Critical Incident Preparedness and Response on Campus: Examining the Relationship Between Local Law Enforcement and Post-Secondary Institutions in Illinois and the United States

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Preface

This report is being released to the public near the first anniversary of the February 14, 2008 shootings on the campus of Northern Illinois University (NIU). The content of this report is particularly relevant to those interested in campus public safety, especially in light of two campus shooting incidents occurring within the course of a year in DeKalb, Illinois and Blacksburg, Virginia.

The impetus for this research project was the Virginia Tech (VT) shooting incident in April 2007; the authors observed in both Illinois and nationally the creation of commissions to examine campus safety issues as well prescriptions for improving security. One of the key questions guiding the research was whether any new preparedness steps were taken. This report frames many of the findings and implications within the context of the VT shootings because the research was focused on change pursuant to that tragedy. Data were collected beginning in April 2008 to study the changes campuses had pursued in the first year after the VT incident.

This focus does not overlook the transformational effect the NIU shootings may have had on campus planning and responses. Given the timing of the data collection (which had been established in advance of the February 2008 shootings at NIU), it was decided the research focus should remain on the influence of VT. Before data collection was initiated, campuses had 12 months after the VT shootings to plan for and implement myriad changes, but only 2-3 months after the NIU shootings. Though the latter may have influenced some study findings, particularly perceived risk of future campus shootings, it seems less likely the events at NIU had time to exert an appreciable influence on preparedness steps, though that possibility cannot be ruled out.

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Executive Summary

The *Critical Incident Preparedness and Response on Campus* research project was designed to describe the current practices of campuses with respect to critical incident prevention and response, paying particular attention to coordination with local law enforcement agencies. Specifically, several inter-related questions guided the design and execution of the research project:

1. To what extent do respondents indicate they have experienced various forms of accidental and intentional critical incidents? What risk do they perceive they are at for future experiences with these types of events?

2. What activities were undertaken by campuses and public safety officials to prevent, plan for, and respond to critical incidents? What policies and practices have agencies implemented since the Virginia Tech shooting? What types of mass communication systems have campuses implemented to disseminate information to students, staff, and faculty?[1]

3. How are public safety departments interacting/coordinating with local law enforcement to prevent, plan for, and respond to critical incidents?

4. Do campus agencies believe they are well-prepared to respond to critical incidents within their jurisdiction? What do they perceive as their strengths/weaknesses, should such a response be necessary?

5. How do the practices of Illinois colleges and universities compare with those of a national sample?

6. To what extent do the reported activities from college public safety personnel and their counterparts in local police agencies indicate agreement on cross-agency planning, coordination, and training to ensure efficacious and efficient responses to campus-based critical incidents?

These questions were addressed using a two-part research methodology. Campus public safety officials in a national sample of colleges and universities and a census of Illinois institutions were surveyed about critical incident preparedness issues. Responses were collected from 181 national, non-Illinois campuses and 76 Illinois campuses (response rates of 31.9 percent and 49.7 percent, respectively). The less than desirable response rates may reflect concerns about liability or confidentiality, lack of interest in an Illinois-focused survey, or some other issue that suppressed participation, particularly in the national survey. Analysis revealed, however, that respondents and non-respondents were comparable across a range of measures.

Surveys were also sent to the local law enforcement agency serving the jurisdiction in which the college or university is located. Responses were received from 204 agencies matched with national non-Illinois campuses and 53 agencies matched with Illinois campuses (response rates of 42.9 percent and 66.2 percent, respectively).

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[1] The Northern Illinois University tragedy occurred approximately 2-3 months before data collection for this project commenced. The authors focused on changes since the Virginia Tech shooting incident because it was likely that such changes would take a considerable amount of time to implement. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Northern Illinois University shooting incident also influenced responses to survey questions. See the Preface for more information (pg. ii).

This report details the results of this research project; some of the key findings include:

- Many campuses experienced critical incidents within the past five years. Most often, the incidents were accidental/unintentional in nature (e.g., weather-related, hazardous materials incident, earthquake). Intentional, criminal, or terrorist-related incidents were extremely rare with the exception of bomb threats.

- Most campus respondents perceived the risk of a future (5-year) critical incident to be relatively low. Only weather-related incidents and bomb threats were rated above the midpoint on the 10-point risk scale. Perceived risk of a future critical incident was typically higher on campuses that had experienced a critical incident within the past five years.

- Campuses responses to enhance emergency preparedness were common after the Virginia Tech shooting incident. A majority of campuses implemented new mass communication technologies, implemented or revised their emergency response plans, participated in field training exercises, and trained non-safety personnel in emergency response.

- On average, campuses had four mass communication mechanisms (of eight addressed in the survey) in place. Email, web page, non-cellular telephones, and cellular telephones/text messaging were the most common technologies employed.

- The vast majority of campuses had a formal written emergency plan in place. Critical incident types most commonly mentioned in these plans included structural fires, weather-related incidents, bomb threats, hazardous materials incidents, and active shooter events. Hazardous material thefts and structural failures were less often mentioned in these plans.

- Approximately two-thirds (or more, depending upon the sample) of campuses provided materials to local law enforcement agencies to facilitate emergency response. Campus maps were the most oft-supplied item while keys or other building access items were provided less frequently.

- Campus respondents rated their organization's capacity in the event of a critical incident high on most dimensions. They expressed confidence in areas such as their partnerships with other agencies likely to be involved in a response, their ability to communicate with responders, and their plan to communicate with the media. Organizational capacity was less than adequate in areas related to resources (e.g., budget, equipment, number of trained personnel) as well as ability to secure campus and ability to notify parents/guardians in an emergency.

- Local law enforcement agency respondents viewed the risk of a critical incident on campus to be relatively low, below the midpoint on the risk scale for most items. The lone exception was for bomb threats (Illinois local law enforcement respondents also rated the risk of a weather-related incident above the midpoint).

- Between 43 and 57 percent of local law enforcement agencies (depending upon the sample) indicated that they had a formal written emergency response plan specifying procedures/responses in the event of an emergency on campus.

- Roughly half of all local law enforcement agencies reported receiving materials from the campus in order to enhance critical incident preparedness and response. Most of these agencies received campus maps while fewer received building floor plans or copies of the campus emergency response plan. Keys or other building access materials were seldom received by local law enforcement agencies.

- Local law enforcement respondents were positive in their assessment of organizational capacity. All items were rated above adequate; the most confidence was expressed in partnerships with other responders, ability to rapidly deploy personnel, and knowledge of emergency response procedures. Resource-related items (budget, equipment, and number of trained personnel) were the lowest ranked items, but still rated above adequate.

- Regarding accidental, criminal, and natural incidents that had occurred, most paired agencies agreed with one another regarding whether accidental, criminal, or natural incidents had occurred in their jurisdiction. Any disagreement noted could be a function of local police not being summoned during the incident.

- Overall, campus public safety and paired law enforcement agencies were in agreement about the level of cooperation on the 12 patrol/service-provision items (e.g., patrolling campus buildings, making arrests on campus, assisting with traffic stops off campus). Only four significant differences emerged.

- Campus public safety and paired law enforcement agencies generally perceived the same level of risk of critical incidents on campus. Only two significant differences were noted; campus respondents rated the future (5-year) risk of an earthquake and a weather-related critical incident higher than their local law enforcement counterparts.

Critical Incident Preparedness and Response on Campus: Examining the Relationship between Local Law Enforcement and Post-Secondary Institutions in Illinois and the United States

INTRODUCTION

Social science research describing the comprehensive crime prevention and homeland security planning and coordination efforts of primary and secondary educational institutions has been common over the past decade, particularly as the topic of critical incident response became more salient after Littleton, West Paducah, Jonesboro, and Springfield became widely linked to acts of school violence. Similar research on prevention and response initiatives at the post-secondary level have been comparatively lacking, in part, because "institutions of higher education are often regarded as sanctuaries, protected environments where young people explore great ideas in a collegial atmosphere and make lifelong friendships" (Langford, 2004, p. 2). The need for critical incident planning and response in higher education has always existed but has become more pronounced in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks and the more recent tragedies at Virginia Tech University and Northern Illinois University.

Since April of 2007, myriad recommendations have been issued to colleges and universities seeking to enhance their prevention, response, and mitigation capabilities (Chancellor's Task Force on Critical Incident Management, 2007; Davis, 2008; Gubernatorial Task Force on University Campus Safety, 2007; Illinois Campus Security Task Force, 2008; Leavitt, Spelling & Gonzales, 2007). Many of these recommendations are closely aligned with the recommendations made in the aftermath of the secondary school shooting episodes in the 1990s (Langford, 2004) and the September 11th terrorist attacks (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2005; Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, 2007; Trump, 2002). Though some reports and writings focus on dealing with active shooters, others take a broader approach that envisions security as one aspect of efforts to protect "students, faculty, and staff…and campus property and facilities from damage or loss" (Polensky, 2002, p. 14; see also Hoover & Lipka, 2008). Despite ample recommendations about what institutions *should* do to enhance their response to critical incidents, to date no systematic efforts have been published detailing what changes have actually occurred.

This report details the results of a research project seeking to study the state of campus preparations for critical incidents within the state of Illinois, comparing the outcomes with results from a national sample of colleges and universities. The project also surveys local law enforcement officials servicing the jurisdiction proximate to the surveyed schools to understand the depth and nature of campus and local interactions and joint planning. The focus was not specifically on agency preparations for active shooters or even violent criminal events; rather, the emphasis is on how campuses have prepared for critical incidents and the role local law enforcement partners have played in that process.

The term "critical incident" can be defined in a variety of similar, yet somewhat distinct, ways. For the purpose of this project, the term was used in research instruments without providing a set definition. This decision was partly based on Zdziarski's (2006) contention that crisis is contextually bound. "What is a full-blown crisis on one campus may be a critical incident at another, depending on

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factors such as the size of the institution, the type of institution, location (rural vs. urban), and organizational structure" (p. 5). For project-related planning and design, the researchers defined a critical incident or crisis event as a situation that causes or threaten to cause injury or death to individuals on or around a college campus, may lead to the destruction of campus facilities or other property, or significantly impedes the operations of the institution. Such events go beyond what is normal or routine for an institution (Jones, 2000); they would typically not refer to the more common crimes and rule violations public safety, police, or security officers are tasked with addressing. Critical incidents may include, but are not limited to, shooting incidents, terrorist acts, certain protest activities, rioting, hazardous materials situations, natural disasters, and other similar incidents that are low probability/frequency but result in (or have the potential to result in) significant loss/costs. Well publicized examples abound of these types of incidents occurring on campuses across the country: a 1999 riot at Michigan State University following its basketball team's loss, the 1991 multiple shooting at the University of Iowa, Halloween violence in Carbondale in 2000, a 2000 dormitory fire at Seton Hall, the Texas A&M bonfire accident, and a 2006 tornado that damaged portions of the University of Kansas.

In Illinois, campus safety received heightened attention following the Virginia Tech incident. Governor Blagojevich extended the state's efforts to address crime and violence at the primary and secondary school level to the post-secondary level with three initiatives: providing radios to facilitate communication between campus officials and local law enforcement, adding campus representatives to the Illinois Terrorism Task Force, and establishing the Illinois Campus Security Task Force (Wiehle, 2007). This Task Force prepared a slate of detailed recommendations for Illinois colleges and universities (Illinois Campus Security Task Force, 2008). In particular it recommended bolstering mental health services; addressing legal aspects for student in crisis and critical incidents; and, responding to critical incidents (particularly those of a violent nature).

This initiative illustrates the consideration many states have been giving to this dimension of crime on campus and demonstrates the need to further integrate higher education institutions into the broader critical response apparatus.

Knowledge is lacking, however, in what post-secondary institutions are currently doing to prevent and respond to crime, violence, and other critical incidents. Maguire and Uchida (2007) suggest that these gaps in our understanding are often the product of a focus on normative/prescriptive approaches—a tendency to want to identify what agencies or institutions should be doing. These types of approaches are valuable in providing direction and several prescriptive-type documents are available (e.g., Gajda, 2006; Langford, 2004; National Summit, 2004). This neglects a descriptive or explanatory focus, one that emphasizes "what they are doing and why they are doing it" (Maguire & Uchida, 2007, p. 104). More importantly, we know very little about the joint-planning or coordination of campus public safety, police, and security departments and local law enforcement agencies.[2] What is the normal level of interaction between campus public safety personnel and local law enforcement officers? Do campus public safety officers train with local law enforcement officers on how to respond to critical incidents such as mass shootings or natural disasters? Are local law enforcement officials aware of critical incident plans on college campuses and do they have the tools and knowledge to effectively lend assistance, should an incident occur? Do local law enforcement officials have ready access to locked buildings in the event of a critical incident?

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[2] For the purposes of this project, campus public safety departments or agencies refer to the various types of campus public safety departments (e.g., security v. police; sworn v. non-sworn). Local law enforcement agencies refer to the agencies responsible for the area around the campus (e.g., municipal police, sheriff, state police).

The research project was designed to describe the current practices of campuses with respect to critical incident prevention and response, paying particular attention to coordination with local law enforcement agencies. Specifically, several inter-related questions guided the design and execution of the research project:

- To what extent do respondents indicate they have experienced various forms of accidental and intentional critical incidents? What risk do they perceive they are at for future experiences with these types of events?

- What activities were undertaken by campuses and public safety officials to prevent, plan for, and respond to critical incidents? What policies and practices have agencies implemented since the Virginia Tech shooting? What types of mass communication systems have campuses implemented to disseminate information to students, staff, and faculty?

- How are public safety departments interacting/coordinating with local law enforcement to prevent, plan for, and respond to critical incidents?

- Do campus agencies believe they are well-prepared to respond to critical incidents within their jurisdiction? What do they perceive as their strengths/weaknesses, should such a response be necessary?

- How do the practices of Illinois colleges and universities compare with those of a national sample?

- To what extent do the reported activities from college public safety personnel and their counterparts in local police agencies indicate agreement on cross-agency planning, coordination, and training to ensure efficacious and efficient responses to campus-based critical incidents?

These questions were answered using an approach similar to Travis and Coon's (2005) survey of responses to secondary school violence. A survey was administered to a census of Illinois public, independent (not-for-profit), and community colleges addressing current practices and their relationship with the local law enforcement agency serving the college or university's jurisdiction. A second survey was mailed to the local law enforcement agency identified as serving the community in which the campus was located.[3] The second survey asked local law enforcement officials to report activities pertaining to coordination, planning, and practices as they related to the local college or university.   In order to examine the practices of Illinois post-secondary institutions in context, a sample of colleges and universities from across the United States as well as their corresponding local law enforcement agency was also surveyed in this same manner.

The intent of this two-pronged approach was to provide an in-depth understanding of the practices and approaches used by campus public safety, police, and security agencies in Illinois, while developing insight into how these practices compared with national norms. By asking officials from both campus and local agencies to report on these matters, it was possible to develop a greater awareness of how each side viewed relationships and interactions. This is of significant importance given that local law

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[3] Local law enforcement agencies were identified by the research team based on an interpretation of the city/county in which the school was located. These interpretations were validated by asking the campus respondents to identify the local law enforcement agency with which they had the most contact. If the original judgment was proven incorrect a survey was sent to the proper agency.

enforcement agencies often provide key assistance to campus public safety personnel (even when the latter are fully sworn, empowered, and equipped police officers) when critical incidents occur. Understanding the prevailing practices and challenges reported on a national scale aids in the development of prescriptive recommendations based on empirical evidence. Though somewhat speculative, Virginia officials maintain the strong relationship between the Virginia Tech Police Department and the Blacksburg Police Department was instrumental in bringing the April shooting incident to an expedient end, precluding the possibility of even greater loss of life.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The following literature review is divided into two sections that provide the context for the research project. First, a discussion is provided to address the history, structure, and nature of campus public safety in the United States. Given the primacy of campus public safety in incident prevention, response, and mitigation, effective understanding of critical incident preparedness cannot overlook these entities. Second, the literature review provides a short overview of key "best practices" for critical incident response. These prevailing recommendations informed key aspects of instrumentation development in this research project.

Campus Public Safety

Despite the long history of campus law enforcement in one form or another, researchers have largely ignored this segment of the policing industry in favor of studies of large, urban municipal police agencies (Sloan, 1992). Police agencies serving "special" jurisdictions (including colleges and universities) account for around 10 percent of American law enforcement agencies, yet they have been largely ignored by the research community (Paoline & Sloan, 2003). The majority of medium and large colleges and universities employ personnel specifically to provide public safety and security services and most such personnel have sworn police status (Bromley & Reaves, 1998). This neglect represents a significant oversight given that campus public safety provides services for a significant population. One survey suggested that in four year institutions serving 2,500 or more students, campus public safety departments covered jurisdictions of approximately 6.3 million students, plus the faculties and staffs employed by those institutions (Reaves & Goldberg, 1996).

Sloan (1992) divides the history of campus policing into three periods, commencing with the hiring of three officers by Yale University in 1894 (see also Bordner & Petersen, 1983; Esposito & Stormer, 1989; Gelber, 1972; International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 1982). Until the 1950s, campus law enforcement assumed what Sloan called a "watchman" role where they were responsible for overseeing university property and protecting it from damage (e.g., fire or water) or from property theft (Gelber, 1972; Sloan, 1992).   As the need for a greater police presence increased as the size of student populations increased, campus officers assumed a "pseudo-police" role where they performed watchman functions but also detected and reported crime and detained violators, albeit with no more legal authority than the average citizen (Sloan, 1992, p. 87).

The "modern campus police" role came about in the 1960s as colleges and universities faced civil unrest related to war protests, the civil rights movement, and other political efforts.   Existing campus safety personnel functioned largely as under-empowered security officers, making them ill-suited for the then-contemporary social realities of crime and social disorder (Harris, 1989). To control this unrest,

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campus officials either had to rely on outside authorities (e.g., municipal police officers) or create their own campus law enforcement presence (Peak, 1995; Sloan, 1992). One of the significant challenges was that tension ensued when local police confronted demonstrating students, sometimes exacerbating a situation (Gelber, 1972). Added to this, some campuses were equivalent in size to small cities or towns, warranting their own protection (Bromley & Reaves, 1998; Sloan, 1992). As a result, many campuses created public safety organizations with the traditional tripartite responsibilities of law enforcement, order maintenance, and service provision (Sloan, 1992). In many respects, modern campus public safety organizations are similar to municipal police agencies in appearance, organization, and function (Bromley & Reaves, 1998; Paoline & Sloan, 2003; Peak, 1995; Scott, 1976; Sloan, 1992; Sloan, Lanier, & Beer, 2000).

The professionalization of campus public safety in the 1960s stimulated a body of research into the practices of these organizations. In one of the earliest systematic studies employing a large sample, Gelber (1972) surveyed 245 member institutions of the International Association of College and University Security Directors regarding organizational characteristics, training, equipment use, and staffing needs. The survey revealed that campus public safety provided myriad functions, both traditional law enforcement and non-law enforcement (e.g., lost and found, key control, ambulance service, fire service). Campus officers were typically generalists; few opportunities existed for specialized positions as undercover agents, narcotics experts, or vice officers. Indeed, the surveyed campus public safety officers found few advantages of their position over local law enforcement officers in terms of salary, equipment, employee qualifications, and amount of turnover. Bordner and Petersen (1983) examined the campus public safety function using a case study methodology. They found that university police were more inclined to adopt a prevention and service orientation than a law enforcement orientation (p. 226; see also Wilson, 1968). Their research also illustrated the tension often seen in campus law enforcement agencies as personnel struggle to act as enforcers of the law, while operating within a political and ego-driven context where greater tolerance of minor deviant and criminal acts is expected. Such tolerance was often reflected, for example, in the expectation that minor acts of student vandalism and drunkenness would be handled as a university matter instead of a public safety concern (Gelber, 1972). The results of these studies were summed up by Border and Petersen (1983)—campus law enforcement, at this point had "never attained professional recognition or legitimacy" (p. 5).

Subsequent studies have found fewer differences between campus public safety and local law enforcement agencies (Bromley & Reaves, 1998; Paoline & Sloan, 2003; Peak, 1989, 1995; Peak, Barthe, & Garcia, 2008). Data facilitating such comparisons have come from a variety of sources. One of the largest national studies of campus policing was conducted in 1995 by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and involved gathering responses from 680 police or security departments on campuses with 2,500 or more students (Bromley & Reaves, 1998; Reaves & Goldberg, 1996; see also Paoline & Sloan, 2003). The survey addressed issues related to the function and organization of campus law enforcement. Findings demonstrated that larger colleges and universities were more likely to rely on campus security personnel with arrest authority and use armed patrol officers.

Comparing responses from campus public safety agencies to responses from local law enforcement agencies revealed a number of similarities across agency types (Bromley & Reaves, 1998). Campus public safety agencies were more likely to have their own dispatch responsibilities but less likely to conduct their own criminal investigations (see below). Both types of agencies were highly formalized in policy and procedure (e.g., vehicle pursuit policy, deadly force policy, officer conduct policy), thereby structuring officer decision making. The limited scholarship emerging in the past two decades

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considering campus law enforcement has focused primarily on structural and personnel matters, but the research consensus supports the notion that the gap between campus police and municipal police has narrowed. The two entities function in distinct environments, but carry out similar tasks using parallel methods and generally comparable personnel.[4]

What is less apparent in these studies is the relationship between campus public safety and local law enforcement agencies. The studies described above only briefly addressed this topic in discussing issues such as investigative responsibility, geographic jurisdiction, and mutual aid agreements. The research suggests considerable variation across campuses in terms of the relationships between campus and local authorities. The absence of insight and commentary into this situation is unfortunate. Campus agencies and their local counterparts work in very close physical proximity; in "traditional" college towns, the geographic jurisdiction of campus agencies is typically surrounded by the jurisdiction of municipal and/or county police departments. Ideally, a close relationship will exist between the two entities, as criminal and disorderly situations routinely cross legal/jurisdictional borders (an act often requiring little more than crossing the street). Front-line personnel may have close relations, working together to investigate crimes and handle common campus-related problems. Despite the potential for this close working relationship, tension may exist on several fronts. Campus agencies and officers are often not viewed as being "real" police because of perceived limits on their authority. Because campus officers are often state employees, they may also enjoy higher pay scales than their municipal counterparts. The educational mission in university settings can extend into public safety efforts, lending the appearance (perhaps rooted in actual practice) that campus public safety officials are "soft" on crime (i.e., referring an intoxicated student to substance abuse assessment and an alcohol abuse education program, instead of using an enforcement response).

The geographic jurisdiction of a campus law enforcement agency is another issue that inevitably involves the relationship with local law enforcement. Bromley (1996) examined the authority of campus law enforcement departments by reviewing the content of state statutes. He found variation to the extent that campus law enforcement authorities were allowed to exercise police powers beyond campus properties. Of the 43 states that specifically addressed campus law enforcement and their jurisdiction, 21 limited campus public safety officers to "campus property or properties specifically under the control of the institution" while 22 allowed officers "to exercise their authority beyond campus properties" (p. 6). Sloan (1992) also found significant variation. He surveyed 10 agencies in the Midwest and Southeast and found that only two campus agencies had city-wide or county-wide jurisdiction. Another four were able to operate on campus property and on specific locations around campus only. The remaining agencies were limited to campus only or to university campuses statewide.[5] In contrast, ten statutes specifically noted that local police may exercise their authority on college or university property. The geographic jurisdiction is essential, especially when the issue of who is to police areas of high-density, off-campus student housing is considered (Peak, 1995).

The importance of jurisdiction is also critical in order to adhere to the requirements of the federal Clery Act regarding the recording of campus crime. The reporting requirements of the Act obligate

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[4] Despite the comparability on paper, campus public safety officials bear the burden of their history. Despite having the training, authority, equipment, and powers of municipal peers, they are still often viewed as "little more than security guards, concerned more with issuing parking citations than guarding against crime" (Ray, 1991, p. 14).

[5] Sloan did, however, note that campus officers frequently provided off-campus services. This commonly occurred when campus personnel were called upon to provide off-campus assistance to local law enforcement personnel.

colleges and universities to tally crimes occurring on campus and public areas bordering campus if they are easily accessible such as a sidewalk across the street from campus but not beyond (*The Handbook*, 2005).   In these cases, campus officials are required to make a good faith effort to work with local law enforcement to obtain these statistics. Issues of jurisdiction are sometimes addressed in mutual aid agreements, formal or informal understandings between agencies that dictate operations, particularly in times of need. Bromley (1996) found that only nine state statutes made any reference to mutual aid agreements between campus and local law enforcement agencies. In many of these instances, agreements with municipal or county authorities would allow the powers of campus law enforcement departments to extend beyond the borders of the campus (see also Peak, 1995; Sewell, 1993). Gelber (1972) found that local police were available in times of need (emergency resources, joint investigations, special events resources) but were not commonly involved in regular conferences or training with campus public safety officers (cf. Sloan, 1992).

The limited body of scholarship considering campus public safety has not yet given detailed attention to critical incident response efforts. The handful of studies detailed above focus primarily on structure and routine operations. There is virtually no systematic data regarding campus efforts to prevent, respond to, and mitigate the effects of critical incidents, be they accidental, intentional, or criminal. Furthermore, the relationship between campus public safety and local law enforcement has not been subjected to systematic study. Early studies asked representatives from campus public safety a limited number of questions about their connections with local law enforcement but never surveyed local police about connections with campus public safety. In the context of critical incident planning for campus-based events, rather than proceed with normative prescriptions of what both types of agencies *should be doing*, it is important to first empirically establish what they *are doing* (Maguire & Uchida, 2007). What types of cross-training occurs? Do local law enforcement officials have key access to locked campus facilities? Are they provided with building layouts? What type of joint critical incident planning takes place? What are the challenges associated with successful coordination? Addressing these issues will enhance the ability of policy-makers to craft recommendations to improve public safety and homeland security on college and university campuses.

Campus Critical Incident Planning

The "town-gown" relationship between both schools and their hosting communities, and campus public safety personnel and local law enforcement agencies, is even more important today with an increased emphasis on critical incident prevention and response. The importance of planning was illustrated following a shooting incident at a Midwestern university during the 1990s. Following the incident, researchers gathered qualitative data from a variety of sources, including from students involved in the actual incident (Asmussen & Creswell, 1995). A counselor interviewed by the research team addressed the campus response plan, or lack of a response plan, expressing concern over how the university would have handled a mass shooting incident. The researchers concluded that, "the lack of a formal plan to deal with such gun incidents was surprising, given the existence of formal written plans on campus that addressed other emergencies: bomb threats, chemical spills, fires, earthquakes, explosions, electrical storms, radiation accidents, tornadoes, hazardous material spills, snow storms, and numerous medical emergencies" (Asmussen & Cresswell, 1995, p. 585). Moreover, they indicated that multiple plans existed; police had response procedures, counselors had a debriefing plan, and others had similar plans yet no comprehensive incident response plan was in place (p. 586).

College brings students with pre-existing and emerging mental health concerns into high-stress environments away from support and coping structures. At times campus environments can be charged

with hostility, animosity, and intolerance (Roark, 1993). The freedom of independent living and young adulthood often leads youth to engage in experimentation and risk taking behaviors. These circumstances can exacerbate existing mental health disorders and contribute to the emergence of new mental health concerns. Such problems can include suicide ideation (Barrios, Everett, Simon & Brener, 2000) and violence directed toward others (Borum, 2000). Though temporal ordering is not conclusive, national survey data have found a nexus between a variety of risk-taking behaviors, such as alcohol consumption, drug use, binge drinking, weapon carrying, fighting, issuing threats, academic performance, and trouble with criminal justice and campus authorities (Engs & Hanson, 1994; Fisher, Sloan, & Cullen, 1998; Miller, Hemenway, & Wechsler, 2002; Presley, Meilman, & Cashin, 1997). It has been suggested that campuses might use a variety of methods to identify "high risk" students for intervention and possible removal from campus (Fein et al., 2004; Reddy et al., 2001), though such processes currently lack accepted validation (Hoover & Lipska, 2008).

The literature is replete with calls for greater planning to prevent violence and enhance public safety, often summed up in a series of recommendations (Langford, 2004). In 2004, the National Summit on Campus Public Safety was held and noted some of the primary deficiencies evident in the relationships between campus public safety and local law enforcement. For example: State and municipal police administrators often are not oriented to the needs of university and college campuses and do little to orient their front-line personnel. There is little or no training or briefing for officers, deputies, and troopers whose beats include a campus. Few, if any, police academies instruct patrol officers on the unique policing and security needs of college and university campuses (National Summit, 2004, p. 39). The participants in the Summit also noted that colleges and universities are often left out of regional disaster and evacuation planning and local law enforcement does not provide as much attention to community colleges as it does four-year institutions (p. 40).

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks and the shootings at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois, the issue of collaboration has received renewed attention. Not only have there been calls for greater collaboration between campus and local law enforcement personnel, but there have been comparable suggestions that campus mental health and law enforcement personnel need to work together more closely to address the needs of students thought to pose a risk to self or others. Additionally, the need to plan and train for critical incidents on campuses has been reiterated and framed to include not only law enforcement personnel, but also other first responders (i.e., medical and fire personnel), campus leaders, public relations staff, and counselors. In effect, critical incidents have been cast into prominence as events that campuses need to prepare for from a variety of perspectives.

The literature detailing recommendations and preferred practices in campus-based critical incident prevention, response, and mitigation has emerged from broader consideration of such matters in other contexts, including materials developed in response to the secondary school shootings of the 1990s and the September 11th attacks. These recommendations focus on prevention by considering how schools might identify and handle "high risk" students to intervene in a potentially violent situation before actual problems are manifest.[6] Response has received perhaps the most consideration since the Virginia Tech shooting, perhaps because it is the easiest aspect to address. A substantial body of professional literature and training focuses on how campuses can: assess and enhance their current level of

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[6] Counseling staff might often balk labeling students "high risk", though the practice continues. Though myriad suggestions for such identifications processes have been proffered there is little, if any, empirical validation of how to adequately distinguish between students who may go so far as to *make a threat* and those who actually *pose a threat* (see Fein et al, 2004; Reddy et al., 2001).

preparation; partner with other regional responders to develop plans and engage in training; secure appropriate equipment for public safety personnel; educate students, faculty and staff to identify and report potential high risk students; and, ensure clarity of command and control among myriad responding entities (not only law enforcement responders). Ample consideration has also been given to the steps campuses can take to mitigate the harm of a critical incident and its aftermath by: implementing multi-faceted communication systems to alert persons in harm's way, communicate to diminish loss during an incident, and communicate in an incident's aftermath; educate students, faculty and staff to protect themselves during a critical incident; and, manage the emotional aftermath of a crisis event.[7]

Though these recommended practices have been detailed in numerous government reports, professional publications, media accounts, and training programs, no research published to-date has detailed the extent to which agencies have actually implemented these practices. Little is known about the state of critical incident preparedness on college campuses. The research methods section below describes procedures to address the issues of safety and security on campus from the perspective of both campus public safety departments and local law enforcement agencies. The survey design will provide information both on current practices as well as impediments to coordination and planning.

RESEARCH METHODS

The project involved sampling both campus public safety officials and local law enforcement officials in Illinois and nationally. The procedures for selecting participants varied so considerable attention is given to describing the research methodology employed in this study.

National Campus Sample

The national campus sample is designed to be a standalone representative sample that can be analyzed in order to understand practices taking place on college and university campuses nationwide. The national sample includes campuses from Illinois selected randomly. To omit them during the selection process would lead to questions about the representativeness of the sample at the outset of the project. Therefore, Illinois campuses are initially included as described below.

The universe of colleges and universities nationwide was first identified using the U.S. Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). To be consistent with earlier studies of campus law enforcement, the national sample was limited to those institutions with 2,500 or more students. Additionally, campuses were only included in the sampling frame if they were either 2-year or 4-year (or more) institutions and either public or private, non-profit schools. This resulted in the identification of 1,571 campuses meeting these criteria (see Figure 1).

A random sample of 600 campuses was pulled from the sampling frame and these schools comprised the national sample. The head of the campus public safety department (or someone similar) received either a paper survey or instructions for completing an electronic survey in early April 2008 (Illinois

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[7] This often includes the use of counseling personnel to address the needs of those directly and indirectly affected by an event. Though such "debriefing" and "crisis intervention" efforts are widely discussed, their actual application has been the subject of some controversy and debate (cf., Poland, 1994; Wessely & Deahl, 2003)

respondents only received a paper survey). The survey was accompanied by a cover letter describing the nature of the project as well as human subject protections and an endorsement letter from the Illinois Board of Higher Education. Finally, recipients were instructed that those returning surveys would be entered into a drawing for an incentive (one of five $50 Visa gift cards). Non-respondents were sent a second set of materials in May. Finally, in early June, attempts were made to increase the number of matched pairs (campus respondents and local law enforcement respondents—see below). Campuses for which response had been received but a local law enforcement survey had been returned were contacted a third time and offered the opportunity to complete the paper and pencil or electronic version of the survey. Illinois institutions contacted a third time were also given the opportunity to complete the survey electronically. Overall, 33.8 percent of national respondents returned a survey. For the purposes of this report, the national sample will include only the 181 non-Illinois respondents. This will facilitate comparisons between Illinois institutions and national campuses.[8]


Figure 1. Selection of the national sample

Illinois Census

In addition to obtaining a picture of practices nationwide, a second goal of the project was to understand critical incident preparedness in Illinois. To that end, all 153 Illinois campuses (no size restriction) were surveyed using procedures similar to those used in the national sample. However, all Illinois respondents received a paper and pencil survey for the first two waves of the survey. They were only afforded the opportunity to complete an electronic survey when contacted during the third wave. Completed responses were received from 49.7 percent of Illinois campuses (see Figure 2).[9] It is important to note that there is overlap between the Illinois census and national samples. They are intended to be analyzed independently.

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[8] National (non-IL) respondents had significantly larger full time enrollments and percentage White students compared to national (non-IL) non-respondents. No significant differences were found by college type, region, location, total assets, total liabilities, part-time enrollment, total enrollment, percent Alaska Native, percent Hispanic, percent Asian, percent Black, percent Female, and percent non-resident alien.

[9] Illinois respondents had significantly larger total enrollments and were more likely to come from rural areas (as opposed to city areas) compared to non-respondents. No significant differences were found by college type, full—time enrollment, part-time enrollment, total assets, total liabilities, percent White, percent Alaska Native, percent Hispanic, percent Asian, percent Black, percent Female, and percent non-resident alien.

For purposes of this report, three groups will be examined[10]:

1. Illinois: Includes all Illinois campuses responding as part of the Illinois census. Recall that no enrollment/size restrictions were imposed on the types of campuses included in the census.
2. Illinois 2,500+: Represents a subset of the Illinois census comprised of Illinois campuses with 2,500 or more students (n=48). This group is most directly comparable to the national sample (number 3 below) given enrollment restrictions imposed on both.
3. National: Represents campuses selected as part of the national sample *excluding* Illinois institutions. This enables comparisons of Illinois campuses and national peers.[11]

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┌─────────────────────────────┐                    ┌──────────────────┐                  ┌──────────────────┐
│ 153 Illinois public or      │                    │                  │                  │                  │
│ private, non-profit         │                    │                  │                  │                  │
│ institutions (4-year or     │  Surveyed          │  All 153 campuses│  Responses       │ 76 campuses      │
│ above & 2-year)             │ ───────▷           │                  │ ────────▷        │ (49.7%)          │
│ No size restriction         │                    │                  │                  │                  │
│                             │                    │                  │                  │                  │
│ Source: 2006 IPEDS          │                    │                  │                  │                  │
│ College/University universe │                    │                  │                  │                  │
└─────────────────────────────┘                    └──────────────────┘                  └──────────────────┘
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Figure 2. Selection of the Illinois census

Law Enforcement Sample

The second half of the project involved surveying local law enforcement agencies in order to address issues of campus critical incident preparedness. How prepared are they to respond to campus-related emergencies? What is the risk of a critical incident on campus? What steps are being taken to address critical incident response?

Each campus surveyed (see above) was matched with their local law enforcement agency. Law enforcement directories, campus response plans, and other sources were consulted to identify the local law enforcement agency serving the community in which the selected campus is located. Campus survey respondents were also asked to identify their local law enforcement agency using the following definition:

> The primary agency serving the community in which your campus is located (do not include university police agencies). This may not be the agency that would respond to calls on campus, only the agency serving the community surrounding your campus. If your campus has more than one local law enforcement agency, please identify the one that you communicate with most often.

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[10] Hereafter, the groups may be referred to as samples even though the Illinois groups are drawn from a census of campuses. This language is used for both convenience and to recognize the fact that not all campuses surveyed responded.

[11] The Illinois 2,500+ and National samples differed significantly on the college location variable but not on mean total enrollment or college type. Illinois 2,500+ institutions were more likely than institutions in the national sample to come from areas classified as rural (as opposed to town).

The campus responses as well as returned surveys or other contacts from surveyed local law enforcement agencies resulted in several corrections to the original list of local law enforcement agencies (e.g., campus policed by county sheriff rather than municipal police department). The goal was to maximize the number of matched response pairs: a returned survey from the campus public safety official and the executive of the corresponding local law enforcement agency. Each local law enforcement agency respondent was asked questions specific to one campus. If more than one campus was located in any given law enforcement jurisdiction as was the case in places like Baltimore, Chicago, and Atlanta, one of the campuses was randomly identified to be the focus of the local law enforcement survey. For example, two campuses from Atlanta were part of the national sample. Rather than send the Atlanta police department two surveys—one for each campus—a single campus was randomly selected. In this case, the survey directed to the Atlanta Police Department was centered on this one randomly selected campus.

The surveys were directed to the chief of police or sheriff using the procedures described above (e.g., three waves; Illinois respondents did not receive the option of an electronic survey until wave 3). These procedures resulted in a sampling frame comprised of local law enforcement agencies representing 80 of the Illinois campuses, 50 of the Illinois 2,500+ campuses, and 475 of the national, non-Illinois campuses. Response rates were 66.2 percent, 65.2 percent, and 42.9 percent, respectively.[12] Descriptive statistics for the campus and law enforcement samples are presented in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics for Campus Respondents

	Illinois		Illinois 2,500+		National	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Number of respondents	76		48		181	
Mean total enrollment	6156.9		9328.4		10612.5	
College type						
2-year	30	39.5	25	52.1	69	38.1
4-year	46	60.5	23	47.9	112	61.9
Location*						
City	32	42.1	18	37.5	79	43.9
Suburb	18	23.7	13	27.1	38	21.1
Town	9	11.8	4	8.3	39	21.7
Rural	17	22.4	13	27.1	24	13.3
Region						
South	0	0.0	0	0.0	69	38.1
Northeast	0	0.0	0	0.0	31	17.1
Midwest	76	100.0	48	100.0	41	22.7
West	0	0.0	0	0.0	40	22.1

*Location data were missing for one national respondent. Definitions are derived from U.S. Census Bureau definitions used in the IPEDS database.

[12] Illinois law enforcement agencies were more likely than their national counterparts to be linked with two-year colleges, and come from suburban and rural areas. They did not differ on either size variable.

Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics for Local Law Enforcement Respondents*

	Illinois		Illinois 2,500+		National	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Number of respondents	53		33		204	
Law enforcement agency size (FT sworn personnel)	337.3		483.8		260.3	
Mean total enrollment	5663.2		8314.4		9746.8	
College type						
2-year	23	43.4	20	60.6	79	38.7
4-year	30	56.6	13	39.4	125	61.3
Location*						
City	12	22.6	6	18.2	87	42.6
Suburb	23	43.4	18	54.5	46	22.5
Town	9	17.0	3	9.1	52	25.5
Rural	9	17.0	6	18.2	19	9.3
Region						
South	0	0.0	0	0.0	69	33.8
Northeast	0	0.0	0	0.0	35	17.2
Midwest	53	100.0	33	100.0	58	28.4
West	0	0.0	0	0.0	42	20.6

*With the exception of law enforcement agency size, all other descriptive statistics relate to the matched campus.

CAMPUS PUBLIC SAFETY SURVEY

History of Critical Incidents

Campus public safety officials were asked to report the prevalence of six types of accidental/unintentional critical incidents and seven types of intentional/criminal/terrorist-related critical incidents. They were only asked to report whether an incident type occurred (prevalence) rather than how many times such events occurred (incidence). The survey question was bound to address only those incidents that occurred within the previous five years. Results are presented in Table 3.

Campuses across the three samples were more likely to report experiences with accidental/unintentional incidents. Among the more common incident types were weather-related events and hazardous material incidents (e.g., chemical spills). Illinois campuses with 2,500 or more students were more likely than national institutions of similar size to have experienced an earthquake. This number was likely affected by the April 18, 2008 earthquake that produced minor damage in the southern region of Illinois. The first wave of the survey was arriving in mailboxes at approximately the same time.

Table 3.
Recent (Five Year) History of Critical Incidents on Campus

Type of Incident	Percent of agencies reporting incident		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Accidental/Unintentional			
Weather-related	37.0	46.8	36.7
Hazmat incident	26.0	29.8	18.6
Earthquake	21.9	19.1	6.2*
Major structural fire	8.2	10.6	14.7
Explosion	5.5	6.4	9.6
Structural failure	0.0	0.0	1.7
Intentional, criminal, or terrorist-related			
Bomb threat	29.7	38.3	43.1
Disorder/riot	6.8	10.6	10.5
Active shooter	1.4	2.1	1.1
Arson	1.4	0.0	4.4
Hostage situation	0.0	0.0	1.7
Intentional hazmat incident	0.0	0.0	0.6
Theft of hazmat	0.0	0.0	2.8

Data available for 73-74 Illinois respondents, 47 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 177-181 National respondents
*Denotes significant difference between Illinois 2,500+ and National campuses (*p*<.05*)*.

With the exception of bomb threats, intentional/criminal/terrorist-related incidents are relatively rare. In Illinois, one campus experienced an active shooter incident, but no campuses had experienced a hostage situation, intentional hazmat incident, or theft of hazmat material during the previous five years. The corresponding numbers in the National sample were very low.

Additional analyses were performed to determine whether critical incident history varied across a number of campus characteristics. Campus data included enrollment size, location (e.g., urban, rural, etc.), and college type (2-year v. 4-year) drawn from the 2006 IPEDS database. Among all Illinois institutions, the likelihood of experiencing each of the 13 critical incidents covered in the survey was unrelated to both campus location and college type. Several statistically significant differences did emerge with respect to enrollment size. Larger Illinois institutions were more likely to have experienced a structural fire, hazardous material incident, disorder/riot, and bomb threat. For example, 87.5 percent of Illinois campuses serving 15,000 or more students reported experiencing a bomb threat within the past five years compared to 12.8 percent of institutions with enrollments below 5,000. Similarly, a hazardous material incident was reported by 50 percent of campuses serving 15,000 or more students, 62.5 percent of campuses serving between 10,000 and 14,999 students, and only 17.5 percent of campuses with fewer than 10,000 students.

A similar pattern emerged among Illinois campuses with 2,500 or more students. Generally, institutions in the 10,000 to 14,999 or the 15,000 or more student categories were more likely to report having experienced a structural fire, hazardous material incident, or disorder/riot. Bomb threats were most common in the largest (15,000 or more students) institutions, followed by campuses with between 5,000 and 9,999 students, 10,000 to 14,999 students, and 2,500 to 4,999 students. Prior experience with structural fires varied significantly by location. Of the four surveyed institutions located in towns, half had experienced a structural fire, compared to 11.1 percent of city campuses, and 7.7 percent of rural campuses. Illinois institutions with 2,500 or more students located in suburban areas did not report experiencing any structural fires within the past five years.

Among National institutions, hazardous materials incidents, bomb threats, and arson were more likely to have occurred in larger institutions than smaller (2,500-4,999 students) ones. Structural fires were more likely to be experienced by the largest institutions (15,000 or more students) or those with between 5,000 and 9,999 students. Prior history of bomb threats also varied across college type and location variables. Such threats were more likely to have occurred on campuses located in cities or suburbs compared to towns or rural areas. Four year institutions were also more likely to have experienced a bomb threat (49.1%) compared to two year institutions (33.3%).

Perceived Risk of Critical Incidents

Campus respondents were asked to rate the likelihood that various types of critical incidents or campus emergencies would occur on campus during the next five years. This perceived risk, measured on a 10 point scale ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely) should be interpreted with caution. The ratings represent the assessment of a single individual associated with the campus; it is possible that a different respondent on the same campus would provide dissimilar results. Nevertheless, the perceived risk scores do provide some indication of the relative likelihood of certain events occurring compared to others. Perceived risk scores are presented in Table 4.

The results show that, with the exceptions of weather-related incidents and bomb threats, the perceived risk scores for all other critical incidents addressed fell below the midpoint of the 10-point scale. Illinois campuses with 2,500 or more students were not unlike National institutions of similar size on most measures; the only significant difference observed was weather-related perceived risk. Illinois 2,500+ institutions perceived the risk of a weather-related critical incident to be significantly higher than the risk perceived by National campus respondents.

Table 4.
Perceived Risk of a Campus Critical Incident within Next Five Years

Type of Incident	Mean ratings based on 10 point scale (higher scores= greater perceived risk)		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Accidental/Unintentional			
Weather-related	6.23	6.96	5.85*
Major structural fire	3.85	3.87	4.00
Hazmat incident	3.72	4.19	3.93
Explosion	3.63	3.94	4.11
Earthquake	2.99	2.98	2.76
Structural failure	2.39	2.43	2.58
Intentional, criminal, or terrorist-related			
Bomb threat	5.28	6.34	5.99
Active shooter	4.21	4.79	4.29
Hostage situation	3.69	3.98	3.90
Disorder/riot	3.31	3.72	3.79
Arson	3.25	3.40	3.37
Intentional hazmat incident	2.99	3.53	3.41
Theft of hazmat	2.45	2.77	3.06

Data available for 75 Illinois respondents, 47 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 178-180 National respondents
*Denotes significant difference between Illinois 2,500+ and National campuses ($p <.05$).

Also noteworthy is the relative ranking of risk compared to prior history of critical incidents (see Table 4). For example, across all three samples, respondents ranked active shooter incidents third with perceived risk scores below only weather-related incidents and bomb threats. This is in spite of the fact that active shooter events rarely occurred in the past five years on college campuses, ranking eighth or lower in all three samples on prevalence. In contrast, the much more common hazmat incidents were viewed as less likely to occur than active shooter situations. That said, respondents from campuses that had experienced critical incidents in the past typically rated their risk of future critical incidents higher than those without similar experience. For example, the five Illinois institutions reporting prior (5-year) history with disorder/riots rated the likelihood of future disorder/riots approximately seven (7.40) on a 10-point scale. The Illinois institutions reporting no disorder/riots in the past five years rated their risk of future disorder/riots 3.06. The difference between the institutions with a history of disorder and riots and those without is 4.34. Table 5 presents the difference between perceived risk ratings based on prior experience. In nearly every situation, prior history is related to higher perceived risk scores (in most cases, the differences are statistically significant).

Table 5.

Perceived Risk of a Campus Critical Incident within Next Five Years, by History of Critical Incidents

Type of Incident	Mean difference[1]		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Accidental/Unintentional			
Weather-related	1.84*	1.14	1.79*
Major structural fire	2.82*	2.59*	1.65*
Hazmat incident	2.00*	1.67*	2.96*
Explosion	2.44	3.26*	2.49*
Earthquake	2.82*	1.24	3.88*
Structural failure	NA	NA	2.12*
Intentional, criminal, or terrorist-related			
Bomb threat	2.09*	1.20*	2.23*
Active shooter	-3.26	-3.87*	2.23
Hostage situation	NA	NA	2.14
Disorder/riot	4.34*	4.06*	3.47*
Arson	4.81*	NA	1.84*
Intentional hazmat incident	NA	NA	5.62*
Theft of hazmat	NA	NA	3.65*

Data available for 72-73 Illinois respondents, 46 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 174-180 National respondents

[1]Scores represent the mean difference between risk scores for campuses experiencing critical incident and campuses not experiencing critical incident. Positive scores indicate that campuses with prior experience with incident perceive their future risk to be higher than campuses with no prior experience (negative scores indicate the reverse). Larger scores are indicative of a greater difference in perceived risk.

* $p < .05$.

Preparedness Activities

The first wave of the survey was sent to respondents in April 2008, approximately one year after the April 16, 2007 shooting on the campus of Virginia Tech University. Survey respondents were asked to report whether their campus made any changes since the Virginia Tech shooting to enhance emergency response preparedness. Results are presented in Table 6.

Table 6.
Campus Responses Since the Virginia Tech Shooting (April 16, 2007)

Response	Percent of Agencies Reporting Action		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Implemented new communication tech.	64.9	70.2	75.3
Implemented/revised response plan	64.9	74.5	78.1
Participated in field training exercises	58.1	72.3	64.0
Trained non-safety personnel in response	47.3	55.3	63.5
Created threat assessment team	40.5	51.1	46.6
Implemented new building access system	20.3	19.1	19.7
Identified reporting/staging area	20.3	21.3	16.3
Increased funding for campus safety	17.6	21.3	30.3
Limited access to campus	6.8	4.3	5.1
Increased funding for campus mental health	4.1	2.1	11.8*
Armed campus public safety officers	4.1	6.4	6.7
Implemented or expanded firearms ban	2.7	4.3	5.6
Organized sworn police force	1.4	2.1	2.2
Campus has not engaged in any of aforementioned steps	8.1	0.0	3.4

Data available for 74 Illinois respondents, 47 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 178 National respondents
*Denotes significant difference between Illinois 2,500+ and National campuses (*p* < .05)..

Common measures undertaken by campuses in the 12 months following the shooting included implementing new mass communication technologies, revising an existing or implementing a new emergency response plan, and/or participating in field training exercises. The majority of larger institutions in Illinois and nationwide (those with 2,500 or more students) also trained non-campus safety personnel in response procedures. Less common measures included organizing a sworn police force, expanding or implementing a firearms ban, and/or arming campus public safety officers. This could be due to the fact that such changes take considerable time to implement and are not reflected here or that campuses already had these policies or practices in place before the Virginia Tech shooting. Few campuses reported taking none of the steps listed. Once again, Illinois campuses with 2,500 or more students were very comparable to similar sized national institutions. Only one statistically significant difference was noted; national institutions were more likely than their Illinois counterparts to have increased funding for campus mental health in the wake of the Virginia Tech shooting.

At the time of the survey, most campuses reporting have at least one mass communication system in place for notifying the campus community in the event of an emergency. Most had multiple systems in place. On average, campuses had implemented four of the eight communication systems covered in the survey (see Table 7). The most common technologies employed were email-based, web page, and non-cellular telephone notification systems. Less common measures included signage or other visual

Table 7.
Types of Mass Notification Systems in Place

Type of System	Percent of Agencies Reporting Mechanism In Place		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Email	83.6	85.1	85.8
Web page	68.5	74.5	80.1
Telephone (non-cellular)	56.2	66.0	58.0
Cellular telephone/text message	49.3	51.1	68.2*
Public address system	47.9	59.6	38.6
Alarm or siren-based system	39.7	40.4	31.8*
Radio-based	35.6	46.8	31.8
Signage or other visual system	16.4	19.1	14.2
No emergency systems in place	2.7	2.1	6.2
Mean Number of Mechanism in Place	3.97	4.43	4.09

Data available for 73 Illinois respondents, 47 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 176 National respondents
*Denotes significant difference between Illinois 2,500+ and National campuses ($p < .05$)..

communication devices, radio systems, and alarm/siren notification technologies. Illinois schools with 2,500 or more students were equally likely to have adopted each notification type when compared to their national counterparts except cellular/text based systems and public address systems. Illinois campuses were less likely than national campuses to have implemented the former while they were more likely to have adopted the latter.

Survey respondents were also asked about the presence of a number of other policies or activities on campus designed to address critical incident issues. As shown in Table 8, the overwhelming majority of institutions have in place formal written emergency response plans. Most campuses had adopted formal bans on firearms on campus though Illinois schools with 2,500 or more students were significantly less likely than national institutions to have similar bans in place. The majority of institutions also had adopted provisions for declaring campus states of emergency if necessary, trained non-safety personnel in response plans/procedures, provided materials to local law enforcement, had in place interoperable communications systems, and participated in joint training exercises with local law enforcement.

Table 8.
Policies and Activities in Place Addressing Critical Incident Issues

Policy/Activity	Percent of Agencies Reporting Policy/Activity		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Formal written emergency response plan	89.5	95.8	96.1
Formal ban on firearms	82.9	81.2	94.9*
Provisions that would allow for declaration of campus state of emergency	78.7	85.1	87.0
Trained non-public safety personnel in response plan/procedures	73.3	89.4	79.3
Provided materials to local law enforcement to facilitate emergency response	66.7	78.7	77.4
Campus and local law enforcement have interoperable communication systems	58.1	78.3	73.4
Participated in campus emergency simulations, drills, table top exercises, or other live exercises with local law enforcement	57.3	70.2	71.8

Data available for 74-76 Illinois respondents, 46-48 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 177-180 National respondents
*Denotes significant difference between Illinois 2,500+ and National campuses ($p < .05$)..

    Given the prevalence of emergency response plans on campus, respondents were asked about the content or coverage of those plans. Specifically, they were asked to identify those types of critical incidents *explicitly* covered by the response plan. Unlike earlier questions regarding history of critical incidents and perceived risk of future criminal incidents, no distinction was made between intentional and accidental fires and intentional and unintentional hazardous material incidents (exception: theft of hazardous material). Whether a fire or hazardous material contamination is accidental or intentional is perhaps not important for the purposes of an emergency response plan. Rather, it is an issue for investigations. Table 9 shows that most institutions have plans that account for the possibility of structural fires, weather-related emergencies, bomb threats, hazardous material incidents, active shooter situations, explosions, and disorder/riots. These types of incidents were generally the ones experienced in the past by the largest proportion of campuses (though prevalence did vary). Hostage situations, structural failures, and hazardous material thefts were generally rare and this is reflected in the relatively low rates of inclusion in campus response plans.

Table 9.
Types of Critical Incidents Explicitly Covered in Response Plans (Campuses with Response Plans Only)

Incidents Covered	Percent of Agencies with Incident Type in Response Plan		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Major structural fire	95.6	93.5	84.5
Weather-related	94.1	95.7	90.8
Bomb threat	89.7	93.5	93.7
Hazardous material incident (e.g., spill)	82.4	89.1	85.6
Active shooter	72.1	84.8	82.8
Explosion (e.g., transformer, gas main)	66.2	71.7	69.5
Civil disorder/riot	51.5	50.0	64.4
Earthquake	48.5	58.7	53.4
Hostage situation	47.1	52.2	60.3
Structural failure	22.1	21.7	32.8
Theft of hazardous materials	14.7	10.9	21.3

Data available for 68 Illinois respondents, 46 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 174 National respondents

The results in Table 8 showed that two-thirds of Illinois campuses and approximately three-quarters of Illinois campuses with 2,500 or more students and national campuses provided some material to their primary local law enforcement agency in order to facilitate or enhance emergency response procedures. A summary of the items provided is presented in Table 10. Campuses commonly provided campus maps and building floor plans to their local law enforcement agency. Fewer provided copies of the campus emergency response plan. It was relatively rare for colleges and universities to provide building access items such as keys or access cards to local law enforcement agencies. Some campuses noted other materials provided including: campus telephone directories, location of fire alarms/extinguishers, tours of campus facilities, and other items.

Table 10.
Materials Provided to Local Law Enforcement (Campuses Providing Materials Only)

Materials Provided	Percent of Campuses Providing Materials to Local Law Enforcement Agency		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Campus maps	90.0	91.9	94.9
Building floor plans	70.0	73.0	70.1
Copy of campus emergency response plan	62.0	64.9	62.0
Keys or other building access-related items	36.0	32.4	31.4
Other	4.0	5.4	4.4

Data available for 50 Illinois respondents, 37 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 137 National respondents

A description of the form of campus public safety used on college campuses and the size of the security apparatus are presented in Tables 11 and 12. Approximately two-thirds of campuses serving 2,500 or more students (both in Illinois and nationally) had sworn campus police forces. On average, campuses employed between 22 and 26 full-time or part-time sworn public safety officers, or between 2.5-3.0 officers per 1,000 student and staff (including instructional personnel) full time equivalent (FTE) (derived from the IPEDS database). More than 80 percent of campuses used non-sworn personnel in public safety roles and two thirds to one-half used students to provide public safety services.

Table 11.
Form of Campus Public Safety

Type of Campus Public Safety	Percent of Campuses with Public Safety Type		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Sworn	44.9	65.2	69.7
Non-sworn providing public safety services	81.2	89.1	84.5
Students providing public safety services	36.2	34.8	47.4

Data available for 69 Illinois respondents, 46 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 137-148 National respondents

Table 12.
*Personnel Levels (Mean Number and Mean Rate Per 1,000 FTE Students and Staff)**

| | Mean | | |
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Mean Number of Public Safety Officers			
Sworn	25.97	24.93	22.66
Non-sworn	12.36	14.20	14.69
Students	16.08	19.25	15.12
Mean Public Safety Officers per 1,000 FTE Student and Staff			
Sworn	3.23	3.08	2.45
Non-sworn	3.40	2.96	2.60
Students	7.06	3.39	1.45

Data available for 24-53 Illinois respondents, 16-41 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 65-125 National respondents
*Means computed only for campuses with particular public safety type. Two Illinois institutions were excluded from non-sworn computations due to
outliers; both were medical institutions.

The final analysis in the preparedness activities section involved examining predictors of preparedness. To accomplish this task, a preparedness variable was created using the time-bound responses since the Virginia Tech incident measures (see Table 6) and the non-time-bound policies and activities measures from Table 8. Summing these 20 items together produces an additive index ranging from 0-20 with a mean of 9.6 for the combined samples (alpha=.677). Higher scores are indicative of greater preparation/more measures taken to address potential critical incidents on campus. As predictors, two measures of risk were included, both summations of the risk measures described in Table 4. One of the measures captures perceived risk of intentional incidents while the other captures risk of accidental incidents. Other predictors included in the analysis were number of students (logged due to skewed distribution), presence of a sworn campus safety apparatus, location (rural is the reference), and college type. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 13.

Among Illinois institutions (both groups), the only significant predictor of preparedness was campus size. As the size of the campus increased, so too did the number of preparedness activities. A similar pattern was not observed nationally. Among campuses in the national sample, only the presence of sworn officers significantly predicted preparedness measures.

Table 13.
Predictors of Critical Incident Preparedness

Variable	Mean		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Sworn public safety			+
Intentional risk			
Accidental risk			
Student enrollment	+	+	
Community college			
Location			
City/Urban			
Suburban			
Town			

Organizational Capacity

While the steps described earlier might enhance preparedness, a question remains as to whether they enhance the perceived confidence in the institution's ability to respond to critical incidents. This confidence is referred to here as organizational capacity. Ratings for a variety of issues related to organizational capacity are presented in Table 14. Campus respondents typically rated their capacity positively (above adequate) on most non-resource related items. They were most confident in their partnerships with local responders, ability to communicate with other responders, and plan to communicate with the media. Items rated below adequate included resource-related items such as budget, training, equipment, and personnel. In addition, campus respondents indicated that confidence in their ability to secure campus and notify parents/guardians in the event of an emergency was less than adequate.

Table 14.
Perceived Organizational Capacity

Dimension of Organization Capacity	Mean Rating on a five-point scale (1=inadequate to 5=Excellent)		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Partnerships w/ responders	3.87	4.11	3.88
Ability to communicate w/ other responders	3.42	3.57	3.47
Plan to communicate w/ media	3.41	3.72	3.56
Knowledge about emergency response	3.34	3.54	3.47
Ability to evacuate individuals	3.30	3.48	3.25
Capacity to rapidly notify campus population	3.23	3.41	3.27
Written emergency response plan	3.14	3.41	3.35
Ability to rapidly deploy personnel	3.12	3.39	3.26
Crisis counseling plan	3.06	3.25	3.12
Ability to notify parents/guardians	2.60	2.61	2.62
Ability to secure campus	2.59	2.61	2.55
Training related to emergency response	2.59	2.72	2.92
Number of trained personnel	2.58	2.72	2.56
Equipment to support emergency response	2.49	2.54	2.58
Budget to support emergency response	2.38	2.52	2.43

Data available for 68-74 Illinois respondents, 44-46 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 177-179 National respondents

   Predictors of organizational capacity were examined by first creating an organizational capacity measure. The 15 items in Table 14 were summed to create a single additive index with scores ranging from 15 (inadequate on all items) to 75 (excellent on all items) (alpha=.930 for combined sample). The same predictors that were used in the previous analysis of preparedness are used here: location, risk of accidental incidents, risk of intentional incidents, number of students (logged), presence of a sworn campus safety apparatus, location, and college type. Preparedness was also added as a predictor; confidence or capacity could increase as preparedness increases. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 15. The results suggest that preparedness is a significant predictor of organizational capacity in two of the three analyses: the all Illinois group and the national group. As campuses take more preparedness steps, campus respondents tend to express greater confidence in their ability to address critical incidents. The only other significant predictor was college type. In the national sample, community college respondents expressed lower levels of organizational capacity than their four-year college counterparts.

Table 15.
Predictors of Organizational Capacity

Variable	Mean		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Sworn public safety			
Intentional risk			
Accidental risk			
Preparedness	+		+
Student enrollment			
Community college			_
Location			
City/Urban			
Suburban			
Town			

Attitudes of Campus Respondents

Campus survey respondents were also asked to indicate their level of agreement with a variety of statements addressing critical incident preparedness issues. The results are presented in Table 16 as mean ratings where higher values indicate greater levels of disagreement with the statement. Respondents were generally neutral in their perceptions of faculty/staff abilities to recognize students in need of referrals to counseling services and faculty staff support for information sharing between counseling services and public safety officials. They tended to lean toward the disagree side of the scale with respect to the abilities of faculty and staff to assist in the event of an emergency. Nevertheless, respondents tended to agree that faculty and staff have a responsibility to report information about potentially dangerous students to public safety officials.

Respondents were again neutral when asked about the responsiveness of the campus community to public safety alerts. They generally viewed classroom buildings and the campus as a whole as accessible to non-campus affiliated individuals but were less inclined to agree that residential buildings were similarly accessible. Other noteworthy items include disagreement with the statement that counseling staff are unwilling to provide information to public safety officials. This suggests that information sharing between the parties might not be overly problematic. Officials strongly disagreed with the idea of allowing students to carry concealed weapons on campus as a safety procedure. Only two statistically significant differences were noted between Illinois campuses with 2,500 or more students and national campuses. Illinois respondents were more likely to say that federal/state privacy laws hamper public safety efforts and that campus grounds were easily accessible.

Table 16.

Campus Respondent Level of Agreement with Issues Related to Critical Incident Preparedness

Statement	Mean Level of Agreement on a five-point scale (1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree)		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Faculty/staff are supportive of counseling staff sharing info. with public safety officials about potentially dangerous students	2.43	2.49	2.49
Faculty/staff are well equipped to assist in emergency	3.11	3.32	3.20
Faculty/staff are capable of recognizing students in need of referrals	2.59	2.77	2.69
Faculty/staff have responsibility to report information about potentially dangerous students	1.66	1.74	1.72
Campus community is responsive to safety alerts	2.25	2.28	2.35
Classroom buildings are easily accessible to non-campus affiliated individuals	1.73	1.34	1.60
Residential buildings on campus are easily accessible to non-campus affiliated individuals	3.16	2.95	3.10
Campus grounds are easily accessible to non-campus affiliated individuals	1.47	1.23	1.47*
Counseling staff are reluctant to provide student information to public safety officials	3.22	3.28	3.26
Campus has mechanisms in place to bar potentially dangerous students from campus	2.76	2.72	2.64
Our campus has mechanisms in place to refer potentially dangerous students to relevant authorities	2.00	1.87	1.99
Federal/state privacy laws hamper our ability to provide a safe campus	3.11	2.85	3.21*
Most campus police/security officers on this campus feel that students carrying concealed weapons is a good safety procedure	4.42	4.37	4.41

Data available for 62-75 Illinois respondents, 38-47 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 164-180 National respondents

*Denotes significant difference between Illinois 2,500+ and National campuses ($p < .05$).

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEY

Perceived Risk of Critical Incidents

Local law enforcement respondents were asked to assess the risk that certain critical incidents/campus emergencies would occur on the local campus (as identified on the survey/cover letter) within the next five years. Results are presented in Table 17. Among Illinois respondents, the rank ordering of incidents based on risk levels is remarkably similar to the order provided by campus respondents within categories (accidental/unintentional v. intentional/criminal/terrorist-related) with one exception. Local law enforcement respondents in Illinois perceive the risk of an explosion on campus to be higher than the risk of an intentional hazmat incident. Once again, respondents ranked the likelihood of an active shooter incident high, near the midpoint on the scale. The only statistically significant difference between Illinois law enforcement agencies in jurisdictions with larger campuses and their national counterparts was the ranking for arson. Illinois law enforcement respondents rated the risk of arson significantly lower than their national peers.

Table 17.
Law Enforcement Respondents' Perceived Risk of a Campus Critical Incident within Next Five Years

	Mean ratings based on 10 point scale (higher scores= greater perceived risk)		
Type of Incident	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Accidental/Unintentional			
Weather-related	5.08	4.73	4.66
Major structural fire	3.44	3.36	3.65
Hazmat incident	2.96	3.15	3.23
Explosion	3.29	3.27	3.68
Earthquake	2.65	2.64	2.29
Structural failure	2.58	2.42	2.54
Intentional, criminal, or terrorist-related			
Bomb threat	5.29	5.61	5.84
Active shooter	4.18	4.31	4.21
Hostage situation	3.73	3.82	3.92
Disorder/riot	3.27	3.53	3.81
Arson	3.19	2.88	3.49*
Intentional hazmat incident	2.79	2.91	3.21
Theft of hazmat	2.39	2.59	2.93

Data available for 50-52 Illinois respondents, 32-33 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 199-201 National respondents
*Denotes significant difference between Illinois 2,500+ and National campuses ($p < .05$).

Preparedness Activities

Local law enforcement officials were asked several questions that addressed issues related to critical incident response on campus. As Table 18 shows, most law enforcement agencies reported having interoperable communications devices that would allow them to communicate with campus public safety officials if needed. A majority of agencies also participated in some form of drill or exercise during the past year with campus public safety officials. In Illinois, less than half of the agencies had received materials (e.g., keys, maps) from campuses or had formal written emergency response plans addressing response procedures in the event of a campus emergency.

Table 18.
Local Law Enforcement Policies and Activities in Place Addressing Critical Incident Issues

Activity	Percent of Agencies Reporting Policy/Activity		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Campus and local law enforcement have interoperable communication systems	58.8	71.9	64.5
Participated in campus emergency simulations, drills, table top exercises, or other live exercises with campus public safety officials	54.9	65.6	50.0
Received materials from local campus to facilitate emergency response	46.2	45.5	53.8
Formal written emergency response plan	43.1	50.0	56.8

Data available for 51-52 Illinois respondents, 32-33 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 195-200 National respondents

Law enforcement agencies reporting that they had received items from the local campus to enhance/facilitate emergency response were asked to identify the items received. The most common items received by law enforcement agencies were campus maps (see Table 19). Other items received by the majority of agencies included building floor plans and copies of campus emergency response plans. Keys or other building access-related items were seldom received by law enforcement agencies.

Table 19.
Materials Received by Local Law Enforcement (Agencies Receiving Materials Only)

Materials Received	Percent of Campuses Providing Materials to Local Law Enforcement Agency		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Campus maps	95.8	93.3	89.5
Building floor plans	66.7	66.7	65.7
Copy of campus emergency response plan	54.2	60.0	65.7
Keys or other building access-related items	20.8	20.0	23.8
Other	12.5	13.3	17.1

Data available for 24 Illinois respondents, 15 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 105 National respondents

Organizational Capacity

Local law enforcement respondents were also asked questions about their organization's capacity in the event of a critical incident on campus. The questions were largely the same as those asked of campus respondents (see Table 14) with some items excluded. Results are shown in Table 20. Like their campus public safety counterparts, local law enforcement respondents ranked partnerships with other responders the highest and two resource related issues—budget and equipment—the lowest. In contrast, however, local law enforcement officials ranked all items as above adequate. Only one significant difference emerged. Illinois respondents serving jurisdictions with larger campuses were significantly less positive in their assessment of their budgets compared to national respondents.

Table 20.
Law Enforcement Respondents' Perceived Organizational Capacity

Dimension of Organizational Capacity	Mean Rating on a five-point scale (1=inadequate to 5=Excellent)		
	Illinois	Illinois 2,500+	National
Partnerships w/ responders	4.42	4.42	4.35
Ability to rapidly deploy personnel	4.21	4.39	4.12
Knowledge about emergency response	4.04	4.09	4.13
Training related to emergency response	3.83	3.91	3.77
Ability to communicate w/ other responders	3.71	3.67	3.83
Number of trained personnel	3.62	3.67	3.71
Equipment to support emergency response	3.42	3.39	3.64
Budget to support emergency response	3.17	3.00	3.47*

Data available for 52 Illinois respondents, 33 Illinois 2,500+ respondents, and 197-199 National respondents
*Denotes significant difference between Illinois 2,500+ and National campuses ($p < .05$).

CONCORDANCE IN SURVEY RESPONSES

Each paired campus public safety department and law enforcement agency was examined to assess how well they agreed on various items regarding campus public safety operations.   For this assessment, the sample included the entire Illinois sample and the national sample combined. Only surveys completed by both paired agencies are included in this analysis. For example, if Mayberry Community College and the Mayberry Police Department completed the survey, they would be included as one case.

The intent was to have an overall measure of agreement on campus safety operations so that inferences could be made as to how well campus public safety and local law enforcement perceived the same issues. There are several standard measures of concordance that could have been used, such as Cohen's Kappa or the intra-class correlation coefficient, which measure agreement, taking into account chance agreement (or error). These measures, however, measure the consistency of different raters observing the same phenomenon. In this study, each pair is observing their own unique situation and therefore such measures of agreement are not appropriate. Thus, instead of these concordance measures, a more global measure was used by calculating the percent agreement through a 2 x 2 contingency table and mean differences among interval-scaled items.

The overall percent of agreement is reported, which comprises the percent of agreement in the affirmative plus the percent agreement in the negative. For example, respondents were asked whether a bomb threat occurred on campus within the past five years. Overall, 66 percent of campus public safety and law enforcement agencies were in agreement; that is, about 47 percent of the 110 pairs agreed that it had not happened and about 19 percent agreed that it had happen (or 47% + 19% = 66%). For the overall disagreement percent, about 16 percent of campus public safety said that a bomb threat had occurred while the local law enforcement said it had not; about 17 percent of campus public safety said that a bomb threat had not occurred while local law enforcement said that it had (or 16% + 17% = 33%). This makes it possible to measure disagreement and note where the disagreement is concentrated, campus public safety or local law enforcement.

This overall agreement measure, while intuitive, does have a drawback: it does not take chance agreement into account. Thus, the overall agreement levels may be inflated due to respondents guessing correctly. We have included a measure of uncertainty by reporting confidence intervals for each overall percent measure.[13]

In addition to the measure of percent agreement, the agreement among several interval-scaled items was also examined. These items measure the frequency in cooperative action between agencies on a scale of 1 to 6, where 1=never; 2=several times per year; 3=several times per semester; 4=several times per month; 5=several times per week; 6=everyday. For these measures, we report the mean level of agreement, the difference between means, a test of significance, and effect size (r).[14]

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[13] The 95 percent confidence interval for the overall percent agreement/disagreement measure is calculated as

$$\% \pm 1.96 \times \sqrt{\frac{p(1-p)}{n}}$$

[14] The effect size r has been calculated by transforming the t-test statistic. The r reported here can be interpreted like a Pearson correlation coefficient (i.e., the closer to 1.00, the stronger the difference in means).

Table 21 reports the percent concordance between campus public safety and local law enforcement. For eight of the items, the agreement is above eighty percent and could be higher (or lower) at the given confidence intervals. For example, the item that asked respondents whether a disorder/riot event had taken place in the past five years, 90 percent plus or minus 5 percent of respondents agreed. Thus, it is safe to conclude that for these items there is general agreement among agencies. The average overall mean percent agreement among the items listed in Table 21 is 85.23 percent.

For a few items, the percent of agreement was lower than the average. When asked about whether law enforcement had keys or related items, the level of agreement was about 73 percent, with a margin of error ± 12 percent. When looking closer at where the disagreement lies, about 22 percent of the entire sample included campus respondents who indicated that they had provided keys while the law enforcement respondent indicated they had not received keys from the campus. Conversely, only six percent of the total sample had campus respondents who indicated no, when law enforcement indicated they had received keys.

Another area of disagreement included whether a bomb threat had occurred. Overall, about 66 percent of respondents were in agreement. Within the 34 percent disagreement, it was evenly split at about 17 percent of the total sample. An odd result is that only about 63 percent of the paired agencies indicated agreement about a weather-related event happening on campus. Within disagreement, about 30 percent of sample included campus respondents who had indicated such an event had happened while law enforcement respondents said "no."

Table 21.
Percent Concordance Between Local Law Enforcement and Campus Public Safety

Item	Percent Agreement	Percent Disagreement	n	Percent Confidence Interval
Campus has a written emergency plan	79.65	20.35	113	±7.42
Law enforcement keys or related items	72.55	27.45	51	±12.25
Occurred – active shooter	99.09	0.091	110	±1.77
Occurred – arson	98.18	1.82	110	±2.50
Occurred – bomb threat	66.36	33.64	110	±8.83
Occurred – disorder/riot	90.00	10.00	110	±5.61
Occurred – earthquake	90.38	9.62	104	±5.67
Occurred – explosion	89.42	10.58	104	±5.91
Occurred – hazardous materials (spill)	77.88	22.12	104	±7.98
Occurred – hostage situation	98.18	1.82	110	±2.50
Occurred – structural fire	86.54	13.46	104	±6.56
Occurred – theft of hazardous materials	97.27	2.73	110	±3.04
Occurred – weather related incident	62.50	37.50	104	±9.30

Table 22 reports the difference in mean level responses for several items regarding joint operations between two agencies. Each item is a measure of how often law enforcement *or* campus public safety operates in the other's jurisdiction. For example, the first item in Table 22 asks whether law enforcement makes an arrest or writes citations *on campus*. The response measures how often the law enforcement agency respondent perceives they engage in these activities on campus; concurrently, it measures the perception of the campus respondent's perception of the same issue. Therefore, the

items in Table 22 measure the agreement in how often agencies share jurisdiction. Only four of the items indicated statistically significant differences. The first difference in perception regarded law enforcement patrolling campus roadways: the campus respondents' average response of 2.68 versus an average law enforcement response of 3.39. Thus, the law enforcement respondent indicated a greater level of patrol presence on campus than was perceived by the campus respondent. The effect size *r* was 0.18, the largest among the significant findings. The second significant difference was for campus agencies responding to calls-for-service *off campus*. Campus respondents reported providing assistance to local law enforcement respondents more often than was perceived by law enforcement respondents (2.37 and 2.00 respectively; *r*=0.12). Third, campus respondents indicated they assisted with traffic stops more often than perceived by law enforcement (2.52 vs. 2.14; *r*=0.11). Fourth, campus public safety officials indicated they patrolled off campus more frequently than perceived by law enforcement (2.24 vs. 1.80; *r*=0.13).

Table 22.
Mean Concordance Between Campus Public Safety and Law Enforcement Respondents on Patrol Activities

Item	Mean Campus	Mean L.E.	Mean Diff.		n	Effect size *r*
LE makes arrests/citations on campus	2.05	2.18	0.138		109	0.06
LE assists with criminal investigations	2.16	2.31	0.144		111	0.07
LE assists with campus matters	2.93	3.02	0.089		112	0.03
LE patrols campus roadways	2.68	3.39	0.713	*	108	0.18
LE patrols campus buildings	2.09	2.33	0.243		111	0.07
LE provides services at campus events	2.09	2.15	0.055		110	0.03
CPS assists LE with off campus student calls	2.31	2.08	0.222		108	0.08
CPS assists LE with calls for service off campus	2.37	2.00	0.369	*	111	0.12
CPS assists LE with traffic stops off campus	2.52	2.14	0.378	*	111	0.11
CPS & LE participate in joint task force	1.91	1.79	0.120		108	0.05
CPS provides LE with services at off campus events	1.50	1.55	0.055		110	0.01
CPS provides patrol off campus	2.24	1.80	0.440	*	109	0.13

"CPS" is campus public safety and "LE" is local law enforcement.
Each item measures on a scale of 1 = never; 2=several times per year; 3 = several times per semester; 4=several times per month; 5=several times per week; 6 = every day.
*p < .05

Table 23 reports the mean levels of risk assessment by the paired agencies. The risk scale is the same as reported previously (1=not at all likely; 10=very likely). Only two of the items are significantly different—earthquake and weather-related incidence; all criminal or accidental events were assessed at about the same level of probability. In both cases, the campus respondents indicated the risk of the event was higher than the law enforcement respondents.

Overall, the paired agencies agreed more often than disagreed. For the percent agreement items, in most cases the agreement was over 80 percent and as high as 99 percent. In cases where respondents were asked about cooperation, not surprisingly campus respondents indicated they patrolled or provided services more often than the law enforcement respondent said they did; the reverse was true for items about law enforcement's activities on campus. Only four of these items were significantly different and their effect sizes were low. With regard to risk assessment, the paired agencies were in agreement for all items, except for two, which were naturally occurring incidents.

Table 23.
Mean Concordance Between Campus Public Safety and Law Enforcement Respondents on Likelihood of Incidents

Item	Mean Campus	Mean L.E.	Mean Diff.		n	Effect size *r*
Active shooter	4.29	4.33	0.043		115	0.01
Arson	3.32	3.57	0.243		115	0.07
Bomb threat	5.74	5.99	0.252		115	0.05
Civil disorder/riot	3.83	3.50	0.330		115	0.08
Earthquake	2.95	2.37	0.574	*	115	0.13
Explosion	4.05	3.72	0.330		115	0.09
Hazardous materials incident	3.85	3.55	0.302		116	0.07
Hostage	3.78	4.01	0.233		116	0.06
Intentional hazardous material incident	3.16	3.12	0.035		115	0.01
Structural failure	2.48	2.58	0.104		115	0.03
Structural fire	4.03	3.78	0.259		116	0.06
Theft hazardous materials	2.82	3.04	0.228		114	0.11
Weather related	6.26	4.88	1.383	*	115	0.27

Notes: Each item measures on a scale of 1 = not at all likely; 10 = very likely.
p < .05

DISCUSSION

Summary

The study findings provide important insights into the experiences, perceptions, and preparations campus public safety departments have regarding critical incidents within their jurisdictions. Campus agencies did experience critical incidents, though such events were far more often accidental or weather-related, not intentionally malicious acts. Local law enforcement respondents tended to under-report the prevalence of such incidents, though this might reflect the fact they were not always involved in responding to some types of critical events. Campus respondents indicated relatively modest perceptions of future risk, with only weather-related events and bomb threats reaching mean scores above the mid-point on the response scale. Campuses that had a history of experiencing a given critical event reported elevated perceptions of future incidents. Interestingly, campus agencies perceived relatively high risk of active shooter and hostage events, despite the very rare historical prevalence of these acts. Such a skewed perception of risk (based on past patterns) could reflect the contemporary sensitivity toward the possibility of these events. It could also suggest campuses were concerned that "copy cat" offenders might emerge within their jurisdiction.

The most common post-Virginia Tech preparations were introducing/expanding communication technologies, engaging in planning (new or revised), coordinating training, and creating threat assessment teams. This does not mean future changes will not occur in other dimensions. It is possible the changes seen in the first year after Virginia Tech might reflect the easiest, cheapest, and most accessible forms of change. The actions taken might also reflect the preparatory steps agencies felt were most critical for enhancing preparedness. Given the structure of these questions on the survey, it is also possible that agencies were already confident in their level of preparedness on other dimensions, therefore no further changes were needed.

Respondents were generally favorable in terms of their capacity to respond to critical incidents. Perceived organizational capacity was generally above the mid-point, though exceptions were noted in terms of personnel, training, and budget to support critical incident response. That exception is not particularly surprising, given that public service agencies will often lament what could be done with more resources. This pattern could also indicate that despite the momentum supporting enhanced campus preparations for critical events, funding allocated to-date had been focused in other areas (i.e., establishing communication systems). It is possible agencies will feel more confident in these resource areas as time passes, provided that allocations are eventually realized.

There was some disagreement between campus and local authorities concerning the nature and extent of their collaboration. Some of these differences might be attributed to respondents being under-informed about certain aspects of their particular relationship. In reviewing areas where differences were noted, no clear problematic patterns emerge. In most instances, campus public safety respondents indicated greater levels of collaboration and mutual support than was reported by local peers.

Comparing Illinois with National Peers

Data from Illinois respondents compares favorably with data from the national sample. Though some significant differences emerge indicating Illinois respondents differed from national peers, most of the differences are logical given contextual factors (i.e., a greater perceived risk of future weather-related critical incidents. Given the myriad relationships considered in the analysis, some significant differences were to be expected, including some spurious distinctions. The results do not demonstrate a clear pattern suggesting Illinois is appreciably ahead of or lagging behind other campuses across the U.S.[15]

Data Limitations

This research project and the resulting data are not without limitations. The survey efforts employed standard social science practices designed to maximize research participation (i.e., letters of endorsement, multiple mailings, incentives for participation, etc.). Nonetheless, the response rate achieved in the project was lower than desired. Campus agencies responded at a lower rate than local peers. This might reflect concern on the part of campus agencies that their participation might somehow cause future complications should they experience litigation from a critical incident within their jurisdiction. In other words, despite assurances of confidentiality, agency representatives may have feared incurring liability by disclosing the perception the agency was not adequately prepared. Despite the lower-than-desired response rate, respondents and non-respondents were favorably comparable across multiple indicators.

The survey instrument assessed changes campus agencies had implemented in the aftermath of the Virginia Tech tragedy, but did not capture steps campuses had been taking prior to that incident. Though the research team recognized there would be value in knowing what agencies had done before

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[15] This statement is, of course, based on comparisons between Illinois campuses enrolling more than 2500 students. The national data do not support comparisons between Illinois and national peers among smaller colleges and universities.

Virginia Tech, what they had done after Virginia Tech, and what they planned to do in the next one to two years, space limitations and clarity concerns precluded addressing changes across these three categories. It is conceivable that an agency appearing to have done little in response to Virginia Tech might have actually been quite well-prepared already.[16]

Finally, the survey only assessed the views of campus security officials and local police, not of students, faculty/staff, administrators, clinical personnel, and community residents. In addition, the survey was sent to the chief executive of those agencies, who may not have always been ideally-suited to complete the instrument, though the instructions suggested passing the survey on to other personnel if that was the case. The chief of a larger municipal agency, for example, may not have been fully aware of the level of routine interaction between that agency's officers and personnel from the campus public safety agency. Though the perceptions of campus public safety personnel are of central importance in considering critical incident preparedness and response, the prevailing view of such efforts is multidisciplinary in scope. This means it is of additional relevance to consider the views of other campus administrators, campus mental health service providers, employees (faculty and staff) not directly responsible for incident planning and response, and the student body of a given institution. This study did not intend to speak to the experiences and perceptions of these other groups, but this does not invalidate the importance of their insights and perspectives.

Unanswered Questions

Sloan (1992) suggested that campus public safety had, at the time of his writings, entered the third era of their existence. Harris (1989) observed that campus public safety agencies were forced to shift from a security to a police model in the 1960s as it became evident the former approach was ill-suited for the then-contemporary social realities of crime and disorder. Will the events of September 11th, 2001, April 16th, 2007, and February 14th, 2008, be the impetus for a 4th era of campus public safety? Might this new era be marked by an expansion of the role of campus public safety officials in monitoring who is allowed to attend a school, who is allowed to stay in attendance, and how students in crisis are handled? Might this new era place public safety agencies at the center of collaborative planning for myriad intentional and accidental events that have the potential to disrupt routine functions on the campus? This study did not provide direct evidence to assess this transition; a longer-term perspective on the continuing evolution of America's campus public safety agencies will likely establish whether the current transformations are simply refinements of the campus-safety-as-police model or whether they are the start of a new evolution.

The research findings provide a snap-shot understanding of the changes public safety agencies pursued in the year following the Virginia Tech incident (perhaps partially re-invigorated by the Louisiana Technical College and Northern Illinois shootings). Time will tell whether these changes remain permanent fixtures within both campus public safety and higher education as a broader entity. Despite events in 2007 and 2008, homicides and active shooter incidents remain uncommon on American campuses (Davis, 2008). If these events remain isolated occurrences, will colleges and universities feel compelled to continue expending scarce resources planning for unlikely occurrences, or

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[16] This prospect must be balanced by the reality that most calls for action after Virginia Tech encouraged agencies to revisit existing plans and policies, and to retrain personnel on a regular basis. The structure of the survey should have meant agencies that were well-prepared before Virginia Tech would have engaged in additional preparatory measures in the year after that incident if the agency was following key recommendations.

will critical incident planning be seen as a beneficial dimension of broader efforts to maintain safe and secure environments for learning and research?

The survey instrument used in this project assessed changes along dimensions frequently discussed in professional literature and government publications. It has been repeatedly stressed that efficacious responses are achieved through collaboration, planning, training, and other associated steps. These recommendations are often based upon post-incident assessments conducted in venues that have experienced various types of critical events. For example, though Virginia Tech and Blacksburg police had strong existing relationships (including mutual training), relationships and communication channels with other service providers (i.e., some medical responders) were not as strong (Davis, 2008). This lesson has been integrated into some of the recommendations proffered in Virginia Tech's aftermath. Whether specific preventative, planning, or preparatory measures actually will make a difference in future critical events will remain an open empirical question.

Finally, though this research yielded beneficial insights into campus and local planning, collaboration, and capacity, the focus was on law enforcement agencies. The very limited body of research considering campus police agencies has focused almost exclusively on agencies; far less consideration has been given to campus police officers and this study continues this trend. What do campus officers think about the prevailing recommendations, the risks faced by their employing institution, and their agency/school's level of preparation? Likewise, what do other campus employees believe should be done to prevent and prepare for various types of critical incidents? Do faculty, staff, and students agree with involving the police in "threat assessment" of campus members? Do mental health service providers believe they have an appropriate relationship with campus public safety personnel? Do campus administrators believe their campus has the resources (not just public safety resources) to manage a crisis event? What do students think about the prevailing recommendations and other more controversial suggestions, such as expanding the right of students and staff to carry concealed weapons on campus? Though this study provided beneficial insights into key dimensions of campus planning for critical incidents, many equally important and intriguing empirical questions remain open for future consideration.

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APPENDIX A
Campus Public Safety Survey

Center for the Study of Crime, Delinquency & Corrections

Southern Illinois University Carbondale

CAMPUS CRITICAL INCIDENT PREPAREDNESS SURVEY

Instructions:

Please think about the current situation in your organization and select only one response for each item, unless directed otherwise.

If you have any questions, please contact Matthew Giblin, Assistant Professor, at e-mail: mgiblin@siu.edu or phone: (618) 453-6360.

You may return the survey in the postage paid envelope or via fax to the number below. If you choose not to participate, please return the blank survey in the envelope so that we will not send you follow-up notifications. If you would like to receive a copy of the final report (anticipated August/Sept.), please include your email address below.

When marking answers, please completely fill in the appropriate bubble:

Like this: ● Not like this: (✓) (X) (/)

Respondents participating in the study will be entered into the drawing for one of five $50 Visa cash cards. Please provide contact information below so that we may contact the randomly selected winners.

This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee. Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the Committee Chairperson, Office of Research Development and Administration, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL 62901-4709. Phone (618) 453-4533. Email siuhsc@siu.edu.

Person Completing Survey	
NAME:	TITLE:
COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY:	TELEPHONE:
CITY/STATE:	EMAIL:

Return completed survey by May 2, 2008 to	Critical Incident Preparedness Survey CSCDC Mail Code 4504 Southern Illinois University Carbondale, IL 62901 Attn: Matthew Giblin	Or fax all pages, including this cover page, to: Matthew Giblin at (618) 453-6377

IMPORTANT NOTE: The term "campus" is used below to refer to your college or university, regardless of its student population, geographic location, or land size. The term "campus public safety" is used to describe the individual or unit that has responsibility for providing police and/or security services to the college or university including security officers and/or contract security companies. It also includes sworn college/university police agencies or sworn law enforcement agencies specifically contracted to provide services to your campus.

SECTION 1: Perceptions of Risk and History

1. How would you rate the likelihood of any of the following types of critical incidents/campus emergencies occurring on your campus in the next five (5) years? Evaluate each possible incident on a scale from 1 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely).

The following accidental/unintentional campus emergencies?	Not at all likely (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	Very likely (10)
1a. Major structural fire	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1b. Hazardous material incident (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological spill)	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1c. Explosion (e.g., transformer)	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1d. Earthquake	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1e. Weather-related (e.g., tornado, flood)	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1f. Structural failure (e.g., building collapse)	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O

The following intentional, criminal, or terrorist-related campus emergencies?	Not at all likely (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	Very likely (10)
1g. Civil disorder/riot	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1h. Active shooter	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1i. Bomb threat	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1j. Hazardous material incident- intentional contamination	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1k. Theft of hazardous materials	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1l. Major structural fire- arson	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
1m. Hostage situation	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O

2

2. Please indicate if any of the following incidents occurred on campus property in the last five years. [MARK ALL THAT APPLY]. If no incidents of this nature occurred, please mark the last choice in each column.

Accident/unintentional incidents		Intentional, criminal, or terrorist-related incidents	
2a. Major structural fire	O	2h. Civil disorder/riot	O
2b. Hazardous material incident (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological spill)	O	2i. Hazardous material incident- intentional contamination	O
2c. Explosion (e.g., transformer, gas main)	O	2j. Active shooter	O
2d. Earthquake	O	2k. Bomb threat	O
2e. Weather-related (e.g., tornado, flood)	O	2l. Theft of hazardous materials	O
2f. Structural failure (e.g., building collapse)	O	2m. Major structural fire-arson	O
2g. None of these accidental/unintentional incidents occurred	O	2n. Hostage situation	O
		2o. None of these intentional incidents occurred	O

SECTION 2: Policies, Activities, and Perceptions

3. Does your campus have a formal, written emergency response plan?

O Yes

O No (skip to question 4 on the next page)

3a. If yes, what types of critical incidents are explicitly covered by the response plan? [MARK ALL THAT APPLY]

3a1. Major structural fire	O	3a7. Civil disorder/riot	O
3a2. Hazardous material incident (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological)	O	3a8. Active shooter	O
3a3. Explosion (e.g., transformer, gas main)	O	3a9. Bomb threat	O
3a4. Earthquake	O	3a10. Theft of hazardous materials	O
3a5. Weather-related (e.g., tornado, flood)	O	3a11. Hostage situation	O
3a6. Structural failure (e.g., building collapse)	O		

4. The following address a variety of issues related to perceptions of critical incident preparedness. Based on your own knowledge and perceptions, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement below.

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
4a.	Federal and state privacy laws hamper our ability to provide a safe campus environment.	O	O	O	O	O
4b.	Faculty/staff are supportive of counseling staff sharing information with public safety officials about potentially dangerous students.	O	O	O	O	O
4c.	Faculty/staff are well-equipped to assist in the event of a critical incident on campus.	O	O	O	O	O
4d.	Faculty/staff are capable of recognizing students in need of referrals to counseling services.	O	O	O	O	O
4e.	Our campus has mechanisms in place to bar potentially dangerous students from campus.	O	O	O	O	O
4f.	The campus community is very responsive to campus safety alerts.	O	O	O	O	O
4g.	Counseling staff are reluctant/unwilling to provide student information to campus or community-based public safety officials.	O	O	O	O	O
4h.	Campus grounds are easily accessible to individuals not affiliated with the campus.	O	O	O	O	O
4i.	Classroom buildings are easily accessible to individuals not affiliated with the campus.	O	O	O	O	O
4j.	Residential buildings on campus are easily accessible to individuals not affiliated with the campus.	O	O	O	O	O
4k.	Faculty/staff have a responsibility to report information about potentially dangerous students to relevant authorities.	O	O	O	O	O
4l.	Most campus police/security officers on this campus feel that students legally (e.g., with appropriate documentation) carrying concealed weapons is a good safety procedure.	O	O	O	O	O
4m.	Our campus has mechanisms in place to refer or report potentially dangerous students to relevant authorities/services.	O	O	O	O	O

5. How influential were each of the following in formulating your campus' current approach or practices related to critical incident response and prevention? Mark only one response for each resource.

		Very influential	Somewhat influential	Not at all influential	Don't Know
5a.	Other colleges and universities	O	O	O	O
5b.	Journal articles or books	O	O	O	O
5c.	Government publications	O	O	O	O
5d.	State grants related to campus safety	O	O	O	O
5e.	Federal grants related to campus safety	O	O	O	O
5f.	Academic courses/seminars/conferences	O	O	O	O
5g.	Professional associations (e.g., IACP, IACLEA) or meetings	O	O	O	O
5h.	Federal legislation	O	O	O	O
5i.	State legislation	O	O	O	O
5j.	Federal training programs	O	O	O	O
5k.	State training programs	O	O	O	O
5l.	Accrediting bodies	O	O	O	O

6. Does your campus have any provisions in place that would allow for the declaration of a campus state of emergency if necessary?

O Yes

O No (skip to question 7 on the next page)

6a. Who has the authority to declare a campus state of emergency if necessary? [MARK ALL THAT APPLY]

O Governor

O Campus President/Chancellor

O Provost or Dean

O Campus Public Safety Director

O Other(s): Please specify titles of all⟶

7. In the event of a critical incident on campus, how would you rate your organization's…

		(1) Inadequate	(2)	(3) Adequate	(4)	(5) Excellent
7a.	Written emergency response plan.	O	O	O	O	O
7b.	Ability to communicate and coordinate with other organizations likely to be involved in responding to incidents.	O	O	O	O	O
7c.	Knowledge and expertise about emergency response.	O	O	O	O	O
7d.	Ability to rapidly deploy personnel.	O	O	O	O	O
7e.	Capacity to rapidly notify the college/university population of the emergency.	O	O	O	O	O
7f.	Ability to evacuate individuals from the affected area/building.	O	O	O	O	O
7g.	Ability to secure the campus (perimeter, roadways, building lockdowns).	O	O	O	O	O
7h.	Ability to notify the parents, guardians, or spouses of affected individuals.	O	O	O	O	O
7i.	Plan to communicate with the media.	O	O	O	O	O
7j.	Partnerships with other local responders.	O	O	O	O	O
7k.	Crisis counseling plan and response.	O	O	O	O	O
7l.	Budget to support effective emergency response.	O	O	O	O	O
7m.	Equipment to support effective emergency response.	O	O	O	O	O
7n.	Training related to emergency response.	O	O	O	O	O
7o.	Number of trained personnel to support effective emergency response.	O	O	O	O	O

8. To what extent do campus officials model your campus' critical incident preparedness protocols after protocols of other campuses viewed as successful?

O   Our agency often models after other agencies

O   Our agency occasionally models after other agencies

O   Our agency never models after other agencies

9. <u>Since April 16, 2007</u> (the date of the Virginia Tech shooting incident), has your agency engaged in any of the following steps to enhance your campus' emergency response preparedness? [MARK ALL THAT APPLY]

O   Organized a sworn campus police force where one did not exist.   9a.

O   Armed campus public safety officers.   9b.

O   Implemented new mass communication/notification technologies.   9c.

O   Implemented or revised a campus emergency response plan.   9d.

O   Increased funding for campus public safety.   9e.

O   Increased funding for campus mental health services.   9f.

O   Implemented new building/dormitory access systems (e.g., ID checks, swipe cards, key fobs, etc.).   9g.

O   Identified a reporting/staging area for notifying parents, guardians, spouses in the event of a critical incident.   9h.

O   Limited access to the campus (e.g., erected fencing, closed off entrances/exits, etc.).   9i.

O   Implemented a new or expanded an existing ban on firearms on campus grounds.   9j.

O   Trained or educated non-public safety personnel or students in campus emergency response procedures.   9k.

O   Created a campus threat assessment team where one did not exist.   9l.

O   Participated in field training exercises, drills, or table top exercises.   9m.

O   Our agency has not engaged in any of the above steps since the Virginia Tech shooting incident.   9n.

10. Does your campus have in place any formal ban on firearms on campus?

O   Yes ⟶   10a. To whom does the ban apply? [MARK ALL THAT APPLY]

O   No (skip to question 11)

   O   Faculty/staff

   O   Students

   O   Visitors

11. Has your organization provided any training or education to non-public safety personnel on campus critical incident response procedures or your campus' emergency response plan?

O   Yes ⟶   11a. If yes, what groups have received training/education? [MARK ALL THAT APPLY]]

O   No (skip to question 12 on next page)

   O   Faculty/staff

   O   Students

   O   Community residents

7

12. Are any "blue-light" emergency phones located on campus grounds?

⃝ Yes

⃝ No (skip to question 13)

12a. If yes, approximately how many are located on college/university grounds? ⟶

13. Which type(s) of emergency mass notification systems, if any, are currently in operation at your college or university? [MARK ALL THAT APPLY]

⃝ Cellular telephone system (including text messages to phones)

⃝ Web page (e.g., campus homepage, public safety-specific page)

⃝ Radio-based system

⃝ Telephone (non-cellular) system

⃝ E-Mail

⃝ Public address system

⃝ Signage or other visual system

⃝ Alarm/siren-based system

⃝ Other(s), specify ⟶

⃝ No emergency mass notification system currently in place

SECTION 3: Interaction with Local Law Enforcement

14. The term "local law enforcement agency" as used below refers to the primary agency serving the community in which your campus is located (do not include university police agencies). This may not be the agency that would respond to calls on campus, only the agency serving the community surrounding your campus. In the space below, please identify your campus' local law enforcement agency. If your campus has more than one local law enforcement agency, please identify the one that you communicate with most often.

15. Does your campus have an interoperable communication system that would allow you to communicate with the local law enforcement agency over the radio, if the need arises?

⃝ Yes

⃝ No

8

16. The next several statements address the activities of the local law enforcement agency serving the community in which your campus is located. For each activity, please indicate how frequently the local law enforcement agency engages in these activities.

	Every day	Several times per week	Several times per month	Several times per semester	Several times per year	Never
16a. Patrol campus buildings.	O	O	O	O	O	O
16b. Assist campus public safety officials with matters occurring on campus or in campus-owned buildings.	O	O	O	O	O	O
16c. Provide law enforcement services at large campus events such as sporting events, concerts, etc.	O	O	O	O	O	O
16d. Make arrests or issue citations on campus grounds or in campus-owned buildings.	O	O	O	O	O	O
16e. Assist with your campus criminal investigations.	O	O	O	O	O	O
16f. Patrol campus grounds, not including entering campus-owned buildings.	O	O	O	O	O	O

17. The next several statements address ways in which campus public safety officials from your campus might assist the local law enforcement agency. For each activity, please indicate how frequently your agency engages in these activities.

	Every day	Several times per week	Several times per month	Several times per semester	Several times per year	Never
17a. Assist with traffic stops occurring off campus grounds.	O	O	O	O	O	O
17b. Assist with calls for service occurring off campus grounds.	O	O	O	O	O	O
17c. Provide law enforcement services at large events such as sporting events, concerts, etc. occurring off campus grounds.	O	O	O	O	O	O
17d. Provide general patrol off campus grounds.	O	O	O	O	O	O
17e. Participate in a joint task for on which the local law enforcement agency participates.	O	O	O	O	O	O
17f. Assist local law enforcement with off campus calls involving students from your campus	O	O	O	O	O	O

18.   In the last 12 months, have members of your organization participated in any campus emergency simulations, drills, table top exercises, or other live exercises with the local law enforcement agency identified above in order to prepare for critical incident response?

    O   Yes

    O   No

19.   Has your campus provided any materials (e.g., keys, emergency response plans) to the local law enforcement agency in order to facilitate or enhance emergency response procedures?

    O   Yes

    O   No (skip to question 20)

        19a.   If yes, which of the following have been provided to local law enforcement officials to facilitate or enhance emergency response procedures? [MARK ALL THAT APPLY]

    O   Keys or other building access-related items

    O   Campus maps

    O   Copy of campus emergency response plan

    O   Building floor plans

    O   Other (specify)_____→

    O   Our campus has not provided any materials to local law enforcement officials

SECTION 4: Agency Characteristics

20.   As of April 1, 2008, how many employees were working for your organization in each of the following capacities? Do not include public safety officials who are part of a contract with a private security firm or state/local law enforcement agency.

	Full-Time	Part-Time
Sworn public-safety personnel		
Non-sworn personnel providing public safety services (do not include students)		
Student employees providing public safety services (e.g., student security guards)		

21. Are any campus police/security services outsourced (i.e., contracted out) to a private security firm or state/local law enforcement agency?

O   Yes, some/all services are outsourced to a private company

O   Yes, some/all services are outsourced to a local law enforcement agency

O   No

22. Are campus public safety officials armed while on duty?

O   Yes, armed at all times

O   Yes, but depends on assignment, hours, or other criteria

O   No, not armed at any time

23. Do your agency's officers have arrest powers granted by a state or local authority?

O   Yes ⟶ 23a. What are the jurisdictional limits of those arrest powers?

O   No (skip to question 24)

        O   On campus only

        O   Within municipality

        O   Statewide

        O   Other (specify) ⟶

24. The following information is necessary in order to provide context about the characteristics of the campus. Please enter the most recent figure available in response to each question below.

24a.	What is the total number of buildings on the main campus served by your agency?	
24b.	What is the land area, in acres or square miles, of the main campus served by your agency? Please specify whether the number provided is acres or square miles.	
24c.	What is the total number of miles of roadways on the campus?	
24d.	How many students reside in dormitories or other housing on your campus?	
24e.	How many non-students (e.g., spouses, dependents) reside in dormitories or other housing on your campus?	
24f.	What was your organization's total public safety operating budget, in dollars, for the most recent fiscal year for which data are available?	

25. Is your campus public safety agency/department accredited by any national, state, or other professional accrediting or certifying body?

○ Yes ————————————————→ 25a. If yes, which of the following has accredited/certified your campus public safety agency/department? [MARK ALL THAT APPLY]

○ No (skip to question 26)

    ○ Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA)

    ○ State law enforcement accrediting body (e.g., Chiefs of Police Association)

    ○ Other law enforcement accrediting body

26. Please mark those functions for which your campus public safety agency has PRIMARY responsibility.

26a.	Parking administration and enforcement	○	26i.	Receiving/dispatching calls for service	○
26b.	Traffic law enforcement	○	26j.	Timely notice of serious crimes in accordance with Federal requirements	○
26c.	Central alarm monitoring	○	26k.	Key/access control	○
26d.	Accident investigations	○	26l.	Stadium/event/arena security	○
26e.	Emergency fire services	○	26m.	Routine patrol	○
26f.	Environmental health & safety	○	26n.	Building lockup/unlock	○
26g.	Personal safety escorts	○	26o.	Traffic direction and control	○
26h.	Emergency medical services	○	26p.	First response to criminal incidents	○

27. In the space provided, feel free to comment about other critical incident issues of importance to your organization not covered in the survey.

Thank you for your participation! Please return the survey to the address on the cover page!

APPENDIX B
Local Law Enforcement Survey

Center for the Study of Crime, Delinquency & Corrections

Southern Illinois University Carbondale

CAMPUS CRITICAL INCIDENT PREPAREDNESS SURVEY

LAW ENFORCEMENT

Instructions:

Please think about the current situation in your organization and select only one response for each item, unless directed otherwise.

If you have any questions, please contact Matthew Giblin, Assistant Professor, at e-mail: mgiblin@siu.edu or phone: (618) 453-6360.

You may return the survey in the postage paid envelope or via fax to the number below. If you choose not to participate, please return the blank survey in the envelope so that we will not send you follow-up notifications. If you would like to receive a copy of the final report (anticipated August/Sept.), please include your email address below. Respondents participating in the study will be entered into the drawing for <u>one of five $50 Visa cash cards</u>. Please provide contact information below so that we may contact the randomly selected winners.

This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee. Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the Committee Chairperson, Office of Research Development and Administration, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL 62901-4709. Phone (618) 453-4533. Email siuhsc@siu.edu.

IMPORTANT NOTE: The term "campus" is used in the survey to refer to the college or university below:

Questions in the survey deal with this college or university only. Please consider this campus only when answering questions below, even if your agency has multiple campuses in its jurisdiction.

The term "campus public safety" is used to describe the individual or unit that has responsibility for providing police and/or security services to the college or university identified above.

Person Completing Survey	
NAME:	**TITLE:**
DEPARTMENT:	**TELEPHONE:**
CITY/STATE/ZIP:	**EMAIL:**

| **Return completed survey by May 9, 2008 to** | **Critical Incident Preparedness Survey- CSCDC** **Mail Code 4504** **Southern Illinois University** **Carbondale, IL 62901** **Attn: Matthew Giblin** | **Or fax all pages, including this cover page, to:** **Matthew Giblin at** **(618) 453-6377** |

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1. Is the campus identified on the cover page within the community in which your agency operates? Answer "yes" even if your agency is not the primary provider of police services to this campus.

   O Yes
   O No

2. Please indicate if any of the following incidents occurred on campus property in the last five years. [MARK ALL THAT APPLY]. If no incidents of this nature occurred, please mark the last choice in each column.

Accident/unintentional incidents		**Intentional, criminal, or terrorist-related incidents**	
2a. Major structural fire	O	2h. Civil disorder/riot	O
2b. Hazardous material incident (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological)	O	2i. Hazardous material incident-intentional contamination	O
2c. Explosion (e.g., transformer, gas main)	O	2j. Active shooter	O
2d. Earthquake	O	2k. Bomb threat	O
2e. Weather-related (e.g., tornado, flood)	O	2l. Theft of hazardous materials	O
2f. Structural failure (e.g., building collapse)	O	2m. Major structural fire-arson	O
2g. None of these accidentals or unintentional incidents occurred	O	2n. Hostage situation	O
		2o. None of these intentional incidents occurred	O

3. Does your agency have a formal written emergency response plan specifying procedures/responses in the event of a critical incident on the campus identified earlier?

   O Yes
   O No

4. To the best of your knowledge, does the campus have a formal, written emergency response plan in place?

   O Yes
   O No

5.   How would you rate the likelihood of any of the following types of critical incidents/campus emergencies occurring on the local campus in the next five (5) years? Evaluate each possible incident on a scale from 1 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely).

The following accidental/unintentional campus emergencies?	Not at all likely (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	Very likely (10)
5a. Major structural fire	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
5b. Hazardous material incident (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological spill)	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
5c. Explosion (e.g., transformer)	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
5d. Earthquake	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
5e. Weather-related (e.g., tornado, flood)	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
5f. Structural failure (e.g., building collapse)	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O

The following intentional, criminal, or terrorist-related campus emergencies?	Not at all likely (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	Very likely (10)
5g. Civil disorder/riot	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
5h. Active shooter	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
5i. Bomb threat	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
5j. Hazardous material incident- intentional contamination	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
5k. Theft of hazardous materials	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
5l. Major structural fire- arson	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
5m. Hostage situation	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O

6. The following address a variety of issues related to perceptions of critical incident preparedness. Based on your own knowledge and perceptions, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement below.

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
6a.	Campus grounds are easily accessible to unauthorized individuals not affiliated with the campus.	O	O	O	O	O
6b.	Classroom buildings are easily accessible to individuals not affiliated with the campus.	O	O	O	O	O
6c.	Residential buildings on campus are easily accessible to individuals not affiliated with the campus.	O	O	O	O	O
6d.	Campus public safety personnel are well equipped to respond to critical incidents occurring on campus.	O	O	O	O	O
6e.	Campus public safety personnel can effectively handle critical incidents occurring on campus.	O	O	O	O	O

7. In the last 12 months, have members of your organization participated in any campus emergency simulations, drills, table top exercises, or other live exercises with campus public safety officials in order to prepare for critical incident response?

O Yes
O No

8. Does your agency have an interoperable communication system that would allow you to communicate with campus public safety officials over the radio, if the need arises?

O Yes
O No

Continue to Next Page

9.   In the event of a critical incident **on campus**, how would you rate your organization's…

	Inadequate (1)	(2)	Adequate (3)	(4)	Excellent (5)
9a. Ability to communicate and coordinate with other organizations likely to be involved in responding to incidents.	O	O	O	O	O
9b. Knowledge and expertise about emergency response.	O	O	O	O	O
9c. Ability to rapidly deploy personnel.	O	O	O	O	O
9d. Partnerships with other local responders.	O	O	O	O	O
9e. Budget to support effective emergency response.	O	O	O	O	O
9f. Equipment to support effective emergency response.	O	O	O	O	O
9g. Training related to emergency response.	O	O	O	O	O
9h. Number of trained personnel to support effective emergency response.	O	O	O	O	O

10.   Has the campus provided your agency with any materials (e.g., keys, emergency response plans) in order to facilitate or enhance emergency response procedures?

O   Yes

O   No (skip to question 11 on next page)

10a.   If yes, which of the following have been provided to your agency in order to facilitate or enhance emergency response procedures? [MARK ALL THAT APPLY]

O   Keys or other building access-related items

O   Campus maps

O   Copy of campus emergency response plan

O   Building floor plans

O   Other (specify)_____

11. The next several statements address activities your agency might perform. For each activity, please indicate how frequently your agency engages in these activities.

		Every day	Several times per week	Several times per month	Several times per semester	Several times per year	Never
11a.	Patrol campus buildings.	O	O	O	O	O	O
11b.	Assist campus public safety officials with matters occurring on campus or in campus-owned buildings.	O	O	O	O	O	O
11c.	Provide law enforcement services at large campus events such as sporting events, concerts, etc.	O	O	O	O	O	O
11d.	Make arrests or issue citations on campus grounds or in campus-owned buildings.	O	O	O	O	O	O
11e.	Assist with criminal investigations of on-campus crimes.	O	O	O	O	O	O
11f.	Patrol campus grounds, not including entering campus-owned buildings.	O	O	O	O	O	O

12. The next several statements address ways in which campus public safety officials might assist your agency. For each activity, please indicate how frequently campus public safety officials perform these activities.

		Every day	Several times per week	Several times per month	Several times per semester	Several times per year	Never
12a.	Assist with traffic stops occurring off campus grounds.	O	O	O	O	O	O
12b.	Assist with calls for service occurring off campus grounds.	O	O	O	O	O	O
12c.	Provide law enforcement services at large events such as sporting events, concerts, etc. occurring off campus grounds.	O	O	O	O	O	O
12d.	Provide general patrol off campus grounds.	O	O	O	O	O	O
12e.	Participate in a joint task for on which my agency participates.	O	O	O	O	O	O
12f.	Assist my agency with off campus calls involving students from your campus.	O	O	O	O	O	O

13. As of April 1, 2008, how many full time sworn personnel with general arrest powers were employed by your agency?

14. Type of agency: Mark the box below that best describes your agency type.

O   Sheriff's department/office

O   Municipal police department

O   Primary state police department

O   Special police (e.g., airport police, housing police, park police, railroad police, transit police)

O   Other (specify_____)

15. In the space provided, feel free to comment about other critical incident issues of importance to your organization not covered in the survey.

Thank you for your participation! Please return the survey to the address on the cover page!