved some ground breaking activity. As you are aware, it has been our intent to learn from the experiences of this pilot and to apply the "best practices" from the program to the work of the other twenty-four district gang tactical teams. To that end, I asked my staff to design a gang tactical strategy that combines and incorporates the strengths of the Little Village Program and CAPS model.

I am reviewing an alternative version of the Little Village Program that would capitalize on our current partnerships with other criminal justice agencies as well as the community involvement promoted by CAPS, but that does not include the outreach workers that are currently part of the existing agreement. I wanted to share with you our initial thoughts about what this citywide

program might look like.

We have benefitted a great deal from our involvement in the Project. As part of our commitment to expand a gang tactical model citywide, we are currently fine tuning a pilot in a police area in July. This model incorporates the elements of information sharing, team work and the targeting and tracking of the most violent gang members. Probation has agreed to continue to provide this population referral to social services as well. We will also be talking with the Illinois Department of Corrections Adult Parole Services and the Office of the Cook County State's Attorney about possible linkages in this effort.

I want to personally thank you for your hard work and dedication in the Little Village Project. I believe that your efforts will lead us to a future model that contains a more focused and effective response to violent gang members in Chicago. I would be happy to hear any thoughts that you might have that would assist us in our expansion efforts.

Sincerely,  
MLR

On May 9<sup>th</sup>, Dr. S. responded to the Superintendent's letter as follows:

Dear Superintendent R:

Thank you for your letter of May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1997. I appreciate your interest in the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Program, particularly based on our monthly (we did not submit quarterly) reports and extensive research reports.

I agree with you that the Project has involved "ground breaking activity", by addressing the serious problem of gang violence in a fairly comprehensive way in one high gang violence Chicago community through the sharing of information, interaction with and coordination of certain key elements of the justice system, community youth workers, and local community institutions, especially churches, youth agencies, job providers and to some extent schools.

My present concern is that your future development of policy and administration may not be based sufficiently on the complexity of the serious gang problem and the need of police leadership to address it in a comprehensive manner... It is important not only to build partnerships with other criminal justice agencies, but also to enhance internal police department coordination and to work closely with the community educational and employment systems as well as with the social service system. Lack of coordination with these non-criminal justice units is part of the complex gang problem.

The use of outreach workers is complex and difficult, but also highly relevant to dealing with the gang problem in an effective way. An appropriate local agency structure must be found in the community to utilize indigenous and professional human service workers as well as former gang members, under close supervision, to address the problem. This is very difficult and risky,



but an essential part of the task of law enforcement and gang crime reduction. A focused criminal justice approach with only a nominal community involvement, will be inadequate.

There were major design flaws in the Gang Violence Reduction Project. Perhaps you can rectify them in your future planning. While Project staff functioned well on their own, there was a serious lack of support by various levels of police administration in integrating CAPS and the Project, or elements of it, into the 10<sup>th</sup> Police District operations. The Project was a relatively isolated effort in the department for over a four year period. It could be that CAPS [Community Alternative Policing Strategy, i.e., community policing], as yet, does not deal with hard-core gang youths in a manner that serves both to control and mainstream them. Unless you contribute to the development of such a more comprehensive focus in your design, I believe the Chicago Police Department will be stuck with a suppression approach which will probably not be effective ...

I thank you for permitting us to conduct the Gang Violence Reduction Pilot program these past years.

Sincerely yours,  
IS

Staff were notified of Project termination effective July 17, 1997. Project police and probation had not yet been notified of the superintendent's or their department's decision and what their new assignments would be, as the end of June, 1997. Officer R.C. was planning to transfer to a day shift with the narcotics division downtown. Officer G.S. planned to remain with the 10<sup>th</sup> district tactical unit. Rumor was filtering down that the Little Village probation unit would remain intact and expanded as part of a new 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> cooperative district police and probation unit to combat gang crime. Each of the community youth work staff quickly found employment. One final effort by Pastor N.C. to mount a community resident and local agency protest meeting to sustain the Project was not successful. Based on reports of each of the former workers of the Project staff in November 1999, gang activities and gang violence continued at a high or higher level after Project termination. The new cooperative police and probation

arrangement was delayed and interrupted several times. As of Fall of 1999 did not seem to be moving ahead satisfactorily. The Cook County Adult Probation Department had still not made specific policy arrangements for integrating its efforts with the Chicago Police Department around the gang problem. The then-current District 10 commander telephoned the coordinator in late November, 1997 for an appointment to discuss the increasing serious gang violence problem in Little Village. He wanted to know more about the use of community youth workers. TF, the adult probation supervisor also agreed to appear at the meeting. He noted that with Project termination the probation officers did not know what was happening with gangs on the streets of Little Village.

Periodic discussion between the coordinator and police officers continued, but no change in policing policy in respect to the gang problem in Little Village or Chicago occurred. In 2003, the Mayor and Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department still had not developed an effective approach to reduce homicides, particularly gang homicides. The rate of homicides in Chicago now exceeded that of any other city in the United States with a million or more people. The Superintendent's new plan to solve the homicide problem remained "red hot." Its focus was " 'Gang strategy teams' in each of the Police Department's patrol areas to meet every week to share information and discuss crime-fighting strategies" (Washburn, *Chicago Tribune* 2003).

The Mayor and the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department still had not learned that the gang problem was a complex human, organizational, and community problem that could not be resolved by hard-line police policy alone. The cost of lives and failed economic and social development would continue to be extremely high.

### Project Assessment

The Chicago Police Department delayed a decision for four and a half years about whether to sustain and institutionalize the Project approach. There was ongoing discussion between the coordinator, the director of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority and the director of the Research and Development Division of CPD about incorporating the Project into regular police operations as part of community policing. Apparently, police department suppression ideology was too great to overcome. Top levels of city government – particularly the Mayor – citywide social agencies and other criminal-justice agencies, as well as the media, remained silent during the course of the Project.

The most successful element of the Project was probably the team structure and the relationships which developed between the different staff members at the street level, including police, probation, and community youth workers, and to a lesser extent the neighborhood organizer. The team approach, however, did not translate into involvement and support by administrators of police and probation once the Project was underway. There was relatively limited direct communication and involvement between the street-level staff and administrators from the Chicago Police Department and Cook County Department of Adult Probation. The

CPD and CCDAP probably did not clearly know or understand what the street level staff were doing. The police tactical team and probation officers on the Project were largely on their own and did not have sufficient backup and supervision.

The close interaction between police and community youth workers on the Project served not only to provide a better targeted police suppression efforts, but also helped the Project police to become aware of and focus on the needs of gang youth for social assistance and service. The close interaction of team members also required the community youth workers to take greater responsibility for directly supervising and controlling gang youth behavior, alerting Project police to gang incidents, and at times assisting police directly and indirectly with their law enforcement role. The probation officers had a close relationship with police on the Project early on and often went on patrol with them. In the later years of the Project, the probation officers participated less in joint patrolling with police, probably due to increased rigidity of probation agency policy.

One of the major limitations of the Project was a lack of substantial commitment to community organizing and interagency coordination at citywide levels. Local agency and neighborhood organization efforts were weak and resources too limited. Community organization efforts should have been carried out by both local and citywide groups and organizations, particularly in violence and high gang crime areas of the city under the auspices of the Mayor's office, with the Chicago Police Department as the lead agency. More time and resources should have been allocated to support services and coordination efforts among local agencies to target gang youth.

Another key factor contributing to the lack of full development and implementation of

the GVRP model was the failure by the coordinator and the Chicago Police Department to stimulate the creation of an interagency mid-level administrative unit of agencies providing staff to the Project. The University of Chicago coordinator was too involved in the day-to-day development and oversight of the GVRP and should have more strongly insisted that CPD and the CCAPD meet its leadership and administrative responsibilities for supporting the Project. More imaginative efforts on the part of CPD to integrate community policing with GVRP, involving the area and district commanders, as well as other police units such as youth and narcotics division, should have been. A community-based and interagency project cannot be created without considerable commitment and involvement not only of top community but mid-level leadership.

Ideally, high-level policy discussions should have been undertaken with city government and political leaders, particularly the Mayor at the start of the Project and throughout to accept, implement and adapt the Project's collaborative model. A strategic error may have been the assumption by an academic, a leader of a state planning agency, and the head of a research and development of a major city criminal justice agency that the achievement alone of project goals and objectives and even the availability of funding was sufficient to sustain a program. The Project, and its positive achievements, would have to make sense also in political and ideological terms. It did not between 1992 and 1997. Chicago's political and police department leadership were not yet ready for a successful reform.



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