Community Policing in Chicago, Year Four: An Interim Report

November 1997

Prepared by
the Chicago Community Policing
Evaluation Consortium

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Executive Summary

This is the fourth in a series of reports examining Chicago's community policing program. CAPS (**C**hicago **A**lternative **P**olicing **S**trategy) began in April 1993, when an experimental program was inaugurated in five police districts. Many operational aspects of CAPS were field-tested before it expanded to encompass the remainder of the city. A coordinated system for delivering city services in response to police service requests was phased in by stages, and was operational throughout the city by July 1994. During the fall of 1994 the 20 nonprototype districts also reorganized their patrol force, dividing officers into rapid response units and beat teams. Beat officers spend most of their time responding to calls and working on crime prevention projects in their assigned area; rapid response units respond to excess calls or those that are of low priority for beat units. Sergeants and mid-level managers went through several training programs, and between January and May 1995, virtually all uniformed officers completed three days of problem-solving training. By then, civilian administrative managers had been assigned to all of the districts, and they all had formed civilian advisory committees. The districts began holding beat community meetings on a regular basis by June 1995, and they had the capacity to generate analytic crime maps by August 1995. By autumn 1995, organizing and problem-solving training sessions for the general public were being conducted across the city by teams of civilians and police officers.

A department general order released in April 1996 codified many organizational features of the program. It created a new planning process that begins with the formal identification of beat problems and the resources required to attack them, and culminates in the formulation of district and area plans that respond to those needs. Chicago's program envisions the formation of police-citizen partnerships for problem solving, so the order directs beat officers to participate in a wide range of community meetings and events, in order to ensure community input in setting their priorities. Their beat plans are supposed to identify specific individuals or groups with whom they will coordinate their efforts against the beat's priority problems. The role of sergeants who supervise the beat teams was clarified, and special training sessions were held for them. Leadership training was also conducted for many lieutenants, who will have new roles as the rank of captain is phased out of the organization. In the ensuing months new technology was introduced to the department. A more advanced crime mapping system was developed; mobile data terminals were installed in patrol cars; experiments were conducted with voice mail and cellular telephones for beat cars; and progress was made on the development of a modern database management system for the agency. The city's new Office of Emergency Communication ended its first full year of operation, and since there have been significant improvements in emergency dispatching and the delivery of management data which should increase the analytic capacity of the police department.

The end of 1996 saw the conclusion of the first citizen training effort, which fielded an organizing and education program in almost all of the city's 279 police beats. Early in 1997, civilian and police trainers were added to the staff of the department's Education and Training Division. They are to tailor the city's future training and technical assistance efforts to the needs

of individual neighborhoods, community organizations, and police beats. During 1996 and 1997 the city also created a staff of community outreach workers charged with assisting beat and district projects and sustaining participation in beat community meetings, and added more staff to support a new emphasis on building and land use issues. A task force representing several city agencies was created to tackle clusters of problem buildings, and city prosecutors were assigned to selected districts to work with police using civil as well as criminal remedies. Finally, during 1996-97 the city mounted a substantial civic education effort through the media. Television and radio programs, billboards, videos, brochures, mailings, festival booths, and district and citywide marches were targeted at promoting awareness of CAPS and involvement in its activities.

This report summarizes our evaluation efforts since the release of the last report in the fall of 1996. The first section summarizes recent trends in crime in Chicago. The city has shared in the decline in crime enjoyed by many of the nation's cities. Since 1991 there has been a noticeable decline in all major categories of crime, and some of the largest decreases have been in violent offenses. Over that period, robbery declined 43 percent and homicide 14 percent. The decline is also widespread. Each of the city's 279 police beats was classified by the race of its residents, and trends were examined separately in each category. By-and-large, major categories of crime decreased everywhere; murder, for example, declined between 15 and 24 percent in different areas. One of the largest declines was registered for crimes involving guns; gun crime is down 18 to 44 percent in different areas. In general, crime was down the most in predominately African-American beats.

The next section of the report examines citizen involvement in CAPS. Chicago's community policing effort features several roles for the public, and this section first examines the extent of program awareness and participation. During 1996-1997, the city launched an aggressive program to market CAPS, and there was a large increase in awareness, from 53 percent to 68 percent of adults. Awareness increased in almost every social group, but remains linked to education and income. It stood at 70 percent among Latinos who were most comfortable being interviewed in English, but at only 52 percent among those interviewed in Spanish. Many Spanish speakers reported learning about CAPS on the radio. Both city and local papers largely attracted the attention of homeowners, whites and more educated respondents. Television was the most common medium by which all residents heard of CAPS — two-thirds via regular channels and one-third on cable.

Overall, 60 percent of Chicagoans were aware that beat community meetings are taking place, and among those who are, almost 30 percent reported going to at least one meeting in the last year. About 90 percent of attendees thought they learned something at a meeting and that they were useful for finding solutions to neighborhood problems. Seventy-two percent reported that actions were taken or they noticed a change in their neighborhood as a result of the meetings. The report tracks monthly rates of beat meeting attendance from January 1995 through May 1997. Over this period an average of 4,500 people attended each month, and total attendance was about 140,000. Surveys indicate participants attend about five times a year.

During the past year, more than half of Chicago residents contacted the police about some matter. Overall, more than 80 percent thought police were helpful and treated them politely. About 70 percent were satisfied with the outcome of the encounter. About one-quarter of adults were stopped by the police during the year, almost all about traffic offenses. About 62 percent thought they were treated fairly and 58 percent politely, and 61 percent were satisfied with the outcome of the case. Males, African-Americans, and poorer respondents were less satisfied than others. Respondents were also asked about their perceptions of police misconduct, and 10 to 13 percent thought police were excessively aggressive. Just over 60 percent thought police corruption was not a problem in their neighborhood, but that figure was lower in some districts.

A special study of CAPS activists in every police district found they were extremely optimistic about the program's progress. They were the most satisfied with beat community meetings, their districts' commanders' efforts to implement CAPS, program marketing efforts, and the quality of service being delivered by beat officers. Their views grew more positive between 1996 and 1997 on most measures, and most notably with respect to beat integrity, special service requests, the Court Advocacy project, and officers working with individual residents on their beat.

The report also summarizes the recent Joint Citizen-Police Training program, in which 14 civilian and 17 police trainers, and 25 civilian outreach workers, conducted more than 1,000 training events. More than 90 percent of participants were satisfied with the training they attended, and in a four-month follow-up interview, they reported getting involved in addressing more than 60 percent of the neighborhood problems they identified. Trainees who were linked to community-based organizations were more likely to get involved in problem solving. Like other volunteer-based efforts, involvement in training was skewed in the direction of home owners and better-off residents, but the program did surprisingly well in mobilizing Latino participants. These training efforts have now been incorporated in the police department's regular training program, and other outreach workers are engaged in education and mobilization projects.

The longest segment of this year's report examines the implementation of CAPS. The evaluation focused on 25 specific program elements. Using a variety of data sources, we assessed how far along the districts are in implementing each element, and what the obstacles to change have been. The program elements fell into seven general categories: teamwork and planning, documentation, partnerships with the community, beat integrity and dispatching, the role of special units in CAPS, support services, and city service delivery. The mandated teamwork and planning (and its associated documentation) that expedites problem solving is underway in all districts, with effectiveness and degrees of involvement varying from beat to beat and district to district. Partnerships between the community and police teams continue to develop through regularly held beat community meetings and District Advisory Committee meetings, although sophisticated joint problem-solving projects are rarely in evidence yet. New management and beat-level training efforts may help improve this. Advisory committees experienced some minor setbacks when the terms of established leaders expired (though in some cases new leadership raised hope for foundering committees). They were also frustrated by what they perceived as a

continued lack of direction and communication about the committees' role. Beat integrity is being achieved at a satisfactory level throughout the city, and Office of Emergency Communications performance was deemed improved by district personnel; newly introduced dispatch communications technology was widely accepted by field officers in spite of ongoing hardware glitches. Special units still do not have a clear role in CAPS, and while some simple procedural accommodations have been made to help districts enlist the aid of other units, community policing remains a chiefly Patrol Division strategy. The various support functions put into place to augment the problem-solving process (district administrative managers, police-community trainers and outreach workers) are being integrated and appropriately utilized. Response to city service request forms submitted by the police has improved in the last year, as has accuracy on status reports.

Another section of the report takes a ground-level view of community policing. It details what CAPS looks like in operation, based on extensive field work and resident surveys in 15 police beats. We examined the activities of citizens and police to see how closely they were hewing to the department's vision of problem solving, and to understand why the program seems to be more successful in some areas than in others. This section describes the beats and their most important problems, based on field observations and surveys. Gangs, drugs, social disorder and physical decay accounted for a majority of the problems facing these areas. The report then examines the capacity of these communities to resolve their own problems, based on the strength of informal social control and formal organization there, and on the beats' ability to extract resources from the outside to address local problems. The final section rates the implementation of CAPS in each of the beats. Overall, four beats have made excellent progress, and five more had good programs. Two beats were struggling to implement CAPS, and four beats had not made much progress at all. The report addresses the issue of whether CAPS is effectively supplementing the efforts of communities that are in need of assistance, or if it is doing best in better-off areas that traditionally work well with the police. About half of the beats with little capacity to defend themselves have vigorous programs, but in the other half of high-need beats CAPS is poorly implemented. Six areas that are highly organized and exercise a great deal of informal social control are also split, but two-thirds are getting relatively good support from police. The other two are middle-class African-American beats which have under-developed CAPS programs.

The final section of the report summarizes several special initiatives that have taken place during the course of the year. These include developments in crime analysis, new police training efforts, the work of the Strategic Inspections Task Force, the 11th District's "Super Block" initiative, new roles for prosecutors in community policing, and plans to reorganize security arrangements for the city's public housing developments. The report also mentions nine additional impending initiatives that may be discussed in future reports.

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Introduction

This is the fourth in a series of reports examining Chicago's community policing program. CAPS (**C**hicago **A**lternative **P**olicing **S**trategy) began in April 1993, when an experimental program was inaugurated in five police districts. Many operational aspects of CAPS were field-tested during the following 18 months, before it began to expand to encompass the remainder of the city. By then, civilian District Advisory Committees had been nominated in all 25 districts. A coordinated system for delivering city services in response to police service requests was phased in in several stages, and was operational throughout the city by July 1994. During the fall of 1994 the 20 nonprototype districts began to divide their officers into rapid response units and beat teams. Beat officers are to spend most of their time responding to calls and working on prevention projects in their assigned area, and the police department's outmoded 911 system struggled to accommodate new dispatching procedures designed to ensure that they stayed there and had enough time free to work proactively with the community. Sergeants and mid-level managers went through several training programs, and between January and May 1995, virtually all uniformed officers completed three days of problem-solving training. By then, civilian administrative managers had been assigned to all of the districts. The districts all began holding beat community meetings on a regular basis by June 1995, and they had the capacity to generate analytic crime maps by August 1995. By autumn 1995, organizing and problem-solving training sessions for the general public were being conducted across the city by teams of civilians and police officers.

A department general order released on April 29, 1996, codified many organizational features of the program. It created a new planning process that begins with the formal identification of beat problems and the resources required to attack them, and culminates in the formulation of district and area plans that respond to those needs. During 1997, high-level tutorials were held for district managers, to help them develop better plans. Chicago's program envisions the formation of police-citizen partnerships for problem solving, so the 1996 general order directs beat officers to participate in a wide range of community meetings and events, in order to ensure community input in setting their priorities. Their beat plans are supposed to identify specific individuals or groups with whom they will coordinate their efforts against the beat's priority problems. The role of sergeants who supervise the beat teams was clarified, and special training sessions were held for them. Leadership training was also conducted for many lieutenants, who will have new roles as the rank of captain is phased out of the organization. In the ensuing months new technology was introduced to the department. A more advanced crime mapping system was developed; data terminals were installed in patrol cars; experiments were conducted with voice mail and cellular telephones for beat cars; and progress was made on the development of a modern database management system for the agency. The city's new Office of Emergency Communication ended its first full year of operation, a period which saw significant improvements in emergency dispatching and the delivery of management data which should increase the analytic capacity of the police department.

During 1996 and 1997 the city also expanded its staff of community outreach workers charged with assisting beat and district projects and sustaining participation in beat community meetings, and added more staff members to support the Court Advocacy program and a new emphasis on housing and land use issues. The end of 1995 saw the conclusion of the first citizen training effort, which fielded an organizing and education program in almost all of the city's 279 police beats. Early in 1997, civilian and police trainers were added to the staff of the department's Education and Training Division. They are to tailor the city's future training and technical assistance efforts to the needs of individual neighborhoods, community organizations, and police beats. Finally, during 1996 and 1997 the city mounted a substantial civic education effort through the media. Television and radio programs, billboards, videos, brochures, mailings, festival booths, and district and citywide rallies were targeted at promoting awareness of CAPS and involvement in its activities.

This report presents an overview of our evaluation efforts since the release of the last report in the fall of 1996. At the end there is a list of detailed studies that we have produced as well. The next section of this report summarizes recent trends in crime in Chicago. It is apparent from reading the newspapers that crime has declined in many of the nation's cities, and this section describes what has happened in Chicago. The third section of the report examines citizen involvement in CAPS. Chicago's community policing effort features several roles for the public, and this section examines the extent of program awareness and participation. It also describes trends in beat community meeting attendance and changes in the city's strategy for involving the general public in neighborhood problem solving. The longest segment of this year's report examines the implementation of CAPS. The evaluation focused on specific program elements. Using a variety of data sources, we assessed how far along the districts are in implementing each element, and what the obstacles to change have been. The fifth section takes a ground-level view of community policing. It details what CAPS looks like in operation, drawing upon extensive field work and surveys in 15 police beats. The final section summarizes several special initiatives that have taken place during the course of the year. These include developments in crime analysis, new police training efforts, the inauguration of a formal planning process in the police department, the work of the Strategic Inspections Task Force, the 11th District's "Super Block" initiative, new roles for prosecutors in community policing, and plans to reorganize security arrangements for the city's public housing developments.

Trends in Crime

The national trend of declining rates of crime has been mirrored in Chicago. Recorded crime peaked locally in 1991, and since has declined substantially in most categories. This is true even for the kinds of crime that research indicates are the most accurately reported to the police, including those that are life-threatening or involve the largest economic losses or high levels of insurance coverage. Significantly, the largest declines have occurred in the highest-crime parts of the city, and some of the biggest decreases have been among gun-related offenses.

Compared to 1991, Chicago's personal crime total was 13 percent lower in 1996, and property crime declined by 20 percent. Among personal crimes, the biggest decline was in the robbery category, down 43 percent. Murder was down the least, 14 percent. Among property

Figure 1
Citywide Monthly Trends in Crime 1991-1997

crimes, burglary was down 22 percent and auto theft 28 percent. These trends are depicted in Figure 1, which tracks monthly reported crime between January, 1991, and April, 1997. While these offenses vary with the weather (crime generally is up in the summer and down in the winter), the underlying trend tracked by the dashed lines in Figure 1 illustrates the extent to which these crimes have declined over time. Many other categories of crime reported to police also declined, including rape (23 percent), assault (12 percent), and theft (9 percent).

These declines appear to be general in nature, affecting many areas of the city. To examine this, the city's 279 police beats were combined in four categories: those in which residents are predominately African-American, Latino, or white, and a subset which are extremely diverse in composition. By-and-large, trends in crime were down in all four clusters of areas. Murder was down 15 to 24 percent in the four areas, and robbery declined between 26 percent (in white areas) to 44 percent (in African-American beats). Burglary was down 13 to 29 percent, and auto theft was down between 19 and 27 percent.

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One important decline was in offenses involving guns. While crimes in the assault category, which includes a diverse set of disputes, fights, and alcohol-related altercations, were down 12 percent, the subset of assaults in which someone was shot was down 23 percent. Robberies involving firearms were down fractionally more than the category as a whole. Some of the high homicide counts in 1991 and 1992 were contributed by gangs, but now gang homicide in Chicago has stabilized and may be declining. Perhaps most significantly, the greatest decline in gun-related crime has occurred in African-American neighborhoods in the city.

Figure 2 presents monthly trends in gun-related crime in the four clusters of police beats. To develop the gun-crime measure nearly 3.8 million offense reports were geocoded to match current beat boundaries (the lines were redrawn in the early 1990s), and each recorded crime involving a gun was identified regardless of the formal crime category in which it was placed. Figure 2 presents gun crime rates per 100,000 residents of each group of beats, so that the levels of crime in the four areas can be compared along with their trends. As Figure 2 illustrates, between 1991 and 1996, gun crime declined 44 percent in African-American beats and 37 percent in the most diverse areas in the city. Rates were also down 26 percent in predominately white beats, but the initial level of gun crime there (32 per 100,000 in 1991, compared to 251 per 100,000 in African-American beats) was so low that the decline depicted in Figure 2 is much less prominent. Gun crime was also down 18 percent between 1991 and 1996 in predominately Latino beats, despite a slight increase in rates there between 1992 and 1994.

Figure 2

Monthly Trends in Gun-Related Crime Rates 1991-1996
for Groups of Similar Beats

Can these declines be attributed to Chicago's community policing program? This is not entirely clear, especially because the trends reported here began in 1992, while CAPS was announced in June 1992 and did not become a citywide program for another two years. To some extent Chicago actually anticipated the national decline in crime, which began in 1994. Research indicates that increasing the number of police on the street impacts crime, and Chicago added several thousand officers to staff CAPS — but they did not appear in significant numbers until 1996. The results of our evaluation of the impact of CAPS in the original prototype districts indicated that the program had an impact on crime, including burglary and auto theft in one district, street crime in another, and gang and drug problems in two other test districts. On the other hand, as the results of the 1990 Census grow more distant, it becomes difficult to estimate trends in many other important factors influencing crime, including immigration and suburban flight, the strength of families, income inequality, and even the number of people living in the city. While the city has shared in the nation's improving economy, the declines in crime reported here began during a recession. Incarceration rates are at an all-time high in Illinois, and this certainly plays an important role. Gun seizures by the Chicago Police Department, which have long been among the highest in the country, have actually declined during the period, but that is consistent with declining gun use and (perhaps) availability. Prominent criminologists have suggested that declining rates of crime during the mid-1990s might be due to the maturation of drug markets, which may have reduced the level of business-related violence and heavy weapon use; drug-related homicides have declined much more quickly than the over-all homicide count in Chicago. Research in other cities has found that homicide rates rise and fall with indicators of the extent of crack cocaine use. Urine analyses of arrestees in Chicago point to a modest decline in cocaine use since early 1994, and a larger decline in opiate use since late 1993.

In addition, one of the most important forces influencing the crime rate is the proportion of young males in the population; across the nation, adult violence has been dropping for almost 15 years, and the big increase in violent crime that helped make 1991 a peak year was largely fueled by juvenile crime, with young people being the principal victims. In 1995, homicide risk for Chicagoans aged 15 to 24 was about four times that for everyone over 25, and had increased during the 1990s while falling for those in older age categories. The youth population has declined nationally, reaching its lowest point in 1995; this frequently is cited as a source of declining crime rates. However, Chicago Planning Department estimates of the age distribution of the city's population point to a tiny increase in the youth population between 1990 and 1995 (3,507 more youths age 15 to 24), so that it could not explain the declining crime rate that Chicago has enjoyed.

<div align="center">**Citizen Involvement in CAPS**</div>

The important role played by the community is one of the unique features of Chicago's policing program. The CAPS model calls for information sharing, joint problem identification, and the formation of problem-solving partnerships between police and citizens. Several key features of the program were designed to facilitate the development of closer working relationships between police and beat residents, including the creation of special beat teams, and a dispatching policy that keeps these teams on their beat with enough free time to engage in proactive problem solving. Each district has an advisory committee that meets with commanders and their management teams. More residents get involved via the beat community meetings that are held regularly throughout the city, and during

1995 through 1996, thousands of them were trained in problem solving by teams of police and civilian trainers.

Trends in Community Participation

The city's experience with beat community meetings began in the five prototype districts where CAPS was developed. They were held monthly in every experimental beat, and were to be a forum for identifying and prioritizing local problems, developing strategies for addressing them, and identifying community resources that could be mobilized to support problem solving. They also provided occasions for police and residents to get acquainted, something that was facilitated by the formation of new teams of officers who were assigned to specific beats and came to the meetings. Beginning in 1995, police began to meet with residents on a regular and well-publicized basis throughout the city. Over time the variety of meetings involving police and citizens has grown, as the districts have found new purposes for public gatherings. Some districts hold special gatherings for business operators. In some beats special meetings are held between police and local activists and organizers, in addition to general public meetings. To boost attendance, some meetings are held for combinations of two to four beats, while in other areas it has been necessary to hold sub-beat meetings that split up the largest and most diverse areas. Beats and districts have sponsored rallies and block parties as well. More recently the districts have been encouraged to send officers to meetings held by block clubs and community organizations, rather than just expecting everyone to attend official beat community meetings.

This analysis of trends in citizen involvement in CAPS is based on data drawn from brief forms that are completed by an officer for each beat community meeting. These forms detail where and when the meeting was held, who was there, and what was discussed. We have found them to be a reliable guide to the basics of the meetings, by comparing them to reports by our observers at the sample of beat community meetings we attend each year. Figure 3 charts trends in beat community meeting participation since January 1995. The left-most axis reports monthly attendance figures, while the right-hand axis presents the cumulative total of attendees since the starting date.

We estimate that Chicagoans attended beat community meetings on about 60,000 occasions during 1995, and on almost 60,000 occasions again during 1996. By May 1997 attendance totaled more than 140,000 over the 29-month period. This estimate includes all of the rallies and gatherings described above. During this period, about 4,500 people went to meetings each month. As Figure 3 indicates, attendance is seasonal, lower in the winter months than during the summer. December is a bad month. Only about three-quarters of the regular number of meetings were held in December 1995, and attendance was considerably lower than expected. But in December 1996 virtually every beat held a meeting, and attendance was still very low.

These "head counts" are silent on how many new participants come each month and how many are regular attenders. Questionnaires that we distributed at beat community meetings during 1996 found that the average participant had come to about five meetings during the previous year; as reported in the next section, a citywide survey conducted in the spring of 1997 came up with exactly the same figure. That survey indicated that about 17 percent of Chicagoans attended at least one beat community meeting in the past year.

Figure 3
Trends in Beat Meeting Attendance

CAPS and the Public

Program Awareness. A survey of Chicago residents was conducted between April and July, 1997; 90 percent of the interviews were conducted by June 30. The interviews were conducted by the Survey Research Laboratory at the University of Illinois-Chicago. A total of 3,066 adult, Chicago residents were interviewed by telephone, in either English or Spanish (8 percent). Respondents were reached using random-digit dialing, so that both listed and unlisted numbers could be reached. For analytical purposes, respondents were weighted to reflect the number of adults and phone lines in their household. The response rate for the survey was 48 percent.

In a citywide survey conducted in the spring of 1996, 53 percent of Chicago residents reported that they were either aware that the Chicago Police Department had adopted community policing or had heard about the CAPS program. One year later, 68 percent reported knowing about the program. This level of knowledge was not equal across groups. Education was the greatest divider distinguishing those who were aware of CAPS. While 76 percent of college graduates were aware of CAPS, that figure was only 48 percent among those without high school diplomas. Similarly, 75 percent of those with annual household incomes greater than $20,000 were aware of CAPS, but only 55 percent of those with annual household incomes less than $20,000 were aware. Senior citizens (56 percent) were less aware than those aged 30 to 64 (73 percent).

The most significant difference in awareness among racial groups was tied to language. Seventy-three percent of whites, 69 percent of African-Americans and 61 percent of Latinos reported that they were familiar with community policing or CAPS. However, awareness among Latinos was complicated by language. In the survey, 43 percent of Latinos were most comfortable being interviewed in Spanish. Among Latinos interviewed in Spanish, only 52 percent were aware of CAPS, but that figure jumped to 70 percent among Latinos who were interviewed in English. Language appears to be an important barrier to learning about CAPS.

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Figure 4 presents the percentage of Chicagoans that learned about CAPS in various ways, comparing results from the 1996 and 1997 surveys. Those interviewed were allowed to name up to five ways in which they learned about CAPS or community policing. Figure 4 indicates that almost all sources of awareness were more effective in 1997 than in 1996 in educating the public about CAPS. The most dramatic increase, from 16 to 27 percent, was the proportion who learned about CAPS from television (two-thirds of whom learned about CAPS from regular as opposed to cable stations). Television remains the most common source of CAPS awareness. The second most frequently mentioned source of information was "from someone else," such as a neighbor or friend, which increased from 10 to 16 percent. It appears that the spread of information via word-of-mouth is gaining momentum as overall awareness increases. Noticeable increases were also found for mailed or hand-delivered brochures or newsletters, advertising on the radio, and displaying posters and signs around the city.

Among those who were aware of CAPS, different groups learned about CAPS in different ways. On average, 10 percent fewer whites, males, and high school or college graduates learned about CAPS through television, compared to blacks and Latinos, females and those without high school diplomas. On the other hand, both major city and neighborhood newspapers were mentioned by more than three times as many whites as blacks or Latinos, while those who graduated from high school or college were more than twice as likely to mention newspapers than those who did not graduate from high school. Although there was no difference between home owners and renters in terms of how frequently they mentioned major city newspapers, twice as

Figure 4
Sources of CAPS Awareness

many home owners mentioned neighborhood papers. Women and African-Americans more frequently mentioned learning about CAPS (by about 5 percentage points) from "someone else."

Latino respondents who completed the interview in Spanish differed from Latinos who completed the interview in English, a difference that highlighted the importance of radio in the Spanish-speaking community. While 10 percent of English-speaking respondents reported learning about CAPS from the radio, that figure was 22 percent for those who completed the interview in Spanish. Additionally, while just over 4 percent of Latinos interviewed in English learned about CAPS from a major city newspaper, not one Latino interviewed in Spanish learned about CAPS from a major city newspaper. Finally, while Spanish-speaking respondents were equally likely to mention TV as English-speaking respondents, 90 percent of those completing their interview in Spanish learned about CAPS on a regular television station, compared to two-thirds among those interviewed in English. The greater frequency of Latinos interviewed in English learning about CAPS via cable TV may be linked to differences in household income between the two groups; while 68 percent of English-interviewed Latinos have household incomes greater than $20,000 per year, that figure is only 39 percent among Spanish-interviewed Latinos.

The fact that CAPS awareness has increased may reflect the diverse and aggressive marketing campaign coordinated by the CAPS Implementation Office at City Hall. The outreach campaign included staff participation in festivals, parades, marches and rallies. The vehicle stickers displayed by all city residents feature a CAPS logo. Advertisements were placed on radio and television, in newspapers, on posters at rapid transit stops and high traffic areas and on billboards. The total budget for the 1997 media outreach program was over $1.5 million, and is expected to exceed $2 million in 1998.

The bulk of the media campaign — that placed on radio and television, and in local newspapers — was underway during the period the survey was being conducted and continues to this day. Many of the television spots aired during the Bulls playoff games, and drew large numbers of viewers. The Crime Watch series continued to be presented on the city's cable channel. The CAPS Implementation Office spent more than $700,000 for radio advertisements, over $600,000 for television spots and over $120,000 for newspaper ads. Advertising on billboards and posters was budgeted at just over $100,000. Some radio stations in turn distributed CAPS literature along with their own at promotional events.

The Implementation Office engaged in other activities to "spread the word" about CAPS. Program materials were distributed to community organizations, libraries, businesses, churches and schools. Schedules for beat community meetings are posted on the Internet and displayed on the city's cable channel. CAPS outreach workers were hired to attend special events to represent and explain the program. Outreach workers often appeared at beat community meetings and other public venues to generate awareness of the program. Often they would bring videos that demonstrated how to conduct problem solving sessions, or illustrated what a partnership between police and citizens looks like. These videos feature successful problem solving projects. In the

words of one manager, "They put tools in people's hands." The Implementation Office sponsored a day-long workshop at the Whitney Young High School attended by hundreds of community activists citywide. The workshop featured several interactive seminars on topics such as problem solving, running effective beat community meetings, the role of the district advisory committee, court advocacy, domestic violence, gang and drug houses and neighborhood organizing. The seminar drew large crowds and included opening remarks by the Mayor and Superintendent of Police.

In addition, during the past year local companies have distributed CAPS information and safety tips. The water utility sent a mailing to every resident along with their bill, and a similar mailing was distributed by a cellular telephone company. The City of Chicago included CAPS information with its employees' paychecks. City workers were reminded of the schedule for beat community meetings in their area, and received information about CAPS and how to participate. City employees are being encouraged to become leaders in the CAPS program.

In total, outreach workers participated in 155 neighborhood and downtown festivals. Booths were set up where they explained CAPS and encouraged participation in beat community meetings and involvement in programs, like court advocacy, that are organized through local district advisory committees. The Implementation Office also organized 50 district-level marches, the purpose of which was to encourage police-citizen partnerships while allowing the community to unite for crime-free neighborhoods. A host of educational and promotional items were distributed as well, including magnets, pens, pencils, rulers and tee shirts. However, it should be noted that many festivals, parades, marches and rallies took place *after* our survey was conducted. These are mainly summer activities and the survey was largely completed by the end of June. These activities may have served further to increase public awareness of CAPS by summer's end.

Crime and Neighborhood Problems. The 1997 survey also questioned Chicagoans about a list of 13 neighborhood problems. Respondents were asked whether their neighborhood had a big problem, some problem or no problem with each. Table 1 displays 1996 and 1997 survey results indicating the percentage of Chicagoans who perceived each to be a "big problem" in their neighborhood. For each of the 13 categories of problems, except attacks/robberies and burglaries, slightly fewer Chicago residents reported they were "big problems" in 1997 survey compared to 1996 survey (there was no change for abandoned cars).

However, these overall figures conceal large differences in the quality of neighborhood life that are experienced by different racial groups. Other columns in Table 1 document that whites infrequently report that these types of crime and disorder are big problems in their neighborhoods. Drug dealing and loitering are worse problems for black respondents; car vandalism, graffiti, disruption around schools, car theft, attacks or robberies, burglaries and abandoned cars are worse for Latino respondents; and gang violence, trash in vacant lots, public drinking and abandoned buildings are big concerns to equal proportions of blacks and Latinos. No neighborhood problem generated more "big problem" responses from whites in 1997

Table 1
Perceptions of Neighborhood Problems

Percent rating a "big problem"	1996	1997	1997 Whites	1997 Blacks	1997 Latinos
drug dealing	29	26	8	44	35
loitering	28	26	11	44	30
gang violence	25	21	7	32	34
car vandalism	20	18	12	19	28
trash and junk	20	17	6	25	25
graffiti	19	18	10	18	33
public drinking	18	17	7	25	26
disruption around schools	18	17	7	22	27
car theft	17	16	8	18	26
attacks and robberies	17	18	9	22	26
burglary	16	18	10	21	26
abandoned buildings	13	11	2	18	18
abandoned cars	12	12	4	15	24

NOTE: columns by race exclude other races and refusals.

compared to 1996, while for eight of the 13 problems more Latinos in 1997 than in 1996 reported they were big problems (for blacks, this occurred for five problems). But due to stable or improved conditions for whites, almost all of the problems declined among the entire sample.

Concern about burglary illustrates the significance of this trend. In 1996, 16 percent of Chicagoans reported burglary was a "big problem." Within groups, that figure was 15 percent for whites and Latinos, and 20 percent for blacks. In 1997, slightly more Chicagoans, 18 percent, reported burglary was a "big problem" in their neighborhood. However, only 10 percent of whites, a decline from 15 percent, thought burglary was a "big problem," while 21 percent of

blacks and 26 percent of Latinos, an increase for both groups, rated burglary a big problem. While the 1996 survey found that equal numbers of whites and Latinos thought burglary was a big problem, by 1997 these two groups were 16 percentage points apart.

The survey also included questions assessing Chicagoans' perceptions of their personal safety and the quality of neighborhood life. Respondents were asked how safe they felt in their own neighborhood at night and whether concern about crime prevented them from moving about freely in their own neighborhood. Responses to these two questions form a safety index, and about 46 percent of Chicagoans reported feeling unsafe in their own neighborhood. Males, those with annual household incomes greater than $20,000 per year, whites and college graduates were the least fearful. Women, African-Americans and Latinos, senior citizens, lower income respondents and those who had not graduated from high school were the most concerned about their personal safety. These results paralleled findings from similar surveys in other cities and national patterns.

But overall, Chicagoans appear comfortable with the neighborhoods in which they have chosen to live: 74 percent said they were either "somewhat satisfied" or "very satisfied" with their neighborhood, while only 24 percent were "somewhat dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied." Whites and college graduates (both 86 percent) are the most content, while African-Americans (64 percent) and those who had not graduated from high school (69 percent) report being less satisfied. With respect to neighborhood trends, regardless of socioeconomic status, race, sex or age, respondents consistently reported that their neighborhood was about the same compared to a year ago, and that they expected the quality of their neighborhood would not change in the next year.

In summary, even though people are generally satisfied with where they live, problems persist, and for some these neighborhood problems are worse than for others. While increased knowledge that the Chicago Police Department has adopted a community policing philosophy is important, it is just the first step in realizing the goal of community policing: collaboration between public and police to solve crime and disorder problems.

Encounters with Police. The 1997 survey quizzed Chicago residents about their encounters with police during the past year. They were asked about contacts that they might have initiated, and about those which might have been initiated by the police. The police-initiated contacts included whether they had been stopped while in a car as either the driver or a passenger (23 percent said "yes") and whether they had been stopped by police while walking on the street (8 percent said "yes"). Almost everyone who was stopped on foot also had been involved in a car stop; altogether, about one-quarter of those we interviewed were stopped. Another 7 percent indicated that police came to their home to provide information or ask about a local crime or problem.

Males (30 percent) were about twice as likely to be stopped as females (17 percent), while 30 percent of African-Americans and 19 percent of whites and Latinos reported being stopped. Thirty-five percent of young adults, aged 25 or younger, were stopped in cars, while 19 percent those aged 26 or older reported having been stopped in a car. African-American males (46 percent) were more likely to be stopped than white and Latino males (about 24 percent for both groups). Black females (19 percent) were slightly more likely to be stopped than either white or Latino

females (both 15 percent). Controlling for age reveals greater discrepancies in the frequency of car stops among different groups. Among those aged 25 or younger, 72 percent of black males reported being stopped while in a car, compared to 36 percent of white males and 49 percent of Latino males. Among males older than 25, 30 percent of African-Americans, 22 percent of whites and 14 percent of Latinos reported being stopped. Very similar differences were found when examining patterns of pedestrian stops. For example, 42 percent of young black males reported being stopped on the street, compared to 21 percent of young white males and 29 percent of young Latino males. There was very little variation across racial, economic and gender groups in whether police appeared at their door to seek or provide information about the neighborhood.

Overall, of those who had been stopped, 21 percent reported being "very dissatisfied" with that contact, while 34 percent reported being "very satisfied" (other responses included "somewhat satisfied" or "somewhat dissatisfied"). African-Americans, those with incomes less than $20,000 per year, males and home owners reported slightly higher-than-average dissatisfaction. However, there were significant differences in satisfaction based on the type of police-initiated contact. As expected, the most dissatisfied (40 percent) were those stopped while in a car (often for traffic violations), while those stopped walking were much less likely to be very dissatisfied (14 percent). Surprisingly, 27 percent of those stopped in their cars reported being very satisfied, while 9 percent were very satisfied with their encounter with police on the street. About 40 percent were very satisfied when police came to their door.

Citizens were also asked about contacts that they could have initiated with police during the past year. Table 2 lists these encounters and their frequency. The average Chicagoan contacted police 1.3 times during the past year. Almost half (49 percent) did not contact them at all, while an additional 31 percent reported making only one or two contacts. The over-all average was driven up by the 20 percent of the sample that reported contacting the police three or more times over the 12-month period.

Satisfaction with these encounters was high. Overall, 82 percent felt that police paid attention to what they had to say, 87 percent were treated politely, 80 percent thought that police were helpful, and officers took time to explain what they were going to do about the problem that sparked the call in about 70 percent of contacts. Overall, 72 percent of those who contacted police reported being satisfied or very satisfied with the outcome. They were about one-fourth as likely to report being "very dissatisfied" with their experience (11 percent overall) as "very satisfied" (45 percent). Both the helpfulness and satisfaction measures are presented in Table 2, broken down by type of contact. The correlation between police helpfulness and satisfaction was +.78, and it was +.70 for politeness. Among people who actually had contact with police, differences in satisfaction across racial, income, gender and education groups were typically small.

Assessments of Police Performance. In addition to reporting on their recent experiences with police, Chicagoans were also asked to assess the quality of police service in their neighborhoods. An index combining responses to 10 questions about police effectiveness, professionalism and responsiveness yielded the same average rating as the 1996 survey, a score which placed the average respondent close to granting police a "good job" (as opposed to a "fair

Table 2
Citizen-Initiated Encounters with Police

Type of Encounter	percent contacted	percent helpful	percent satisfied
to report a crime	27	79	69
to ask police for advice or information	18	82	78
to report a traffic or medical emergency	16	84	78
to provide police with information	13	77	62
to report a suspicious person	13	82	78
to report suspicious noises	11	85	76
to report other neighborhood conditions or problems	11	80	73
to report any other problem or difficulty	10	77	64
to report other events that might lead to a crime	10	71	61

job" or "very good job") rating. When respondents were divided into three groups — those giving police negative, mixed, or positive evaluations — they were most divided by education and race. Seventeen percent of college graduates and 13 percent of whites rated police negatively, while 28 percent of non-college graduates, 35 percent of blacks and 31 percent of Latinos rated police negatively. On other questions, 3 percent of whites, 7 percent of Latinos and 13 percent of blacks thought police service in their neighborhood had gotten worse in the past *and* expected them to get worse next year. But in the survey, a majority of the public awarded favorable ratings to the police and recognized their effectiveness and professionalism.

Other questions asked about police brutality, discrimination and corruption, all issues that have resurfaced in Chicago during the past year. A police misconduct index was created combining responses to questions about whether police stop too many people without good reason, whether police are too tough on those they stop in the neighborhood, and whether police verbally or physically abuse people in respondents' neighborhoods. Most thought police misconduct was *not* a big problem in their neighborhood. Between 10 and 13 percent thought these were big problems, 24 to 28 thought they were some problem, and 62-63 percent said they were not a problem. But there were marked differences among groups in this regard. While only

7 percent of college graduates, 10 percent of those with household incomes greater than $20,000 per year and 5 percent of whites thought police misconduct was a serious problem in their neighborhood, 31 percent of those without high school diplomas, 27 percent of those with household incomes less than $20,000 per year and 28 percent of blacks and 18 percent of Latinos thought police misconduct was serious. These negative ratings mirror the earlier finding that these groups are more likely to be stopped by police, whether while driving or on the street, and report greater dissatisfaction about their encounters with police.

Another question was asked about perceptions of police corruption, which we described to respondents as "taking bribes or getting involved in the drug trade." Their responses were similar to those of other police misconduct questions: 61 percent of residents thought police corruption was "no problem" in their neighborhood, 23 percent thought it was "some problem" and 16 percent thought it was a "big problem." However, there was considerable district-level variation in this question. For example, among respondents from the Austin District — where there has been extensive coverage of corruption issues in the media — 52 percent thought police corruption was a big problem in their neighborhood, and only 13 percent thought corruption was no problem there. Overall, race and education again were related to assessments of corruption: 10 percent of college graduates and 6 percent of whites thought corruption was a big problem, while 24 percent of those who did not graduate from high school, 25 percent of blacks and 20 percent of Latinos thought corruption was a big problem in their neighborhood.

Participation in CAPS. Finally, respondents to the spring 1997 survey were questioned about their participation in community anti-crime efforts. First they were asked whether any meetings had been held in their neighborhood to deal with crime and disorder problems. These could have been beat community meetings (which are held monthly), CAPS-related meetings without police present, or other anti-crime meetings held by various community organizations. Awareness that these opportunities for participation are present in their community is an important first step in building citizen involvement in CAPS. Those who knew about the meetings were asked if they attended, and those who attended were asked to assess their effectiveness.

Overall, 60 percent of Chicagoans reported that community anti-crime meetings had been held in their area. Awareness varied. Young adults (50 percent), those who did not graduate from high school (47 percent), Latinos (53 percent) and those with household incomes of less than $20,000 per year (52 percent) were the least likely to know such meetings were being held. On the other hand, home owners (68 percent), those who had lived in their current neighborhood five years or more (70 percent) and those with household incomes greater than $20,000 per year (65 percent) were the most likely to know that such meetings were being held. In almost all groups, awareness of meetings was lower than awareness of CAPS. An exception was senior citizens: while only 56 percent of those aged 65 or older knew about CAPS or community policing, 67 percent knew that anti-crime community meetings were being held in their neighborhood.

Among those that knew community meetings were being held, 28 percent (a total of 889 respondents, and 17 percent of all Chicagoans) reported attending at least one meeting, and the average respondent who went to any meetings attended five of them. Almost 90 percent reported that police were present, suggesting that the vast majority of respondents were describing beat community meetings. What accounts for the gap between being aware that beat community meetings are being held and actually showing up at one? Some of the factors are personal ones, others reflect neighborhood conditions, and some reflect the initial impetus sparking their involvement. Those who actually attended a meeting were more likely to be homeowners, over age 30, and among the married-with-children set. White respondents who knew that beat community meetings were being held were less likely than African-Americans or Latinos to turn out. This was partly because of the influence of neighborhood factors. Turnout was also stimulated by higher levels of violent crime in the beats where the respondents lived, and those rates tend to be highest in African-American and Latino communities. Compared to those who did not get out to a meeting, local gun crime rates averaged 30 percent higher in the beats where people who did turn out lived. High property crime rates were not much of a stimulus to turnout, on the other hand. Finally, how people heard about CAPS made a difference. Those who reported that they heard about it at church, through a child's school, or at a festival booth (although the numbers were small) were more likely to turn out, while respondents who got the message via television or other mass media outlets were not especially motivated to do so. The largest difference, however, was among those who recalled that they heard about CAPS from someone else. As we saw above, the "word of mouth" message was one that increased a great deal in the past year, and among those who got that message, 38 percent report going to a meeting; the contrasting percentage for everyone else was 21 percent. Personal messages make a difference.

Those who went liked what they saw. Examining just beat community meetings, there was a strong consensus that they were useful and productive. Eighty-six percent of those who attended at least one beat community meeting reported they had learned something there, and 91 percent reported that the meetings were "very" or "somewhat" useful for finding solutions to neighborhood problems. Most striking is that a large majority of attendees (72 percent), reported that actions were taken as a result of the meetings or that they noticed a change in their neighborhood resulting from decisions made at the meeting. In addition to serving as a useful vehicle for problem solving, 93 percent credited the meetings as being "very" or "somewhat" useful in improving police-community relations.

In summary, there is a great deal of good news to be found in Chicagoans' views of crime and disorder problems, in their views of the police department, and in their participation in community policing. Small improvements have been realized in reducing neighborhood crime and disorder problems; Chicagoans today are more aware of, and active in, CAPS. Those who go to beat community meetings are very positive about what happens there. Public assessments of police performance and professionalism are holding steady at generally positive levels. However, there remain persistent class and race differences in these successes. Because African-Americans and Latinos constitute a majority of Chicago residents, further good news will depend on their circumstances. White Chicagoans have relatively few neighborhood problems and highly positive views of the police, so there is not much room for further improvement on those

measures. Generating more good news will depend on improving the perceptions of those who now feel the least safe in their own neighborhoods and currently have the most negative views of police effectiveness, professionalism and integrity.

CAPS Activists

In addition to surveying the general public about the progress of community policing, we also made a special effort to represent the views and experiences of people who are extremely active in CAPS. In 1996, telephone interviews were conducted with 238 activists. They were selected in a variety of ways. Some were chairs or members of their district's advisory committees, others were active in the Community Policing Task Force and other projects sponsored by the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS), and some were officers or executive directors of community organizations. During their interviews they were asked to identify other activists we could talk to about events in their district, a "snowball" sampling technique. Other names came from the city's CAPS Implementation Office, and some were identified as beat activists by neighborhood relations officers. The 1996 activists were distributed evenly across all 25 police districts, and they were interviewed between April and August 1996.

In 1997 we attempted to recontact all of the 1996 activists in order to assess changes in their districts over the ensuing year. Reinterviews were conducted with 205 of the original respondents, but 18 of those confessed that they were no longer active in CAPS issues, often because they were busy at work or had to spend more time at home. This left a repeat group of 187 CAPS activists, and this section examines what they thought about the implementation of CAPS in their home district during the year between the interviews. In addition, 97 activists were interviewed for the first time in 1997, in order to refresh the activist sample for 1998. Many were nominated by other respondents, while others were drawn from lists of CANS training participants. All new district advisory committee chairs were interviewed as well. Figure 5 below includes their views. The activists played numerous and sometimes overlapping roles. Among the 1997 group, about 10 percent were chairs or co-chairs of their district's advisory committee, and another 15 percent were heads of advisory committee subcommittees. About 20 percent played a leadership role in their beat, including serving as the civilian facilitator at beat community meetings. About 25 percent qualified for the sample because of their beat activism. Slightly more than 15 percent were officers or leaders of community organizations, ranging from block clubs to chambers of commerce, and another 20 percent were members of such organizations. A handful reported that they were involved in CAPS because of their job. Almost 30 percent of the 1997 activist sample reported being in contact with the commander of their district at least every other week, and another 28 percent were in contact at least monthly. Sixteen percent indicated that they never had any contact with the commander, and 27 percent said they saw their commander "once in a while."

The 1996 and 1997 activist samples are comparable in terms of race and sex. In both years about 35 percent were African-American, 50 percent white and 10 percent Latino. Fifty-seven percent were male in 1996, and 54 percent in 1997. The 1997 sample was involved in

Figure 5
Activist's Assessments of CAPS

Figure 5
Activist's Assessments of CAPS

CAPS a bit longer (two years and three months in 1996, and two years and seven months in 1997). The average 1996 activist was about 48 years old, and in 1997, about 50 years old. However, while in the general population members of different race and class groups have different experiences and attitudes towards police, we find that activists' attitudes and experiences are not particularly differentiated by factors such as age, race or sex. As a group, their experience as activists — which generally has been quite positive — transcends many other divisions. The discussion below does not dwell on those differences as a result.

Figure 5 summarizes the views of the activists who were interviewed in 1996 and 1997. Each time they were asked how good a job their district was doing implementing various components of CAPS. Figure 5 summarizes their ratings of five program components, combining responses to 20 different survey questions. Regarding beat community meetings, activists were asked three questions about the quality and frequency of beat community meetings held in their district. In terms of the district advisory committees, activists rated the quality of committee and subcommittee meetings generally, and their Court Watch subcommittee in particular. The five questions making up the problem-solving index ask about their district's ability to bring police and citizens together to identify problems and solutions, and how well beat officers are working their beats in accordance with community policing goals. There was one question about how effectively CAPS is being marketed in the district. Four questions make up the district commander index; activists were asked to assess how effective and active their district commander has been in implementing CAPS. Finally, activists were asked five different questions rating police responsiveness to the community and officer effectiveness in problem solving and crime prevention.

Two aspects of Figure 5 are noteworthy. Change, though in all but one instance positive, was very slight between 1996 and 1997. The only statistically significant change occurred in perceptions of in perceptions of CAPS marketing; 57 percent of activists said their district was doing a good or very good job of marketing CAPS in 1996, and 69 percent in 1997. This shift mirrors real improvements that occurred in the funding and diversification of CAPS marketing. There was a small downturn in ratings of the effectiveness of beat community meetings. But one of the biggest lessons of Figure 5 is that activists' assessments of CAPS implementation were already highly positive in 1996. In some areas, such as beat community meetings, there was little room for improvement. Beat community meetings remained the most highly rated program element, followed by the efforts of district commanders and marketing. Two indices got lower marks: they involved the extent of citizen involvement in problem solving, how well beat officers are working their beats in accordance with community policing goals, and officers' responsiveness and problem solving efforts.

Finally, the summary indices described in Figure 5 obscure shifts that have occurred on several specific issues. A substantial number of activists changed their mind on few issues between 1996 and 1997, switching between positive and negative views seven times. These changes are summarized in Table 3. Between 1996 and 1997, activists became much more positive about beat integrity, the CAPS service request process, court advocacy, and the willingness of beat officers to work with citizens. Police-citizen problem solving efforts also seemed to be going a bit better, as were efforts to get people to turn out for beat community meetings.

Involvement and Assessments of Police

Finally, Figure 6 illustrates the importance of active involvement in community policing in sustaining more positive assessments of police professionalism and efficacy. Figure 6 compares responses to five questions asked both of the general public and activists. The general public is divided by their activism, into those who did or did not know about CAPS, and those who attended at least one or more community meetings dealing with crime. The responses of the 1997 activist sample are included in Figure 6 as well. For each question, the percent of each group reporting police were doing a "very good" job — the highest possible rating — increases as the level of participation rises. Furthermore, Figure 6 reveals that among the general public, the biggest difference in assessments of the quality of police service tend to occur not between those who knew and did not know about CAPS, but between those who just knew about CAPS and those who attend meetings. What is the linkage between the two? Participation may produce more positive assessments of police, or those with a more positive outlook may be more likely to participate. What exactly drives this nexus between participation and attitudes is not clear; both factors may be at work at the same time. The highly positive outlook of activists, and the finding that the more involved Chicago residents are in CAPS, the more positive they are, provides another instructive lesson for how public satisfaction with police could improve in the future: more Chicago residents need to become involved in community policing.

Table 3
Shifts in Activist Opinion, 1996-1997

Rating	percent negative in 1996 but positive in 1997	percent positive in 1996 but negative in 1997	net change 1996-97
Getting people to come to beat meetings.	48	29	+19%
Getting citizens and police working together to identify important problems.	39	14	+25%
Getting citizens and police working together to identify solutions to problems.	32	19	+13%
Keeping beat officers working on their assigned beats.	55	13	+42%
Getting beat team officers to work with individual citizens on their beat.	44	14	+30%
Completing and setting priorities for CAPS service request forms.	55	16	+39%
Having an effective Court Advocacy subcommittee.	46	13	+33%

Training the Community in Problem Solving

During 1995 and 1996, Chicago made a substantial effort to train residents in neighborhood problem solving and their role in the city's new community policing program. Few were knowledgeable about CAPS and many were uncertain about what they could do to support it. It was apparent that it was important to train the public as well as the police in how to identify persistent local problems and how to mobilize the resources — including the police, city service agencies, and their own energy and capacities — required to solve them. In partnership with the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS), police and civilian trainers conducted a series of these training sessions in beats throughout the city.

The training was conducted by two-person police-civilian teams, supported by civilian organizers who were to lay the groundwork for the sessions by encouraging resident participation. While the numbers varied over time, about 14 full-time civilians and 17 full- and part-time police trainers were involved. The original plan for Joint Community-Police Training (JCPT) envisioned hiring 50 civilian organizers, but when budgetary problems arose a few

Figure 6
Involvement and Assessments of Police

months into the project, the number of organizers was cut in half. Toward the end, two additional civilian training positions were created as concern grew over the project's ability to complete training in all parts of the city. However, the number of civilian staff members dwindled during the final months, and it was hard to fill the terminating positions.

Altogether, 1,065 training events took place. These included 211 formal planning meetings, 183 orientation sessions, 528 problem-solving training sessions and 146 technical assistance sessions. A large number of local organizing meetings were also held. CANS estimates that about 11,700 people were involved in JCPT activities. Because they were encouraged to participate in multiple sessions, this figure was derived by counting 100 percent of those attending the initial orientation meetings (6,310 attendees), plus one-third of the participants at problem solving sessions (3,915 new participants), one-quarter of the participants at technical assistance sessions (adding another 251), and half of those attending planning sessions (another 1,224).

To assess what participants thought about the sessions, 354 attendees were interviewed four months after they had completed training. As the 1996 report detailed, about 60 percent of those who attended an initial orientation session went to a follow-up session. Almost 90 percent thought the police trainers did a good job, and over 80 percent felt the same about their civilian

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instructors. Overall, more than 90 percent were satisfied with the orientations and training they attended.

Our own assessment of the training, based on observations of 31 sessions and personal interviews with trainers and the program's managers, was somewhat more critical. As reported in 1996, while in general the curriculum was comprehensive and usually well delivered by the police-civilian training teams, at times the groups being trained would have been better served by a greater degree of flexibility in instruction. The individuals and groups that were represented displayed varying levels of experience and knowledge about CAPS and problem solving. The participants also brought a wide range of experience and knowledge with them to the meetings. This diversity was compounded by the ethnic and socio-economic cleavages that were often in play at sessions. Though the trainers often ran successful sessions, at times they seemed unequipped to handle the dynamics of the diverse groups of participants that assembled. Stimulating participation was also a challenge, and often harder to accomplish in the areas that needed it most. Ironically, it was often those with a more sophisticated view of CAPS and neighborhood activism that most eagerly sought training, and frequently received more of it. As the ending of the training contract loomed, the commitment of JCPT managers to offer training to each of the city's 279 beats was fulfilled only by hurriedly scheduling abbreviated sessions for residents from multiple beats. Trainers were in short supply, and the number of organizers was sharply reduced by this point in the project. Not surprisingly, attendance at these was poor. The field practicum component of the curriculum was not offered in these instances, since time and training manpower were already exhausted.

Who Participated? Data was collected on JCPT participants until December 1996, when this phase of community training drew to a close. One goal of the JCPT organizers was to gain representative involvement from the city's population in training. Efforts were made to publicize the training program, and the organizers fanned out into the community to encourage people to attend the sessions. Publicity and training materials were prepared in several languages, and organizers were matched to the beats in terms of their linguistic skills. Surveys of those who participated in training indicate that this turnout effort was to a certain extent successful, although some of the biases that almost inevitably accompany programs that rely on volunteer participation affected JCPT as well.

We examined the issue of community attendance representativeness in several ways. Questionnaires were completed by 4,607 persons who attended orientation sessions, asking them about their background and their views of the problem-solving roles of the police and the public. Similar questionnaires were administered to residents who attended beat community meetings, another forum for involvement in CAPS. This enabled us to compare the background of those attending training and beat community meetings with Census profiles of beat residents. It also enabled us to contrast the views of the two groups.

A comparison of the backgrounds of those attending JCPT training with demographic profiles of their beats indicates that homeowners and better-off residents were more likely to turn out for training, just as they were for their regular beat community meetings. Figure 7 almost 75

Figure 7
Training Participant and Beat Demographics

percent of the trainees were homeowners. The over-representation of homeowners in this kind of voluntary, neighborhood-based activity is certainly to be expected; the 1996 report presented virtually identical findings about patterns of involvement in community beat meetings, and volunteer-based anti-crime efforts around the country often look much the same.

Other factors were related to involvement in training, and most reflected the same pattern. Residents with more education were also heavily represented at the sessions. In beats where about 50 percent of residents had a high school degree, about 75 percent of those participating had a high school degree; where 70 percent had a degree, 85 percent of those who came to training were high school graduates. College graduates were over-represented by 10 to 15 percentage points. More affluent neighborhood residents (those making more than $40,000 per year) had a five to 10 percent edge, and in heterogeneous areas whites were overrepresented by about 10 percentage points.

On the other hand, the city's Latino residents were better represented in JCPT than they were in beat community meetings. The 1996 report found that at beat community meetings Latinos were involved at only one-third to one-half their proportion in the population, and that they were the most under-represented group. By contrast, Latinos were under-represented in JCPT training sessions by only about 10 percentage points. Seventeen of the training beats surveyed were more than 50 percent Latino, and Latino turnout was greater than 50 percent in 13 of them. Spanish-speaking JCPT organizers likely played a role in this, for they canvassed the areas and aggressively sought Latino participation. Besides improving the representation of

Latinos in training, a possible benefit of this turnout is that they found themselves having positive, first-hand experiences with police. The evaluation's surveys have found that Chicago's Latino respondents are the most dissatisfied with police service. Some of our Latino respondents attribute their continued participation in CAPS to police that they came to know, respect and trust during JCPT training.

Did this differential turnout have an impact on the tenor of the training sessions or the later involvement of participants in problem solving? While we do not have comparable data about nonparticipants, differential turnout favoring better-off elements of the community should have created a relatively favorable venue for JCPT training. More educated JCPT participants were more likely to have confidence in the police; they were more likely to believe that police would trust citizens enough to work together effectively, that police would be able to analyze local problems and discover their underlying patterns, and that police had a sense of the problem-solving role that the public could play under CAPS. They were also more optimistic about the role that the public could play in crime prevention and problem solving, and that the public is open to the police. There were similar distinctions between poor and better-off JCPT partici-pants, with lower income trainees fearing that citizens will never trust the police and will not be very effective at problem solving, and that police will never trust citizens and also will not be very effective problem solvers. The modest under-representation of Latinos discounted a little the voice of the group that is most pessimistic about the development of trust between police and the public, and do not think that police will be open to citizen input when setting their priorities.

On the other hand, some observers feared that the organizers who were rallying partici-pation in JCPT had a political agenda that went beyond training. They thought this may conflict with CAPS' training goals, by fostering a more critical and even abrasive relationship between police and their neighborhood constituencies than government-paid-for programs typically enjoy. This is not entirely our view; many trainers and organizers displayed a deep commitment to promoting cooperative community participation and went on to other CAPS-related jobs when the training contract ended. Core members of the CANS training staff remain involved in citizen training, both in the city and as part of a regional training program involving both citizens and police. However, the data suggest that residents who participated in JCPT were somewhat more critical — or perhaps more realistic — about the possibility of forming partnerships with the police around neighborhood problem-solving efforts.

To assess this, the views of training participants can be benchmarked by comparing them to those of residents of the same areas who attended beat community meetings. Training and beat community meeting participants were included if they came from beats in which more than 20 training participants were surveyed; this was a subset of 3,046 trainees and 852 beat meeting attendees living in 100 different beats. These selections were made in order to compare the views of people who lived in the same areas of the city, for because of race and class segregation those views vary considerably from place to place.

The initial pessimism of JCPT participants, which was assessed at the beginning of their training and not at the end, is illustrated in Table 4. It presents responses to selected questions by

Table 4
Attitudes of Training and Beat Community Meeting Participants

Survey Topic	Percent Agree	
	Training	Beat Meetings
Police open to citizen opinions	40	58
Citizens open to police opinions	42	50
Police trust citizens enough to work together effectively	68	68
Citizens trust police enough to work together effectively	53	60
Police will rely on citizen input to set priorities	56	64
Citizens will take responsibility for neighborhood safety	68	66
Police able to prevent crime	37	33
Citizens able to prevent crime	43	46
Number of cases	3,406	852

NOTE: respondents at training sessions and beat community meetings who lived in a subset of 100 beats with more than 20 training respondents.

trainees and beat community meeting attendees living in the same areas. In general, beat community meeting participants were somewhat more optimistic than those from their beat who attended training. Trainees were less likely to think that police and citizens would listen to one another, or that police would rely on citizen input when setting their priorities. Table 4 also indicates that there was a good deal of pessimism about the possibilities for problem solving among both groups. From 40 to 60 percent of each group were uncertain about some of the key premises of the program.

A significant difference between those who attended beat community meetings and joint training was their experience with CAPS through involvement in beat community meetings. As noted above, the average beat community meeting participant reported attending an average of 5.2 meetings in the last year. They had accumulated considerable experience in meeting and talking with police serving their area. For some this probably either reinforced their optimism or led them to become more optimistic as a result of what they saw at the meetings; presumably, those who were still unhappy about their experience dropped out. We saw in Figure 6 that the extent of involvement was strongly related to optimism about CAPS. However, among training participants the average was only 2.9 beat community meetings; they had not had as much experience, and they completed their questionnaires before training really began. Among both groups, the more beat community meetings they had attended, the more optimistic they were about both police and citizen commitment to joint problem solving. Differences in attitudes

related to beat community meeting involvement were strongest for their views of police, and in particular police openness to citizen opinions and the extent police would rely on citizen input to set priorities. While only 6 percent of those attending beat community meetings were there for the first time, fully 33 percent of the trainees had never been to a beat community meeting, and that group was very pessimistic in its views. Controlling for this accounted for most of the differences between the two groups' attitudes.

Involvement and Problem Solving. As reported in 1996, a follow-up survey of 354 trainees that was conducted four months after their initial orientation session found that they were heavily involved in problem-solving efforts. They were trying to do something about 63 percent of the neighborhood problems they identified. As the 1996 report documented, the most important factor distinguishing trainees who did and did not take action was their level of involvement in community organizations: the more involved they were, the more they did.

One reason for this may be seen in the survey that was conducted during JCPT. It found that 65 percent of those who came to training were involved in community groups, and most were involved in more than one. In total, 23 percent of trainees reported they were involved in a block club, 18 in a neighborhood watch group, 34 percent in a church or synagogue, 9 percent in a business group, 15 percent in a service organization and 33 percent in some other community group. Significantly, in the survey that was distributed during training, those with organizational connections were more optimistic about neighborhood problem solving under CAPS, and they were particularly optimistic about the role for the public in the program. The more involved they were in the organizational life of the community, the more likely trainees were to think that citizens can analyze problems, prioritize them, and come up with solutions. They were particularly optimistic about the kinds of efforts that organizations could encourage: citizens training one another in problem solving, and getting others to attend beat community meetings. Trainees who were already involved in community organizations were also more optimistic about the ability of ordinary citizens to prevent crime.

The Future of Citizen Training. One of the distinguishing features of CAPS among community policing programs around the country has been the city's commitment to civilian training and organizing. Even now, in our judgment, sophisticated joint police-civilian problem-solving efforts are still relatively infrequent — partly because civilians and beat officers have not yet envisioned how joint strategizing really works. Since the end of the original training project, training resources have been reorganized and procedures modified to reflect the successes and difficulties the original trainers faced. Efforts to train the public are now based in the police training academy. All but one of the seven civilian and seven primary police trainers were drawn from the original training staff. The new civilian trainer was hired in part because of her fluency in Polish. These seven training teams have been assigned to areas of the city, and are to operate flexibly in response to the training needs they identify there. Their first stop was to meet with district commanders, at sessions often attended by other district managers and neighborhood relations sergeants. Consultations like these gather local information and identify beats for training. The teams are then to develop a needs assessment for each beat, and tailor their training efforts to meet these needs. They can conduct training for beat officers as well as for civilians.

The trainers are authorized to organize their own training sessions, but they plan in particular to provide training in cooperation with community organizations and block clubs. The city's new training effort will emphasize more cooperation with existing groups and will target individuals who are already affiliated with organizations. As the 1996 evaluation report detailed, residents with organizational connections are much more likely to actually get involved in problem solving once training concludes. For the most part training will be delivered in three sessions; an initial introduction and two follow-up meetings, with more added if necessary.

The organizing component of citizen training is now handled by the CAPS Implementation Office. It deploys five area-service coordinators and 25 full-time equivalent outreach workers for education and mobilization projects. Most recently seven new staff were hired as information services coordinators to act as liaisons between city departments and court advocacy committees and provide technical support and information, particularly as it pertains to Housing Court. In addition to staff members' organizing skills and knowledge of specific areas of the city, they were often hired on the basis of their ability to speak languages other than English. The CAPS Implementation Office also has a substantial marketing budget. Some of these funds have been used to develop an array of multi-lingual educational materials, as well as videos depicting neighborhood problem-solving efforts and the problem-solving process. In the first six months of operation the office primarily focused on spreading the word about the program; since that campaign has been quite successful, attention and resources could be redirected towards rallying involvement and attendance at CAPS functions and community meetings.

Implementation of the General Order

In April of 1996 — exactly four years after CAPS was launched — organizational features of Chicago's community policing program were codified with the release of a new departmental General Order. The order specified procedures for differential dispatching and maintaining beat integrity; formats were specified for recording and tracking progress on specific beat problems; mechanisms were described that facilitate intershift communication within beat teams; and the responsibility police have for coordinating the delivery of city services was documented. The general order also outlined a departmentwide planning process that enhances the role of sergeants, lieutenants and district commanders in allocating resources, and it created area-level management teams. New roles were specified for lieutenants to accommodate the gradual disappearance of the rank of captain. Also described was how beat community meetings are to be run and how the districts' advisory committees are to be organized.

To assess implementation of this directive, this year's evaluation focused on the status of specific program elements in 13 sample districts. This is about half of the police districts in the city, and they are the same districts that were described in the 1996 report. Using the methods described below, we examined progress in implementing some key components of CAPS, and then made summary assessments of the status of those program elements, the success of the sample districts and trends since last year. Although the locales remain unchanged, some of the specific program components we examined changed. As CAPS matures, new ingredients are

introduced, while old ones become routine. Some aspects of the program that were once revolutionary have become commonplace and almost self-perpetuating. Many of the new activities that are examined in this report reflect teamwork and planning aspects of the program.

Based on a variety of data sources, we assessed the implementation of 25 specific program elements, although here we combine them into seven broad categories. The districts were selected to represent Chicago as a whole. Residents of four districts were overwhelmingly African-American; those living in two of those districts were extremely poor, while people in the remaining two districts were somewhat more affluent. Two more districts were home to large concentrations of Latinos and substantial African-American communities; another district was heavily Latino and otherwise occupied by whites. Two districts were made up of white middle-class homeowners; young white professionals (including many renters) were concentrated in two other districts; and two districts were extremely diverse and included representatives of most of Chicago's major demographic groups. In all, there were three South Side districts, three West Side districts, and three North Side districts. Another district lay to the northwest, one to the southwest, one was Near North, and one Near Northwest. In three of the districts more than 7,000 people live in public housing, and in two other districts the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) houses more than 1,000 persons. About 54 percent of the population of Chicago lived in the 13 districts, and in 1996 they reported about 50 percent of all the recorded crime in the city.

The program elements we evaluated this year fell into seven broad areas:

C   **Team Work and Planning**, consisting of district management teamwork, sector management team meetings, beat team meetings and communication between beat team members across shifts

C   **Beat Documentation**, based on an examination of the districts' master beat files. This includes a cursory inventory of the required forms, a discussion of their upkeep and an assessment of their utilization

C   **Partnership with the Community** involved taking a look at beat community meetings, the District Advisory Committee (DAC) and its subcommittees, and the DAC chair's role

C   **Dispatch Communications**, including beat integrity, 911 dispatching, portable data terminals and PCAD

C   **Bringing Other Units into CAPS**, looks at the role of detectives, district gang and tactical officers, special missions, intradepartmental requests and the role of district tactical lieutenant

C   **Ancillary Support**, focusing on the role and involvement of District Administrative Managers, the CAPS Implementation Office's outreach workers and the training academy's police and civilian trainers

C   **City Services**, discussing trends in service activity, and agency responsiveness and cooperation

The evaluation team conducted personal interviews with commanders, neighborhood relations sergeants, sector team leaders (lieutenants), beat team leaders (sergeants), district administrative managers, and the chairs of the district advisory committees in the 13 sample districts. Each interview was guided by a standardized list of questions, to ensure that we asked all of the appropriate questions of each respondent. The process also accommodated additional or follow-up questions, and enabled respondents to volunteer information as they wished. This allowed us to gather information that might have been otherwise overlooked. The 76 personal interviews were conducted during May, June, July and early August 1997. In addition, the evaluation team attended district plan seminars and reviewed quantitative data on beat community meeting attendance and service delivery.

When all interviews were completed, the evaluation team exchanged detailed notes. Each team member rated the status of individual CAPS components, by district, following a set of standards. Most of these criteria were based on program descriptions and explanations contained in the Chicago Police Department's General Order 96-3 and various other Department documents and training materials. The evaluators collaboratively discussed and compared each set of ratings. In most cases, the group's findings were consensual, but when there was dissent, the interview notes were revisited and discussed until consensus was reached.

Based on this review, this section of the report presents a snapshot of the progress of CAPS implementation in the summer of 1997. Each sub-section that follows includes an explanation of the program's components and how they are to function, as well as their importance or role in the CAPS strategy. When possible, we contrast the current status of the program's elements with their ratings in 1996, thus marking the progress of implementation. Summary data is then presented that assesses the progress of individual components as well as district-level progress in implementing CAPS.

Team Work and Planning

The Patrol Division's strategy to address chronic crime and disorder problems places much emphasis on teams and team work, because it is clear that individual officers cannot solve crime and disorder problems independently. In addition to instituting a communication process whereby officers who are completing their tour of duty speak to those coming on for their shift to apprise them of the day's occurrences, the strategy called for establishing teams at the beat, sector, district and area levels to facilitate planning and implementing the problem-solving process.

A fundamental difference between these teams and earlier ones is that traditionally teams were made up of partners or groups that worked together on the same shift. But in keeping with the neighborhood focus of CAPS, today's teams are composed of officers working the same geographical area on all three watches. This approach ensures that team members have a

multidimensional perspective of the crime and disorder conditions as well as the resources to address them in each area.

The teams are structured and managed as follows:

C   The foundation of the team structure is the **beat team**, which works with the community to identify priority problems, defined in CAPS as "a group of related incidents that concerns people in a particular area, which are chronic because they are unlikely to disappear without some type of intervention and which can be impacted by the resources available." These priority problems are then worked on by the beat team, which is headed up by a sergeant known as the beat team leader.

C   The next level is the **sector management team**, which is composed of all sergeants assigned to that sector as well as the beat team leaders. This team, led by a lieutenant, assigns resources and develops strategies to address beat priority problems and problems that transcend beat boundaries.

C   The district commander is at the helm of the **district management team**, the next layer in this configuration. Members of this team include the district's watch commanders, lieutenants, the neighborhood relations sergeant, the District Advisory Committee chair and the district administrative manager. As a group they set broad priorities that determine the use of sector and district resources to chip away at beat-level problems. Another responsibility of this team is to identify underlying conditions that contribute to crime and develop strategies that will affect those conditions.

C   The **area management team**, which is chaired by the area deputy chief, monitors resources and develops additional ones as needed to address beat-level problems that cannot be completely resolved using district resources. This team's membership consists of the district commanders and other key management personnel in the area as well as those in various citywide units, such as the commanders of the Youth Division, Gang Crimes, the Detective Division or any other unit appropriate to address the problems of that particular area.

These teams meet regularly to engage in analysis and planning. The process begins with information and priorities gleaned from beat community meetings. Within two weeks of that gathering, the beat team meets to identify, prioritize and analyze problems and subsequently design strategies and evaluate their progress. Because the CAPS philosophy recognizes that the residents of the beat and the officers who work there on a regular basis understand the local problems best, the planning process begins with the information and priorities that emerge at the beat community meeting. All the other meetings flow from what has been established at the beat community meeting and the beat team meeting. The sector team meets within a week of the last beat team meeting; the district management team meets at least quarterly after all sector teams

have met, and the area management team convenes after all the district management teams in that area have held their session.

The following sections provide an overview of teamwork and the various plans at the district level.

Beat Teams. As mentioned above, beat teams consist of a beat team leader and officers from all three watches assigned to the same beat. The beat team leader is a sergeant who monitors officers' problem-solving activities and attends beat community meetings. Beat teams meet within 14 days of every beat community meeting to exchange information, discuss community issues and develop strategies to attack crime and disorder problems. These beat team meetings are attended by all beat team officers and any other necessary personnel such as rapid response officers, gang and tactical officers and foot patrol officers. It is during beat team meetings that beat plans — comprehensive plans of action to attack prioritized crime and disorder problems — are developed and maintained.

The process set forth for developing a beat plan includes the following steps:

C   identifying and analyzing problems
C   establishing a time frame and realistic goals
C   designing strategies; assigning responsibilities among team members
C   implementing strategies (after the plan is approved by the sector team leader)
C   informing the community about progress at beat community meetings
C   assessing progress
C   evaluating strategies

Beat plans are to be reviewed at each beat team meeting, and modifications are to be made as necessary. New problems that have been identified by the beat team or community members are to be added to the beat plan at subsequent beat team meetings.

Beat plans play an important role in the police department's problem-solving process, for they are the foundation for all of the department's strategies to address crime and disorder. Using beat-level problems as the basis for department strategies ensures that problems and issues of the greatest concern to the beat team and community are addressed. Using this "bubble up" planning process recognizes that the beat team and community know best what problems exist and how they should be addressed.

Beat team meetings are an effective information-exchange tool. They provide a structured forum for officers across all watches to meet. Officers from all three watches rarely have the opportunity to discuss their beat in depth as a group. Because beat team meetings are held after beat community meetings, the beat team can discuss the community's perspectives on crime and disorder problems and include their input in the beat plans.

At the time of the last evaluation report, the implementation of beat plans and beat team meetings had only just begun. At that time, only two districts had begun holding regular beat team meetings, two had held trial beat team meetings a few months earlier, and the rest were to begin holding them by the end of July. No district reported having begun formulating beat plans; many of those interviewed explained that beat profiling needed to be completed and beat team meetings underway before that process could begin.

This year, however, all districts were holding beat team meetings and all had beat plans, albeit in different states of completion. Every beat team interviewed but one holds their meetings within 14 days after beat community meetings; the other meets immediately before the beat community meeting to prepare for the upcoming event.

According to beat team leaders we spoke with, beat team meetings are well received by many beat officers and considered worth having, although some beat team leaders do not think meetings are needed monthly. A few sergeants mentioned that overtime pay for attending the meetings contributed greatly to officers' opinions that beat team meetings are worthwhile. Beat team leaders' comments indicate that they, too, see value in beat team meetings:

> *They're useful to a degree because it keeps officers aware of what's going on. They're good for me, too, because I don't see the first and third watches very often. I use the meetings to remind officers to keep using the implementation forms and think about strategies for the problems.*

> *We discuss what happened at the beat community meeting. The foot officer voluntarily attends and he discusses with the officers what he knows. Officers will also pass along any important information to the foot officer then.*

> *They're worth having. They help with the beat plans. They are good for the officers as well — they can sort out what's gone on in the beat.*

When asked what occurs during team meetings, beat team leaders said officers discuss community meetings and the problems identified, work on priority problems, and exchange general beat information. A quarter of the beat team leaders specifically mentioned that officers work on their beat plans. A few sergeants said they use the department's problem-solving method, the crime triangle, to get officers to address all aspects of a problem. One beat team leader said:

> *At first, [beat team meetings] weren't accepted, but officers understand now that the department talks about problems differently than they used to. The department is looking for a more non-traditional response by the officers. At first all the team thought about was more police presence, more arrests and requesting tact. Now they talk about better lighting, talking to [city services], and working with the landlords. Their strategies are more innovative.*

During beat team meetings, leaders often encourage officers to complete paperwork such as beat implementation logs and some sergeants inspect officers' beat plan binders. (Beat plan binders contain beat plans, beat profiles and other beat-related material that officers carry with them.) According to one-third of the beat teams questioned, outside units such as rapid response, tactical officers and foot officers attend. In some districts tactical and gang officers are assigned to beat teams and are required to attend beat team meetings, while foot officers attend voluntarily. No civilians attend beat team meetings in any of the districts, although a few sergeants said they would not mind if their beat facilitator attended.

Three beat team leaders said they personally like the meetings because they rarely have any other opportunity to interact with all of their officers. In fact, among the beat team leaders interviewed, only two of the 13 interact with officers outside their watch on a daily basis. All of the sergeants with whom we spoke try to interact with beat officers on their own watch, although even that is difficult when a beat team leader is assigned as a sector sergeant in a different sector, or as a rapid response sergeant or relief sergeant. One beat team leader said:

I think [beat team meetings] are worth having. The meetings make officers know what's going on. Face-to-face relief isn't enough time to exchange the kind of information exchanged at the meetings.

When beat team leaders were asked if it is difficult to keep abreast of conditions on their beat, answers depended on whether they were assigned as a sector sergeant in the area. Of those interviewed, seven are assigned to the same sector as their beat. The remaining six are either relief sergeants or rapid response sergeants. One sergeant pointed out that no tactical or gang sergeants are beat team leaders in his district — a fact that reinforces his belief that the Tactical and Gang units are absent from CAPS. However, two commanders in other districts reported that they had assigned tactical sergeants as beat team leaders. One specifically mentioned he assigned tactical sergeants to mitigate the "us versus them" mentality that can arise.

Beat Plans. Beat plans are developed and revised during beat team meetings and forwarded to the sector management team leader for approval. We asked sector management team leaders what, if any, input they have in the beat plans. They all said they review and approve plans when submitted to them. A few have a hands-off attitude and are not involved in developing the plans at all — they let the beat team work independently on them, while other sector management team leaders are more active. Two of the 13 sector management team leaders regularly attend beat team meetings and are part of the beat planning process. A few others said they encourage their beat teams to use the problem-solving process. One sector management team leader thinks his beat teams have more to learn. He said,

[Beat teams] are supposed to use a three-pronged approach to analyze the problems. When looking for a solution, they're supposed to look at how the victim, offender and location are all involved in the problem. They don't do it as well as they should be. In this district, they're still learning how to do that.

Another sector leader believes his beat teams do not need much direction:

I review [beat plans] and I sign off on them once they're submitted to me. I attend all the beat [community] meetings in my sector, so I know pretty much what's going on. I'll make some suggestions on occasion. It seems like the sergeants have been receiving more and more training, so they probably know more than I do right now about what's expected.

In the spring of 1997, the CAPS co-managers and Patrol Division personnel met individually with district management teams to review their district plans. Each district had varying strengths and weaknesses; however, beat plans were universally weak. Stemming from this need, beat team leaders attended a one-day in-depth beat plan training at the Training Academy in May. Academy trainers reviewed the district planning process and the importance of the beat plans. They broke beat team leaders into small groups and tackled hypothetical problems using the same problem-solving process beat teams use during beat team meetings. Beat team leaders were reminded to analyze problems from offender, victim and location perspectives and list them in the appropriate beat plan section. Beat team leaders also learned they are to have specific, measurable goals noted in the beat plan that the beat team and community can strive toward.

We asked beat team leaders if they were required by their district to revise the beat plans. By that time, all district management teams had met with the CAPS co-managers for their district plan review session and most beat team leaders had attended beat leadership training. Half reported they were not asked to revise their plans, a quarter felt their plans were adequate as they were, and the remaining quarter revised them after being instructed. Many of the beat team leaders who had revised their plans felt their changes were minor — they simply needed to improve small areas. Two beat team leaders had the following comments:

Currently, we're going through the plans and modifying them. I've been focusing on defining goals and time frames mostly and fine tuning the rest. I think my plans are good and don't need a lot of revision. The examples they gave during the [beat team leader training] were similar to my plans. My beats only need more realistic goals.

My beat only had one plan and I was asked to redo it. I received some feedback from the meeting — we are to have more extensive analysis and have specific goals. This was clear when I went to the training, too. My plan doesn't need much revision, because it's what they're looking for. Did I learn anything useful from the training? I'm focusing more on the crime triangle now. The commander wants us to use the crime triangle, too.

Two of the sector management team leaders reported their beat teams were given explicit instructions for revising beat plans by district personnel. In one district, a member of the management team sat with beat teams and explained what changes they needed to make. The following comments are from sector leaders:

We just went through the process of putting together new beat plans....We told the sergeants this time we wanted new beat plans made up because the department wanted us to revise our district plan and the department gave us guidelines on how they wanted the beat plans made up, which they didn't give us the first time. So we've just gone through the process of analyzing and strategizing and coming up with new beat plans

There was no resistance to getting the beat plans done. In one of the beats, we spent two and a half hours just working on one problem. It was exhausting! Then we came back the next week and worked on the other two beat plans.

We also asked beat team leaders if they thought their officers needed additional training. We heard various responses: four stated that no more training was needed, three thought officers need meeting facilitation training, two believed officers need more problem-solving training, two think rapid response officers and the community need additional training, and the remaining two indicated that training is always needed.

Implementing the Beat Plan. All districts have created beat plans, but do beat teams have the opportunity to implement the beat plan strategies? We asked sector management team leaders if time is given for beat teams to implement beat plans. All of those interviewed said officers can "go down" or take a break from answering radio calls when they need the time. Sector management team leaders reported that beat officers only need to contact their sector sergeant and the sector sergeant will inform dispatchers to hold the beat officers' calls.

Although sector management leaders believe officers can take the needed time to work on plans, some qualified their statements. A few sector leaders said they rarely hear officers asking for time away from the radio. One mentioned:

I think, for the most part, if [officers] want some down time to work on [beat plans], they'll get it, although I don't see that happening too much, where officers ask for the time. I think I hear them going down more in [another district]. We share air time with them.

Another sergeant felt officers have many responsibilities which limits the time they can devote to problem solving. In answering whether allowances have been made to implement strategies, he said,

That's kind of a hard one to answer. I would say yes, but with reservations. They have other duties. We're still responsible for answering calls. We're still responsible for traffic enforcement, curfew enforcement, truant enforcement. Other agencies ask us to check on things. This takes away our time to concentrate on beat plans.

At the end of a shift, officers report what occurred during their tour of duty — how many arrests they made, how many traffic tickets they issued — to their supervisor during "check off." We wanted to assess whether supervisors sought information about beat plan progress at the end

of officers' shifts. Of the 13 district commanders interviewed, only two commanders know that beat plans are discussed at check off. One commander named four sergeants who he knows specifically ask, while the other commander said watch commanders and sergeants ask all the time, not just at the end of the day. The common response to the question, though, was that there is no time to do so because officers are too eager to go home.

One district has implemented a creative way to keep on top of beat plans. A sector management team leader reported,

> *Sergeants have strategy sessions with the commander every month and I think this really puts the beat team leaders on their toes. They have to drive the commander around and show him what's what.*

Beat team leaders. The advent of beat team leaders has changed the role of the neighborhood relations personnel slightly in two-thirds of the districts interviewed. Beat team leaders attend beat community meetings and run team meetings that were previously the domain of neighborhood relations. Neighborhood relations sergeants were asked if their staff attend beat team meetings and only a quarter responded someone still does, down dramatically from previous years. Neighborhood relations officers in these districts are assigned specific beats and act as a liaison between the beat team and the community. They regularly attend beat community meetings as well.

Neighborhood relations sergeants were asked if the assignment of beat team leaders has changed their own responsibilities. A little more than half believe it has changed their role. The most common response to questions about how neighborhood relations sergeants' jobs have changed is that they no longer have to attend beat community meetings nor do they have to focus on individual beats as often. One neighborhood relations sergeant described the difference succinctly:

> *[Beat team leaders] have made my role one of support and not management.*

Another neighborhood relations sergeant believes switching the brunt of beat team responsibility to beat team leaders has helped police officers understand that CAPS is not just a Neighborhood Relations project.

Beat team leaders were asked to describe sector sergeants' roles and comment on whether that role is clearly distinguished from beat team leader responsibilities. Across the board, beat team leaders described sector sergeants' responsibilities as coordinating officers, monitoring dispatch and completing paperwork. Sergeants split about whether they believe the beat team leader's responsibilities are clearly differentiated from those of sector sergeant. Of the six who thought it was not absolutely articulated, five lead beats where they are also sector sergeants. One of them explained,

The responsibilities [of sector sergeants and beat team leaders] are the same—only the forms are different. Beat team leaders have CAPS forms that structure what to work on and what problems to solve. Sector sergeants work on solving problems as well, but it isn't as structured. The information is still there—it's just not hand fed. Both sergeant responsibilities are to manage the 'blue shirts.' One has papers in the file cabinet and the problems are continual. The other's crimes come through the radio. They are the same overall responsibilities.

Among those who opine that sector sergeants' and beat team leaders' roles are distinct, only two are leaders of beats in the sector they supervise. A beat team leader who is otherwise a relief sergeant said,

Sector sergeants work on the immediate problems and beat team leaders figure out the strategies. Beat team leaders are more like planners.

Although sergeants differed on whether the two roles are similar, two-thirds of them agreed that the additional responsibilities of a beat team leader — especially paperwork — are excessive. One sergeant said,

I have many responsibilities. My day was full before CAPS and now it's worse.

The job of beat team leader would be very, very time consuming if they relieved you of everything else. But that hasn't happened. Just keeping up with CR number paperwork can take one entire shift! All I can do is do my best....so if they tell me to do something, I do it. And I do it to the best of my ability. But for everything they add, something else is going to be affected.

Some complained about the lack of compensation. One sergeant said,

I have no incentive to be a beat team leader. I have more work to do for the same pay.

A sergeant interviewed for last year's report said then that he was enthusiastic about the new beat team leader responsibilities:

Even though on paper I managed those under my supervision, I really didn't manage anybody. Anything I did had to be approved by somebody. In Patrol, sergeants really had no responsibility, but now we do.

This year, the same sergeant seemed overwhelmed by the responsibilities he was previously enthusiastic about:

I think as a beat team leader, I should receive more pay. I have many more responsibilities as beat team leader compared to sector sergeant. I don't want another ribbon or title change, just more pay.

The role of beat team leader is clearly not perceived as an upgrade by sergeants. When asked if they knew why they were selected as beat team leaders, half answered (some sarcastically) that they did not know nor did they ask; a quarter answered they were stuck with the job because they are the newest in the district; and only two said they were assigned because of their previous experience.

Two-thirds of the interviewed commanders reported, however, that they selected beat team leaders based on their experience, ability and adeptness with the community. In most cases, commanders chose their beat team leaders with the assistance of watch commanders and sector management team leaders. A few commanders had to make changes over time, but overall they report being pleased with their selections. Two commanders with whom we spoke assigned tactical sergeants as beat team leaders as well. Commanders discussed their selections:

I first looked at the sergeant who worked the sector. And then I tried to figure out who would be most effective and who was most competent.

The original people we chose, we picked for their personality and how they seemed to work with people. We really thought we had it right, but we did have to change a few. When it came time to make some changes, we decided not to have only beat sergeants, and we selected a few tact and gang sergeants. Well anyway, one gang sergeant remains as a beat team leader. A lot of sergeants feel that there's too many details to being a beat team leader, but we really thought it was important to use sergeants other than beat sergeants.

Sector Management Teams. The sector management team is composed of sector sergeants assigned to the same sector on all three watches, beat team leaders in that sector and a lieutenant designated by the district commander to serve as sector team leader. The team is supposed to meet regularly — whether monthly, bi-monthly or quarterly — seven days after all the beat teams in the sector have met, to share information about beat plans and beat priority problems. They ensure that the problems and strategies described in the beat plans accurately reflect the needs of the community, as noted on beat community meeting logs; identify problems that transcend beat boundaries; and assess progress made on existing problems. Other key district personnel such as tactical, gang or rapid response supervisors may be invited to the meeting as needed.

Sector management team leaders are responsible for convening the meetings, where they are supposed to review and approve beat plans and beat plan implementation logs and then, following the meeting, forward them to the district administrative manager for inclusion in the master beat file. They also reviews their teams' Intra-Departmental Support Service Requests and, if they approve, forward them to the commander. Above all, they are an important link in the chain of communication between district management and the beat teams in their sectors,

sharing information gathered at the sector management team meeting with the district management team, and vice versa.

Sector management team leaders in the 13 study districts were interviewed about how the team concept has been put into practice. According to most of them, their meetings involve only themselves and their sergeants, but one reported including the rapid response sergeant, another said he invites gang and tactical sergeants and a third mentioned inviting the watch commander. His rationale follows:

> *The watch commander will attend sometimes to keep abreast of what's going on. We kind of ignored them in this system. There are a lot of holes in that [general] order about watch commanders being informed about things. They're in on the district management team, but not a lot of lower level stuff.*

Following are lieutenants' descriptions of what transpires at sector management team meetings:

> *I sit down with all four of my sergeants and discover what problems have occurred since the last meeting. I do this after their beat meetings and beat team meetings so I get current feedback. I find out what little problems there are that can be resolved right away, like a stop sign that's needed. I require them to keep notes so they can go back to their beat meeting and let people know what they've done.*

> *We discuss if they have any problems implementing the plans that they have determined to solve a specific problem. If they want other city services to help on that, then I'll certainly help with that.*

> *We go through every single beat plan — all the beat team leaders and I — and then we discuss 'em and see what progress has been made, and if no progress has been made, then we see what other strategies we can come up with. I think it's really eliminated a lot of minor chronic problems.*

> *We have each sergeant talk about their beat, what's going on, their hot spot areas and how they've addressed them. And once each sergeant goes through their little spiel, we'll see if there are overlapping problems on adjoining beats so the left hand knows what the right hand is doing.*

> *I disseminate whatever information I have that pertains to CAPS that I've collected in the last couple of months. I'll ask the sergeants about their problems, what's going on, how long before it's closed out.*

> *There's discussion of the problems in each beat and how they move from one beat to another. For example, gangs; if the shooting's on one beat one day, then the retaliatory shooting might be on the next beat the next day, and we share strategies and discuss any problems that they might have.*

We usually talk about problems that are common throughout the sector; what our goals are — a one or two percent decrease in crime; what strategies need to be changed or refined.

Informal discussions are sometimes substituted for sector management team meetings, particularly between beat team leaders and sector management team leaders who work the same shift, or when more than one of the sergeants in a sector is on furlough or a special detail:

Sometimes I may have only one or two sergeants and I get together with them on an informal basis and we discuss what we want done.

The age-old problem with meetings is, it's hard to get everybody together with furlough and days off, et cetera, so daily communication is really important.

We meet once every other month. But I talk to the sergeants in my sector every day, so there's communication going back and forth.

Of the 13 sector management team leaders interviewed, about half of them (six) held monthly meetings with their team; four met every two months; two of them conducted meetings once every three months; and one reported meeting with his sector team only twice a year. He commented:

When we first put the district plan together, we had [a sector team meeting], and then when we revised it, I sat down with my three leaders and then gave the commander one or two priority problems in our sector. Generally, the problems in your beat didn't change in the month. The CAPS program is working here because the people are well organized. There is no reason to have all these meetings.

As far as their involvement in the beat planning process is concerned, most of the lieutenants indicated that their role is primarily to review beat plans developed by their beat teams. They explained that sergeants had more training in the process than they had and expressed confidence in their beat teams:

Unless there's a problem with the plan, I don't get too involved. And I don't want to take the gusto away from beat team leaders, so I've only gone to one or two beat team meetings.

I want to encourage them to actually have their beat men come up with the ideas, where the beat man has some input on it and because of that, will in fact implement it. I think the beat man has to be involved.

Yet, they indicated that they are capable of providing more than a review when it is warranted:

What I've done is brought it to their attention when a Beat Plan is not done correctly — when they're not using a crime triangle approach to problem solving.

I try to get them to put more emphasis on detail in those areas — victim, offender and location — and to pass that along to the beat officers.

If I see that [beat team leaders] are lacking in some area, I'll bring them in, maybe one at a time, and go over some of the parts, like problem solving or interacting with the community.

The lieutenants' attendance at beat community meetings in their sector ranged from sporadic to frequent. One said he goes to almost all of them "to keep close tabs" on what is happening and that, "because I have close contact with the sergeants, we don't have sector management team meetings as often as prescribed." Unanimously sector management team leaders reported that allowances are made for the time that beat officers need to implement beat plan strategies, that their requests to "go down" to work on problems is denied only if there are more pressing duties.

District Management Teams. As mentioned earlier, it is the district management team's responsibility to set priorities on the use of sector and district resources to impact beat-level problems. Under that umbrella falls the development of the district plan, which had been the main focus of district management team meetings for the period leading up to our implementation study.

By summer 1997 all 13 of the districts evaluated were holding district management team meetings. Commanders were not particularly conversational about these meetings, and their assessments of them ranged from "okay" and "all right" to "very good." One commander considered his district management team meetings to be "good," but his opinion was not shared by those who attend. All things considered, however, most participants seemed amenable to attending the meetings and were not critical of what had transpired.

In each district we visited, management team meetings were attended by the commander, the administrative manager, watch commanders, sector team leaders, the neighborhood relations sergeant and the tact lieutenant. Other participants varied by district and according to what was on the agenda for that particular meeting. For example, some commanders would meet with sector leaders and beat team leaders when certain aspects of the beat plan were being developed at a particular meeting. The only glaring omission in the district management team meetings roster was the DAC chair. Only four of the 13 DAC chairs had attended a district management team meeting in spite of the fact that the General Order specifies that the DAC chair is a member of the district management team, and as such should attend these planning meetings. It must be clarified, though, that sometimes exclusion of the DAC chair was a matter of timing. For example, some of the individuals we interviewed were recently elected in districts where meetings are held quarterly. They had not yet attended district management team meetings, but their predecessors had. In other districts, however, the DACs' absence from the management team meetings was not circumstantial, and they were vocal about it:

I've been told I would be [included] but it's never happened. The last time I asked [the neighborhood relations sergeant], I was told I'd be the first to know, and it

has never happened. The only thing that came to mind is that it's just disorganization.

The commander's revamping things, so I don't know where I'm gonna fit in as the DAC chairperson.

[The meeting tomorrow] will be my first one. What's funny is that they're getting directives [that specify that the DAC chair should be included], and then I'm getting invited.

I haven't been invited. I don't know when it is.

Others were quite unaware that they were to be included:

Are DAC chairs supposed to go? Do they go in other districts?

Should I be going to them? What's the purpose [of my attendance at this meeting]?

We don't have formal meetings, but we meet all the time. The commander comes by here. [The Neighborhood Relations sergeant] meets with me....

It is interesting to note that in six of the districts there are different perceptions as to whether DAC chairs attend the meetings: commanders stated that their DAC chairs have been attending meetings, while the DAC chairs themselves report that they have not. In the four districts where the DAC chair does attend district management team meetings, each seems to be quite assimilated and have a significant role:

I give my opinion on how the subcommittees in the DAC could reduce and make an impact on crime. I see what style of crime exists in the different areas and take the information back with me to the DAC. For example, one reason there's so much home burglary is that no one's home, so you figure you need to have a seminar on it at night. I ask questions openly; no one ever tells me to shut up. It's open communication across the board.

My input [at the meetings where the district plan was being developed] was basically to give them a sense of what's important to the community. The format they use is how to reduce crime, so I'm trying to get them to find other ways to measure their success.

I sit in on the team meetings that the commander has every other month and he solicits my input on the allocation of manpower, the top three priorities of the district, the best way to attack problems.

We'll go through, beat by beat, and I share information and give input if there's something they've overlooked that's an issue that's come up in that beat, or if I'm not getting the court turnout, or if the patrols aren't coming into a specified area.

One commander was quite honest about the challenge of welcoming the recently elected, strong-willed DAC chair to the district management team:

*I know [the DAC chair] is supposed to [attend meetings], and [the DAC chair] will. It **is** the right thing to do. It's just that I always feel that I have to act as mediator when [the DAC chair] is around, and I don't really want to have to be in that role in my own management team meeting.*

District Plans. The process of developing district plans took place in autumn 1996. Commanders were directed to submit a two-part plan. The first section of the plan was to identify the district's priority problems, describe the nature and extent of them and identify their underlying causes. The second section of the plan was supposed to address the way in which district resources would be deployed to implement the plan — a management plan.

Little instruction was given to the commanders about what they were to submit, and the result was that documents with a wide range of formats and quality were handed in. After the 25 district plans were reviewed independently by four people — the CAPS co-managers and the chief and deputy chief of Patrol — the plans were rated. Though some were clearly stronger plans than others, all 25 needed additional work in any one or all of four areas: problems analysis, devising measurable targets, identifying underlying causes and developing management plans.

A focus group was held with developers of the strongest plans, mostly commanders and district administrative managers, but other key people from the districts also attended. Using information gleaned from their overviews of the plan development process, the CAPS co-managers created a day-long personalized tutorial to clarify expectations for the final version of the district plans, which were to be resubmitted on a date specified by the Chief of Patrol. The tutorial session is discussed at greater length in the special initiatives section of this report.

At the time we interviewed district personnel for this report, none of the 13 commanders had gotten feedback on the revised version of their district plan.

Face-to-Face Relief Process. Face-to-face communication at change of watch is an established concept that was re-emphasized with the inception of CAPS. The revival of this activity, augmented by a Daily Watch Assignment Record form, stemmed from the department's vision of making the organization more unified and one in which all members would share information with one another. Police researchers have noted how infrequently officers who are assigned to the same beat but serve on different shifts communicate with one another. Each watch begins policing its beat anew, with no "institutional memory" of what happened there even an hour before. For police, continuing events can be as disconnected as if they had taken place in different parts of town when they span a shift change. The number of beats in a city may need to be multiplied by a factor of three to approximate the number of "worlds" officers work

in. This state of affairs presented problems even when policing was incident driven, and in agencies that are committed to problem solving by teams of officers who are to be expert on local conditions, it is a very big problem.

In response, CAPS' managers underscored the importance of exchanging information across watches. Face-to-face relief entails communication between off-going and on-coming officers assigned to the same beat or rapid response unit and includes a discussion of information recorded on the off-going officer's Daily Watch Assignment Record. This one-page form, completed during each officer's tour of duty, is the basis for discussion during face-to-face relief at roll call. It documents actions taken, observations, community contacts, radio assignments, serious incidents, arrests, and follow-up procedures for priority problems. The brief interaction enables newly arrived officers to ask questions and discuss ongoing problems with the officers they are relieving. It is to ensure that critical information is shared in a timely fashion so that officers beginning their workday are better prepared to deal with recurring incidents and are alerted to potentially dangerous situations that may flare up or intensify during their watches. The process also supports long-range problem solving by helping to identify chronic problems. Supervisors described how the kind of information that is shared runs the gamut from scuttlebutt to critical information and varies from beat to beat:

> *They discuss the problems of the day — something they feel their relief should know about or what action might have been taken on some existing problem.*

> *They talk about suspicious persons, missing people, kids in the park; they let each other know who they need to keep shagging.*

> *It's needed for information exchange and equipment control. They can let each other know if anything is wrong with any of the equipment.*

> *They discuss any problems on the beat — any ongoing domestic problems, any arrests made, and any probable hot spots.*

> *They'll talk about increases in gang recruitment or stuff that's happening in the schools, or gang initiations.*

> *They [share information about] crimes that may have occurred late in the watch where they may be looking for somebody; wanted persons; special attentions.*

> *Usually, [they talk about] extraordinary incidents where you'll have a homicide or a drive-by and you're looking for a particular vehicle; or there's shooting in an area, and the officer will tell his relief to be careful. And in-house gossip; a lot of gossip.*

Our interviews in 13 districts revealed that the face-to-face information exchange is more widespread than it was last year at this time, with verbal exchanges taking place regularly between off-going officers and their relief in eight of the 13 districts, as compared with only five

last year. One factor which has facilitated the process was the addition of beat team meetings in the intervening year, enabling beat team members to become acquainted with their counterparts on other watches and build a rapport. In districts where the face-to-face procedure is not taking place at roll call in a consistent and systematic manner, Daily Watch Assignment Records are used to share routine information and supervisors make a point of announcing newsworthy items such as repeated calls for service, domestic disturbances or major incidents that have occurred. In addition, alternative forms of communication have surfaced; for example, certain dispatchers serve as useful sources of beat and district news for patrol officers, and the new personal data terminals (PDTs) installed in the squad cars have proven to be a convenient means of communication between beat officers. More than one supervisor discussed how, over time, PDTs could eliminate the need for the face-to-face process altogether:

> *The PDT systems are the best way to leave or exchange information. The same PDT should be routinely assigned to the same car, so watches can leave information on the PDT and regularly exchange information that way. They should be able to keep a daily watch log on the PDT. They can send messages to each other and take notes.*

Another innovative approach to information sharing employed in one district entails keeping a notebook in the beat car so that officers can record information about every suspicious person they stop, particularly helpful in light of the high auto theft rate there.

As noted last year, a significant factor in the success or failure of the face-to-face process appears to be its timing. In most districts, it is held after roll call for arriving officers, when departing officers are impatient to complete the check-off procedure and leave. Roll call can extend until almost the end of the off-going officers' tour of duty, especially when training is taking place; and then, even if the departing officer is willing to engage in a face-to-face information exchange, the arriving officer is sometimes dispatched right away. In some districts where the face-to-face relief process has been more successful, time has been set aside for it prior to the on-coming roll call. In fact, police in many of the study districts recommended that the General Order be amended to provide for off-going officers to come into the station 10 minutes earlier than they do now to accomplish this important exchange of information. They suggested that the face-to-face procedure be held on the hour, followed by roll call. Supervisors' remarks about the process include the following:

> *It could be useful, but not how it's run now. People would be more motivated if they could come in earlier and not eat into their own time.*

> *The conflict is that watch commanders don't want the cars in the lot early, but holding face-to-face after roll call doesn't give the officers any incentive to do it.*

> *Whether or not it happens depends on how long roll call lasts.*

> *If I don't get my roll call out in time to do the face to face, are we gonna make the guys [on the previous watch] stay overtime? Let's have it in writing to have them come in*

early and do it before the roll call. The department should make a policy about how they want it conducted.

Other deterrents to the success of the face-to-face communication process cited in interviews are the lack of adequate facilities in the older district stations, personality conflicts between officers, and the fact that it is not always enforced by senior officers. Inadequate space was mentioned often, and in good weather the information exchange is often held in the station parking lot, as is roll call. Although some districts have initiated creative strategies in an effort to ensure that the face-to-face process is accomplished regularly, such as having officers remove the beat identification tag from their car and hand it over to their relief, their efforts are still not necessarily successful. To a large extent, the presence or absence of verbal communication depends upon circumstances and individuals' personalities. Often, the reason for forgoing the face-to-face exchange is that the departing officer feels there is nothing of significance to report. Supervisors commented:

Those who are motivated will do it. Even though face to face is mandatory, it still depends on officers' personalities.

When officers need to tell each other something important like there's a missing child, it's done. Otherwise, it isn't necessary to tell the on-coming officer that they've had a boring day.

If there's something important that happened on a beat it will be communicated — maybe to the sergeant, who will tell the next watch; not always by the face to face.

Despite the fact that the face-to-face procedure is not occurring universally, most supervisors interviewed feel it is a valuable tool from a safety standpoint, if for no other reason. Many also believe that the personal contact and socialization aspect are important, and some remarked that good police officers have always engaged in an exchange of this nature, now formalized by the department order. However, there are those who find it unnecessary if there is nothing eventful to report, particularly in quieter districts; they appear oblivious to the team building and beat ownership facets of daily communication. Among supervisors' comments about its value were:

You want to know what you're walking into.

If a person doesn't have much to say one day, the meeting will be short. The officer coming on needs to know what went on.

A conscientious officer, if he has valuable information to pass on from one watch to the next, especially if it can impact on an officer's safety situation, is going to do that. But to say we must have a formalized face-to-face relief with each officer, I don't think it's necessary. I don't think that, especially in a slower district like this one, that, in most cases, there's anything to say. If an officer goes through a day without any crime or major incident, what is there to pass on?

Beat Documentation

Complementing problem solving, beat teams are responsible for documenting their efforts. A central filing system was mandated by the CAPS general order to keep problem solving paperwork — beat plans and other beat level information — organized and accessible to beat officers; that system is the master beat file. The master beat file should enable officers to find resources to aid them in problem solving and to help them inform residents of activities on their beat. Master beat files also serve as a good resource for newly assigned beat officers to acquaint themselves with their new beats.

Master Beat File. In the master beat file, beat plans, beat profiles, beat plan implementation logs and any other paperwork deemed necessary can be found. District administrative managers (DAMs) are responsible for maintaining the set of file cabinets, while watch commanders are charged with inspecting them once a month.

Although master beat files were mandated in the General Order in April 1996, they were not uniformly in place until after last year's 1996 implementation study. Many of the required problem-solving components such as beat team meetings and beat plans had not started until late summer or early fall of 1996, and some districts at that time were still developing their beat profiles. In many cases master beat file development coincided with getting these other components up and running.

During the summer of 1997, however, every district observed had a master beat file and, judging from cursory examinations, all 13 appeared to have the requisite paperwork. In some districts and in some beats, necessary paperwork such as beat plan implementation logs and problem reference number control sheets were missing, but many districts had far more information than required. Typical additional information included beat community meeting logs, Daily Watch Assignment Records, Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information (MOII) status reports, arrest statistics and crime maps. More than half the districts keep their files in easily accessible locations like the watch commander's office or the roll call room and six out of 13 districts keep them open and unlocked. A few DAMs explained that their files were locked because officers either removed original documents or left trash and debris behind in the files.

Those responsible for file maintenance differed by district and by whose opinion was asked. According to DAMs, master beat files are either maintained by the DAM themselves or the CAPS clerk, a civilian position in the Neighborhood Relations office. More than half the beat team leaders, however, consider themselves responsible. The remaining half believe Neighborhood Relations or the DAM manages the files. It seems many beat team leaders, cheerfully or not, maintain their beat's file, while DAMs and CAPS clerks oversee the entire file.

Because all districts have master beat files and most are up to par at this time, we were interested in learning whether master beat files are useful to beat team members — do beat officers and sergeants use them? According to a little more than half the beat team leaders, their officers use the master beat file, although the level of usage varies. A statement commonly heard from sergeants was, "some officers do and some don't." For example, one beat team leader thinks at least three of his eight officers use the files.

Three of the 13 beat team leaders we interviewed report they use the files to exchange information with their officers. In some districts, officers drop off their beat community logs for review and in another, a sergeant leaves detective information for officers' perusal. This sergeant enjoyed the convenience of making only one copy for all 11 beat officers. A few other beat team leaders said beat officers use the master beat file before beat community meetings to collect information or review past problems. Another sergeant assigns officers in his sector specific beat plan problems by reference number during roll call. Officers are then encouraged to use the master beat file to learn what progress the police and community made on the problem.

A few beat team leaders mentioned that they themselves find the master beat file useful. One beat team leader said the file keeps him apprised of what has been happening in his beat. This is helpful because normally he interacts with his shift's officers only and does not know what occurred during other shifts. And as mentioned above, a few of the sergeants enjoy the master beat file as a paperwork/information exchange system.

Not all beat team leaders reported the master beat file is effectively used or is worth the trouble, though. Approximately half reported that their officers either do not use it or they were not really sure. One sergeant said his beat was too slow for officers to have any need for the master beat file. Another sergeant said although he was not sure if officers used the master beat file, they do carry around their beat plan binders holding all the same information. A less enthusiastic sergeant stated she believes her district's master beat file is inaccessible to officers because it is locked and usually has incomplete files.

District administrative managers were much more optimistic when asked if officers use the master beat file. Almost two-thirds said officers use it, and a few said this because they often request missing information. One district's master beat file is so popular with beat officers that a second master beat file was needed. The second file has copies of the original forms with additional blank forms for the beat teams.

Problem-Solving Paperwork. While half the beat team leaders and more than half the DAMs considered the master beat file an effective tool for communication and reference, overwhelmingly both groups considered the amount of CAPS paperwork to be excessive — a sentiment that has been repeated year after year. A few sergeants are disgruntled that although they were told paperwork would be reduced, it has instead only increased:

> *There's way too much paperwork. At the end of my shift I stop by the dumpster and trash tons of paperwork. The department loves documentation and won't change. They want to know, 'where'd ya go today and what did ya do?'*

A district administrative manager lamented,

> *The paperwork is phenomenal and it's killing trees. Officers are drowning in it.*

Complaints about paperwork were not restricted to those with less positive attitudes about CAPS. Even enthusiastic, "pro-CAPS" beat team leaders complained about paperwork. One beat team leader said emphatically, "The whole CAPS program is becoming a paper thing."

He explained that though he likes the beat community meetings concept, the documentation requirements are so great that he feels he does not have time to implement strategies. An innovative beat team leader said he has been bogged down in paperwork, resulting in his feeling that,

> *Although they were supposed to empower the officers, they've created a new bureaucracy.*

Another optimistic sergeant identified "killer paperwork" as one of the obstacles to implementing CAPS. A sergeant who is a proponent of the master beat file said,

> *I hope they don't strangle this program in paperwork. I was told CAPS was supposed to be versatile, and yet we've only been bombarded with more required paperwork.*

Beat Profiles. Illustrative of the resistance to paperwork, less than a fourth of beat profiles have been updated in the last year. Beat profiles are an informational tool that helps beat officers and other district personnel become more knowledgeable about the beat. It describes the chronic crime and disorder conditions on the beat and identifies community resources that can assist in alleviating the problems. The beat profiling process helps beat officers become more familiar with their beats and establish contacts with key members of the community. Another valuable function of the beat profile is that it provides information for new and relief officers and other personnel who may be conducting missions on a particular beat. Information collection for the beat profile is done by all members of the beat team. Rapid response officers, tactical, and gang tactical officers assist in the collection and verification of information that goes into the beat profile. According to the CAPS General Order, officers are to update the beat profile during beat team meetings when deemed necessary.

At the time of last year's citywide implementation study, beat profiles were in the process of being updated in those districts that had previously created them, and they were being compiled in the remaining districts. As of the summer of 1997, few beat profiles had been updated. Less than a quarter of beat team leaders interviewed said their profiles were updated; the remainder said either they have not been done or were not sure if they had. A beat team leader noted:

> *Beat profiles are worth having but they aren't worth doing. For the amount of time it takes to complete them, they aren't worthwhile. Honestly, no one refers to them or very rarely.*

A number of beat team leaders also felt updating the beat profiles was not necessary because nothing had changed in the beat.

Neighborhood relations sergeants told a similar story. Only a fourth of neighborhood relations sergeants said the profiles have been updated, while almost a half said they had not. A few sergeants complained that it had taken a long time to complete the original profile, and it seemed to them that the beat profiles had only just been finished.

While it is important to note that a firm update schedule has not been deemed necessary, the evaluators have the impression that field personnel have little awareness of the beat profile's true value — to familiarize new officers or administrators with the intricacies of the beat. Answers such as "nothing has changed " (in the year since the beat profile was completed) indicate that it is unlikely that many beat profiles will remain useful as months pass.

Beat Plan Implementation Logs. Beat plan implementation logs, on which beat team members record actions to address priority problems, were particularly tedious for many of the officers. Two-thirds of the beat team leaders either do not require officers to fill out the logs or they did not consider them necessary for their beat. One sergeant said he has trouble getting officers to turn the logs in, adding,

> *It's yet another form to justify and document what you're doing.*

Another sergeant thinks it is unreasonable to ask the third watch to stop and fill in implementation logs because they are so busy. He does not require his officers to fill them out and said,

> *If they want us to solve problems, there's no time to do logs. [The people who mandated logs] either haven't worked a busy car in a while or ever. There's way too much paperwork.*

Partnership with the Community

The citizen role in Chicago's community policing partnership is facilitated at the broadest level by means of the beat community meeting, but in addition there is a citizen advisory group in each district that is set up to assist the commander. The District Advisory Committee (DAC) consists of several subcommittees, the foci of which vary among the districts, depending on their needs (though there are two mandated subcommittees — Court Advocacy and Senior Citizens). Beat community meetings, District Advisory Committees and their subcommittees, and Court Advocacy will be examined in the following sections.

Beat Community Meetings. Beat community meetings are one formal mechanism for building and maintaining partnerships. They provide a forum for community members and police to meet, exchange information, and begin the process of identifying, prioritizing, and analyzing crime and disorder problems in their neighborhood. Beat community meetings are the most common way that the police-community partnership is developed.

As was the case last year, beat community meetings are held regularly in each of the 13 districts surveyed, most often occurring monthly or every other month, and rarely, quarterly. Also similar to last year, beat community meeting attendance varies widely from beat to beat, with reports of anywhere from six to 150 community members participating. (See Citizen Involvement in CAPS for more specific details about beat community meeting attendance.)

Resident attendance continues to be a problem in many districts. Of all interviewed, about half the neighborhood relations sergeants and district commanders, a quarter of beat team

leaders and a third of District Advisory Committee (DAC) chairs believe attendance is too low in their districts. Like last year, police personnel report a core group of people regularly attend the meetings. Concerning the recurrent beat community meeting attenders, a neighborhood relations sergeant said,

> *I'd like to see them get new faces. It's always the same people. That just means that CAPS is working for a small group of people. And like that, it begins to be like a private police department for that group.*

Strategies employed by police to increase attendance vary from district to district. Commonly, police tell community members about the meetings whenever they interact; for example, when citizens call with complaints or when police respond to a call police officers claim they tell people about upcoming beat community meetings. Police also contact community groups, ask businesses to display meeting announcements in their windows, distribute flyers to churches and to citizens at beat community meetings to pass out, and announce beat meetings at other community meetings. Announcements are also posted on the Chicago community policing home page on the Internet and are published in local newspapers in some districts. Police personnel this year can also rely on the new outreach workers from the CAPS Implementation Office in City Hall to help improve attendance. Outreach workers attend neighborhood festivals, give CAPS presentations at schools and canvass door-to-door to improve beat community meeting attendance and spread CAPS awareness. (More information about outreach workers appears later in this report.)

District personnel continue to be frustrated with citizens' lack of commitment. Many do not attend beat community meetings until a problem emerges that affects them personally. Those interviewed had these comments on the subject:

> *If a specific problem isn't threatening, many people won't attend meetings. Unless there's a crime, they aren't as vocal.*

> *Lots of citizens are only involved when there's bad stuff. Attendance increases when something bad happens.*

> *I'd like to see more people getting involved without having a big problem to send them to the beat [community] meeting. I'd like to get someone from each block, but I know that is too ideal. But new people generally come because of a problem.*

> *The beat [community] meetings should be attended by 60 or 70 percent of the residents. You don't get the neighbors participating. They only come out if something affects them—robbery or property damage. A lot of times, once that has been resolved, then they disappear.*

Police are just as concerned about who is attending beat community meetings as they are about the numbers in attendance. In most districts, it seems to be easy to attract senior citizens, but there is some question about how to get youth involved as well as people between the ages of

35 and 50, some of whom are likely to be the parents of teenaged offenders. One beat team leader said,

> *We have many upstanding citizens attend the meetings, but I would like to see the people from the problem areas attend. I'd also like to see younger people attend. Most are middle aged or older. I've attended beat [community] meetings in different sectors and it seemed like all the people were in their 70s.*

The actual proportion of meetings that are predominately attended by seniors is somewhat smaller than any expect, however. During 1995 we attended 165 meetings and surveyed those who attended. Overall, about 30 percent were 60 years of age or older. About 20 percent of the meetings involved a majority of seniors by this definition.

As for police presence at beat community meetings, it includes the sergeant who is the beat team leader, beat officers from all three watches and other department personnel as needed, such as rapid response and foot officers. Only two districts reported that tactical and gang officers regularly attend beat community meetings. Slightly more than half the sector management team leaders report they regularly attend beat community meetings in their sector. Occasionally, watch commanders and district commanders also attend.

In the majority of districts, neighborhood relations officers continue to attend beat community meetings, although in ever decreasing numbers. A quarter of the districts reported they are "moving out" of the meetings and only attend when requested. In only a few beats are neighborhood relations officers facilitating meetings. In most cases, they perform a support function, answering questions and bringing packets of information about community resources. A number of districts have assigned neighborhood relations officers to beats to act as a liaison between the community and beat team. This is a significant departure from when beat community meetings were first held, because at that time, neighborhood relations officers ran the meetings with beat officers holding question and answer sessions toward the end of the gathering.

Beat Facilitators. Beat facilitators are volunteers from the community who aid beat teams in creating community-police partnerships and work on making problem solving happen. Beat facilitators are often "translators" or "communicators" between residents, stakeholders and the police during beat community meetings. Beat community meetings may be run by a beat officer, a beat facilitator or a combination of the two.

Who runs beat community meetings differs across districts and beats in our study. According to district commanders, a third of beat community meetings are run by beat officers, a third by beat facilitators and a third jointly. Neighborhood relations sergeants reported that half beat community meetings are run jointly and most of the remaining are run by beat officers. According to the beat team leaders, five lead beats where meetings are run by beat officers, four have meetings run by beat facilitators, three have jointly chaired meetings and one runs the meeting himself. It is clear that beat facilitators have a more active role this year compared to last year.

Beat facilitators are a relatively new addition to CAPS. They were not originally part of the CAPS model. A prototype district recognized the need for a community member to help conduct beat community meetings and communicate with residents. Beat facilitators were later appointed by other districts.

The police department's CAPS general order states beat community meetings are to be run by beat officers, although they can be co-chaired by a beat facilitator when appropriate. The responsibility for communicating with the community and solving problems remains with the beat teams, and the information they gather during the meeting is to be an integral part of their beat plans. In keeping with the CAPS philosophy, the role of beat facilitators varies by district. Though a later document encourages joint facilitation at beat community meetings, questions continue to arise, and the need for more thorough explication about the role of the facilitator has been requested by beat facilitators and officers alike.

To help answer these questions, more than 100 beat facilitators and a handful of DAC chairs were convened in September 1996. The purpose of the meeting was to assess CAPS implementation and beat facilitators' needs, and to provide a forum for beat facilitators to exchange ideas and voice their opinions about the program. During the session, the community's role in CAPS was reviewed as were particular aspects of CAPS, such as the district planning process and the city's marketing campaign. A detailed 33-question survey was distributed by the Research and Development Unit of the CPD. Some highlights of the survey results are as follows:

C   Beat facilitators overwhelmingly believed CAPS works in their beats
C   Relationships between police and community had improved
C   Beat officers were engaged in problem solving
C   Facilitators requested joint training with their beat officers (half of them reported they had received some form of training)
C   Facilitators wanted additional CAPS literature and printing capabilities to increase CAPS awareness

Facilitators were enthusiastic when asked if they should reconvene in the future; however, a second meeting of that type has not yet been held. They were, however, invited to a day-long CAPS seminar in May 1997. One workshop discussed how to run effective beat community meetings, but some participants mentioned afterward that they were disappointed that no specific beat facilitator guidelines had yet emerged. A DAC chair told us,

We need to get [beat facilitators] more into the loop. We need to identify and recognize those beat facilitators. We met at [a city college] last [autumn] and filled out a survey telling us they were looking at some guidelines for beat facilitators, and what came back didn't have guidelines. The beat facilitators want something concrete. It was just glossed over at the workshop at [the city college in May].

The Education and Training Division trainers have since organized district-wide beat facilitator meetings in a few districts so beat facilitators could discuss and share their experiences. These meetings were well received, although it is uncertain whether they will continue or be adopted citywide. (More information about training efforts is contained in a later section.)

A few police personnel we interviewed discussed their confusion about the role of beat facilitators. One commander said,

At first [the CAPS managers] said that beat facilitators were not supposed to be running [beat community meetings], but now they say they are. Some beat facilitators are running the meetings. But in some beats we have the problem of spotty attendance of the beat facilitators. The amount of volunteerism here is tough.

A neighborhood relations sergeant would like more specific direction concerning beat facilitators:

Some of the beat facilitators are good, but we need to know how to select new ones. Most of these were appointed, but even more important is that we need to know exactly what their role is. Here's another thing—you've got beat facilitators who are good in May, but the time September rolls around, they are not so effective or they are too busy to attend. What are we to do to get another facilitator in that one's place?

The majority of district personnel reported good working relationships with beat facilitators in their districts. In fact, a quarter of the commanders interviewed allow only beat facilitators to run beat community meetings. A number of commanders, though, believe the best beat community meetings are run jointly by officers and facilitators.

There are a few commanders who believe beat facilitators have too great a role. One commander definitely believes that meeting leadership should be shared:

I think it's time for the beat officers to take a decisive role [in beat community meetings]. The facilitators have been running them. It's not that I want the sergeants or beat team to lead, but they should definitely co-facilitate.

Two of the six neighborhood relations sergeants were concerned that beat facilitators monopolize meetings, which negates the police-community partnership:

The beat facilitators were trained before and they have sort of taken over, and we're trying to change that. The beat facilitators all have their own agenda, so we'd like the beat officers to be running the meetings.

I've been pushing for officers to run [beat community meetings] because the facilitators start to think they're so powerful. I'd be happy if it were just a cooperative effort.

Out of 13 beat team leaders, only two have had conflicts with their beat facilitators. They said,

The officers run the meetings. Before they were exclusively run by [beat facilitators] but there was a power struggle and I feel the police should run the meetings since it's ours. I want to work together with the co-chair and work in agreement.

Beat facilitators run the meetings. Because facilitators believe they run the meetings, they think the police work specifically for them as well. I want the meeting to be a place where we work together. Our meetings need more of a partnership feel to them....I believe the meetings are a police meeting, but should be run like a partnership.

After our field research was completed, the Department's Research and Development Division released beat facilitator guidelines. The document lists facilitators' roles and responsibilities and makes a clear distinction between those who conduct the meeting and those who host the meeting. One section of the guidelines read:

"CAPS beat community meetings are hosted by the Chicago Police Department, not beat facilitators or other individuals or groups. (Who *hosts* the meetings and who physically *conducts* them are two separate issues, however; see below for more information about responsibilities for conducting beat community meeting.) Hosting the meeting means that the Police Department is responsible for seeing that the meeting is scheduled and publicized, that the location is secured, and that the meeting actually takes place. It also means that beat community meetings are 'public meetings' (under the Illinois Open Meetings Act) and are, therefore, open to anyone. Beat facilitators and other community members can be involved in carrying out many of the tasks related to beat community meetings, but responsibility for seeing that these tasks get done rests with the meeting host—the Police Department."

Joint Problem Solving. The purpose of beat community meetings is for the police and community to exchange information and work together to reduce problems using the CAPS problem-solving process. The amount of communication and problem solving differs across beats and some district personnel reported improvements over last year. The following comments reveal what typically occurs during beat community meetings:

Our beat [community] meetings are productive. They use the beat planners and prioritize the problems. [Officers] take two or three problems to the meeting to work on.

The beat officers and the residents have been trained for beat [community] meetings. They try to use the triangle. There is an agenda for each meeting. I insist they have an agenda. They start the meeting with a prayer, and go over old business and then new business. They discuss the crime triangle when problems are brought up. Then the beat team says, 'Let's see what we can do.' Then maybe the beat team will request that the residents write a letter to find out about who owns a certain property or something. Some of the residents will do it. They get a true sense of accomplishment.

[Beat community meetings] were complaint sessions, but now the police report progress [on problems] and the beat facilitators are getting people to get involved.

Although there has been a vast improvement in beat community meetings from two years ago, not all beats have moved beyond "911-style" beat community meetings. There are still beats where residents only relate their personal problems and do not understand their role in helping to solve them. One DAC chair said,

I notice that at some beat [community] meetings people come and try to get answers from the police and it turns out to be a complaint session. It's a finger-pointing process, and then attendance goes down.

A district commander lamented,

It's unfortunate. There's still a lot of education needed for [beat community meetings] to reach their true outcome. At a lot of our meetings, it's still in-person 911. There's still a lot of people that feel we don't know what the problems are.

To assess whether problem solving occurs, we asked if citizens and police jointly identify problems, jointly develop solutions and jointly implement solutions. Overwhelmingly, those interviewed said that mainly the community only identifies problems. Officers normally come to meetings prepared with ICAM maps and crime statistics that could be used to develop response strategies, but the community only relates what they have witnessed in their neighborhood. This is to be expected according to one DAM because the community lives in the beat and knows the problems well.

A few commanders were unhappy about the lack of officer input. One commander tries to impress on his officers the need to identify problems:

I'd say the citizens bring up about 60 to 65 percent of the problems and the beat officers bring up about 35 percent. Whenever I go to roll call or when I speak to the supervisors, I try to impress upon them that they must preach at training that beat officers are not just a sounding board. They gotta bring up some problems at the meetings also—the problems that the residents might not know about.

Even though the community mainly identifies problems, they are not as involved in developing and implementing strategies. When a sector management team leader was asked if any problem solving occurs, he answered,

I feel that we're at least chipping away at some of the problems, but citizen participation is not the reason the problems are being solved. Citizens give us the information, but we're the ones having to act on the information.

Another beat team leader described the community as non-committed:

The community only gets involved when the strategies or problems are easy. It's 'sunshine patriotism.' It's hard to get the community to follow through on their ideas.

Another commander pointed out, however, that his district's problems are too large and intimidating for residents to get involved.

Mostly out here the problems are gangs and drugs, and we are looking for a reduction, so we mainly ask the residents for information. That's their role.

A small number of district personnel also said the community does not intend to implement strategies and they do not understand their new responsibilities under CAPS. Comments on this were:

The citizens expect the police to handle [implementing solutions]. It's not as bad as it was [in another district], but some citizens still have the idea that, 'Well, I'm paying your salary, so you should be handling it.' But that new [training] unit from the academy is great, and I think it's going to help.

Citizens don't really discuss solutions. They are used to and they expect that they can ask, 'What are you going to do about it?'

I'd like to see more residents taking charge of their destiny. I don't want to hear any more of this, 'I pay taxes so you better take care of my problem.' I want to see them get more involved.

Although joint problem solving is not the norm, there are beats where the community plays a more active role than just relaying problems. Residents seem the most successful and are most active when tackling troublesome or abandoned buildings. In some instances, the success may be attributed to the combined strength of sophisticated community groups with focused strategies and accessible city task forces. Community members contact landlords, help screen tenants, attend court and work with city legal departments to evict problem renters or demolish abandoned buildings.

Residents are involved in other activities as well. They clean up abandoned lots, install lighting, form block clubs and neighborhood patrols, organize rallies and join Court Advocacy subcommittees. Following are comments from beat team leaders:

The community has suggested strategies like voting a ward dry to get rid of problem bars. They've suggested tactical officers survey particular areas and advised putting addresses on back of houses and businesses. One of the more creative solutions to the beat's parking problem was neighbors put stickers on illegally parked cars asking them not to park in alleys. Trucks illegally park as well as cars and one of the trucking offenders came to a beat [community] meeting to talk about where's better to park.

The community contacts their alderman about city service problems. They identify lighting problems and abandoned cars, as well as neighbor's negligent lawns. During their neighborhood patrols, residents call the front desk to alert officers to loitering youth.

Originally meetings were gripe sessions for community groups, but it has relaxed. The community has been somewhat involved in solutions and implementing them. CANS ran trainings and helped organize the community. We've had some business owners volunteer their time and parents volunteer to patrol a grammar school.

A commander related another problem-solving story:

There's been problems [at a certain location] for a really long time, and the residents have been complaining about the building, as they should. Well, the task force inspected it and it really scared the landlord into cleaning it up. That included kicking some people out. Anyway, there were arrests made there, and the people on that beat let our officers set up a perch right in their homes. They were willing to give up their homes to the police to try and straighten out this problem.

A neighborhood relations sergeant reported this:

There were one or two residents that were calling about an eyesore building, so the beat officer checked it out, and everyone within the block got together at the meeting. They wrote letters, and they marched on the house and held a prayer vigil. The owner cleaned everything up, and now it looks very good.

Even though many districts are not up-to-speed in problem solving, a few expressed optimism that they are moving in the right direction. Comments from police personnel illustrating this were:

The community suggests solutions more so. It's not as good as I'd like, but it is getting better in stages. You can't mandate how fast it gets better.

Well, [beat meetings] are a lot closer to where we want them to be at this point. I'd say we're 60 percent there. We've got nice facilitators, and they're all DAC members now. Both the beat team and the residents seem to be more comfortable with the whole set up. There's no more complaints like, 'I'm going to go tell the

commander,' when the beat officers don't tell them what they want to hear. And I think a year from now, it'll be even better.

They are still not really jointly solving problems and it is something we're trying to work on. They are trying to discuss each side's role in the various problems, but everyone is still learning.

There's not much problem solving. The police are doing some, I believe, and the interaction between the two needs help. I've seen some sparks of it. We've seen some citizens ask others to join their block club because they found out they live across the street from one another, and then they put together a couple of blocks and they decided to send a representative to the beat [community] meeting. Whether it's problem solving or not, I don't know, but it's a step in the right direction.

Even though half of the beat team leaders interviewed reported the community does not brainstorm solutions or help implement strategies, half of them appreciate the improved community-police relations and new partnerships due to beat community meetings:

People realize now that officers are people and not three-headed space aliens. This interaction is beneficial to both of us.

Officers know their beat much better. They hear the community's problems and officers feel responsible to the people. They know them personally now. Officers will check on individuals without even being asked because they know them.

The community leaves the beat [community] meetings thinking the police are part of the solution. We've turned enemies into fans.

The improved community-police relations is a success. People look at the police more as people instead of as authority figures. The community has a voice now. They believe they have partnerships and we do, too.

Those interviewed were asked what changes could be made to improve beat community meetings. Sixty percent of the responses suggested more community participation and attendance. As mentioned before, many police personnel and DAC chairs believe residents do not attend beat community meetings until a problem affects them personally and only a core of dedicated residents regularly attend.

Almost 20 percent of those interviewed want more problem solving by the police and community. The following statements reflect this interest:

I'd like to see solutions discussed [by the community]. I'd like to stop seeing just the problems come up, thrown at the police, and wait for them to do something.

I'd like to improve problem solving and get something accomplished. We make 150 arrests a month but our problems don't go away.

A little more than 15 percent suggested that continued training for police officers and the community would improve beat community meetings. A small number specifically identified beat officers needing meeting facilitation training.

A lot of our beat [community] meetings are basically a wall of blue, the beat team, at the front of the room and the residents sitting as an audience. It's an unfortunate dynamic, because I think people are not motivated to speak in a set up like that. The problem is that the beat team leaders and beat officers are still not fully trained. I called in the training group so they can give us a needs assessment.

My officers need beat [community] meeting training. They specifically need training on how to talk to abrasive people. The sensitivity training from the Academy is [not good]. Officers need training that teaches them not to get upset and confrontational when they are attacked. They need to learn how to take the air out of angry people.

The officers need to be continually trained. Some of the [police/community trainers] are scheduled for some upcoming meetings, and we'll see what their recommendations are. But the training needs to be continual because I always have so many changes in personnel. They're always transferring in and out of here.

As of August 1997, the police department's Education and Training Division and an outside agency were in the planning stages of beat community meeting training for beat teams and beat facilitators. This training is tentatively scheduled for the fall of 1997.

District Advisory Committees. District Advisory Committees, composed of residents, business owners and other stakeholders in the community, are charged with helping the commander identify broad issues related to crime and disorder. Once priority problems have been identified, the committee is supposed to develop strategies that can have an impact on those problems and, whenever possible, on their underlying causes. Since the character and problems of each district are very distinct, so are the foci and accomplishments of the DACs.

Members of the original advisory committees were generally chosen by the district commanders, based on their previous service to the community, standing in the community, ethnic affiliation and geographical representation. Each member served a two-year term, and subsequent members have been elected to the post by those remaining on the committee. Several of the DAC chairs interviewed mentioned that they did not seek the position, but were either asked to take the job by the commander or nominated in a compromise move, as an alternative to candidates from opposing factions. DAC members often head up subcommittees and may represent influential outside organizations; some are also beat facilitators. In some districts, all

beat facilitators are part of the DAC, while in others they comprise a subcommittee whose chair is a DAC member. Aldermen, park district employees, and representatives of city, state and federal agencies may also regularly attend DAC meetings; however, these individuals serve in an ex-officio capacity.

Each of the districts included in this year's study had an active DAC that was meeting on a regular basis. However, only eight of the 13 appeared to be functioning well, according to their chairpersons and police personnel interviewed. On the whole, they have become better defined over time, but more stringent criteria were used to judge them this year, taking into account expectations of the maturation process. Discussions about those committees that were languishing invariably centered around political infighting or unfocused leadership, problems which, in some cases, were resolved by recent DAC chair elections. Many of the committee leaders were their own harshest critics, and most of those who were negative about their committee's effectiveness explained that they were new to their position and had inherited a floundering committee that they were challenged to rekindle. Commanders were more positive, confident that the new chairpersons of three of the five struggling committees were moving them along an upward trajectory. But the reality of the relative newness of the DAC concept, along with the difficulties inherent in a start-up committee, were reflected in chairpersons' remarks about how their committees were doing:

We're starting to work very well. We're out of infancy, into toddlerhood. We're redefining because I'm reading some new information that's come out on what is the role of the DAC. We're defining goals. It's like creating a family structure.

I believe, at this point, we're just beginning to pull together. In the past few years, no one really knew what to do.

We got over [wrangling over bylaws]; to me, that's a big improvement. This is the year that I see us having an effect.

We're regrouping and moving in the right direction.

One who was not as positive remarked:

I don't think it's been working as well as it could. I think it could be better, because we've had [an advisory committee] for maybe two and a half years.

It was interesting to note how many DAC chairs commented about the inordinate amount of time that had been wasted haggling over bylaws during the previous year, and the resultant internal rifts; this group included both those who headed successful committees and those who did not. A desire for the city to establish common bylaws and spare them the torment was often expressed. Another frequently mentioned wish was for regular citywide meetings of DAC chairs, preferably quarterly. In fact, one DAC chair reported that he intended to organize them.

DAC meetings were usually led by the elected civilian chairperson, although one of them reported that he did it only when the commander was absent. Most advisory committees had between 15 and 20 members and meetings were generally attended only by committee members and Neighborhood Relations officers. However, one district's monthly DAC meetings were open to the public and two other districts' meetings were attended by the community-at-large every other month, with the commander meeting with DAC subcommittee chairs during alternate months. Usually, heads of the subcommittees made progress reports at the meetings, and in some districts, beat facilitators did as well.

The extent of beat facilitators' involvement with the DAC varied from district to district. Nine of the 13 DAC chairs reported that beat facilitators were encouraged to attend DAC meetings and make reports, although they met with varying degrees of success in this endeavor. Of the remaining four, one reported that such participation would be beginning soon, another said that they were encouraged to attend and thought that having them make reports would be a good idea, the third related that DAC meetings were closed but that he held quarterly meetings with beat facilitators, and the last one explained that beat facilitators were not invited because,

> *We feel that beat facilitators really don't contribute much. The feedback we've been getting from beat [community] meetings is that it could have gone on just as well without them.*

Furthermore, he reported having no regular communication with beat facilitators. It should be noted that this is one of the districts whose DAC appeared to be struggling mightily. In at least four of the other districts, beat facilitators were holding regular meetings for the purpose of exchanging information and sharing ideas. Often the DAC chair was present, or the group was represented on the DAC by a subcommittee chair.

DAC chairs usually described themselves as facilitators, mediators and recruiters. Some had firsthand knowledge of what was happening district wide, while others did not even know if there were differences in beat community meetings from beat to beat. Police personnel interviewed characterized 10 of the DAC chairs as being self-directed, and the other three as looking to the commander for direction. Some DAC chairs described their function:

> *My role is to stimulate movement among people.*

> *I think my role has changed from what I envisioned. At first, I saw it as looking at all the issues of the co-chairs and trying to focus all of them on one problem. I see my role trying to keep them working as a unit together. At first, I thought it would be a role that would find problems in the community and take them to the DAC. Now I'm sort of a mediator; you have to understand everyone's ego and where everybody's coming from.*

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> *Nobody else wanted to do it so I volunteered. I play more a facilitator role than anything else — put out a couple of fires on occasion, that sort of thing.*

My roles are recruitment, to facilitate dialogue, mediation when necessary, and to keep people focused.

I consider my role to be chairing the meetings and implementing any projects that the advisory committee comes up with.

I see myself setting the direction and working with the commander to achieve that direction.

Many of the commanders interviewed tended to view their role in the committee as an advisory one, providing information to the DAC or making suggestions about what course it should take. There were a few, though, who portrayed themselves as facilitators, and in the one district where DAC meetings are led by the commander, he described himself as the chairman, noting, "I bring up ideas." Variations in commanders' perceptions of their role in the DAC are illustrated by their comments:

I'm a facilitator. I bring ideas and develop an agenda.

I make sure each subcommittee has a role. I address them about their concerns and I tell them how we need help from citizens. I make suggestions and I get suggestions.

I go to the meetings and I give an overview of what's going on in the district. In addition, I work with [the DAC chair].

They look to me for guidance, and as a source of information. I guess I'm a mediator on occasion.

The 13 DACs were working on a wide variety of issues, ranging from restructuring their organizations to community outreach to recognizing police and volunteers for their efforts in making CAPS work. Specifically, one or more DAC chairs interviewed related that they were emphasizing CAPS outreach; developing written guidelines on how to conduct beat community meetings; working on getting beat facilitators for all beats; attempting to increase beat community meeting attendance; restructuring and, in some cases, reducing the number of subcommittees; activating subcommittees; engaging ex officio DAC members such as aldermen and state representatives; sponsoring a community seminar on disorder issues; conducting a survey of residents to learn what crime and quality of life issues are top priorities for them; organizing unity picnics; and sponsoring appreciation dinners and awards ceremonies for beat facilitators and beat teams.

When it came to describing their DAC's notable accomplishments in the previous year, a few chairpersons gave concrete examples, but most portrayed them in more abstract terms. It seemed to be understood that, usually, visible successes were attained by the subcommittees,

while the DAC itself played a supporting role. Following are descriptions of some of their more palpable successes, in the words of the DAC chairs:

Probably our biggest thing is, we got our Court Advocacy committee up and running, which we were struggling with. On the south end of the district, the [local] Chamber of Commerce has gotten business owners involved. They have block captains and keep a network going — share information about shoplifters, encourage people to press charges, to keep cases going. The executive director of the [local chamber of commerce] has agreed to expand this into the rest of the district and get a business subcommittee going.

We successfully completed the first youth conference citywide. It incorporated the neighborhood agencies, youth in grade schools and high schools, city services. It was attended by 300 to 400 individuals. We had an open forum with the community to hear their needs. Topics were domestic violence, youth crime, the role of youth in CAPS. There were skits conducted by youth from our schools.

Less tangible accomplishments mentioned by other DAC chairs included:

We're laying some good foundations. There's growth; and [partnerships] in the community are being built.

Our success is mainly our community relationship with the police department. We seem to have developed a very good relationship with the commander and his staff; from [the superintendent] all the way down.

I see the DAC as a resource to the beat. It's not like the DAC would have priorities outside what the beat plans are.

The DAC doesn't really stand alone. There have been some successes with community policing and I think in a roundabout way the DAC has been involved. There are things that the beats do on various levels that the DAC may assist with. I think communication is the foundation for all of it.

One commander echoed their sentiments when he said:

The biggest [success], I would say, is bringing together a district this size. They're working as an entire district now. They see it as a whole. In the beginning, they were only concerned with what their [individual] issues were. And now they're starting to understand that as demographics change, so do problems. Some of the members of the DAC have gone to different beat [community] meetings just to see what they do.

Other district commanders, asked to name notable successes achieved by their DACs in the past year, mentioned their fund-raising efforts in support of bike patrols, police-sponsored

athletic activities for youth, and subcommittee workshops; a bus tour of the district for DAC members and other interested residents to familiarize them with its scope, and a similar bike tour in another district; identification of a priority problem on which to focus, in one district; and development of subcommittee goals, in another.

When asked to name obstacles they still faced as DAC chair, study participants offered four recurring themes: lack of direction and communication from the CPD, the difficulty of engaging the community, personality conflicts, and lack of funding. Here, in their own words, is what DAC chairs viewed as impediments to their success:

> *The role of the DAC has never been described. I guess I should know what the expectations are.*

> *When you generate your own bylaws, you generate your own job description. What are all 25 of us supposed to be doing? I don't think there's that much great communication. Is CAPS saying, "Okay, 25 districts, go out and do your thing," or is CAPS saying, "This is Chicago"?*

> *I think there is a lack of guidance at times. There should be some uniform dispersement of information or something.*

> *There's the omnipresent issue of getting the community involved.*

> *My biggest issue is the personality issue. You've got to dodge and placate certain individuals. Feelings get hurt very easily. You've got to give them what they want. You've got to make sure they produce, and then if they don't produce, do you get rid of them or not?*

> *I never know who's going to be at the DAC meeting. I could have a dissident who wants to make a name for himself or try to take control of the meeting; I won't let them.*

> *That's another thing — you can't do fund-raising. There are no funds for the DAC. We were told to get the steering committee to get funds. The steering committee disbanded. There's no money for simple things like flyers; you can only ask the community to donate things. There are two things I hate about this: writing the bylaws and trying to get funds. There's got to be something!*

> *I think that, for the amount of work I need to do, there should be some funding. The money needs to be made available to the people who need to do the work. And the $4,000 we get is no money for nothing. Each district was allocated $4,000 by the city. I was asked to put the budget together. I have not been able to access that money. We wanted it for refreshments or a banner or stamps. I wanted it where each beat would know they had X amount of money. I wasn't invited to the meetings where they discussed it. We had to finally start asking the citizens,*

would they give some money? They donate at the beat [community] meeting — for example, to pay to rent a van to go downtown for something. We don't have any idea how much money the city is spending on all these people they've hired for this program. I'm not feeling the results, not feeling any kind of benefit from all these people. And I can't understand why, when they went out and hired all these people. I have huge phone bills. I should be able to turn in a voucher or something to be reimbursed for my expenses. And I spend a lot of time going to all those meetings — meetings with aldermen, et cetera — and it takes a lot of time, time away from my family; and I'm not reimbursed for any of it.

Even police personnel addressed this issue:

The allocation of DAC funds has been really problematic.

Although district commanders and DAC chairs interviewed appeared to have good working relationships, there were noticeable differences in attitudes on the part of both throughout the city. While some seemed to be fast friends, others still carried the baggage of the "us versus them" mentality, unable to make their relationship more of a partnership and less like a chess match.

Subcommittees. District Advisory Committee organizational guidelines specified that each DAC would appoint Court Advocacy and Senior Citizen subcommittees and other subcommittees were to be established "as required to address issues of community concern, such as school safety, youth services, economic development, etc." During this past year, however, districts with frequent calls for domestic disturbances were strongly encouraged to form Domestic Violence subcommittees. Subcommittees were also charged with the responsibility of "researching issues, identifying, developing and implementing solutions, and mobilizing appropriate community resources." All subcommittee recommendations are subject to the approval of the full DAC.

As one would expect, there are certain subcommittees that are common to most of the DACs, such as Youth and Family, Business, Parks and Education. Examples of subcommittees that are specific to the individual needs of districts are Hospitality (in a district with a pre-ponderance of hotels, nightclubs and restaurants), Zoning (illegal building conversions are prevalent there), Community/Police Relations (segments of the district have historically had an uneasy relationship with the police), and Gay and Lesbian (a major presence in this community).

Subcommittee strength continues to be a challenge for some of the districts, and only two of those included in this year's study indicated that all of their subcommittees were vital. While all of the 13 districts reported that most of their subcommittees met regularly and had specified goals, six of them appeared to be struggling. In some cases formerly thriving subcommittees, such as Senior Citizens, had fallen by the wayside, either due to a change at the helm or dwindling interest. Business subcommittees, in general, seemed to be difficult to stimulate. DAC chairs expressed their intent to foster involvement in the subcommittees or else restructure their

organization. For example, in a couple of districts where churches were not a significant part of the social framework, DAC chairs did not think the Ecumenical subcommittee necessary and wanted to abolish it. Two districts proposed combining their Legislature subcommittee with the one on Court Advocacy.

Those interviewed spoke of new initiatives of the subcommittees. For instance, one district's Business subcommittee was addressing panhandling through posters that raise awareness and by setting up a network among business owners. The posters detail organizations which will accept donations to support the homeless. The Hospitality subcommittee in another district dealt with deleterious effects of pub crawling by busloads of over-indulgers by persuading bars owners to withdraw their sponsorship of bacchanalian tours of the district's well-known entertainment sector. The Hotel subcommittee elsewhere was conducting doorman education seminars to prepare personnel from condos, hotels, and residential associations to deal with pickpockets and thieves. In a district where frequent summer events attract large crowds, the Festival subcommittee previewed festival plans to determine crowd size, noise levels, air pollution, sanitation needs and police plans. A Youth subcommittee organized junior beat community meetings, held every other week at local boys' and girls' clubs. In one district, the Ecumenical subcommittee co-sponsored a unity fest, aimed at furthering racial harmony.

In a number of the districts, each subcommittee was required to sponsor a workshop or event for the community. Examples were a symposium on protecting youths and seniors organized by a Legislature subcommittee and a district-wide picnic sponsored by a Community Network subcommittee.

Court Advocacy. A mandated DAC subcommittee, Court Advocacy is a group of community volunteers who track court cases and attend judicial hearings in cases that are of concern to the community. This vehicle for citizen involvement in CAPS shows support for victims as well as solidarity against crime. Court Advocacy volunteers generally consult with beat officers or other district personnel to identify cases that negatively affect the quality of life in their district, and the group actively and systematically follows them through the criminal justice system. Court Advocacy was actually conceived at the behest of the mayor, before the inception of the CAPS program. In his tenure as state's attorney, the mayor became aware of the need for the community to have a voice in the courtroom because of the great impact that crime and disorder have on the community. As community policing was becoming a reality in mid-1993, the mayor recognized that a community-empowering enterprise such as Court Advocacy would naturally complement CAPS.

This year's study revealed that all 13 districts had active Court Advocacy subcommittees, but only 11 of them were functioning well. In these 11 districts, a core group of citizens followed cases deemed important in their community, pulling in other residents to join them on a case-by-case basis. The groups believe they have successfully impacted the resolution of many cases. While the other two districts also had active Court Advocacy subcommittees, they were basically "one-man operations," meaning that the group of court watchers was very small, composed only

of relatives and close associates of the chairperson, and their leaders had not made concerted efforts to recruit a membership that was representative of the district.

Court attendance by subcommittee members ranged from three to 40 people, averaging about 15. Participants were overwhelmingly retired senior citizens but also included self-employed residents or business owners who tended to have flexible schedules; residents who worked part time; people who were affected by specific cases, including school principals; and others willing to take an occasional day off work to take part in this community service. Sometimes, participation was limited to only one particular ethnic group in a diverse district, or people who lived in certain beats; in these cases, DAC chairs and district commanders were acutely aware of the need to garner more widespread participation. One DAC chair pointed out that alternate ways of involving residents, rather than having them go to court, would be to enlist their help in making phone calls to recruit volunteers or in promoting the program at beat community meetings and other community gatherings. Furthermore, she thought attorneys residing in the district could be helpful by writing up guidelines or sharing their ideas with the subcommittee. This way, community members who had less flexible schedules or limited mobility could be engaged to share the workload.

Some districts experienced problems with getting community members to attend court. Among reasons frequently cited was the inconvenient location of many of the court houses, along with the serious problem of lack of transportation. For those who were able to drive, not only was it a headache to have to negotiate rush hour traffic and find parking, it was also costly. Highlighting the significance of this issue, DAC chairs in several districts noted that offering transportation alleviated the problem of getting people to go to court. Another impediment was the timing of 9:30 a.m. court calls, which require employed volunteers to take an entire day off work, whereas later sessions take up only half of a workday. One more deterrent to getting a consistently good turnout was the frustrating number of continuances, which caused some advocates to eventually abandon their efforts. To surmount these obstacles, court advocates in some districts have been working on getting the time and location of court calls changed to make the program accessible to more people; some of them have been successful. Furthermore, the city's CAPS Implementation Office has made buses available for groups of 20 or more, and one district uses a mini van confiscated by police in a drug case. An additional incentive adopted in a few of the districts entails asking local restaurants to sponsor a brown bag lunch on court days. It was felt that this token attempt to minimize out-of-pocket expenses could go a long way towards increasing participation.

Court Advocacy subcommittees obtain information about upcoming cases from district commanders or their Neighborhood Relations Office and decide which ones to follow. Some coordinate their efforts with arresting officers to learn more about victims, and as a result, might get phone numbers of other people willing to attend court with them. The types of cases they follow vary from district to district, but generally include high profile ones such as well-publicized murders and shootings of police officers; these have the potential for drawing in people who remain with the group. Other cases tracked involve any of a multitude of crimes that have a negative influence on the community: thefts and burglaries, graffiti, drug dealing,

gangbanging and mob action, prostitution, carjacking, housing cases. In at least one district, advocates assign a high priority to cases involving repeat offenders, identified by police. They also try to follow cases resulting from police missions run in response to community concerns, such as those targeting drug dealing and prostitution, believing that mutual police/community support is key to the success of CAPS. As a result of their efforts, they have seen liquor stores shuttered, buildings torn down, habitual criminals put away, and others slapped with stiffer sentences than usual, including heavier fines, probation, community service, sentencing to juvenile detention facilities, and jail terms. Both police and civilians alike believe that the presence of advocates in the courtroom has affected the outcome of cases.

In many cases, advocates have received visible support from other key stakeholders in their communities. For example, local community councils provide additional court watchers for housing cases which specifically target deteriorating buildings where narcotics are involved. In a couple of districts, representatives of businesses whose customers had been victims of the same thief banded together and appeared in court; the offenders were given surprisingly stiff sentences. In at least two of the districts studied, commanders have accompanied advocates to court, an action which impressed upon the judge the importance of the case to area residents. One of the cases involved a drug house with multiple housing code violations and another concerned a convenience store where health laws were violated and liquor was sold to minors.

DAC chairs made the following comments about the impact court advocates have in the courtroom, and described successes:

> There are cases where we know our presence makes a difference, and we've been told that by judges and court attorneys. And we've seen it on the faces of long-term offenders who were startled they didn't just get a slap on the wrist. We've seen jail time given or we've been able to get them to up the charge.

> The state's attorney points out the community [is] there and that makes a difference.

> [The court advocates] were verbally threatened outside the courtroom afterwards and reported it, and the offender's bond was revoked and he spent the night in jail.

> The judges seem to be very receptive when we show up in court. In one case in housing court, we had 20 to 25 people there and the judge said, 'Well, obviously the community is concerned about this building.'

> In the very beginning, we had a 64-unit drug and gang infested building. Within seven months, with community support and court advocacy, we had it totally shut down and $100,000 frozen in assets, and basically, the building taken away from the owner.

We had a homicide on [street name] with basically two years of continuances, but the offender eventually got 40 years.

In one district where court advocates were treated inconsiderately by judges — to the point of being asked to leave the courtroom — they sent letters of complaint to judicial supervisors and received encouraging responses. One judge was transferred to another facility and another was placed under investigation. In another district, the state's attorney vouched for the court advocates when the judge attempted to dismiss them, identifying them all as witnesses.

The court advocacy experience has been satisfying for participants not only from the standpoint of empowering them against crime, but also because it has given them the sense of fulfillment that comes from providing support to crime victims. They have found the thanks received from victims and their families very gratifying. Likewise, the appreciation shown by local police is meaningful, too; some districts publicize the group's successes in their newsletters. The following comments from DAC chairs illustrate the victim support aspect of the program:

Are you familiar with the [victim's name] murder? It was very much a victim support scenario. The [court advocates] got a very good response from the rest of her family, who were grateful for their presence. Court advocacy, in our district, has always wanted to be part of victim assistance. We had the right people at the right time. It was good for the advocates, too, because the feedback and recognition was very good.

There was a gang breaking into buildings on [street name] and one of the business owners didn't want to press charges. He didn't want to go to court because he was afraid of what would happen to him. One of our court advocacy members told him they would go with him; he wouldn't be alone. Not only did they go with him, they showed up at his business every night before he closed up and escorted him out.

Challenges that lie ahead for Court Advocacy subcommittees include sustaining or improving outreach efforts to maintain a committed core of activists, developing creative ways to disperse the workload, and working in partnership with government to overcome the obstacles of timing, transportation, and case continuances that deplete the ranks of volunteers.

Beat Integrity and Dispatch Communications

CAPS is a neighborhood-based strategy, which means that police officers are supposed to give special attention to the residents and problems of specific neighborhoods. It necessitates that officers devote as much time as possible to their assigned beat to work with the community to solve crime and disorder problems. To successfully undertake its community policing program, the Chicago Police Department had to create enhanced ways to receive, manage and respond to calls for service. Prior to the inception of CAPS, nearly all calls for service came in

through the 911 system, regardless of whether they were of an emergency nature, and jobs were assigned to available district cars, regardless of whether they were "officially" designated to that beat.

It was clear that beat officers, who are supposed to be afforded time to implement beat plan strategies, could no longer be driven by nonstop calls for service. To enable them to become "specialists" in their geographical area and focus on their vicinity, a strategy known as beat integrity was established. The Department also rewrote its dispatch policy and instituted an alternate response program. Coinciding with these ventures was the opening of Chicago's Office of Emergency Communications (OEC), which utilizes an automated dispatch system known as Police Computer Aided Dispatch (PCAD).

Beat Integrity. Beat integrity is a strategy that allows beat officers to spend as much time as possible on their beat answering calls for service and working with the community to solve problems. In CAPS, beat integrity means that beat officers mostly answer calls for service only in their beat — their area of expertise — from the time they begin their tour of duty until the time they go home. The CAPS beat integrity policy specifies that beat cars will be assigned calls off their beats "only as a last resort;" in many circumstances plain-clothes tactical officers and sergeants are supposed to answer calls rather than sending beat teams out of their areas.

Along with continuity of assignment (the regular assignment of officers and supervisory personnel to beat, rapid response and sector management teams), beat integrity goes to the heart of community policing. It is the neighborhood orientation that gives beat officers the opportunity to become familiar with crime conditions and issues of concern to the community on their beat, and it affords beat officers the time to engage in mission-oriented patrol. Beat integrity also helps promote partnership among the police and the community, because beat team officers not only become more familiar with the residents, problems and resources there, but community members become more familiar with and, ideally, trustful of the police officers that they see regularly.

In practice, however, maintaining beat integrity proved to be challenging. Factors that can compromise it include improper dispatch of calls for service, a high volume of calls for service per district, insufficient manpower, the zealousness of some officers to be in the heart of the action, and the need to assist fellow officers in dangerous situations. With this in mind, the CAPS managers set a 70 percent figure as a reasonable expectation for keeping beat officers on their turf. However, they stressed, through roll call training and an accompanying bulletin, that beat integrity is not a rigid control mechanism or a disciplinary tool, nor are there quotas concerning the amount of time that officers must stay on the beat. Also emphasized was the fact nothing "prohibits beat team officers from leaving their beat in emergency situations to provide assistance to a fellow officer or member of the community."

In the first years of our evaluation, beat integrity was a source of continuing frustration for most districts. Respondents generally cited all of the above reasons as well as complaints about dispatching (though some assignment anomalies could have been avoided through supervisory vigilance). This year, however, beat integrity no longer seemed to create many

problems. OEC data indicates that all but three of the city's 25 police districts were able to maintain beat integrity at least 70 percent of the time on the third watch (approximately 3 pm to 11 pm) — the busiest shift. The citywide average for this shift is 75.8 percent, but figures decline on the other two watches for varying reasons. Though day watch figures fall to 71.3 percent, citywide beat integrity does remain just above the 70 percent threshold. Numbers are significantly lower on the midnight watch: that average is only 51.7 percent. These lower figures may be directly related to manpower allocation: on the day watch, beat units are one-officer cars, necessitating that an additional car be sent as back up on many calls. Occasionally the back-up unit is a car from a neighboring beat. And, on midnights there are no rapid response cars.

We asked the 13 commanders about whether they were satisfied with the amount of time their officers were able to spend on their beats, and most based their response on a review of daily watch assignment sheets or reports compiled for them by their administrative managers. All but three expressed satisfaction with the level of beat integrity that was being maintained in their districts, but one dissatisfied commander did believe that there had been improvement over the previous year. Surprisingly, OEC figures show that beat integrity in these three districts is at a very respectable level, with two of them ranking among the highest in the city in this measure. Some commanders and administrative managers indicated that access to reliable data on beat integrity would be helpful:

> We really have no MIS back up on this, so it's really the honor system. [Beat officers] can put what they want on their daily activity report, so it's just an estimation. I would like to get MIS reports.

> It's good according to what we were told in [a previous meeting].

> It averages over 80 percent here. We're counting it on our own from the daily watch assignment sheets.

> [Beat officers] are asked every day to calculate what their beat integrity is. I think our district's is high.

Most sector management team leaders (lieutenants) were quite optimistic about their beat integrity percentages though, again, a few believe that it is worse than OEC reports indicate. In fact, those lieutenants believed that their personnel stayed on their beats only about 50 percent of the time when, in actuality, data show that their district's beat integrity figures were more than 20 percentage points higher. Conversely, the positive lieutenants usually overestimated the amount of time officers were answering calls in their designated beats. All but one of the sector management team leaders interviewed stated that they were satisfied with their districts' beat integrity level. The disappointed one was at least realistic when he said, "I'd like to keep it at 100 percent, but I think that's probably an unattainable goal."

Beat team leaders, who have first-line responsibility for maintaining beat integrity, were less united in their ideas about it, with most simply saying it seems to be working adequately.

Those that did offer additional comment about it showed some lack of understanding of the spirit of this component and their responsibility to intervene if an assignment is dispatched incorrectly:

> *In most cases, dispatchers stick to beat integrity, unless there's unusual circumstances. I tell dispatchers to use their discretion.*

> *I'm a proponent of it, but...today's policing is different, and the bad guys are mobile and transient. An officer may know where the bad guy lives but doesn't necessarily know where he hangs out because he can't follow him off his beat. Beat integrity can make a job easier for an officer, but it isn't practical. If an officer has to go off his beat to make a pinch, he'll do it.*

> *[Beat integrity] can create friction between officers. Some officers get stuck doing all the work in a night because his beat is particularly busy. It wears thin between officers....Before, when job assignments changed, everyone got their turn in the barrel. Beat integrity creates a lot of moaning between officers.*

> *It doesn't bother me if my officers go off their beat. I tell my officers off the air to not tell the dispatcher a call is out of their sector. In my opinion if a sector is busy and a community member needs service, you handle it.*

Despite this last comment, district personnel consistently said that sergeants are monitoring the assignments and stepping in when improper assignments are made; a goodly number also said that beat officers question assignments that are off their beat. Though three commanders admitted that their sergeants are not monitoring to the extent they would like, others responded that they stress its importance to all supervisory levels and that sergeants are being vigilant:

> *They're stepping in — I'm always talking to them about that. I tell them not to let Dispatch be the supervisor.*

> *It's a subject I address at every staff meeting. We have a new batch of sergeants, and one by one they end up getting on the air and eventually saying 'absolutely not' in response to some assignment. The seasoned sergeants have been doing it all along.*

Several commanders were emphatic that they, too, monitor the radio to ensure that beat integrity is achieved. District administrative managers as well as beat team leaders and sector management team leaders often confirmed this in their comments.

Dispatch Communications. Another key aspect to attaining beat integrity is dispatch communications. The Department's dispatch policy was rewritten to correspond to the Patrol Division's strategy to address chronic crime and disorder problems, and the policy was simply communicated in a bulletin that was distributed to personnel via roll call training. The CAPS

dispatch policy specified five levels of priority, ranging from calls that require immediate dispatch to those of a nonemergency nature, which are to be handled by the alternate response unit. Flow charts depicting the various personnel who are to be assigned each type of priority call further clarified the policy.

Assigning calls appropriately had been a ongoing challenge since the inception of CAPS. Difficulties ranged from technological shortcomings and confusion about dispatch policy in the first year to glitches related to the inauguration of the new state-of-the art communications center and the replacement of police dispatchers with civilian personnel in the ensuing years. While some complaints about improper dispatch persist, this year district personnel indicate that dispatch is becoming less problematic. The majority of those we interviewed noted greater adherence to the official dispatch policy, increasing understanding of the intricacies of the job on the part of civilian call takers and dispatchers and a leveling off of technical problems. Only one-fifth of those we asked about dispatch believed that things were not going as well as they would like, and nearly half of that group did respond that dispatch communications had improved over the year before. Some of the satisfied respondents told us:

> *In the beginning they had problems, but there haven't been any problems recently.*

> *It's improved. I think the problem was the new system and personnel needed to get used to it.*

> *Dispatch has gotten much better. The quality is better, the efficiency and understanding is all better. The new system itself is working better.*

> *Dispatch is going well and they have a better handle on beat integrity. Maybe it's because the dispatchers understand their policies better.*

> *I'd say it's improved compared to last year. Since they set up some standards. They weren't following the order before.*

> *They've improved the software, and a lot of the complaints have been taken care of. I think the people they have working here are just getting more used to it.*

South Side districts were clearly less satisfied with OEC performance than were their North Side counterparts. Among the disgruntled districts, complaints were invariably centered around personnel assigned to their particular radio zone. The fact that those complaining often shared zones points to the probability that these districts would benefit from greater adherence to dispatch policy. When asked about how dispatching is going, some respondents among this group said,

> *It leaves a lot to be desired. It's the timeliness of calls. They just sit on calls.*

Terrible! We have a problem with priority calls that are sometimes dispatched an hour late.

It's still a problem. The dispatchers are not following the dispatch policy.

Arguably, one reason for improved dispatch is that supervisors will tell dispatchers to reassign the call if it will pull officers off their beat, as discussed above. But many of those interviewed said that supervisors' intervention is rarely required:

They do it, but it was needed more often in the past than now.

It's not a problem. I think the dispatchers are very familiar with the concept of beat integrity.

They'll do it when it's necessary...but that doesn't happen very often at all.

A year ago I would get on the air, but not recently. I can't remember the last time I had to.

Respondents were not always in agreement about what was responsible for OEC's improved performance, however:

Could it maybe be a change at the helm down there?

We've learned each other's systems. We know more about theirs and they know more about what we do.

The dispatchers have more experience.

I think it's training on both parts. People at the communications center and our people are doing a good job.

I think it's partly perceptions. OEC changed commanders and this helped. OEC has communicated more with the police and the community. Reps attend beat community meetings and admit problems.

There was a common thread in criticism about OEC. Across rank, individuals mentioned that call-takers need to get more useful information and richer descriptions as well as providing a reasonable estimate about when to expect the car to answer the call. Complaints about dispatchers had to do with the need for them to prioritize better — to not impulsively make assignments "just to clear their screens." Several people suggested that logistical improvements are needed at the OEC facility. According to them, call-takers and dispatchers are now physically separated, which prevents dispatchers from "leaning over to ask additional questions." And, on the subject of interaction among OEC staff, one interviewee offered his belief that it

would be helpful for dispatchers to "list the important events that happened during a watch for the next dispatcher — a kind of face-to-face relief. That way on-coming dispatchers do not start their watch blind to what's happened."

As always, there is a small group who looks at things a bit differently. In spite of the fact that there is reduced negativity about dispatch communications, they are not willing to concede that there is improvement. Among their comments:

> *Complaints are down, but I'm not sure if it's because it's improved or because the officers are resigned to poor dispatching.*

> *It seems like there's less complaints in recent months as compared with previous months. Maybe things are getting better — unless the guys and girls out in the field are getting so used to it, there's less complaints.*

Police Computer-Aided Dispatch (PCAD) Terminals and Portable Data Terminals (PDTs). District personnel can interact with the Office of Emergency Communications by means of stationhouse terminals and portable data terminals (PDTs) which, in addition to managing assignment of police calls, provide a direct line of communication between the districts and OEC. District personnel — mainly desk staff — use this system to file daily rosters, locate cars out on patrol, generate case report numbers and send calls to the district or walk-in requests for service to dispatch, among other things. A recently added complement to the PCAD system are portable data terminals (PDTs), which are mounted in police vehicles. Via these on-board computers, beat and rapid response officers receive dispatch information — the same information that call-takers forward to dispatchers. In addition, officers can perform name and license plate checks and generate case report numbers. Supervisors have an additional use for PDTs: they can do queries to find the locations of cars that report to them.

The stationhouse terminals were introduced about a year prior to the installation of the PDTs, and as is often the case with complicated communications systems, there were some delays and glitches before the interactive portion of PCAD was up and running smoothly. Last year when we spoke to district personnel, many individuals expressed great optimism about the system's potential followed by expressions of frustration with its usefulness up to that point.

This year, informants indicated that interacting with PCAD via the stationhouse terminals had become much more reliable and problem-free. And, though we asked about each type of terminal, most people seemed to talk about this year's technology addition — the portable data terminals.

The PDTs are also subject to "wrinkles that need to be ironed out," as one person put it. These "wrinkles" seem to be hardware-related. But police officers' reaction to this latest bit of technology is unlike most any other innovation or new component that has been added during the time our evaluation team has been involved with the Department: the PDTs are widely accepted. Though many users cited difficulties, they usually followed up by talking about the

system's benefits. The following comments are a sampling of interviewees' opinions about access to the PCAD system, via both types of terminals:

> *I was skeptical about [the PDTs] at first, but now I swear by 'em. They've made my job easier. I can keep track of officers and multiple jobs. I can check on a complaint without getting on the air.*

> *When the PDTs are working, they're great, but a lot of the time they're down. Officers like them. They can make checks and find out more information about a job without having to go on the air. They can also socialize with other officers.*

> *There's a problem using the PDTs inside the station — faulty reception zones, or something, and they're years away from correcting it. So I have to take the laptop outside the building before roll call to learn what happened during the previous shift...I like to know what's gone on with my beat team. The PDTs are a great source of information.*

> *No one likes change, but now everybody is accepting the PCAD system. And then there's the PDTs. All I hear about them is good stuff. They really like them.*

> *When the PDTs are working, officers have positive feedback. The problem is, more than 25 percent of the time, they are being repaired....the tact officers beg to have the PDTs because they can talk clandestinely from car to car.*

> *PDTs are an excellent supervisory tool. They allow us to keep track of our officers — where they are and what jobs they have. The officers seem to like them, especially because they can send messages to one another and not tie up radio time.*

> *The PDTs are okay. They go down often and need to be fixed. I think officers have mixed feelings about them. It's an easier sell, though, because officers can talk to one another using them. They actually let officers do a lot of things they couldn't do before.*

> *Officers like [PDTs] because they can get more information than from the dispatcher. They see all of the call-takers' notes.*

> *Eighteen out of 30 of 'em are continually broken. They're okay when they work, but if you aren't assigned a pool car, you won't have a bracket to mount the unit on. The PDTs do make it easier for me to see where cars are assigned jobs. There's no need for me to get on the air to find them.*

Bringing in Other Units

From the earliest planning days of CAPS, the department stated its commitment to involving the entire organization in community policing, and it anticipated that roles would be developed for the detective, tactical, gangs and narcotics divisions. The intent was to wait until the program was running smoothly in the field before integrating the other divisions and units, and on several occasions there have been meetings that hinted that planning for role development and training for specialized units would soon be underway. However, it is now four years since CAPS was launched, and little progress has been made in carving out a significant role for these other divisions and units.

Several small steps have been taken to stimulate greater cooperation between specialized units and Patrol Division, the latest of which is the development and distribution of the intra-departmental support service request form. It allows beat team leaders to seek help (after getting approval from the sector management team leader, district commander and area deputy chief) from other divisions or units for documented priority problems on their beat. Beat team leaders are supposed to have a response to their request within 10 days.

The few beat team leaders who took advantage of the intradepartmental support request form were, on the whole, quite positive about its effectiveness but, unfortunately, only one third of those we spoke to had done so. They told us:

> *I've used it and it was excellent. We have an ongoing problem that an outside unit is working on right now. I sent the form through the chain of command.*

> *Yeah, I used it, and the process was good.*

> *I requested [a special mission]. They were out here within a week.*

> *I've sent a few to Gambling and Narcotics. [The timeliness of their response] wasn't too bad.*

Of the beat team leaders who do not utilize the request form, slightly more than half said they did not believe that help from outside units was needed in their beats, though one said that he had used the form in his former district. The rest preferred to seek help by making a request through their supervisors or calling the outside unit directly. One such sergeant said,

> *Normally I'll call if I need outside assistance. I prefer to do it that way because I can discuss the problem with the other unit and we can work on a plan of attack.*

In a somewhat contradictory following remark, he added that he would like to have some sort of record that he had made the call. Using the intradepartmental support service request form would provide this type of record and certainly would not preclude his making a phone call to discuss strategy.

Another endeavor aimed at facilitating greater intradepartment cooperation is the establishment of a regular meeting dubbed the Detective Division Monthly Information Sharing meeting. Its stated goal is "enhanced communication between the Patrol Division and the Detective Division." At this meeting, detective liaisons from the five Areas meet with district personnel to review the status of unsolved cases. Also, in some districts tactical officers have permanent beat assignments.

To try to gauge whether these arrangements are having an impact, we asked district personnel whether they find that special units are working more closely with beat officers. Nearly everyone stated unequivocally that gang and tactical officers are working closely with beat officers, while just over three quarters of those polled believe that there has been increased communication and cooperation from the Detective Division — but that detectives have not necessarily worked any more closely with beat officers than ever before. Other units like Narcotics got mixed reviews.

> *Tact and gang officers are part of each beat team. That's been that way for a while here. They work very closely. But the detectives...there's no significant change....[the Area] has assigned a liaison to us, and we're getting more information on the status of things, but that's all.*

> *No, the same old separation is still there, but I would say there is more cohesiveness because of our monthly meeting with the Detective Division. They don't really know about the smaller problems. Like in the 20 sector, there are a lot of burglaries. It's a real concern for the residents, and we finally brought it up at the information-sharing meeting. But there is a long period of time between when it becomes a problem and they're alerted to it.*

> *The detectives are actually working more closely with the districts, I would say...we're getting much more information about pending cases than we ever did before.*

> *I think we've established a better flow of information — in both directions. They're really good about getting crime alerts to us. The beat officers now know about all of them.*

> *I haven't found any groups working any more closely with my beat team.*

> *[The detectives] are meeting with us to share information, and there is a liaison who visits here on a fairly regular basis. They aren't really working with the beat officers anymore closely, but the problems between the divisions are very old, and it will take a long time to solve them.*

> *As far as detectives go...well, they're supposedly giving us more information. They are letting us know more about what's going on with cases. But they sure as hell aren't giving any more information to the beat officers!*

The detectives might as well be on Mars for all the good they do us. They don't come unless you yell at them.

When it comes to Narcotics or the Gang unit, [they are working more closely with the beats], because we request a special mission here and there. But as far as the dicks go, no. They're in their own world.

While acknowledgments of enhanced relations between the Patrol Division and specialized units or divisions and the introduction of a new monthly meeting are indeed positive steps, there is really no appreciable progress toward carving out roles for specialized units in Chicago's community policing strategy. And perhaps one very fundamental obstacle is that the general order that codifies the program is prophetically named "Patrol Division Strategy to Address Chronic Crime and Disorder Problems."

Ancillary Support

Chicago's brand of community policing is distinguished by its use of municipal agencies and other resources to provide comprehensive services to the neighborhood residents. In addition to harnessing the power of city departments to augment the police department's delivery of services (discussed at length in the City Services section of this report), new resources were gradually brought in to free up some of the commanders' time to focus on the community and to stimulate residents' interest in the venture and train all involved in understanding and performing their roles. Three such supportive functions are examined in this section.

District Administrative Managers. The district administrative manager (DAM) is a civilian member of the district administrative office who reports directly to the commander. DAMs oversee the district's automation systems, manage the master beat file, coordinate officer training, prepare reports, and supervise administrative positions in the commander's office with the exception of the district secretary. Typical employees reporting to the DAM are the timekeeper, review officer, citation clerk, civilian administrative assistants and custodial staff.

The administrative manager position is a relatively new one. Before the launch of the CAPS program, a management consulting team recommended this civilian position to give district commanders more time to work with the community and focus on planning and management. In addition, individuals with some expertise were needed to manage the automation systems introduced into the districts. Bringing in these nonsworn administrators to handle these functions made a significant step toward civilianizing jobs that could be adequately handled by nonpolice personnel. In December 1993, new civilian district administrative managers were added to the prototype districts, and by March 1995 all 25 districts had administrative managers.

When the first administrative managers were hired for the prototype districts, the 1993 CAPS special order only loosely defined the position's duties and there was little uniformity to the position across the districts. These were rocky times for the DAMs. There was recurrent

friction with many of the officers who served as the commanders' personal secretaries and, as a result, often with the office staff. Many DAMs who had come to the department from the corporate world also suffered culture shock. Some of the managers were also somewhat overwhelmed with the UNIX-based local area networks that they were to manage. As a result of this shared set of problems, DAMs began meeting monthly to compare notes and craft solutions to these challenges. Later, the Patrol Division appointed a lieutenant as liaison who attends the meetings to facilitate any requests or concerns.

Last year's citywide implementation report found that despite these somewhat difficult beginnings, the group of administrative managers had remained pretty stable and they adapted well to the department, their districts and their positions, and this remains the case at present. This year DAMs did not report the same inner-office conflicts they had experienced in the past, although they referred to their previous hardships. DAMs today, if they have any complaints at all, are more concerned with personnel needs, disciplinary restrictions or inadequate department resources like computers.

While all DAMs fulfil the administrative responsibilities listed above, half of those interviewed have additional responsibilities specific to the needs of the district and commander and reflective of their own expertise. Some attend District Advisory Committee (DAC) meetings, beat community meetings and other community-related events. These DAMs attend to "get a pulse" on what is going on in the community and evaluate the strengths and weakness of their district's efforts. A few DAMs head DAC subcommittees and organize community events. Other DAMs generate statistical and crime analysis reports for the commander, district management team and beat teams.

Since last year's implementation study, DAMs have been better integrated into district management. The CAPS general order designated DAMs as members of district management teams and, consequently, participants in management team meetings. These meetings began in earnest during the winter of 1996 and all DAMs interviewed attend them. Not surprisingly, many of the district managers who have additional community-based and crime-analysis responsibilities have a more substantial role in the district management team meetings, while the remainder work in only a supportive capacity. A third of the DAMs were actively involved in the formation of the district plan, and many attended a district plan seminar (see the Special Initiatives section) as well. A few of these DAMs were quick to point out that while they are not police officers nor do they have officers' professional expertise, they have valuable private-sector and community-based experience to contribute.

Outreach Workers. As discussed in a previous section, the Joint Community-Police Training (JCPT) program was revamped for 1997, and now includes the function of community organizing, fulfilled by "outreach workers" — 25 full-time equivalents hired in early 1997 by the CAPS Implementation Office in City Hall. The newly hired staffers were quickly assigned to specific areas. In most cases these assignments were based on the individual's knowledge of a particular beat or beats or professional, interpersonal or language skills that meshed with the needs of a beat.

Outreach workers recruit residents for CAPS training and work to increase CAPS awareness and participation in beat community meetings and CAPS functions, focusing on areas most in need of help. District commanders and other police personnel assessed their beats to determine those in particular need of outreach and education, and outreach workers were assigned accordingly. Regular beat assignments allow outreach workers to develop long-term relationships with key members of the community and the district — their own type of "beat integrity." District commanders help determine outreach workers' duties within a district. For example, in one district, outreach workers might focus on involving businesses in CAPS; in another, outreach workers may target a non-English speaking community; and in another, they might work almost exclusively with schools and youth.

It is too early in the outreach workers' tenure to evaluate their impact or effectiveness. However, we did seek to learn what outreach workers are doing and whether police personnel are aware of their availability and are utilizing their services. We administered a comprehensive questionnaire to capture data on outreach workers' initial efforts and learned they attend many summer festivals, flyer and canvass door to door for upcoming community meetings, and help organize neighborhood CAPS rallies. Other outreach workers talk to school administrations and parent-teacher associations, block clubs, and church and business associations. A small number of outreach workers translate civilian training materials into Korean, Russian and Polish.

District commanders and neighborhood relations sergeants we interviewed are not only aware of outreach workers' activities, but most have worked with them to coordinate their activities. Police personnel listed some additional activities of the outreach workers, such as helping districts obtain incentive items like CAPS tee-shirts, and some outreach workers target linguistically isolated communities who have been thus far absent from community meetings. All but one District Advisory Committee chair are aware of, or work with, outreach workers as well, confirming that outreach workers are trying to increase CAPS awareness and community meeting attendance through the many avenues listed above. One DAC chair said,

> *In my beat, [a business] changed ownership and we had a hard time communicating our concerns to the new owner about what was going on there with loitering and drug dealing. The outreach workers got him to come to a beat [community] meeting and he's been coming ever since. Also there was [another business] where people were squatting in front of it and also hanging out. The store manager was tolerating it and it was getting out of hand. People didn't want to see it become a hangout. There was some low- level crime [that] people thought was associated with it. So the outreach workers went out and talked to the managers. It helped. The managers started discouraging people from hanging out there.*

Beat team leaders and sector team leaders are not as aware of the outreach workers as a resource. This is not surprising since outreach workers are not in every beat in the city and their operation is relatively new. Almost half of the sector management team leaders interviewed know an outreach worker from their attendance at community meetings and are aware of their

activities. Fewer beat team leaders are in contact with outreach workers; so far only a quarter of beat team leaders have outreach workers at their beat community meetings. Outreach workers in these beats have made presentations to the community about what services they offer and a few outreach workers have helped beat teams distribute flyers on upcoming meetings. One beat team leader is currently working with his outreach worker to solve a traffic problem. The remaining three-quarters have never met with an outreach worker.

As this year's evaluation field work was ending, we learned outreach workers were shifting their focus from attending summer neighborhood festivals to identifying active block clubs, helping establish new ones and tying them into the CAPS system. Lists of contact persons for community organizations are being updated in the process. Research from last year's JCPT evaluation shows that residents already active in their communities, such as members of church groups, block clubs and civic associations, are much more likely to sustain involvement in CAPS. Outreach workers are turning their focus to these stakeholders to encourage them to attend beat community meetings and become involved in CAPS.

Police/Community Trainers. By the beginning of summer 1997, all 13 commanders interviewed had met with the Education and Training Division's police/community trainers assigned to provide assistance in their districts. Most were positive about this new resource, with 12 of the 13 already availing themselves of it or planning to do so. Only one was noncommittal about future use of the police/community trainers, being unimpressed by the initial meeting with them. Trainers' methods included performing needs assessments based on beat plans and observations of district meetings, a process which they prepared for by observing district plan tutorials conducted by the CAPS co-managers with each district management team. Typically, district commanders had trainers introduce themselves at staff meetings, District Advisory Committee meetings and sometimes roll call, where they explained the services they offered. Trainers were later scheduled to observe beat community meetings and beat team meetings, either at the request of a supervisor or by Neighborhood Relations personnel, providing feedback and a plan of action. Some trainers also participated in district management team meetings where district plans were formulated, evaluated sector team meetings, and conducted problem solving training for beat residents and beat teams. Commanders commented about their assistance:

> *They've done an excellent job. They went to some beat [community] meetings to see how they're dealing with problem solving [and gave me verbal feedback].*

> *I'm very pleased with them. They attended a beat [community] meeting and gave us a report about how it's going. I want to have them [do an assessment for] all beats.*

> *These trainers are focusing on people who can benefit from the training.*

> *We're going to have them at the beat team meetings and the beat [community] meetings. The civilians are good; the community will like that.*

What they tell us is only useful if the officers and the community take the commentary to heart. The most important thing about this is that I'm not saying it. If it were to come from me, it would derail the whole effort.

Most of the 13 sector management team leaders interviewed had not had any contact with the trainers except for, perhaps, hearing their presentation at a staff meeting. Only four were familiar with work they had done in the district, and most spoke favorably about it:

They've been scheduled to hold training in some of my beats, through Neighborhood Relations. It was good. They actually worked on one problem in [a beat] for a couple of months and helped citizens who were assigned tasks do their tasks. They gave out certificates.

They were at all of my May beat [community] meetings and beat team meetings to assist us in making our beat plans and to give us more advice on our beat [community] meetings. They left us a little critique for each beat. They were helpful. Their ideas just made me feel like my ideas were right on track, so they made it easier for me to implement what I thought needed to be changed, not having a lot of experience doing this. Plus, they made my beat team members, especially the sergeants, reassured that they were doing the right thing. They gave a real boost to the sergeants; I liked that. Also, they made us aware of what help and equipment they had available to help us. That was good. And I really liked their positive attitude. I thought [the civilian trainer] understood our job, whereas most citizens don't always get it. All in all, I'm very positive about what they're doing.

One offered an opposing view:

A couple of people with no knowledge at all about police work came from the academy to talk to us. They were nice people, but they were about a year behind us.

Beat team leaders interviewed were also less enthusiastic, primarily because trainers came unannounced to their beat community meetings and beat team meetings, following up their observations with written critiques that were copied to the sergeants' supervisors. (Some commanders had similar concerns about needs assessments being sent to their bosses, the area deputy chiefs.) As a result of this lack of communication about the process, some team leaders viewed it as negative rather than constructive and were correspondingly unreceptive to trainers' suggestions. A conversation with a trainer revealed that it was painful for the trainers as well to be placed in situations where they were unwelcome. Whether it was deliberate or not, apparently this happened because trainers' visits were scheduled by Neighborhood Relations or other members of the command staff, such as sector team leaders, and failed to be communicated to members of the beat team. While only four of the 13 beat team leaders in our study had experienced having one of their meetings evaluated, they were unanimous in their displeasure with being uninformed, and many were also unhappy with the critiques. Of the remaining nine leaders, three had only heard trainers' introductory presentations at district staff meetings and the

other six had not had contact with them. Following are some of the comments about the evaluation process made by beat team leaders:

> *I figured out that the trainer was at the beat team meeting to grade me. He didn't announce his purpose or agenda and didn't participate in the meeting. He didn't assist us. He was more of an annoyance and I didn't appreciate it. After the meeting, he criticized me for not using a form properly.*

> *Some [trainers] have attended my beat team meetings. They contributed little. I tried to pull them into the discussion by asking questions. I don't like to see people just sitting there.*

> *I didn't meet any of them, but they sat in on one of my beat community meetings unannounced, then sent a critique. I wasn't pleased they didn't announce themselves, and I don't plan to implement what they suggested.*

Only two of the 13 District Advisory Committee chairs interviewed had met with the police/community trainers, but neither had yet enlisted their support for anything in particular. However, one of them had received a letter from the district commander informing him that the trainers would be attending beat community meetings in every beat in the district, to provide support to beat facilitators. In another district, trainers helped developed guidelines for community training slated to take place under the auspices of a new DAC subcommittee called CAPS Implementation and Education, masterminded by district police invested in the program.

City Services

A vital and innovative component in Chicago's community policing program is the linking of city services to beat teams in order to more effectively address disorder problems such as graffiti, abandoned vehicles and other neighborhood conditions that contribute to crime and increase the perception of crime among residents. Officers can enlist the help of city services to enhance the success of the community policing strategy for problems that they observe on their beat or those that residents tell them about at beat community meetings.

The city departments that are involved in Chicago's community policing program include the Department of Streets and Sanitation, the Department of Transportation, the Mayor's Liquor License Commission, the Department of Planning and Economic Development, the Department of Buildings, the Mayor's Office of Employment and Training, the Department of Consumer Services, the Department of Health and the Department of Zoning. The Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information (MOII) serves as the conduit for city service requests.

Upon learning about troublesome conditions that can be acted upon by the various city departments that have a role in CAPS, police personnel complete a service request form and submit it to the Neighborhood Relations office. If it is determined that the situation requires immedi-

ate attention, neighborhood relations personnel contact a supervisor at MOII to report the situation and its priority nature; when immediate response is not required, a request form is forwarded to MOII. All requests are recorded by the Neighborhood Relations office and MOII, and they are tracked by means of a status printout distributed to the districts. In addition, city agency representatives and City Hall's CAPS implementation manager meet with district commanders to review service concerns and implementation problems on a monthly basis.

By all indications, Chicago has made strong inroads towards achieving the interagency coordination essential to a successful community policing program. All 25 districts are using city service requests, at rates that range from 153 to 1,017 per 10,000 residents (cumulative totals from the inception of the process through June 1997). Our 13 study districts represent the full range of variation, high to low, in request rates. The three agencies that have accounted for most of the requests, in order, are the departments of Streets and Sanitation (mostly for towing abandoned cars), Buildings (for demolition of abandoned buildings) and Transportation (signage). Most frequently, requests are submitted for removing abandoned cars and buildings, adding or replacing traffic signs, removing graffiti, filling potholes, and trimming trees.

There are ambiguities in interpreting service request rates. They are (depending on the category): (1) a function of the extent of problems; (2) influenced (presumably) by community pressure; and (3) reflective of policies and management at the beat and district level. Conclusion (1) was arrived at, in part, by examining findings from our 1994 observation study, in which teams of observers checked actual conditions on city blocks chosen randomly, and comparing them with 1995 city service request rates for the 25 districts. The results showed a close relationship between how badly deteriorated the districts were and the rate at which requests were being written; pretty impressively, the services were being targeted toward the need or being driven by need. We also compared service request rates through mid-1997 with district demographics, including poverty. This comparison showed a high correlation between requests for demolition of abandoned buildings and poverty, and also between requests for graffiti removal and poverty, indicating that service requests are primarily driven by need. Other types of service requests tie into much more widely distributed problems and are not particularly linked to poverty; such as requests for towing abandoned cars, replacing or adding signage, and filling potholes. There is also evidence that local policies and leadership make a difference. Our evaluation of the service request process in the five prototype districts found wide variation between districts with similar problems. For example, of two districts with similar and relatively few problems, one generated nearly twice the number of service requests as the other. The difference between them was due to the aggressive leadership of one of the district commanders.

It was apparent from this year's study that use of city service request forms had become quite routine based on police personnel's answers to our queries. Police in several districts reported that "everyone" was submitting them, meaning citizens, aldermen and police alike, indicating a high level of comfort with the process. Many of them noted that submission was fairly evenly divided between police and citizens, with citizens sometimes submitting a facsimile (distributed by police and community organizations in some districts) which police used as the basis for filling out a service request form. District police described how the forms were used:

*Generally, beat officers submit them or people call Neighborhood Relations or the
desk, or things are brought up at beat [community] meetings. And whenever there's
a community event, we always have a table set up and get requests that way.*

*It's a mixture between police and citizens. The good thing is, we've built up credibility,
so the citizens believe when something is submitted, it's gonna happen. Generally, the
beat officers are submitting requests that have to do with safety issues.*

A few district supervisors observed internal patterns to who was submitting the forms:

*It's interesting — a lot of the older officers are really submitting them. It's like the
younger guys are out there trying to capture John Dillinger, but the older guys
understand what the quality of life stuff is all about.*

It's the same officers who are submitting requests. Some never submit requests.

*There's a couple of beat officers who seem to be in competition to see how many
they can turn in.*

While that last comment might appear innocuous, it may be telling of an unspoken
concern that numbers do count, and one commander raised the reality of it when he said:

*We keep a table on the number submitted, and we'll send a note to the watch commander
if the number falls.*

Almost all of the 63 CPD respondents reported that requests were handled in a timely
manner and that MOII was responsible and cooperative in their dealings with them. Only three
of them expressed the view that, as more districts had come on line, service response time had
slowed. In several districts, graffiti removal was singled out as one service that was
exceptionally timely. No one complained about the amount of paper used and stored in the
process or the difficulty of interpreting it, as many had last year. Only one related having the
experience of finding that jobs reported as completed were, in fact, not, and he acknowledged
that happened infrequently. This represents a marked difference from last year's findings. It was
also noted that MOII's beat summaries of the status of service requests were being printed out in
a much more user-friendly format: a neat, compact 8½" by 11" sheaf of paper, easy to carry to
beat community meetings where officers could check the status of service requests when citizens
asked about them. This handy report was a far cry from the voluminous reams of computer paper
generated in years past.

Just as in last year's study, officers reported that certain types of requests were routinely
slower to be resolved than others, but in most cases they understood that it was due to the need
for proper notification and other legal procedures before they could be acted on. Once again,
these were requests for towing, a service which was privatized in the past year; requests for new
or replacement signage submitted to the Department of Transportation; and requests submitted to
the Department of Buildings for the closing or demolition of problem buildings. Buildings were
mentioned most often as requiring the longest wait for visible results, but it was with the

understanding that legal entanglements caused delays. One police supervisor described how the court advocacy program could help speed up the process:

We're getting better results with housing court, especially when we take pictures the day before court. That really moves the judge. That way, if one of the inspectors or the owner says something has been done, we have proof that it hasn't.

Overall, the number of favorable comments made about the improvement in towing since the city transferred the responsibility from the Department of Streets and Sanitation to a private contractor last year outweighed the negative reports two to one. Police in six of the 13 study districts specifically mentioned the improvement, although one qualified it by noting that requests for tows were solicited at beat community meetings so that they could be submitted in groups of 10; that way they got a better response. Two districts that reported the preponderance of their service requests concerned abandoned autos praised the improved service. But in another district, a police supervisor told of reporting tows as emergencies even when they were not so as to get prompt service. In the five districts where a slow response time was mentioned, police usually qualified their remarks by acknowledging that it was improved over what it used to be, or that only particular types of towing requests posed a problem, such as tows of vehicles impounded after a sting or tows on private property.

Replacement of signage is also a slower process than many would like, especially because it is often a matter of public safety, and it was mentioned as a source of irritation in at least four of the 13 study districts. For example, one lieutenant told of a stop sign that had been removed from a very dangerous intersection and was not replaced for three days. In another district, police expressed frustration at being unable to get a stop sign erected at a very busy corner until the Department of Transportation had performed a feasibility study. Police in a third district had a better understanding of the situation because their backlog of requests for signs caused them to investigate. A neighborhood relations sergeant reported:

The assistant commissioner came to explain the delay to us. Believe it or not, the signs are not stockpiled. For every request, a new sign must be made. But I must say, it has improved a little bit.

Summary

The seven broad program categories discussed in this section were assessed in terms of their depth and effectiveness of implementation in the 13 studied districts. The broad categories are team work and planning; beat documentation; partnership with the community; beat integrity and dispatch communications; bringing other units into CAPS; ancillary support; and city services. Although many of the components observed are the same as in our previous report, this year's evaluation standards are different. Last year we assessed the extent of implementation, but as time passes and community policing in Chicago matures, we turn our attention to the quality of implementation. For this reason, even in categories where components are the same, evaluative findings cannot always be simply compared.

C   All 13 districts are holding regular team meetings at the district, sector and beat levels. There is little discernible resistance to them, though in some districts there is some question about the effectiveness of district management team meetings. All districts have completed district and beat plans (of varying quality), and most had revised their district plan based on feedback from the co-managers. Surprisingly, only one-quarter of beat team leaders reported that their beat plans had been revised. All sector management team leaders claim that beat officers are permitted to request time to work specifically on their beat plans. The assignment of beat team leaders has shifted beat-related responsibilities away from Neighborhood Relations in two-thirds of the districts. Beat team leaders think their already heavy workload has been compounded by their teamwork and planning responsibilities, and they continue to resent the amount of accompanying paperwork. Face-to-face information exchange at change of shift is more widespread than it was last year at this time, with verbal exchanges taking place regularly between off-going officers and their relief in eight of the 13 districts, as compared with only five last year.

C   All districts have master beat files containing most of the requisite paperwork. Half of the beat team leaders and two-thirds of the district administrative managers reported that officers are using the master beat file, particularly to prepare for beat community meetings and to exchange information between beat team members. However, beat profiles are not routinely amended and most districts have not instituted update schedules to ensure their accuracy.

C   Like last year, beat community meetings are held regularly and attendance continues to be a challenge for many beats. In 25 percent of the districts, neighborhood relations officers no longer attend beat community meetings, and in districts where they do attend, most are there only for support and do not run the meetings. Civilian beat facilitators have an increased role this year, with many independently chairing or co-chairing meetings with beat officers. Most meetings feature positive exchanges of information between residents and beat officers. Beat residents do identify priority problems, however, the majority of them do not brainstorm strategies nor help implement them. When the community does participate in problem solving, residents are particularly successful when tackling nuisance buildings. Although police personnel as well as community activists admitted that joint problem solving does not happen, many believe that together they are moving toward such partnership. District Advisory Committees were active and meeting regularly in all districts. Only eight of the 13 were functioning very well, but three of the five that were struggling appeared to be improving under new leadership. Half had too many inactive subcommittees, though each district did have active Court Advocacy subcommittees. All but two of the Court Advocacy subcommittees were functioning well; those that were not had limited membership that did focus on cases that were of particular concern to themselves rather than the community-at-large. DAC chairpersons expressed the desire for the city to establish common bylaws and organize regular meetings for them and their counterparts to exchange ideas and share information. Aside from their perceived lack of direction from the city, other obstacles they felt they faced included difficulty in engaging the community, dealing with personality issues, and lack of funding.

C   Beat integrity exceeds the "reasonable expectation" mark of 70 percent in 23 of the city's 25 districts on the busiest watch, according to OEC figures. Supervisors who believed their beat integrity figures to be low were generally overly pessimistic, while those who believed beat integrity to be good often overestimated their district's compliance. In addition, district personnel deemed dispatch communications to be significantly improved over the last year; beat sergeants did not need to intercede on improper assignments as often as previously. Concerns about the physical proximity of call-takers and dispatchers remain, because of fears for officers' safety resulting from insufficient caller information being sent out on the radios. Information transmitted via portable data terminals in the squad cars is mitigating the situation, but functional problems persist with PDT equipment. In spite of their lack of reliability, field personnel have reacted quite favorably to this new technology.

C   In spite of the department's stated commitment to involving the entire organization in community policing, after four years, little has been accomplished toward bringing in divisions and units other than Patrol. While tactical officers have been assigned to beat teams in many districts, frustration about the Detective Division's lack of participation in CAPS remains. A new mechanism — the Intra-Departmental Support Request form — was introduced this year to help beat officers enlist the assistance of specialized units, and those who have used it found it to be effective.

C   District administrative managers (DAMs) are more integrated into their positions, and resistance from police personnel has diminished considerably from last year. Half of the DAMs engage in community-related and crime-analysis responsibilities as well as typical administrative duties, and most are an integral part of the district management team. One-third of the DAMs were actively involved in the development of the district plan, and many attended their district plan seminar. The new outreach workers are mainly responsible for increasing CAPS awareness and participation in beat community meetings. Outreach workers have been working in their assigned beats and all of the district commanders and neighborhood relations sergeants have worked with them or are at least aware of their availability. Almost half the sector management team leaders are acquainted with their activities, and a quarter of beat team leaders are aware of them as well. All commanders interviewed had met with the police/community trainers assigned to provide assistance in their districts. Most were positive about this new resource, with 12 of the 13 already availing themselves of it or planning to do so. Only one was noncommittal about future use of the trainers.

C   The response to city service request forms had improved since last year, most notably towing after it was privatized. All but three of those interviewed throughout the 13 districts reported that requests were handled in a timely manner. By all accounts, MOII was responsive and cooperative in their dealings with district personnel.

Problem Solving in Practice

While our analysis of program implementation focused on many concrete details of Chicago's community policing effort, it was cast at the district level. While this is an important level within the police department for understanding management effectiveness and the progress of organizational change, it does not directly address a key question: is any problem solving going on? Chicago is committed to the adoption of a problem-solving orientation by the entire department and to the involvement of neighborhood residents as partners in that process. This and previous reports have detailed how the model was designed, how officers and residents were trained to use it and how it is supposed to look in the field. But it is difficult to discern the extent to which police and neighborhood residents are actually practicing — perhaps in partnership — elements of the problem-solving model, for few of the department's performance indicators touch on this issue.

This section of the report focuses on the problem-solving practices that could actually be observed in the field. During 1996-97 we examined first-hand the activities of police and citizens in a sample of beats, to see how closely they were hewing to the department's model and to identify factors that seemed to explain why some areas were more successful than others in making it work. A sample of fifteen beats was selected that represents many of the conditions and styles of life that are common in Chicago. The areas ranged from quite well off to very poor — the extreme mixes of economic levels. Some were racially homogeneous, while others were home to diverse sets of neighbors. The beats were selected on the basis of census, crime and geographical factors. Once they were identified, a great deal of qualitative and quantitative data was assembled to describe what was taking place there.

Five field observers worked on the project, each responsible for three beats. They mapped them to identify key features of each beat; they drove the streets to observe what was taking place there and rode with police officers to quiz them about specific sites and gather their impressions of conditions and events there; and they examined the files on each beat that can be found in district stations and in the officers' beat planners. The observers interviewed beat officers and their supervisors, neighborhood relations personnel, and district managers and commanders; and they attended meetings of beat team officers.

The general public was represented in this effort as well. Personal interviews were conducted with community activists and organization leaders, with members of the District Advisory Committee and their subcommittees, and with aldermen and city employees active in the area. The interviews examined how problems were being addressed on their beat and what the role of the community has been in community policing there. We also observed many of these individuals in action, at committee meetings and community gatherings. Staff members observed the beat community meetings that were held almost every month in each area, and in April of 1997 gathered questionnaire data from 280 of the residents who attended. In addition, a survey was conducted in 12 of the beats; households were randomly selected for inclusion from the telephone directory, and an adult respondent was chosen at random in each household. A total of 1,290 households were interviewed, including at least 100 in each of the 12 beats we were able to survey.

The Beats

These beat profiles are based on our observations, the resident survey, updates on data from the 1990 Census and more recent economic and social data from the Chicago Planning Department. They describe the current condition of the 15 areas and provide a backdrop for understanding the varieties of policing and problem solving that we observed in action there. The parts of the city where they are located is illustrated in Figure 8, which outlines each of Chicago's 279 police beats. While the police department numbers its beats, we have chosen a name for each that captures the routines of life there.

Three Predominately Latino Beats. These beats share a great deal, including poverty and isolation from the wider community. Based on family income, the three predominately Latino beats we studied are among the poorest 25 percent of the 279 beats in the city. Between 20 and 30 percent of households receive public assistance. Only 30 to 40 percent of those living in these areas have a high school diploma. Between a quarter and a third of residents were classed as "linguistically isolated" by the Census, meaning that neither they nor anyone in their family spoke English. Half or more of households do not have a car (nationwide the figure is 8 percent), and a quarter do not have a phone. All are densely populated, and homes and apartments are crowded with children.

Figure 8
Problem-Solving Study Areas

Fiesta is a vibrant, thriving community, almost entirely Mexican in character. The storefronts lining the commercial strip are always open, and shopkeepers greet their customers in rapid-fire Spanish. Graffiti coexists with colorful murals, trash with bustling sidewalks and a hodgepodge of architectural styles with one another. *Norte* is a predominately Puerto Rican community, although African-Americans live in some numbers on its quiet southern end. A third of the beat's residents are under 18 years of age, and most live in multi-unit apartment buildings. New and redeveloped scatter-site public housing is opening in the area. *Two-Turf* is a community divided within itself. The Spanish-speaking population is divided among Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans. Political boundaries and the area's aggressive gangs have divided the beat in many ways; the political split is reinforced by a railroad viaduct. The interior of the beat is mostly residential, and most residents live in small homes or apartment buildings. While

some areas of the beat are well-tended, others — which tend to be those with gang problems — are strewn with trash and junk.

Four African-American Beats. The beats that were predominately African-American in character were more varied than the Latino areas and reflected the class and life-style diversity of Chicago's black communities.

Residents of two areas are extremely poor; both are near the economic bottom, among the poorest 20 percent of all of the city's beats. Although neither includes any public housing developments, one-third of families are headed by single women, between one-third and 50 percent of all households receive public aid, and infant mortality rates are high in both areas. *Inner City's* appearance varies, but on several blocks more than half of the buildings are abandoned or extremely dilapidated. Larger single-family homes have been subdivided into smaller units. Poverty levels have been going up and the population of the area is slowly dropping, along with its economic prospects. The area's once-thriving commercial strip has virtually died. *Rebuilding* is the poorest beat we studied, with the largest proportion of families (half) receiving public assistance. It had the most vacant and abandoned buildings of any beat. But the area is now changing. Anchored by a large public facility, it is attracting some new housing construction (some of it government financed), and mass transit linkages to the city center have been refurbished. However, the area's current residents are unlikely to enjoy any benefits of this renewal unless new services and job opportunities accompany the housing renaissance.

The remaining two areas are in much better shape. They lie near the median income level for the city as a whole, and many fewer families here (in both cases about 12 percent) receive public aid. But both beats' average scores disguise sharp contrasts between middle-class and poor communities cast together by police beat boundaries. Vocal residents of *Pride* think theirs is the number-one black community in Chicago. Many VIPs, and blocks of new luxury town homes, can be found in the beat's west end. But multi-unit apartment buildings fill the eastern third of the beat, where more than half of the area's crimes, and even more of its calls for service, originate. *Old Guard* is better off as a whole because its nicer, home-owning sections cover more of the beat. Among the beats we studied, this has the highest proportion of senior citizens (almost 25 percent), many residents have lived there a long time, and there are relatively few children (one-quarter of whom attend private schools). But the one-sixth of the beat that is commercial, and the one-sixth that is not well off at all, contribute disproportionately to the beat's problems.

Two Predominately African-American Beats. *Southtown* is a poor, racially diverse community. Almost 30 percent of Southtown's residents (up from 20 percent in 1990) now are Latino, living in single family homes or small buildings along the beat's northern boundary. Although this sub-area too is sprinkled with dilapidated or abandoned buildings, they appear to be somewhat better off than the beat's African-American residents. In-migration has stirred the real estate market, and relative to its median income (which is low), Southtown ranked first in the number of residential mortgage loans in 1994. In the rest of the beat about one-third of families are headed by single women and one-third receive public aid.

Middle Classes is a different community entirely. Half to two-thirds of the population (accounts vary in this regard) is African-American and the remainder white. The division between the two is delineated by a commuter railway track that bisects the beat. Both groups are well off — white residents particularly so — but the median income on the African-American side of the tracks would still rank this area among the city's better-off beats. Together, their median family incomes place them among the top 10 percent of beats in the city. The area is composed almost uniformly of single family homes, larger in the better-off part of the beat.

Three Predominately White Beats. Together these areas represent the lifestyle of many white Chicagoans. Two of them are decidedly lower-middle class in character, the homes of city workers and working couples who together make a decent living. Both have a high proportion of high school graduates but few college graduates (together, about 9 percent). Forty to 60 percent of school-age children in these beats attend private — predominately Catholic — schools. *Bungalow Belt* is 85 percent white, and about 90 percent of residents live in single family homes. Almost everyone there owns their home, and the beat lies in the top 10 percent of all beats in terms of family income. We estimate that since the 1990 Census the black population of Bungalow Belt has grown from almost zero to 5 percent, and the Latino population has doubled to 10 percent. In our survey Bungalow Belt stood out in one regard; while only 2 percent of the entire sample volunteered that neighborhood racial change was one of their leading concerns, almost all of them were concentrated in Bungalow Belt, where racial change was mentioned by 17 percent of those we questioned. The western end of *Blue Collars* closely resembles Bungalow Belt, but the Eastern stretch is more than one-third Latino, and many more homes there are two-family duplexes. Latino residents' somewhat lower income and education levels bring down the beat's average, but Blue Collars still lies in the top quarter of the income ranking for all beats in the city. A beat we dubbed *Property Values* represents upper-middle-income white Chicagoans; it is a quiet, picturesque suburb that happens to be located in the city. Homes there are big and had the highest value of the areas that we examined. Ranked by income, Property Values lies in the top 4 percent of beats in the city. Two-thirds of the children living in Property Values attend private schools. This area earned its name from the primary concern we heard expressed at beat community meetings.

Three Diverse Beats. These three areas represent virtually all of the lifestyles that Chicago has to offer, face-to-face in relatively compact areas. Homes in these areas ranged from mansions and luxury high-rises to slots in single-room occupancy hotels, with a fair number of elder care and residential treatment facilities mixed in as well. *Stir Fry* epitomized the racial diversity of these areas: residents there are about 32 percent black, 28 percent Asian, 23 percent white and 17 percent Latino. All 6,000 of them live in a four-by-five block area. *Potpourri* is very similar, with more whites and a few thousand more residents. Like in Stir Fry, 99 percent live in multi-family buildings featuring tiny apartments. There are many single people in both places; 40 percent of householders in Stir Fry, and almost 60 percent in Potpourri, live in single adult families. Home ownership is very infrequent (just 7 percent in Stir Fry). In Potpourri, a thin band of white middle-class homeowners dwell along the beat's Eastern boundaries, across from a lakefront park; in Stir Fry they have recently moved into two different parts of the beat where they hope their real estate will appreciate in value. While Stir Fry and Potpourri are heavily commercial, and passers-by crowd the main-street sidewalks day and night, *Solid Mix* is

residential in character. It is a diverse, working-class community: the area has almost equal numbers of whites and Latinos, small numbers of blacks, and about 10 percent of the population is Asian. It enjoys the highest median income of the three diverse beats (lying in the top 40 percent of the city's beats); the fewest families receiving public aid; smaller apartment buildings and more duplexes; and many more traditional, two-adult families.

Neighborhood Problems

What kinds of problems did these communities face? To examine this, we surveyed residents in 12 of the areas and interviewed police and neighborhood activists everywhere. We toured the beats repeatedly and came to our own conclusions as well, based on what we could see happening in public places.

In the survey we asked respondents to list "... the most important neighborhood problems affecting your area," and then reminded them of the area we were interested in by repeating the street boundaries of their beat. We asked for the most important neighborhood problem first, and then for the second and third most important. In each case we also asked where it was a problem, so that we could map their responses. Most respondents had several things to report, and the interviewers recorded their answers verbatim.

Four broad categories accounted for 52 percent of all of the problems that were nominated.

Gangs were most frequently mentioned, by 36 percent of those we interviewed. They expressed concern about gang violence and wars between contending groups, gang involvement in the drug business, gangs in schools and gang intimidation of neighborhood residents.

Drugs came next and were mentioned by 23 percent of the respondents. They mentioned drug houses in their area, street drug sales, public drug use and drug problems in schools.

Social disorder problems were described by 20 percent of those we interviewed. Graffiti and teen-age loitering in the neighborhood each made up about one-quarter of the total, public drinking 13 percent, and vandalism and panhandling each contributed another 10 percent. Less frequently mentioned were truancy and curfew violations, fights and strangers in the neighborhood.

Physical decay was mentioned by 15 percent of respondents. Almost half of these problems involved trash, junk, litter, or loose garbage in the neighborhood. Another 20 percent were reports of unsightly or ill-maintained buildings. The remainder included rats, noise, abandoned buildings and dog waste.

Three other general categories encompassed beat problems named by fewer residents.

Cars and traffic problems were nominated by 10 percent. Most were concerned about parking, speeding and traffic congestion. These are not examined in detail in this report.

<u>Property crimes</u> were listed by 9 percent. Most were burglaries, auto thefts and break-ins of cars.

<u>Violent crimes</u> were also mentioned by 9 percent of those interviewed and included homicide, robbery and purse snatching.

Many other specific issues were mentioned. Some felt that their neighborhood's problem list included the ineffectiveness of the city agencies charged with dealing with concerns like those listed above. Others mentioned that police were apathetic, that there were not enough police on patrol, or that police were slow to respond when called. Only 1 percent noted police harassment, disrespect or corruption. The remaining problems were not particularly local (for example, high phone bills, poor mail service and the weather); involved macro-economic issues (for example, poverty and unemployment) or social issues (for example, teen pregnancy or moral decline); or were highly personal in character (for example, illness or aging).

It is important to note that these problems reflected the public's assessments of their communities. There was no guarantee that these assessments would match official measures of the seriousness of their neighborhood's problems, or even the sheer volume of officially recognized problems. But regardless of any congruence between citizens' perceptions and outsiders' views of their communities, these were the issues that were on their minds when asked to consider the problems affecting their neighborhoods. To the extent to which Chicago's community policing program is to respect the public's definition of the problems that needed solving, these issues could be some of the "raw material" for police and community problem-solving.

Not surprisingly, many of the concerns plaguing the study neighborhoods reflected their race and class composition. Many of the most frequently reported problems were typically concentrated in poor and minority neighborhoods. However, there were important differences in the kinds of issues reported by African-American, Latino and Asian respondents, so the neighborhoods where they were concentrated exhibited varying constellations of problems. This is illustrated in Figure 9, which charts the social distribution of the two most common problems, gangs and drugs. The left-hand axis of each figure presents the percentage of beat residents identifying these problems. The beats are also arrayed by their social and economic features, which are displayed cross the bottom of each chart.

Gangs

As Figure 9 depicts, reports of gang problems were concentrated in the three heavily Latino areas, Two-Turf, Fiesta and Norte. Residents of Blue Collars, a lower-middle class area with a new and growing Latino population, also mentioned gang problems more than 40 percent of the time. Solid Mix, on the other hand, reported fewer gang problems despite its substantial Latino population.

Residents of ***Two-Turf*** are caught between two large Latino gangs jostling for control of the area, and the gangs in turn are being challenged on the fringes by three other Latino gangs

Figure 9
Gang and Drug Problems

Gangs

percent gangs a problem

Two-Turf
Fiesta
Norte
Blue Collars
Bungalow Belt
Rebuilding
Solid Mix
Pride   Stir Fry
Potpourri
Old Guard
Property Values

r= +.84

percent Latino

Drugs

percent drugs a problem

Rebuilding
Norte
Stir Fry   Pride
Two-Turf
Potpourri   Old Guard
Fiesta
Blue Collars
Bungalow Belt   Solid Mix
Property Values

r= +.81

percent African-American, Latino and Asian

Gangs

percent gangs a problem

Two-Turf
Fiesta
Norte
Blue Collars
Bungalow Belt
Rebuilding
Solid Mix
Potpourri   Pride   Stir Fry
Old Guard
Property Values

r= + .83

percent under age 18

Drugs

percent drugs a problem

Rebuilding
Norte
Stir Fry   Pride
Two-Turf
Potpourri   Old Guard
Fiesta
Blue Collars
Bungalow Belt   Solid Mix
Property Values

r= +.84

percent female headed families

a branch of the Black Disciples. Fully 68 percent of those we surveyed in the area identified gangs as a problem. Gang shoot-outs are a fairly common occurrence in the area, and locations around the community are decorated with wreaths and markers enshrining fallen gang members or bystanders. Gang graffiti mars buildings where city workers have been unable to keep up with the demand for clean-ups, though occurrences are regularly written up by one of the beat officers. In Chicago, Latino gangs are divided between those who fight for recognition and pride of place, and those that are deeply immersed in the drug trade. In Two-Turf, knowledgeable residents reported a close tie between gangs and drugs, and feared reprisal from them for their activism. There is street drug dealing along the beat's arterial streets and violence between the gangs over the trade.

In *Norte*, drugs are also mentioned in conjunction with concern about gangs. However, while they sell some crack cocaine, the three large Latino gangs that dominate the area are more combat-oriented and even tolerate independent heroin dealers in their midst. One gang is an entirely local group that was formed to defend the area from white gangs to the north and west. Gang violence and street shootings are also the most important problems in Fiesta, which is tied for first among our study beats for murder. Violence erupts in Fiesta for control of territory. Fights and occasionally shootings erupt around schools there at closing time. Fiesta's gangs have carved up the area on a block-by-block basis and are constantly testing the boundaries. Gang graffiti is a common sight, and gang members gather on corners or outside apartment buildings and intimidate passers-by. The five major gangs are all local in origin and have been active in the area since the 1970s. Unlike Two-Turf, drugs are not identified as a major problem in Fiesta, either among neighborhood activists or the general public.

Because of their concentration in Latino areas, gang problems were associated with all the factors that characterize those beats. One of these is presented in Figure 9, the concentration of youths in the beat. As it illustrates, the three Latino beats had a distinctively youthful population. In Two-Turf, for example, almost 40 percent of the population is under 18 years of age. White and African-American areas with relatively few children reported fewer gang problems. Residents of Bungalow Belt mentioned gang problems more frequently than their smaller youth population would predict. That community is deeply disturbed by the activities of gangs of local white youths that reputedly formed in reaction to advancing racial transition. As one beat officer described them "The gangs out here are more into territory. They break each other's car windows — rivalry stuff... They chase each other down and beat each other up with bats." Other factors that are associated with gang problems and the concentration of Latino residents include low education, crowded housing and schools, population turnover and linguistic isolation.

Drugs. Drug problems plague areas where African-Americans, Latinos and Asians are concentrated. As Figure 9 indicates, reports of drug problems were few in number in the three predominately white, home owning areas: Property Values, Bungalow Belt and Blue Collars. Solid Mix again had fewer problems than predicted by its demographic composition, as did Fiesta. Drug problems were greatest in the poorest of the areas: Rebuilding (primarily African-American) and Norte. They were also high in somewhat better off Pride and Old Guard (African-American), Two-Turf, and in Stir Fry and Potpourri (both very diverse).

Drug trafficking in **Rebuilding** is facilitated by the existence of some abandoned buildings and numerous vacant blocks where deserted housing has been leveled. An SRO (single room occupancy hotel) in the area also contributes to the problem. Drug transactions primarily take place on the street, by teenagers who conceal their inventory amid the ruins of the area. A 1996 computerized hot spot map identified five drug zones that encompassed about half of the beat.

As noted above, gangs in *Norte* are heavily involved in the drug business. Unlike some areas, the trade in Norte is concentrated in drug houses rather than on the street. During our field period, there was a constant stream of traffic in and out of one home near a school in the beat. The very experienced family living there was difficult to connect with evidence of trafficking, however, and neighbors were afraid to share any information about them with the police. In *Pride's* troubled east end, on the other hand, the problem was open-air drug markets. On ride-alongs, our observer noted,

> *Groups of teens and young adults crowded into apartment building foyers and congregated on the sidewalks in front, scattering when police cars pulled up. Alleys were also gathering places for adults and teens known to the police as having criminal records for drug possession or dealing. On the business strip that separates the east end from the rest of the beat were smaller groups of teens who ducked into stores or crossed the street when police cars approached. One night, an apparent drug deal in progress in the parking lot of a closed gas station was interrupted by police; it was obvious that the supposed customers were not area residents, because they were white.*

The major gangs in this area have these street drug markets neatly divided up, so violence between them is infrequent. Customers occasionally get roughed up because they try to pass through one gang's turf to buy from another, but control of points of sale is stable and uncontested. Pride ranked fourth from the bottom in terms of resident perceptions of the extent of gang problems. Instead they were concerned about the bands of loitering youth — often in obvious gang apparel — associated with the business, and Pride ranked second (at 10 percent) in the proportion of residents naming loitering as one of their beat's biggest problems. In *Stir Fry*, concern about street drug dealing is linked to the aggressive street life of the area, in particular to the prostitutes and bands of men who congregate, loiter, panhandle, drink, and use and sell drugs with seeming impunity in this congested area.

Across the study areas, drug problems were high in the most "bombed-out" and semi-abandoned beats, places with high apartment vacancy rates, abandoned buildings and a great deal of empty land. The four beats that were highest in terms of drug problems had four times as many abandoned buildings as the remainder, twice as many vacant parcels of land and twice as many vacant homes. The correlation between the extent of drug problems and median income was -.75. Broken families and public aid recipients were concentrated in drug-plagued areas, and the areas' schools were very bad. As Figure 9 illustrates, drug-plagued areas had more female

headed families. Unlike gang problems, there was a strong link between drugs and crime. Street crime, gun use, domestic violence, and public disturbances were very common in high-drug areas, based on the Police Department's crime and 911 dispatch data. The street crime rate in the four worst drug areas was twice that in the other study sites, and the gun crime rate stood out almost as much.

Physical Decay. Visual evidence of decay and neglect, a category encompassing unsightly, unhealthy and occasionally dangerous conditions, was very strongly linked to neighborhood poverty. Figure 10 depicts the quality of life that comes with affluence, measured by median family income. At the top of the income ladder, residents of Property Values and Bungalow Belt mentioned unsightly or unsanitary conditions less than ten percent of the time, while that percentage doubled among residents of Norte and Potpourri. Two areas stood out as having worse problems than predicted by their wealth, Fiesta (poor) and Solid Mix (which is ranked just below the top 40 percent of beats in the city).

Based on residents' rankings, physical decay was the most pronounced in *Fiesta*, and the Latino fraction of the population was substantial in the five beats where these problems were most prominent. Part of the problem is population density: unlike many areas, Latino neighborhoods in Chicago are growing in population and this has put a strain on city services. Fiesta's alleys are strewn with garbage and rats constitute a serious menace there. Litter drifts through the area, kicked up by the bustle on the streets and sidewalks. Twenty percent of those interviewed in Fiesta named litter or trash as one of their area's biggest problems, almost twice as many as the next highest beat, Solid Mix. Solid Mix ranked second in terms of trash and litter problems and second in terms of concern about graffiti. However, we observed that many of the area's residential blocks were neat and clean and much of the muss seemed confined to alleyways and trash bins. Like all of the study areas that combine significant white and Latino groups, it was white residents who expressed most of the concern about physical decay. This is an area where long-time residents are quick to register concern about threats to the area's well-being.

Residents of *Norte* have been involved in a significant amount of beautification, but other forces are working against them. Like other poor areas of the city, Norte has been inundated by fly dumpers, who unload their trucks in the alleys and vacant lots rather than pay for depositing their construction rubble at licensed landfills. Residents fear the consequences of scatter-site public housing which is opening around the area, in light of the Chicago Housing Authority's track record in maintaining its properties. Sections of Potpourri — primarily a rental community dominated by absentee landlords — are in very poor condition. Many buildings there are not being kept up and trash and broken glass litter streets and empty lots.

Because of the association of unsightly and unhealthy neighborhood conditions with poverty, those problems were also linked to a long list of community factors. Several of the most problem-plagued areas were heavily Latino and thus were isolated from the rest of the city by language, education and lack of transportation. The areas characterized by frequent complaints about decay problems were the most dense that we studied; some included considerable

Figure 10
Crime, Disorder and Decay Problems

Property Crime

percent a problem

15

Blue Collars
Old Guard · Bungalow Belt
Property Values
Pride
10
Potpourri
Solid Mix
Two-Turf
Stir Fry
5
Norte
Rebuilding
Fiesta

r= +.79

10000   20500   31000   41500   52000
median family income

Violent Crime

percent a problem

19
Potpourri Pride
Stir Fry

14
Old Guard
Blue Collars
9
Rebuilding Two-Turf
Property Values
Solid Mix
Norte
Fiesta
Bungalow Belt
4

0   10000   20000   30000   40000   50000
median family income

Physical Decay

percent a problem

30
Fiesta
Solid Mix
20
Potpourri
Norte Two-Turf
Stir Fry
Rebuilding
10
Old Guard
Pride   Blue Collars
Bungalow Belt
Property Values
0

r= - .84

10000   20500   31000   41500   52000
median family income

Social Disorder

percent a problem

Stir Fry   Blue Collars
Old Guard
30
Potpourri   Solid Mix
Pride
20
Property Values
Bungalow Belt
Rebuilding
10
Norte
Fiesta
Two-Turf

10000   20500   31000   41500   52000
median family income

commercial or industrial land, others had high vacancy and abandonment rates, and residents were packed in large apartment buildings or small multi-family units at almost six times the proportion in the other study neighborhoods.

Social Disorder. The portrait of neighborhood disorder drawn in Figure 10 is more complex. Recall that this list is dominated by unlawful activities that frequently are not taken very seriously by the authorities: graffiti, public drinking, vandalism and truancy. It also includes lawful activities lying on the fringes of the criminal law: loitering, panhandling, fights and noisy domestic discord. These posed little concern — compared to the other problems that people could mention — in the poorest of our sites and in the best-off places. As Figure 10 documented, disorder problems were most commonly cited in areas in the <u>middle</u> of the income distribution. They were highest in Stir Fry, Blue Collars (whites and some Latinos), and Old Guard (the best-off African-American community). Other middling-income neighborhoods also were higher on disorder than either those at the top or the bottom: Solid Mix, Potpourri and Pride.

The high-disorder communities are very different places. In **Blue Collars**, where Latinos continue to edge in on traditionally white-ethnic turf, concern about disorder is equated with the emergence of gangs and gang graffiti. Twenty-five percent of those we interviewed in Blue Collars identified graffiti as a problem, more than twice as many as the next highest area, and whites and homeowners in the beat were by far the most likely to be concerned about these issues. Police, residents, and the alderman see gang graffiti as a high-priority concern because it signals changing neighborhood conditions. Gang activity to date seems confined to vandalism and "hanging around," and is not linked to drug problems, which are infrequent in Blue Collars. Housing conversions which illegally divide larger homes into multi-family units are also a problem in the area. In **Pride**, on the other hand, the threats posed by loitering young men loomed large on people's minds. During the day they stand alone or in pairs, dressed in obvious gang apparel; later they turn out in larger numbers on the corners of intersections along the beat's arterial streets and along its commercial strip. They are unknown to long-time residents, and their presence intimidates passers-by. They are suspected of shoplifting, burglary and robbery, particularly around currency exchanges and a regional public aid office.

As noted above, in **Stir Fry** the central issues revolve around the large number of people roaming the streets day and night: male and female prostitutes and their pimps, panhandlers, "bag ladies" and their male counterparts, runaways, peddlers, drunks and (almost certainly) street drug dealers. They cluster around transit stops, fast food restaurants, liquor stores and convenience grocery outlets. The detritus they leave in their wake — including bottles, cans, food wrappers, and soiled blankets and clothing — litter the area. There is evidence of public urination and defecation all around. Stir Fry leads the 15 study beats in the rate at which police are dispatched to handle disturbances and non-crime matters, including persons missing from halfway houses, and homeless people sleeping in vacant lots, parks and public facilities.

Crime. Our survey of beat residents gathered reports of two different types of crime, property offenses (people principally complained about burglary and damage or theft of cars) and violent crime (they mostly mentioned robbery, along with some homicide and purse

snatching). Property- and violent-crime were only modestly associated with one another, for property crimes were more frequently cited by residents of better-off beats, but better-off places were the least likely to indicate that violent crime was a problem. Interestingly, measured by what people identified in the survey as their areas' biggest problems, there was almost no correspondence between official rates of crime and the public's priorities. And perhaps most important, compared to the other problems they had on their minds, those we interviewed did not mention crime very often.

As Figure 10 illustrates, reports of property crime problems were concentrated in the higher-income beats. The four beats that most frequently nominated property crime problems averaged twice the income level of the other sites and almost four times the home ownership rate. Three of the four were largely white, but one — Old Guard — was African-American in composition. Note, however, that scoring "high" on violent crime meant that about 12 percent of those we interviewed thought it was an issue.

Property crime was the only issue stirring much response from residents of affluent Property Values; this area came in last in terms of the frequency with which problems were mentioned in the survey, but concern about burglary put it fourth on the property crime problems measure. Based on police reports, Property Values actually had the second highest burglary rate of the beats we studied, but they were mostly thefts from garages. Police statistics for working-class Bungalow Belt ranked it third of 15 in terms of theft and in the top half for burglary. Garage thefts and break-ins are frequent there as well, and tools and lawn furniture are frequently lost. The police view is that residents do not secure their property very effectively, but some residents read crime as a disquieting signal of neighborhood racial transition. In Blue Collars, which ranked first on police burglary figures, concern about property crime was concentrated among white residents we surveyed, but not among Latinos. Garage burglaries are common in Old Guard, our most affluent African-American community, because of the opportunities created by the single family homes covering almost two-thirds of the beat. Shoplifting is an offense that does not so easily come to the attention of residents, but the police consider the large grocery and retail stores along one edge of Old Guard to be "shoplifting central."

The three areas that most frequently identified violent crime problems included one African-American community (Pride) and the two most racially heterogeneous areas we studied, Stir Fry and Potpourri. What they feature in common is that they all attract "the unattached." Almost 60 percent of the residents of Potpourri are unattached single people, and that figure is almost 40 percent for Stir Fry and 37 percent in Pride; these three areas rank by far the highest on this dimension. And in all three areas, more than 90 percent of the population lives in large, anonymous apartment buildings. Both Potpourri and Stir Fry feature a vibrant street life and commercial strips and transit stations that concentrate people day and night. Our observer noted that public places in the deteriorated end of Pride were also "hopping with pockets of activity," even in cold weather. Street robbery and purse snatching are concentrated at this end of the beat. All three of these areas are home to significant numbers of disadvantaged or marginalized residents who are vulnerable to victimization. One police sergeant in Pride described thefts from seniors who use the currency exchange and bus stops in the area as a 25-year-long pattern.

Perhaps the most striking feature of both violent and property crime problems is that their reported frequency was virtually unrelated to rates of officially recorded crime for the same beats. The correlation between violent crime problems and the violent crime rate was slight (+.26), with residents of three beats identifying violent crime as a problem more often than official figures would warrant: Potpourri, Pride and Stir Fry. On the other hand, respondents in Norte and Fiesta did not cite violent crime as frequently as official statistics would suggest they should. The mismatch between area property crime rates and the extent to which residents cited problems with property crimes was virtually complete. The highest property-crime beat based on police figures — Old Guard — was tied for first place in terms of problem ratings, but the second-highest beat based on official numbers — Rebuilding — was tied for last place in terms of resident concern about the problem.

It also does not appear that concern about neighborhood crime problems matches changes in trends or recent upsurges in recorded crime. This conclusion is based on an examination of detailed data on crime trends for the beats. Potpourri, which ranked number one in terms of concern about violent crime, did experience an unexpectedly large upsurge in street crime (which is seasonal everywhere) during the summer of 1996, six months before the survey began. However, trends in violence in Pride, which ranked number two, remained stable, as they did in number three ranking Stir Fry. And while burglary also jumped alarmingly in Potpourri during the Summer of 1996, residents there stood in the middle of the pack with respect to concern about property crime problems. Burglary was up sharply in Blue Collars, which tied for first place with respect to concern about property crime, but it was stable and (exceedingly low) in Property Values and declining in Old Guard, also places where residents most frequently mentioned property crime problems.

Community Capacity for Problem Solving

Our analysis of these beats indicates that they vary a great deal in their capacity to solve these problems on their own. Some are richly endowed with active community organizations, while others support only a few, struggling civic associations. In some areas neighbors feel they can count on one another to watch for trouble and intervene to stop it if possible, while in others people think they are pretty much on their own. A few of the communities we examined have a proven capacity to get help from public and private institutions, but in others residents are largely disregarded by the outside world, and in one beat, outsider developers seem intent on destroying the existing social fabric.

Analysts have labeled these capacities "social capital," in order to highlight the ways they parallel the productive possibilities inherent in economic capital. Political scientist Robert Putnam has identified "networks of civic engagement" as a key form of social capital. Civic engagement is reflected in the density of local organizational life, for organizations enable individuals to share, accumulate, and prioritize their concerns, and to coordinate their efforts to deal with them. Organizations can sustain problem solving when individuals tire, retire, or turn to other interests. Civic engagement is also manifested in spontaneous acts of generosity, support and even courage; acts that may be motivated by people's sense of community, civic obligation,

or belief that they and their neighbors are sealed in a common fate. Communities high in social capital evidence a great deal of mutual respect and trust and cooperation for residents' mutual benefit.

Another measure of a community's capacity is its ability to extract resources from the outside world. Areas that score highly on this dimension are more closely bound to city or metropolitanwide institutions that can deliver the goods, services and economic capital that communities require to tackle local problems. This study examines the "downtown" connections of each beat. These included how well connected they are to important political leaders and policy makers; if their aldermen are aggressively pursuing community revitalization; if grants or investments by government or private institutions are visibly improving public areas of the beat; and if beat residents have "friends in high places" by virtue of their jobs or affiliations. Along with these factors we also assessed the electoral capacity of each beat, a factor that counts a great deal when it comes to getting things done in Chicago.

Measuring Community Capacity. One important form of social capital is the action that people take to represent the norms of the community by intervening to safeguard them when they are threatened. This is known as <u>informal social control</u>, and we assessed the extent of informal control in each beat using the resident survey. The survey asked about the likelihood that neighbors would get personally involved in stopping three kinds of incidents: if children were spray-painting graffiti on a local building, if a teenager was harassing an elderly person, and if there was a fight in front of their home in which someone was being beaten up. This perceptual measure represents what people thought their neighbors are likely to do, or the perception that they are protected in part by a defensive web of social support.

Respondents thought it was most likely that someone would intervene to stop teens from harassing an elderly person: overall, 43 percent thought neighbors would be "very likely" to tell them to stop it, and another 40 percent thought they were "likely" to do so. Intervening in a fight was the most problematic: only 20 percent thought it was very likely that their neighbors would break it up, and 30 percent thought it was likely. About 34 percent thought their neighbors were very likely to step in and do something to stop children from spray painting a building, and 35 percent thought it was likely. Responses to these three measures were consistent, so we combined them to calculate a single informal control rating for each respondent and beat.

Property Values came in first on the combined measure: 75 percent of residents thought their neighbors would step in to protect the elderly, 67 percent to stop spray-painters, and 48 percent to break up a fight. Next on the over-all measure came Old Guard. At the bottom lay a predominately Latino beat, Two-Turf. In this gang-ridden area only 4 percent thought neighbors would step in to stop a fight, and only 21 percent thought they would speak up to spray-painters. Just above Two-Turf came the most diverse area, Stir Fry, where the perceived willingness of neighbors to intervene in a fight stood at only 9 percent.

To measure the extent of <u>involvement in neighborhood-based organizations</u>, we asked survey respondents if they or anyone in their household was involved in a neighborhood watch or

patrol group, or a block club or community organization in the area. We also asked if anyone in the household was involved in a PTA or Local School Council, and in a church or synagogue. We only counted churches or synagogue that were located in the neighborhood, which accounted for about half of those who were religiously affiliated. Overall, about one-third of those we interviewed were involved in a local church or synagogue, 30 percent in a block club or community organization, 15 percent in an anti-crime group and 12 percent in a school group. These responses were also combined to create a single measure of local organizational involvement and, overall, 58 percent were involved in at least one organization on the list.

Involvement varied a great deal across beats. In one of the most diverse beats — Potpourri — 76 percent of the households surveyed were not involved in any local organizations, while in Property Values 86 percent were affiliated with at least one. Another predominately white beat scored second (Bungalow Belt, where 84 percent were involved), but the third most organized beat was Old Guard, the most affluent African-American community. Involvement in neighborhood watches or patrols was most common in another African-American beat, Pride (26 percent) and was lowest in Potpourri (6 percent). Old Guard was also number one (at 58 percent) in involvement in block clubs or community organizations, while Solid Mix (white and Latino) came in last with 9 percent.

While intervening informally and participating in neighborhood organizations provide two quite distinct avenues for involvement in problem solving, the two generally went together. The two measures were correlated +.78. Beats that enjoyed a measure of social capital on one dimension could bank on the other as well. Secluded Property Values stood first on both, followed by Bungalow Belt and Old Guard. At the bottom on a combined list lies Potpourri, then Two-Turf and Stir Fry. Figure 11 depicts where each area stood on each dimension.

Figure 11 also indicates which beats proved to have a high capacity for extracting outside resources to address community problems and protecting what they have. Most have little ability to do so. The reasons varied, but as Figure 11 suggests, those that did also enjoyed other advantages. The downtown connections of the highest-capacity beats are described in detail below: they were social, organizational and political in nature. The nine areas that we judged to have very little capacity for extracting resources from the wider community were both poor and working-class in character. These areas were not represented by large civic associations or umbrella organizations. Figure 11 illustrates the relatively low organizational involvement of their residents, and in Potpourri it was difficult for our observer even to locate beat activists to interview. The residents of several beats were not politically sophisticated, and in some they too frequently feared the authorities rather than relied on them. Several of these beats were ignored by their aldermen, sometimes because the aldermen's electoral majorities were built around residents of other areas, and sometimes because they were not particularly interested in delivering any but the most basic city services to their constituents.

All but one of these overlooked beats also scored at the bottom of our ranking of their political capacity. Three factors were taken into account in this assessment. The first is the readiness of neighbors to organize to protect their beat against a "take away," as reported by

Figure 11
Organization Involvement and Informal Social Control

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Organization Involvement and Informal Social Control

survey respondents. In the survey they were presented the not-so-hypothetical threat that their district police station would be closed (in 1992 the city attempted to close seven stations, but rescinded the move in the face of community resistance), and asked about the likelihood that their neighbors would organize to keep the station open. The second factor is the beat's voter turnout rate for the 1995 mayoral general election, which proved to be correlated +.81 with the survey measure of political mobilization. Third, we looked at who they vote for and if their favored candidate has anything to give them. Except for Blue Collars, beats with fewer downtown connections are also politically marginal. Blue Collars is a middle-income beat (the fourth-best-off on this measure) and home to a number of city workers. Turnout in local elections (about 44 percent of adults) is relatively good; 96 percent voted for the winner in the 1995 election, and residents there thought their neighbors were fairly likely to get organized. But community organizations are weak in Blue Collars, and there is little solidarity among the area's white and Latino residents. The beat is divided between three different aldermen, complicating any CAPS-related efforts needing their support.

Three High-Capacity Beats. *Property Values* stood at the top of the list. In the survey, over 85 percent of households reported they were affiliated with a local organization and 41 percent with two or more. Block or community organizations were most frequently mentioned (52 percent), and not explicitly anti-crime groups were mentioned by only 16 percent. Four well-organized civic associations provide coverage for every block in Property Values. The largest claims 2,000 members, and sponsors neighborhood cleanups and civic projects, and lobbies for improvements in the area's public facilities. While the city only manages to clear major arterial streets of snow, in this area civic associations have contracts with a private service that plows the residential streets and sidewalks. In this overwhelmingly Roman Catholic area, 82 percent of those we interviewed claimed a church affiliation, and 62 percent worshiped in the beat itself.

In its relations with the outside world, Property Values is a neighborhood with "clout." While other areas house city workers, many of the top brass can be found here: Property Values is home to top police administrators, political leaders, judges and business executives. The area's businesses are effectively represented by chambers of commerce. The alderman is actively involved in CAPS beat meetings and the district's Advisory Committee, and officials representing city and county agencies are there to take notes. Voter turnout in Property Values is high, and solidly in the camp of the incumbent administration. If Property Values had any problems, help would be on the way.

Residents of middle-income *Bungalow Belt* also establish where they live by reference to their parish, and 57 percent of those we interviewed (second highest) were affiliated with a local church. Our observer noted that church bulletins have been an important way of getting information around Bungalow Belt. But unlike Property Values, where references to crime are unwelcome because they hint that there might be a problem, Bungalow Belt is honeycombed with aggressive neighborhood watch groups. The largest has more than 100 members and has at least two cars on patrol every night. A leader of this group described it as her "gang." As she told us, "you come after one of us, all of us will come after you." Critics from the part of the beat where racial minorities are concentrated know group members well and refer to them as "vigilantes." Twenty percent of households in Bungalow Belt were affiliated with a neighborhood watch or patrol group. In addition, Bungalow Belt is well endowed with general-purpose neighborhood improvement groups and civic associations (48 percent claimed membership), and their efforts are coordinated by a large umbrella organization that encompasses the entire beat.

Bungalow Belt's strong community organizations help link the beat to outside institutions with resources to offer. They work closely with one of the aldermen, real estate developers and mortgage companies. The alderman pays a great deal of attention to the beat and is quite involved in CAPS. Beat organizations have been very involved in stabilizing the real estate market, controlling land use in the area and halting unwanted commercial development by a national corporation. The many city workers who live in the beat know the city's bureaucracies and how things get done. This beat had the highest voter turnout rate of those we studied (60 percent of all adults) and the highest support for the incumbent, and the civilian facilitator who

chairs the beat's community meetings is a precinct captain. In this ward, the precinct captains meet to discuss how they can support community policing.

Old Guard is an African-American community where people simply have been around — together — for a long time. It has the most seniors and the fewest children of any of the beats we examined. The respondents to our survey were the oldest we interviewed (averaging age 55), and they had lived in the community for more than 18 years (Bungalow Belt had the highest average, 19 years). It is easy to meet people there: Old Guard is a community of single family homes and two-flats, and neat and inviting shops line the arterials surrounding the residential parts of the beat. In the nicest areas, residents have united to purchase matching lampposts for their front lawns. Residents have raised their families together and worked for common causes through block clubs, local school councils, community associations and church committees (there are six in or around the beat). They greet each other warmly at community beat meetings and socialize before and after the sessions. Block club signs are visible everywhere, and in the survey Old Guard was number-one on this measure (58 percent of households claimed a block club affiliation). There is an active citizen patrol in the beat (Old Guard was ranked first on this measure, at 26 percent), and a member of the District Advisory Council's cellular phone patrol committee lives here. The troubled part of this beat (about one-sixth of the area) is less organized; residents there are transient, less educated and much poorer.

The troubled end of Old Guard is served by an alderman with strong connections at City Hall. His staff members attend beat meetings and step forward to attend to the complaints that are raised there. The head of the area's major civic improvement association has spearheaded redevelopment of the area's business corridor and helped secure a major new business facility for the area. A large bank has opened a new branch office in the better-off part of the beat, and it is very involved in business revitalization and local investment projects. In terms of electoral turnout and perceptions that people would actively fight the closing of their police station, Old Guard stood fourth among the 15 beats we examined. However, the part of the ward where most residents live has a strong independent streak and has not supported winning candidates. That section is represented by another alderman with less support from the executive branch. He does not deliver services very effectively, and business interests in the area worry that his lack of downtown connections hurts the beat.

We were unable to conduct a survey of residents of *Middle Classes*, but that community was also capable of extracting resources from the metropolitan community. The two middle classes represented on the beat — whites at one end and African-Americans at the other — fall under the umbrella provided by a large and powerful community organization with extensive connections with government. The alderman representing the best-off section of the beat has been very successful in securing crime prevention funds for the entire area. That part of the district is home to judges, agency heads, police executives and Board of Education administrators. The larger African-American section of the beat has no discernable connection downtown, but its expanse of single family homes and largely middle-class residents is tended to by the wider area's civic association, and the alderman from the other end of the beat attends to

CAPS matters there, too. The beat registered high voter turnout levels but split its vote along racial lines.

Among the remaining beats, *Pride* evidenced enough social and political capital to be classed as a moderately capable community. One end of Pride, an area comprising about half of the beat, is home to many influentials: city officials, judges and real estate developers. A local business association managed to secure redevelopment funds for the area. However, their alderman is not central to city governance, and the one serving the other end of the beat is not particularly interested in development issues. Residents of that area were unable to halt unwanted Section 8 housing conversions and lack the ability to influence the course of events in their community. Compared to the others, Pride ranked third on the anticipated response of residents to the threat that they would lose their district police station; however, turnout in elections is low. On the other hand, voters in *Blue Collars* turn out in large numbers for winning candidates, and in the white parts of the beat appear ready to battle downtown for police resources.

Three Low-Capacity Beats. The capacity of residents of *Potpourri* to exercise much influence over their common fate is extremely low, but so diverse and insular are its component communities, it is unlikely that there is much of a common fate to defend. Our observer found it hard to identify beat residents who are involved in community affairs in any organized way. A small band of Potpourri town-home owners is active in one part of the beat, taking vigilante-like action against problems in their immediate area. However, the two concentrations of middle-class homeowners in the beat are effectively walled off from the beat's problems by fences, cul de sacs and parks. They drive directly into their garages from work and shut the doors behind them. Their homes are carefully armored and wired for alarms, and police are responsive to requests for special watch over the area. Residents of these isolated pockets have and use the resources to take care of themselves and have little in common with the rest of beat, which they ignore. Elsewhere on the beat, residents are jammed into large apartment blocks, low-income retirement hostels, drug and mental-illness treatment centers, or unsavory single-room occupancy hotels. Almost 60 percent of residents are single adults, and they are divided among whites (40 percent), blacks (28 percent), Asians (20 percent) and Latinos (11 percent). The large Asian population includes many non-English-speaking households (including some illegal residents), and they keep to themselves. They do not turn out for beat meetings, and they reputedly do not call police when they have problems. Instead, they handle them on their own, as best they can, without drawing attention to themselves. In the survey, more than three-quarters of the households we questioned in Potpourri did not belong to anything. Only 6 percent are active in an anti-crime group, and only 12 percent are affiliated with a church located in the beat, the most frequent form of involvement everywhere. They are near the bottom in terms of perceived willingness to intervene to maintain order: 14 percent in a fight, one quarter against spray painters and less than a third to rescue a senior citizen.

Stir Fry has a little more organizational life, but less informal control. It is the most diverse area we examined, featuring an ethnic balance that is almost perfectly divided among whites, blacks, Latinos and Asians (who in turn are divided into at least six significant groups). In our survey, 62 percent reported they had lived in Stir Fry for less than five years. In terms of

their perceived willingness to step in to rescue a senior citizen, Stir Fry residents came in last, and only two beats stood below them in challenging spray-painting vandals. There are only a few storefront churches in the beat, and the organized life of the community is contributed to by a scattered group of home owners (the area is 93 percent rental) active in two civic associations. Many survey respondents claiming an organizational affiliation named an association representing residents of their high-rise building, but these inwardly-focused groups do not cast much of a security envelope outside the lobby doors. Residents involved in CAPS-oriented groups do not get any support from the alderman who represents the area and who is opposed to the program.

Finally, there is ***Two-Turf***, the gang-ridden Latino community fractured along political and social lines. It's middle-of-the-pack score on organization involvement was boosted by church participation; unlike Potpourri or Stir Fry, there are <u>30</u> churches in this beat. However, their insular congregations have declined to become involved in neighborhood issues despite targeted requests by CAPS activists, and residents of Two-Turf are otherwise not very heavily involved in organized community life. Many residents are immigrants and distrust the police, undermining involvement in anti-crime groups. They are not accustomed to using formal organizations to get things done; as one activist noted, "They don't know how to form committees and pay dues. I threw a rummage sale and it was the first funding experience most of them had had." The two aldermen who split the area are not necessarily opposed to community policing, but dislike one another, and this has made it harder to coordinate city support for the program.

Community Capacity and Community Policing. Several factors differentiate these beats in their capacity for dealing with problems on their own. Two obvious factors are affluence and diversity. Older, better-off home-owners predominated in the self-regulating and well-organized areas, while poorer apartment dwellers with more children are concentrated in areas where it is hard to get people involved. The measures of informal control capacity and organizational involvement presented in Figure 11 are highly correlated with median income, home ownership rates and the concentration of single family homes in the beat. Factors like age, length of residence and other community stability measures were highly related to these two capacity measures as well. The capacity of beats to extract external resources to deal with local concerns was also concentrated among the best-off places we studied, including the two highest-income African-American areas (Old Guard and Pride), and two of the three predominately white beats. Their social capital had a lot to do with that.

One not-surprising implication of this is that areas with the most capacity to deal with their problems have the fewest problems to deal with. The association is far from perfect, for Old Guard and Pride both have significant drug problems. But informal control and organizational involvement are linked to lower levels of fear of crime, fewer concerns about gangs, fewer problems with neighborhood deterioration and simply fewer problems of all sorts (the correlation between the average number of problems that beat residents nominated in the survey and the strength of informal control is -.85, almost a straight line). It is likely that this relationship is a two-way-street. The ability of communities to exercise extensive informal control and mount

organized efforts to stamp out emergent problems doubtless explains most of this linkage. However, advancing blight, violence by gangs, fear of drug dealers, and disorderly conditions that drive families off the street and eventually out of the neighborhood, undermine the informal control capacity of communities that have fallen under their sway and probably their organizational capacity as well. Each causes the other, which is why they are so closely associated.

The challenge this presents to community policing is easy to state, but harder to act on: to find ways selectively to supplement — and perhaps help restore — the capacity of communities to deal with their problems. One of the great national debates about community policing is whether it helps the worse-off get better-off, or if the better-off just get even more better-off. The risk that the latter is true is a real one; the same factors that placed the beats at the upper-right corner of Figure 11 in their enviable position make most of them easy venues for community-oriented police work. One officer working there described Bungalow Belt as "the perfect CAPS beat," in reference to its family orientation, strong organizations, high turnout at beat meetings (Bungalow Belt averages more than 100 residents per meeting), and identification with the police. The challenge to community policing is to implement an effective program in the lower-left quadrant of Figure 11, among the places without much of a capacity to defend themselves. That would be helping the worse-off get better-off. One reason for conducting this detailed study was to report on how well Chicago has done to date in that corner of the city, an issue that is addressed in the next section of this report.

The second challenge to community policing is presented by diversity. The beats in this study that were racially and ethnically homogeneous found it easier to get organized, and people there seemed more willing to intervene in untoward events. In referring to Figure 11, it is apparent that all five of the areas with significant community capacity were very homogeneous in composition, including two white and three African-American communities. To examine this relationship in more detail we calculated an index of demographic homogeneity based on a detailed breakdown of the racial and ethnic composition of each beat; a high score on this index reflected the concentration of most residents in one category or another. This homogeneity index was correlated +.85 with the extent of organizational involvement and +.69 with the strength of informal control.

Blue Collars illustrates the point. This beat has many fundamentals in its favor, but it did not register very high levels of social capital. Blue Collars is an area of neat single family homes and two-flats, home to a significant number of city workers with stable, middle-income jobs. It lies in the top income quarter among all of the beats in the city. Yet residents there report about the same level of confidence in their informal control capacity as residents of Potpourri, and they almost match Stir Fry. This may be because racial transition in the area has upset existing relationships and discouraged the maintenance of beat-wide alliances and mutual support. The newly arrived Latino residents are much less involved in local organizations. Our survey found they are substantially more likely to think they are not getting adequate service from the police, and they are less optimistic about how well community policing has progressed in the area. White residents of Blue Collars are concerned about the area's newly emergent graffiti problem,

and they see much more social disorder around them than white residents of other comparable areas.

With the small number of beats involved in this study it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the distinct role that diversity plays in fostering community capacity, but research in other cities cautions us in this regard. That research suggests that in diverse communities, suspicion and fear may divide the area along race, class and lifestyle lines, leaving residents and the organizations that represent them at odds with one another. Diversity makes it easier to blame others and abdicate personal responsibility to take constructive action. They may point fingers at each other over who causes what problems, and the police are likely to be pressured to choose sides. Groups contending over access to housing, municipal services, infrastructure maintenance, and public sector jobs and contracts may also find themselves battling one another over policing priorities and for the ear of the district commander. Community policing then threatens to become politicized, with police appearing to take sides and representing "local priorities" that are those of some in the community, but not all.

But it is also possible for police to provide a bridging link in diverse communities. They can bring together community members in a regular, safe, public forum where the concerns of participants are aired and their commonality recognized, perhaps for the first time. CAPS provides an incentive for cooperation because a clear, united community voice can make a more credible claim for attention from the police and their partner agencies. Residents united around a common set of problems may be able to leverage more resources than by speaking separately. Finally, compared to many other fora where low-visibility policies get made and acted upon, beat officers can be expected to operate in a relatively law and rule-bound fashion. With proper mechanisms for supervision and accountability in place, we should be able to expect them to safeguard the rights of all citizens, act with lawful restraint even in the face of popular demands for action and find common ground for taking action.

The Police and Problem Solving

The police make up the final part of the community problem-solving equation. Their central role will always be the one that society uniquely entrusts to the police: to use force (sometimes deadly force) to deal with dangerous and too-often armed lawbreakers who threaten the safety of the community. But CAPS expands their responsibilities to encompass a broader conception of policing, that of promoting community security. To do this they have taken on a number of new tasks, ranging from coordinating the delivery of city services to hosting beat community meetings and assisting resident's organizing efforts. Central to this new mission is that they are to form partnerships with the community, both to bring the resources of residents to bear on local concerns and to support the development of an indigenous problem-solving capacity that can sustain that effort while police turn their attention to other matters they are uniquely empowered to address.

The beats were selected to evaluate how well all of this is being implemented. They were chosen on the basis of demography and crime rates, rather than any knowledge of policing there.

As it turned out, among the 15 beats that were examined, four are doing an excellent job, five are fielding reasonable programs, two are struggling to make the grade, and four have failed to implement much of CAPS at all.

These assessments were made on the basis of direct observations by the evaluation staff, rides with beat officers, personal interviews with officers, beat team leaders, neighborhood relations sergeants, district administrative managers and commanders. They observed both community and beat team meetings and sessions of the district's advisory committees, inspected beat paperwork and attended administrative meetings. They also interviewed business operators, local activists and organization leaders, and attended neighborhood meetings. Their detailed notes were reviewed centrally by several readers, who rated the standing of all 15 beats on a series of evaluative dimensions. These ratings were then reviewed again by the entire evaluation staff, and a consensus decision was made about each beat. This analysis also makes use of the survey of residents of 12 of the beats.

Of course, many factors complicate the assessments presented here. The descriptions and ratings reflect what we observed between October 1996 and April 1997 (with later occasional follow-up efforts when necessary), but CAPS is constantly evolving. Significant administrative moves were made to speed implementation while the evaluation was under way, but before they could have had much effect. Staffing changed over time, and in some of the beats there were significant leadership changes — and thus new people were assigned who were less sure of their jobs — just before the evaluation began. A few staff changes that occurred while the evaluation was under way did not promise to improve things. Some of the laudable activities we observed were in place before CAPS began, and others were reactions to parts of the program that officers on the street found burdensome. In a few beats, positive efforts by foot officers and neighborhood relations personnel were well received by the public, but were masking inattention by beat teams to their new duties. In some, community groups were engaged in vigorous problem-solving efforts despite a lack of support by the police. Because CAPS is a "moving target" the real purpose was not to calculate the fraction of beats that were performing well or badly. The sample of beats was selected to represent styles of communities, not to identify pockets of bad practice. Instead, we documented what the program really looks like, both where it is making progress and where it has not come very far. We also hoped that comparisons among the snapshots that we took would illuminate some of the reasons for the successes and failures we observed.

In the profiles that follow, we have also gone to some length to protect the confidentiality of the beats involved and the people we interviewed. Selected details that went into the overall rankings are not described here. We changed the gender of all pronouns to masculine in order to reduce their identifiability despite the fact that women played important line and staff roles in some beats.

The Best and the Worst. *Two-Turf* was the most highly rated district. Beat team officers there work regularly on prioritized problems and report on their progress at beat team and community meetings. They are also quick to take on fresh problems raised at beat community meetings. The team's staff meetings are energetic, and the officers don't hesitate to

dispute or debate ideas that are tossed out, even when there are top brass present. They have worked out new and sometimes innovative strategies to address issues identified in the beat plan. The officers like to negotiate solutions to problems when they can. For example, at a beat meeting residents made two complaints, about men congregating and drinking behind a liquor store and about junk truck drivers leaving their vehicles parked illegally for days on end. Beat team officers identified the trouble-makers, spoke with them, kept after the situations and resolved the problems. They made local acquaintances rather than arrests. The day-shift officer on the beat team is particularly aggressive in combating graffiti, a significant problem in Latino areas. They make extensive use of the information in their well-worn beat binders.

The sergeant who leads the team is dedicated to involving residents in community beat meetings, and he spends a great deal of time working with and supporting the somewhat-shy civilian facilitator who co-leads the sessions. He is a very dynamic leader at the beat team's meetings and encourages his officers to throw out and debate ideas. The beat's plan was well thought out and identified clear and addressable problem locations. In addition to the shorter list of prioritized problems identified in the plan, the team sergeant insists that officers follow up on all of the issues raised at community meetings. He keeps a list from each community meeting, and at team meetings there is a group discussion about what to do about each one. The sergeant developed his own "special attention" form to record less significant problems (for example, overnight truck parking on residential streets) and tracks his officer's efforts against them.

The district management team works to support these efforts. The lieutenant responsible for the area (the "sector management team leader") attends about half of the team's meetings and some beat community meetings. He actually reviews the team's beat profiles, plans and meeting logs, and provides feedback about what he sees there and, on occasion, has identified problems that transcend single beats for coordinated attention. When a beat team leader proposed that security police from a problematic public housing development in the sector be invited to the sector management team's monthly meetings, he quickly endorsed the idea. The district commander devotes a great deal of attention to youth programs he is developing, a priority in an area rife with gang activity. He also adopted an experiment by Two-Turf's beat team leader of involving another sergeant as an "assistant beat team leader," and made it a district-wide practice.

The largely Latino population of this beat is not particularly supportive of the police, and in the resident survey Two-Turf ranked last on that dimension. Yet beat officers and their sergeant remain optimistic and committed to community involvement, and at one beat team meeting they brainstormed about how to increase participation. They have established good ties with resident activists, and a cadre of loyal participants helps sustain consistently attended beat meetings. At the meetings, officers report progress on issues that have been raised at previous sessions. The officers make aggressive use of the CAPS service request process, and representatives of city agencies frequently are invited to attend beat community meetings. At the meetings they also report on the area's improving crime statistics and patterns revealed in ICAM maps of the beat. The district's neighborhood relations unit also distributes a newsletter that details police efforts. However, consistent with the department's plan to pass responsibility for community meetings over to police who actually work in the area, neighborhood relations

officers do not play a visible role at these public sessions. The beat team's responsiveness to citizen's concerns was signaled when they added street prostitution to their official list of priority problems, then followed up with undercover and enforcement measures to counter it. The most significant shortcoming of this beat's effort is a very common one; its limited effort to involve residents in problem solving. But their beat plan respected citizen input, and they have been aggressive in resolving — and reporting upon — problems of all sorts.

Stir Fry was the lowest-rated beat we studied. Little redeems Stir Fry: it is tied for the worst district management, beat leadership and officer involvement, and it has the second-worst beat plans. The officers serving there work from the assumption that they cannot resolve any of the beat's problems; they feel helpless to do anything about them. They do not look past their traditional crime-fighting role, which they also do not think does much good. On this beat, problem solving consists of patrolling more often, talking to trouble-makers and issuing citations (the officers don't like to make too many arrests, because of the paperwork). Officers report that they are not doing anything different than in the past, yet they think that "CAPS isn't working."

The beat team leader views CAPS as a public relations program that principally involves new paperwork. He made up his beat plan to encompass some efforts that community activists had already undertaken, and claims he has not — and does not plan to — use it. In his view, the area's problems are "100 percent societal" and not going to change, so he sees little reason to analyze or strategize about them. He does not want to press too hard on his officers, who already feel "put-upon" by the demands of CAPS. The beat team's meetings are unproductive; few officers come, there is no discussion, and the usual conclusion is that nothing is new. The sergeant's view of community beat meetings is that they are a forum for voicing complaints about the police, a reaction that did not surprise us.

In this beat, community meetings do provide a useful forum for bringing up individual problems, because a district neighborhood relations officer attends and is a vocal leader. Along with some traditional enforcement efforts by beat officers in response to issues raised in the meetings, his efforts have been instrumental in whatever problem solving has taken place in the beat. However, he is not considered part of the beat team and not invited to team meetings. The survey of beat residents included questions assessing whether they were aware of CAPS, and Stir Fry ranked last on the list; they ranked tenth among the 12 in terms of awareness that beat meetings were going on. Questions about their own involvement in problem solving placed Stir Fry at the very bottom of the list. The civilian beat facilitator reports that problem solving that does take place is organized by block clubs and not through CAPS' formal channels.

The commander of this district has good public relations skills, but thinks that is the primary gist of CAPS. He is amiable and accommodating with the public, but does not really understand that the program calls for his officers to undertake different, more ambitious projects. The district's beat plans were thrown together to meet the department's deadlines and have not been followed up with subsequent implementation or beat meeting documentation. The lieutenant who supervises beat teams in his sector does not play a leadership role. There are few

management team meetings, and he has not actively reviewed the team's very sketchy paperwork.

More of the Best. In the rankings, the police serving *Bungalow Belt* came very close to tying for first-place position. The officers who work the day and evening shifts are very pro-CAPS. They are quite involved in the dialog at beat community meetings and report back at following meetings on their actions. The officers also developed a special form that they distribute during the meetings that enables participants to anonymously identify problems for their attention, perhaps "naming names" in a way that they might not want to in a public forum. The team also has a home-grown form that it uses to track progress on problems. Officers who work in the early evening work closely with a neighborhood watch organization representing the area. The sergeant brings a lot of enthusiasm to beat team meetings, which are a locus for a spirited exchange of information and strategies that officers have identified. Team members work regularly on priority problems identified in the beat plans. One of those was added to the list even though officers did not think it was very important, because nearby residents were fearful. They sometimes employ non-traditional strategies, including rallies or working with neighborhood watch groups, but their sergeant wishes they had more training and a better understanding of the program.

In part, all this good-spirited activity is tied to the fact that officers working in Bungalow Belt see the area's problems in exactly the same light as do most residents. In much of the district, officers identify closely with community groups; they stop at organizers' homes to exchange information and share their pager numbers widely. Perhaps as a result of this consensus, the survey found that 91 percent of residents thought police serving their beat were somewhat or very responsive to community concerns. The beat ranked number two on enthusiasm for the quality of police service in the area. However, residents are not particularly involved in joint activities with the police. Beat meeting attendance is very high in Bungalow Belt, but the discussion remains focused on airing complaints and identifying problems for the police to solve. Neighborhood watch groups interface with police principally by paging beat officers to provide them with information, or by calling 911 when they want arrests made. While this beat is honeycombed with active organizations, residents by-and-large carry out their activities independently. This is because their interest primarily lies in protecting property values, stabilizing the real estate market and coping with suburban flight. This is an area enjoying low rates of violent crime, few social disorder problems, little physical decay and no serious gang or drug problems. But it is one where 17 percent of those who were surveyed pointed to white flight as one of their areas biggest problems. While they are tackling that issue aggressively, they are doing so outside the framework provided by CAPS.

The relationship between police and the community is not as strong in the pockets where Latinos and African-Americans dwell, and residents there have a tense relationship with organizations representing white residents of the beat. One of the goals of representatives of the minority area is to have community meetings held closer to their end of the beat, and when they attend, their principal demands are for more traditional policing measures like directed patrols and faster response times when they call.

The beat team leader is very supportive of CAPS and has an excellent understanding of the program. His beat community meetings feature a printed agenda, crime maps and flip charts to record problems that are brought up during the meeting. He has a good relationship with the community. He has tried to convince them to take an active role in problem solving, but laments that most members of the public just want more patrols. He noted, however, "CAPS has opened a door that can never be closed. The community is really happy about the community meetings and getting to know us and telling us stuff." This beat shares some problems with the one next-door, and he has developed coordinated responses with the team leader there. Bungalow Belt's sergeant directs extremely productive team meetings and contributes his own creative strategies to discussions about resolving problems. He reminds officers of the importance of keeping up with the paperwork documenting their efforts and to keep their beat plan binders up to date in case they are inspected. Officers on the afternoon watch do not have any problem with the paperwork. As one reported, "We like to prove to the upper echelon guys what we do. We want recognition." One problem the sergeant faces is that the officers who work midnights in this beat refuse to attend either beat team or community meetings because they have decided they do not like the program. For reasons not clear to us, no one seems to have challenged their withdrawal, perhaps because they have so little interface with the general public.

The district commander responsible for Bungalow Belt is not particularly excited about CAPS, but understands what he is supposed to do. He strongly supports community relations efforts and places the program in that category. The lieutenant who serves as the sector management team leader watches over the activities of his teams and reports about them at district management meetings, but does not need to provide much guidance. He has encouraged his sergeants to coordinate their efforts across beats. The civilian district administrative manager attends many community meetings and played a key role in drafting a good-quality district plan.

Norte was also high on the list. Beat team officers are quite willing to work with residents to make the area a better place to live. They are concerned, though, because residents are reluctant to get involved in problem solving. To get things going, they asked residents to help them tackle one of the beat's major problems, fly dumping. They encouraged them to take on the "eyes and ears" task of identifying offending trucks so they can trace the owners. There was evidence that officers are making good use of their beat profiles and information binders, and they are knowledgeable about many aspects of life on their beat. When asked about trends in the area, they pointed to such factors as property improvements being undertaken by residents, a beautification program and newly-dug community gardens. One of Norte's officers has worked the beat for many years and has an intimate knowledge of its residents, businesses and problems. He works closely with community members, the local school and other city agencies. He keeps the records, maintains the beat profile and helped draft the beat plan.

The beat team sergeant is an enthusiastic and vocal supporter of community policing, and a conscientious supervisor. He actively coordinates his officers' missions and is adamant that they devote significant attention to the priority problems identified in the beat plan. During team meetings he reviews procedures and protocols that need to be followed and reminds team members of the importance of keeping up with their paperwork. The meetings also feature a

review of the beat's priority problems and discussion of actions needing to be taken to counter them. Team meetings in this beat are unusually well attended, including representatives of the neighborhood relations unit, the district administrative manager and the sector lieutenant, as well as beat officers. The sergeant understands that residents have a role to play in the new scheme of things in Chicago. Part of one beat team meeting was devoted to participation issues and how to get the beat's civilian facilitator more involved. A sincere and amiable chap, he initially was not dynamic enough to motivate his fellow residents. The team sergeant meets with the facilitator in advance of each community meeting to review the issues needing to be raised, and during the months we visited the beat, the facilitator's leadership skills improved markedly.

Norte has a stronger social fabric than Two-Turf, another predominately Latino beat. The neighborhood survey indicates that more residents here think their neighbors will intervene when trouble occurs. Some report that CAPS has had a unifying effect on the area, and the program may be able to capitalize on the beat's stronger informal social control. As one resident explained, "I've met new neighbors. There are people that live directly behind me that I never knew. I met them at the beat meeting." Beat meeting attendance has been good for several years, averaging 28 residents. Those who come are loyal participants, averaging about five meetings per year. Beat team members are quite loyal as well; one beat team member who was transferred to another area came to an additional community meeting just to say goodbye and to introduce his replacement to the neighbors. The vitality of the beat community meetings in Norte is significant, because the organizational life of the community is otherwise quite limited; according to the survey few residents are involved in any, and the district's neighborhood relations office has a sparse list of organizations serving the beat.

Unfortunately, resident involvement in problem solving was also very limited in Norte. There was some improvement in this during the course of the study, but for most of the period residents came to the meetings to get their problems solved. They voice their complaints, and then team members explain how they intend to handle them. As the sometimes-disheartened team leader described it, "CAPS has the potential to make things better, but the community just doesn't get it... They come to the meetings, and they'll talk about the problems, but then they just sit there and expect the officers to tell them what they're gonna do about it." Like a surprising number of police we have encountered, he thinks the community is too arrest-oriented. "They think that if an arrest is made, that's all that counts. They go to beat meetings to get the maps and hear about arrests. They could be doing clean-ups or graffiti paint-outs or holding neighborhood forums, but all they care about is arrests."

The commander is extremely knowledgeable about CAPS and is bent on putting it into practice in the district. Other members of the management team also understand their roles and seem to be carrying out their part. The administrative manager is thoroughly informed about CAPS and maintains excellent documentation of the district's efforts. There was a change in sector lieutenants while the evaluation was underway. The original sector team manager was well informed, had some creative ideas, was a hands-on manager, and held the beat profiles and plans for his beats to a high standard. Norte's beat team leader reported that he passed along information from the district management team's meetings and that they had a lot of interaction.

There were signs that his replacement intended to keep an eye on beat team meetings, but he is far less involved strategically.

More of the Worst. Just above the bottom comes *Pride*. The implementation of CAPS there is deficient in just about every way. The officers working there feel helpless in the face of the area's problems; "no problem is ever closed," one complained. They lay the area's problems upon an influx of poor people who are moving into the beat's east end with housing vouchers and youths who lack respect for authority. They pay little attention to residents' concerns; they do not think beat community meetings are useful, and they give only superficial attention to the problems that are brought up there. The beat team does not understand CAPS, and when asked about its steps for problem solving, they admit they do not use them because they are too complicated. They are also resentful. They resent the notion that their job is to serve residents, and they resent the elements of CAPS that are intended to empower the community. Officers feel that residents of the better-off part of the beat regard them as their personal security force and clean-up service; one commented they expect him to be "the pooper-scooper police." They want to do what they have always done — conduct sweeps, make arrests, stop-and-frisk, and tell hangers-on to move along.

It is important to note that race is not at issue here. Pride is an African-American community, and those attending beat meetings are almost uniformly black. But based on observations of the 47 officers who attended six beat meetings during the study period, 83 percent of the police officers who appear at the meetings are African-American as well. Beat meetings in this area are well attended, primarily by residents of the better-off section of the beat where there are fewer problems needing to be addressed. At the meetings, residents describe problems and the police respond by promising to check on them. Police view those who attend as caring about their community, and there is considerable respect in evidence between officers and residents. In the survey of residents, those living in Pride ranked fourth highest in terms of their assessment of the quality of police service in their beat. Officers on this beat have just not made a transition to the kind of proactive, problem-solving policing that CAPS was intended to trigger. As their beat team sergeant put it, "Overall, they don't like it because it interferes with their real job, which is to respond to emergency situations and to enforce the law and arrest offenders."

He, too, takes about the same view. Resigned to the community's problems, he believes that they are too deeply rooted in social problems to be solved. As he noted to his officers at a beat team meeting, "What do you think we can do to improve the quality of life of everyone who lives in [beat], short of dropping a bomb on the east end." Team meetings are small because, when asked to choose when to schedule them, the officers selected a day when most of them are off-duty. The sergeant thinks the process of soliciting citizens' complaints is pointless. "The same people show up at the meetings all the time. They complain about things like missing garbage can lids." But problems that are discussed — sometimes at length — at beat community meetings are not being reliably recorded in the meeting logs, and there is no discernible link between issues raised at beat meetings and those listed on the beat plan. The beat team leader also does not understand CAPS. He thinks it's "public relations." As he put it, "We're doing two types of policing. On the west side ... we're doing public appeasement, investigating stuff that

isn't really there, and on the east side we're patting people down for guns..." He rues the paperwork the program has inflicted upon him and views it as another obstacle to getting any work done. He is also disengaged; he does not really review the team's paperwork, nor does he provide any leadership or motivation for his officers.

The management team for this district is less notably deficient, but its efforts simply have not "trickled down" to the street level. The commander has good public relations skills. He is attentive to his district's advisory committee, and he attends beat community meetings and sees to it that they are well attended by officers. He is actively building partnerships with civic groups and the local business association. He voices impressive plans that are well received at police headquarters. But he is new to the district, and seems out of touch with what his officers are doing. Before the end of the evaluation period he instituted regular meetings with his beat team leaders and rode with them in their beats to familiarize himself with local problems. However, the district's administrative manager does not evidence much interest in the program, for the district's beat files are useless: they are incomplete, inaccurate, locked up and never used. The lieutenant who serves as the sector's management team leader does understand the program and attends every beat community meeting. He adeptly fields residents' complaints, promising police attention, and gently reminding them that they can assume some responsibility for problem solving, too. Not many do, however; the survey of residents placed Pride second from the bottom in terms of public involvement in problem solving. Instead, beat meetings there result only in exchanges of information. The neighborhood relations staff has attempted to spur participation in beat meetings, and the liaison officer for Pride plays a vocal role at beat community meetings. However, he feels that others resent this: "Some of the beat officers are intimidated by me because a lot of them are not into CAPS the way they should be. Sometimes I feel like I should be less aggressive." One of the foot patrol officers who works the beat has been left out of team and community meetings, even though he would like to attend and is familiar with many local merchants and their concerns, as well as the criminal element.

Old Guard resembles Pride in many ways. Both are predominately middle-class African-American communities, although Old Guard is more uniformly better off. One difference between the two is that officers in Old Guard really care; they are well known to activists, try to respond to complaints raised in the beat meetings and are dedicated to serving residents. As one activist noted, "The police go out there and do the things we ask them to." Over 90 percent of the officers who attend beat community meetings in Old Guard are themselves African-American, and several activists reported that they have become good friends. At the meetings, officers are quick to respond to incidents that are brought up, describing the very traditional things that they will do in response. Officers discuss these concerns at team meetings, and there usually is good follow-up on them. However, no semblance of the CAPS problem-solving model is in evidence. Complaints are not analyzed and categorized as problems; there is no particular strategizing beyond initiating more patrols and arresting or ticketing violators; and there is little citizen involvement in joint efforts once their complaints are registered at the beat community meetings.

Like Pride, Old Guard has leadership problems. The beat team sergeant is cynical about the program and makes fun of it. At the same time, he has only a superficial grasp of CAPS, and

we had to explain to him what a beat plan is. He does not lead the team in problem solving or monitor his officers' efforts to do so. He does not know the beat very well, or the people who live there, but thinks that beat meetings are too frequent, because "people seem to be complaining about the same things, and they have other ways of contacting police." To him, it is a paperwork program so "... they can drop 4,000 pounds of paper down and say, 'See! Look at what we've done!'" He goes through the motions to comply with the requirements of the program that he cannot avoid. CAPS is not very far along in Old Guard, and there is little public involvement despite the fact that this well-off, home-owning area has a great deal of latent capacity for problem solving.

The beat team serving *Fiesta* seems frozen in time, doing the same job they have always done, seemingly untouched by CAPS. The officers adhere to a very traditional definition of police work. Their tactics remain unmarked by the training they have received in problem solving. Their response to social disorder along the beat's bustling commercial strip is to chase away the drunks, panhandlers, and apparently homeless people when they gather. Unlike almost everywhere else, they do not appreciate the service-delivery component of CAPS. They do not want to be bothered by dealing with collapsing sidewalks or open fire hydrants. Officers complain about the service request process. "Everybody complains to us. Why can't the community call their alderman to complain? What do pot holes have to do with police work?" They hold the community at the traditional arms-length that police always have, and they fret — as police always have — that the community does not understand them. For many on the beat team, CAPS is a community relations program; they certainly are not against that, but they do not see how that should affect their actual work. As one officer noted, "I love to talk to people. The older guys have been doing CAPS forever. They've been doing exactly what the city wants. It's the young guys that don't want any part of it. They want to chase bad guys." (Like other team members, this officer equates CAPS with talking to people.) The officers think that the problems facing Fiesta are beyond the control of the police, but that both residents and "downtown" have the unrealistic expectation that they can do something about them.

Active residents, on the other hand, report that officers downplay their problems and scoff at their lack of "severity." They report beat officers adopting an "us vs them" mentality if their efforts are questioned, but that police are not particularly interested in the community's problems. They are not unfriendly; in fact, community leaders are pleased with the familiarity and ease of informal contact they have with members of the beat team. But in formal beat-meeting settings, the officers sit apart with their arms folded. Few speak Spanish, which redoubles any other gaps between them and the community; in a beat that the Census classifies as more than 90 percent Latino, observations of beat meetings set the percentage of officers who were Latino at about 25 percent. Beat community meeting attendance in Fiesta is very low; in a recent year an average of seven residents participated. As another community leader described it, "They weren't doing it right, anyway. There was no co-chair at the meetings, no agenda... When the police department started running beat meetings they stopped involving the residents and changed the location of the meeting. They turned the meeting into the police standing at the front and taking complaints from the community." The area's community organizations and many service agencies gain their access to police via the district's advisory committee and are not

represented at beat meetings. Business owners and storefront organizations get special attention from foot patrol officers, who are not part of the beat team (see below), and they also do not appear at beat meetings.

Their immediate supervisor in turn holds his officers at arm's length. He does not encourage them to accommodate the program, and he does not challenge them to take any CAPS-related initiatives. In response, his officers have not stepped forward to work with the community. He gives them no instruction, despite the department's hope that sergeants will "coach and mentor" their officers. He has a good understanding of the requirements of the program, but he is very hesitant to supervise his officers. "I don't want to burden my officers with excessive paperwork and responsibility. I don't want to pressure my officers." He wrote and submitted his beat plan with minimal input from his officers, and it features what he dubbed "strictly criminal activity problems," but not the area's visible social disorder. To outsiders it looks fine, but not surprisingly, officers do not seem to lend any extra attention to the problems it identifies, and some do not know what they are. The team's meetings are short, featuring quick updates on events with no officer input. They are run so tightly that there is no exchange of information or strategy development; the sergeant quickly chokes any off-agenda discussion. He does not think that the problems citizens voice at beat meetings are significant and does not give them any special notice. "Nothing hits the core of police priority problems. We don't prioritize the beat community meeting problems because they aren't a priority, but we take care of them." The mechanics of running the beat get accomplished; the team leader knows the rules, holds the required community and beat team meetings and completes the paperwork, which looks fine. But this beat team leader does his job by going through the motions.

The commander of Fiesta's district is knowledgeable about the program and he works well with members of his district's advisory committee. He has a lot of constructive ideas about how to address youth and quality-of-life problems in his district. Responding to complaints by business operators, the extensive disorder along the area's main business strip is one of his priorities, although that was not reflected in Fiesta's beat plan. There is less follow-through by other members of the district staff, however. The neighborhood relations office plays only a minor role in implementing CAPS, and the neighborhood relations sergeant is notably disinterested in it. On the other hand, foot officers working in the area (who are not part of the beat team) pick up a lot of the slack. A lieutenant serving as the sector management team leader described himself as "old school," and was quick to note that he was "in the twilight of [his] career." Part way through the evaluation period he was replaced by a younger and more motivated lieutenant who is much more supportive of the program.

As we observed in many areas, important contributions are made by the district's foot patrol officers. In Fiesta they are particularly enthusiastic about CAPS, and they are repeatedly singled out for praise by community activists. They are in close contact with the area's thriving business community and available by pager. However, as we also frequently observed, they are not considered part of the beat team, do not attend team meetings, are not part of the beat's implementation plan and are not asked to attend beat community meetings that occur off their shift.

Rating the Beats. These vignettes describe beats that fall toward the top and bottom on a systematic ranking of the extent of CAPS implementation in each area. Four factors were rated, each on the basis of multiple criteria.

The beat's <u>district management team</u> rating took into account the extent to which the district commander understood the CAPS philosophy and new protocols, and the extent to which he provided vocal support for the program. Beats in which the sector management team leader (a lieutenant) actively reviewed beat plans, provided feedback on them and visibly supervised his beat team sergeants received a higher rating. Finally, the rating took account of the extent to which the district leadership was aware of, and actively managed, the beat team. Each of these four factors was evenly weighted in the final assessment for the beat.

The <u>beat team sergeant's</u> contributions were assessed along seven dimensions. Three leadership components were each given partial weight: the extent to which the sergeants understood the CAPS philosophy and new protocols, provided vocal support for the program, and expressed enthusiasm about it. Full weight was given to four other components: the extent to which the team leaders encouraged compliance with CAPS procedures and paperwork, encouraged their officers to engage in problem solving using the CAPS model, encouraged officers to target the priorities established in the beat plan, and we assessed the productivity of the beat team's meetings.

The <u>beat team officer's</u> activities were judged along three equally rated dimensions: whether they actually worked on the problems identified as priorities for the beat, if they employed at least a rough approximation of the CAPS problem-solving model, and if they developed any creative or non-traditional strategies in tackling problems on their beat.

The beat team's efforts to <u>involve the community</u> were also rated using three equally ranked measures. We assessed the productivity of the beat's community meetings, whether officers engaged in any community outreach efforts, and whether they involved residents in some way in attempting to solve a problem. We tried to assess the extent of police efforts to involve the community in problem solving independently of their success. As noted above, there was tremendous variation across these beats in their initial capacity to get organized and involved.

Table 5 presents the final implementation ranking of the study beats, from one (best) to 15 (worst). The rankings are based on a summary score which equally weights the contributions of the district management team, the beat team leader, beat officers and community involvement efforts. The categories in which they are placed reflect the results of a statistical clustering of the beats using the four separate measures. Those within each cluster resemble one another more closely than they do beats in another cluster.

The excellent programs in Table 5 enjoyed solid leadership by beat team leaders, and their officers often were enthusiastic and innovative. For the most part their beat plans and profiles were up to date, and quite frequently in use by officers as well as team leaders. The priority problems identified there were regularly addressed. Beat team meetings were well

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Table 5
Beat Rankings

Rank	Excellent Programs	Rank	Struggling Programs
1	Two-Turf	10	Blue Collars
2	Bungalow Belt	11	Potpourri
3	Norte		
4	Inner City		
	Reasonable Programs		**Failing Programs**
5	Solid Mix	12	Fiesta
6	Middle Classes	13	Old Guard
7	Rebuilding	14	Pride
8	Property Values	15	Stir Fry
9	Southtown		

attended and officers spoke up. They also regularly engaged in community outreach efforts. While sophisticated joint problem solving was not necessarily in evidence (it was rare everywhere), information was consistently and effectively shared between police and residents at beat community meetings. "Paperwork" did not seem to be a big problem here; in fact, officers developed their own, including special forms for addressing community problems brought up at beat meetings but not yet prioritized, and they made frequent use of interdepartmental forms so that other units and outside resources could be brought to bear on beat issues. City services and request forms were also frequently used and appreciated by beat team members, in contrast to officers closer to the bottom of the list, who were likely to see even these forms as yet another imposition.

For the most part, the beats with reasonable programs were operating with many elements of CAPS in place, but aspects of their work were under-developed. While beat team members might be conscientious, well intentioned and open to the program, they might not regularly be working on priority problems or making efforts to involve the community. The beat team leader might have a good grasp of CAPS, and keep administratively up-to-date, but he might fail in giving feedback or guidance to his officers. While most officers seem to be vested in the program, sometimes an entire watch group might be evading involvement. Younger officers often prefer aggressive and action-oriented tactics over community work, and toward the bottom of this category police are still largely incident driven.

In the two struggling areas, beat teams in one instance gave CAPS lip service but showed little evidence of understanding it in any meaningful way; in the second area they were clearly

neutral about the program. In neither case was much of an effort made to explore the benefits of new systems or protocols available to them, and community involvement was seen by too many officers as an imposition. In both cases beat leadership was lacking; although the program appeared to be well understood by both sergeants; one the beat team leader was simply unenthusiastic and the other was unsuccessful in rousing his group of rather unimaginative officers. Their beat plans were incomplete and were virtually never consulted. Officers in the bottom two categories frequently do not attend to issues raised at beat community meetings, and sometimes fail to report back on their efforts when they do.

In the failing areas, few CAPS-related program elements were implemented, or had even been attempted. Officers serving there often feel hopeless about their ability to make a dent in problems in their beats, and their supervisors feel CAPS program will not change matters - except to burden their officers with more responsibilities and unnecessary paperwork. They rely almost solely on traditional policing tactics, and their beat plans are largely ignored by the beat team. Even community meetings may be resented by officers and perceived primarily as forums for residents to criticize the police, or to use them as errand boys.

Given the decentralized, around-the-clock nature of police work, it is no surprise that the closest associations were between the ratings for the beat team leaders and their officers, while both were somewhat distant from variations among the districts' upper echelons. Ratings for beat team leaders and their officers were correlated +.82; the officer's scores were correlated +.70 with the community involvement measure, and the beat team leader's +.66. Both were correlated +.48 with the district management team's score. The quality of the beat's formal plans was also rated, and they were more closely linked to the beat team leader (+.80) than the district management team (+.61).

Where is CAPS Working Best? These ratings enable us to examine how effectively CAPS is being delivered in different kinds of city neighborhoods. In particular, they can be compared to the indicators of community capacity that were developed above, to assess the extent to which police efforts reinforce existing capabilities or supplement the efforts of communities struggling to cope with their problems. The question is, whether community policing is helping better-off areas get better-off, versus helping worse-off places get better-off.

Figure 12 summarizes the findings. The horizontal axis places each beat in terms of its capacity, measured by combining the informal social control and organization involvement measures described earlier. They were highly correlated and together rank each beat on its collective capacity to manage local conditions. The vertical axis arrays each beat on its implementation score, placing those where community policing is most advanced near the top and those where it is not very far along near the bottom. Note that Figure 12 includes three beats that were not surveyed. They were included by using statistical techniques to estimate their community capacity score, using factors that are highly correlated with capacity, including voter turnout, family orientation and home ownership. Those three beats are presented in italics in Figure 12, to denote their more tentative position.

Figure 12

Community Capacity and Community Policing

Figure 12 suggests that there is no direct association between community capacity and CAPS implementation. In earlier sections of this report, measure after measure pointed to advantages shared by the same set of communities. The benefits of informal social control, organizational involvement, political mobilization, and downtown connections all seemed to accrue to the same fortunate areas. They also were the most homogeneous, stable, home-owning and affluent beats. However, it is not the case that better-off places with a home-grown capability for handling problems are also the beats where community policing is working best. Only Bungalow Belt scored near the top on both dimensions.

To the contrary, four of the most highly rated beats are to be found among those with relatively little community capacity: Two-Turf, Norte, Inner City and Solid Mix. In those areas, CAPS supplements the efforts of communities with relatively limited capabilities for resolving their own problems. While they vary, none of the communities in this quadrant is a particularly well-off place. In terms of income, three of the four are in the bottom quarter of all beats in the city; only residents of Solid Mix (just missing being among the top 40 percent of beats) did well.

They are not older, stable communities; all are in the bottom half of the study beats in terms of age and length of residence. They did not do this well because they are particularly homogeneous, either. Only Inner City has a high homogeneity index; Two-Turf and Norte house significant numbers of African-Americans, and Solid Mix is home to whites, Latinos and a small numbers of a variety of races.

None of the beats in this quadrant have strong enough connections downtown to demand better police service, either. They all score low on a political mobilization index, and none has much capacity for extracting resources from the wider community. They are also not places where police and the public just naturally get along. In the survey, all are in the bottom half on a measure of the perceived quality of police service; Two-Turf is at the very bottom, and Norte is just two positions higher. Finally, these are not places with easy-to-handle problems, where successes are easy to rack up. The survey measure of gang problems placed Two-Turf as number one, and Norte ranked third. On the survey measure of drug problems, Norte placed second and Two-Turf was fifth. Only Solid Mix scored in the bottom half of beats on both measures. Inner City was not surveyed, but it is in desperate condition.

There are left-out places as well. Near the bottom of the CAPS implementation scale lie three other communities that are in great need of help but are not getting much — Potpourri, Fiesta and (especially) Stir Fry. All are poor and disenfranchised. Finally, two African-American beats — Old Guard and Pride — lie in the quadrant where communities have a high capacity for self-help, but CAPS is not very effectively implemented. In an irony that mirrors the situation in beats in the upper-left, these beats are among the most supportive of the police, ranking 3rd and 4th, just following Property Values and Bungalow Belt. Both also have proven downtown connections and a high capacity to get mobilized politically, but beat team and district leaders have not managed to get the job done there.

The factor that comes across most clearly in shaping the extent of CAPS implementation on the ground is leadership. It accounts for a great deal in the areas we studied, and the closer leaders are to officers in the field, the more they count. While we encountered considerable variation between the district commanders included in this study, that variation did not account for very much. For example, how well the commanders understood CAPS and how vocal they were in support of the program was fairly visible to our observers and other members of the district management team, but was unrelated to what beat sergeants or their officers did, or to their extent of community outreach. The lieutenants who directly oversaw the beat team sergeants accounted for more. There was a great deal of variation in how they did their jobs. Some carefully reviewed beat plans and gave their sergeants feedback to improve them, and others barely got their signatures at the bottom of the page. A few (but not many) studied them intently enough to identify generic problems that cut across beat boundaries. Some made a practice of attending occasional beat team and community meetings, while others did not know much about what went on there. Across these 15 beats, how actively lieutenants managed their sergeants and officers made a difference in what they did.

But the key actors were the beat team leaders. What <u>they</u> did accounted for a great deal of variation in what their officers managed to accomplish. We assessed the performance of beat officers by whether they actually worked on the problems identified as priorities for the beat, if they used the steps of the CAPS problem-solving model and if they developed non-traditional strategies in tackling problems on their beat. They did these things a lot more frequently when their sergeants pushed them to focus on the key problems, stressed problem solving, clarified the importance of following CAPS protocols and held productive team meetings.

Where beat team leaders did not, not much happened. Recall the position of the sergeant in Stir Fry — he did not want to press his officers, because they already felt too "put upon" by CAPS. He did not think it was worthwhile to analyze or strategize about his beat's problems, because they are "societal." In Pride, the sergeant thought CAPS interfered with his officer's "real jobs." Fiesta's beat team leader does not want to "pressure" his officers, and so avoids giving them direction or instruction, and he is wary of the paperwork. In Old Guard, the beat sergeant makes fun of the program, which he really does not understand at all. The relationship between these factors is not perfect; in Old Guard there was significant gap between ratings of the beat team leader and his officers. They cared about the beat's residents and worked hard to respond to public concerns, but in the absence of any coaching they reverted to the most traditional of tactics and were incident- rather than problem-driven in their efforts.

Each of the four beats whose CAPS program was judged "excellent" had beat team leaders ranking in the top third of the 15 beat team leaders (the fifth beat earning a top beat team leader score, Property Values, had significantly fewer neighborhood issues for the beat team to rally around). The beat team leaders who were "on board" and effective regarded the program and their officers quite differently than did the disheartened or hardened beat team leaders cited above. Enthusiastic leaders frequently acknowledged the importance of civilian involvement and the new roles and responsibilities of beat officers. They often reported respect for beat team members' ability to contribute and respond to challenges. Two-Turf's beat team leader said that he looked forward to "being just a little cog in the wheel," admitting, "I kind of wish the program was further down the road so we didn't have to do as much recruiting, but people would just show up." He went on to add, "I think as this program goes on, it will flow easier," and he also stated how "really proud" he is of his beat officers and the work they do. This type of respect for beat officers was often held by successful beat team leaders, and frequently mirrored by their subordinates in the most dynamic teams. Bungalow Belt's beat team leader, also very successful, was somewhat of an exception to this general rule. He looked at his role differently because he was not convinced that officers were uniformly receptive to the program: "20 percent love CAPS, 20 percent hate CAPS, and the remaining 60 percent have a 'we'll see' attitude. They go along with it because they have to." His success lies in his ability to consistently communicate that his officers must go along with the program. The differences in styles of supervision lead to a final point: successful beat-level CAPS programs are fluid and have varying formulas. Basic elements — beat team chemistry and leadership, district management teams, available resources — exist in widely different combinations. The role of beat team leader has a considerable impact on whether these elements combine productively.

Special Initiatives

This section describes a few new elements of the CAPS program, and related events that are occurring in the city. We will be examining these emergent issues during the next year.

New Problem-Solving Resources

Successful problem solving not only depends on imaginative and effective use of resources, but also on the development of creative, new means for addressing problems. As mentioned elsewhere, the linking of city services to Chicago's community policing program has enriched the police department's arsenal, and this year's notable additions to the program are the Strategic Inspections Task Force, a pilot program by the Corporation Counsel's office, and the expansion of the "Super Block" concept to new areas of the city.

Strategic Inspections Task Force. In November 1996 a new anti-gang and drug house ordinance went into effect under which the City of Chicago sends out notices to negligent landlords and follows up with an inspection of their buildings, especially those that serve as drug and gang houses. To enforce the ordinance, the city created the Strategic Inspections Task Force (SITF). When the task force finds evidence of illegal activities or city code violations in these buildings, the owners can face a three-part process to make the building safe. Both residents and police can identify a building as a place where gang members reside, sell drugs, or where illegal activities are taking place. The Strategic Inspections Task Force confirms the reported activity, as well as determines whether there are building code violations. Owners are given the opportunity to comply with an abatement plan which could include eviction and investment in security measures. If owners refuse to comply voluntarily, they can be brought before the Code Enforcement Bureau and be compelled to meet an abatement plan. Owners who refuse to comply with a prescribed compliance plan can be criminally charged. The new ordinance is meant to protect good landlords and tenants by making it easier to remove problem tenants.

In addition to the Strategic Inspections Task Force, the City of Chicago has begun a landlord training program which helps property owners and managers understand how to keep illegal activity out of their buildings and away from their sidewalks. The program also provides instruction on effective tenant screening and writing leases. Additionally, the landlords learn how to obtain an eviction notice when a tenant engages in illegal activity. The idea behind this program is to help the good landlords become more aware of how to prevent problem tenants in the first place, and take appropriate actions when illegal activity has taken place.

The City hopes that the new ordinance will send a strong message to irresponsible landlords. As stated by the Mayor, "It is another tool for communities to fight back against gangs, guns and drugs. Working together, residents and police can build safer neighborhoods, day by day and block by block."

Corporation Counsel Pilot Program. To help facilitate the new anti-gang and drug house ordinance, the City of Chicago developed a pilot program in six of its districts that brings

assistant corporation counsel to the beat level. In the past, officers had to take any complaints about suspected gang and drug problems in buildings to a downtown office. Not only was this time consuming, but officers were often unaware of the various building code violations that could be cited to further expedite the clean up of bad buildings and negligent landlords. Under the pilot program, the corporation counsel comes to the officers at the district station — on the beat officers' time and turf. Offices have been set up in six of the city's districts from which these city attorneys assist the police and local communities in combating the social problems created by drug and gang activities. The focus is on eradicating drug and gang houses from Chicago neighborhoods, and addressing community problems that create an environment that encourages the spread of illegal conduct and the deterioration of neighborhoods.

The attorneys will compile cases for identified problem properties and refer them to the proper unit for further action, assist department personnel in problem-solving by assembling evidence to build cases against owners or managers of the buildings, participate in roll call training of district personnel, attend beat community meetings to respond to community inquiries, and provide district commanders with monthly reports listing the status of the cases in the program. They will be assisted by the Case Prosecution Unit in determining corrective measures to eliminate the drug and gang activity occurring on the properties, bringing actions before the Code Enforcement Bureau when property managers or owners fail to comply to Notices of Violations or corrective measures, bringing actions of abatement before a court, and providing written notice to the district commander when a police officer is required to attend legal proceedings in a case.

Police personnel at all levels have various responsibilities in this program. The beat officers have a Law Intake Form for reporting information about drug and gang houses and related criminal activity on their beat. The information may result from their own observations or input provided by the community. Beat officers submit the form to their watch commander and inform the community members of the status of drug and gang house cases on their beat. Beat team leaders are charged with making sure that their beat officers are kept informed of any developments on cases occurring in their beat. Special units are to meet regularly with the assigned attorney to discuss drug and gang houses in the district and make certain that appropriate gang and tactical personnel are assigned to conduct follow-up investigations when requested. The commander is responsible for meeting periodically with the assigned attorney and ensuring that district personnel cooperate and assist the attorney in gathering necessary information.

Reaction to the SITF and Corporation Counsel Pilot programs has been quite positive — among those select individuals who know about them. Every commander that we interviewed for this year's study was familiar with the SITF initiative, and all but two of them had already worked with the task force in their districts (one of the remaining two districts was scheduled for SITF in the coming weeks). Those that had received SITF attention were unanimous in their praise of the operation, though one was still awaiting "feedback on the results." Neighborhood Relations sergeants were similarly impressed. The story was not nearly so encouraging when we spoke to sector management team leaders and beat team leaders: of the 26 we interviewed, only

three had heard of the Strategic Inspections Task Force, and one had purposely avoided interacting with the group because he "sensed paperwork" if he were to really get involved. The Corporation Counsel pilot program had less recognition, but that is understandable because it had been fielded in only six districts. Responses to our questions about the effectiveness of this program indicate that it has promise, but that it is only as good as the attorney assigned to the district.

Super Blocks. The Super Block concept was developed by a former police commander who envisioned revitalizing his community — one block at a time. He explained, "If we could elevate one block and maintain a middle-class standard, then the whole community could be elevated, block by block," In winter 1995, the commander contacted various resources such as aldermen, financial institutions and housing services and began the process by bringing them together. With so much interest and enthusiasm developing from the meeting, the first Super Block was identified — in what some consider to be the worst beat in the most challenged district in Chicago. The community's biggest, most evident problems were narcotics sales and abandoned buildings. But the commander believed that if success could be achieved there, it could be reached anywhere. The Super Block concept incorporated three of the four elements of CAPS: proactive problem solving, partnership with the community, and support of city agencies. The commander enlisted the support of the Government Assistance Program (GAP), an affiliate of DePaul University in Chicago, to document the project, facilitate strategic planning sessions focusing on the area and assess Super Block's progress. The planning sessions served as a forum where residents and beat officers engaged in open dialogue to learn to work together.

Resident involvement was key if Super Block was to be a success. A dormant local block club was re-formed, headed by a block resident who demonstrated the kind of resident leadership that can turn a community around. Additionally, a long-time block resident and regular beat community meeting participant became the vice-president of the Super Block Club. At the initial planning session, residents voiced their concerns and demanded commitment by the police. They wanted to see the main problems of the block get solved; in their eyes these were open-air drug markets, squatters living in abandoned buildings, and a vacant lot that was filled with garbage and only used as a safe-haven for drug dealers and users. The residents wanted to see drug sales stopped, abandoned buildings rehabilitated and the vacant lot turned into a park for the community.

The commander pledged the support of the police and immediately changes began. "The block became swarmed with police 24-hours a day, seven days a week. The officers got the loiterers and drug dealers off the street," said one active community member. The police began to develop personal relationships with the residents. They would stop and talk with the block residents while on the beat, something that no one could remember happening before. Police became more responsive to residents' needs. Drug dealing and curfew enforcement were handled much more seriously than in the past. The commander also brought in representatives of community-based organizations (CBOs) to see what they could contribute to the project. Representatives of the CBOs also came to the strategic planning sessions.

Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) handled rehabilitation and real estate improvements on the block. "After they kicked off the bad guys, we came in and helped build up the properties," said a representative of NHS. According to this representative, "the block's biggest real estate problem was absentee landlords. With absentee landlords, nobody is there to see what is going on. If occupants engage in drug sales or do not pay rent, they cannot enforce rules because they are not there. This all leads to bad neighborhoods." NHS rehabilitated some buildings and even sold some properties, and is stressing the importance of increasing owner occupancy in the area. NHS is also responsible for conducting the City's Facade Program in the area. "NHS will oversee the process and do the Department of Housing's job because we can do it more expediently," said the representative.

Other CBOs have also been involved, mainly to develop the Super Block park. The park is officially named after the district commander who spearheaded the program. A partnership between Department of the Environment and a local public university supported the purchase of trees, plants, flowers and other greenery that went into the park. Many corporate volunteers turned out for a park clean-up event, and a local park conservatory was involved in planning its layout. The City was also a big donor to the project, and particularly to the park. Through the Park District, the park has received a wrought iron fence, benches, wood chips, a concrete jogging path and a tot lot. Next, the park will receive chess tables and a water fountain. A pavilion will be constructed in the park, adding to its charm. City services have also responded in a timely manner, accomplishing tasks such as repaving sidewalks, and laying down new sod. The street is scheduled to be repaved. With the new Facade program, home improvement loans will be much more affordable to block residents.

The Development Council, which had originally nominated the locale as the first Super Block, has been involved from the start. The Council was also responsible for getting block residents to attend the planning sessions and beat community meetings. "We stayed on the project because we were the catalyst for community cooperation," said a representative of the Development Council. The organization is also the fiscal agent for the project. It was successful in raising funding for the block's new park that sits on a former empty lot that was used only by drug dealers a few short months ago. In addition, donations from local banks and corporate sponsors helped pay for a recent Super Block celebration in honor of the neighborhood's great progress. The Development Council also coordinates beat community meetings with local district police personnel — meetings at which attendance figures have risen from 10 or 12 residents to more than 60 regular attenders.

Things remain to be done on the original Super Block. A nearby commercial eyesore needs to be torn down, according to residents. There is still one drug dealer that lives on the block, and although narcotics sales are down, they still occur. And while their achievements have been great, the people involved with the Super Block have much to do to sustain their success. Still, in their view, within six months, Super Block went from the worst to the best block in the district. The collaborative efforts of police, residents, community-based organizations, and city services had a great impact on the community. Other blocks are taking notice and following suit. One community activist is helping a nearby block organize a block club.

City officials are also taking notice. With the help of an alderman, the city is expanding the Super Block program. In July 1997, the Mayor visited the Super Block and delivered a speech to celebrate its inauguration. "The block club organization is the way to solve the community's problems. I congratulate the [Super Block] for bringing together this community in order to protect their children," he said. The Mayor has designated four new Super Blocks in diverse communities around the city, believing that the program strengthens CAPS by focusing the City's resources on selected targets. Introduced as a pilot program for 1997, new Super Blocks will be chosen using specific criteria:

- The block must be residential and victim to crime-generating activity — putting a stable community at risk;
- Block residents must be willing and able to develop an action plan in conjunction through a block club, church, or other resident organization;
- Private development must occur or there must be available city-owned land to leverage private investment; and
- The District Commander and the District Advisory Committee must support the project.

As part of the Super Block program, the City will intensify its services, including street improvements, graffiti removal, residential facade rebates, demolition of buildings, vacant lot fencing and clean-up, community gardens, code inspections and boarding up abandoned buildings. (For greater detail on the Super Block project, see Project Paper No. 19.)

Chicago Block Club Convention. In October 1997 the city sponsored the first Chicago Block Club Convention, which offered a series of workshops designed to help residents improve their neighborhoods through community involvement. Its aim was to provide the community an opportunity to interact with city representatives to learn how to best access city services. The event consisted of workshop sessions and concluded with a keynote address by General Colin Powell. Attendees participated in two sessions of their choice, selecting from the following:

- Building Powerful Block Clubs
- Eliminating and Renovating Problem Buildings
- Neighborhood Beautification
- Safe Neighborhoods are Everybody's Business
- Turning Problem Liquor Stores into Good Neighbors
- Using the Law to Take Action Against Abandoned Buildings

District Plan Development Seminars. The teamwork and planning that is called for by the department's master plan — "The Patrol Division Strategy to Address Chronic Crime and Disorder Problems" — necessitates the creation of a series of formal planning documents. The district plan is one such document, and after the implementation of the department's general order, commanders were required to develop a plan for their districts based on beat plans, which form the foundation. As described in a previous section, commanders submitted a draft set of district plans in autumn of 1996, and after a thorough review it was determined that all 25 draft

documents needed at least some revision. The CAPS co-managers decided to hold individualized tutorials with each district management team. In addition to providing instruction on the planning process and how to develop beat and district plans, the role of the civilian advisory committee as it relates to the district plan was clarified at the seminar.

Each of the 25 meetings was a day-long session held at the training academy, and though some of the curriculum was customized for the districts, an identical format was employed throughout. Occasionally an area deputy chief would sit in and, at several, district advisory committee chairs also participated. The meeting began with a discussion of the co-managers' and participants' anticipated outcomes for the seminar; followed by a video overview of the planning process, a review of the district's already-completed beat plans, discussion of how to develop the finalized district plan and a question and answer period. Sessions usually began mid-morning, and they continued on until late afternoon. Lunch was brought in to enable everyone to continue working after a short break. The morning's activities included a review of upcoming training plans as well as a comprehensive overview of soon-to-be-developed information technology that will be available to commanders and supervisors as well as the department's new criminal history database and crime mapping system. In the afternoon police-community trainers joined the group to take part in a problem-analysis exercise focusing on a priority problem from the visiting district's beat plans. A handbook entitled "Operationalizing the Philosophy of CAPS" — a compilation of training bulletins, the general order and planning guides — was also supplied for each participant.

The CAPS co-managers were certain to assure everyone that the intention of the process was to simply educate each district team to enable them to produce a higher quality district plan. They also characterized the meeting as "a compendium of ideas," because they were quite eager to hear about creative and successful endeavors in each district. The CAPS co-managers were quick to praise the many management teams who had devised clever and effective ways to address problems in their districts, and they shared all such discoveries with subsequent districts, giving appropriate credit to those responsible.

District personnel were told that they could ask questions about anything, and many individuals seemed sufficiently comfortable to ask very directed questions, especially if their area deputy chief — their direct boss — was not in attendance. Inquiries ranged from probing about philosophical inconsistencies (what was stated in the department's vision document versus reality) to questions about when use of advisory committee's discretionary fund will become discretionary to when new equipment would be available. The co-managers answered with apparent candor, regardless of the subject matter.

The most effective and impressive portion of each meeting was the problem analysis exercise. A problem from one of the district's beat plans was chosen, and then the co-managers led the group in the type of analysis activity that is essential to creating viable strategies to address them. Each problem was analyzed from the standpoint of victim, offender and location, while answering the pertinent questions about each. Then, strategies were suggested. On the

whole, district management teams were very knowledgeable about the problems in the districts and creative in deriving strategies.

The majority of district personnel reacted quite positively to the seminar and the emphasis on comprehensive plans. During follow-up interviews, members of district management teams noted:

It was helpful. I like to get feedback.

I left it enlightened.

I was very impressed with the amount of information [the co-managers] brought forward...it was really nice that they spent so much time with us to help us along.

It was great, especially compared to the past, when we have essentially gotten no feedback.

It was helpful. We never get feedback, so it was nice to have interaction.

They explained some things and gave us tips that were specific in our district plan. We learned their expectations.

I thought it was good. I learned how to make a district plan. Before the meeting, I didn't really know how to do it. I finally understood the process by the end of that meeting.

I thought it was extremely useful. Now we know what they're looking for. We were able to tailor our plan to what the citizens want and what the problems are.

I thought it was good. I don't think the tact lieutenant should have been there. He never said a word. The sector leaders should have been there.

But others had a different view:

That was my first experience with [the co-managers], and I have to tell you that I felt like they were treating us like juveniles. The whole thing seemed to me like they were treating us like, 'are you stupid or something?'

As far as the district plans go, I think they're all pretty much the same. Everybody's priority problems are the same: gangs, guns and drugs. I think it only takes one plan — just change the district number, and you can call it the city plan!

The beat plan, the district plan process, it's all falling into a bureaucratic formula. It doesn't matter if it's good or bad. It's like going to a Latin Mass and not understanding anything that's said. All 23 district plans have to say the same thing. It's a paperwork check. And that is, I'm afraid, what's happening. It isn't real.

While the meetings were effective, according to most attending, and the co-managers' obvious time investment cannot be minimized, it was surprising to the evaluators that sector team leaders and beat team leaders, who are responsible for seeing that the beat plans — the foundation of the district plan — are appropriately developed were not able to benefit from these very informative and motivational meetings. That the managers provided personalized feedback certainly dispelled the notion that it is "business as usual" in the department, but in an organization where precious little information is passed down to the lower echelons, it seems ill-advised to devote the equivalent of five work weeks to instructing only the top level. In fact, our queries indicate that in the districts where we interviewed, only one sector team leader not attending the district plan seminar had been given any post-seminar instructional information about the planning process, while none of the beat team leaders got any instructive feedback from the meeting. And only 40 percent of the DAC chairs who did not attend the seminar had received any clarification from the commanders about the committee's role.

One commander apparently recognized the merits of first-hand learning, saying, "If I could only transplant my brain to the supervisors, that would guarantee that [the district plan seminar] was worthwhile."

Manager and Supervisor Training

Training is one of the fundamental engines of organizational change. Police at all levels need to understand the new roles that are being thrust upon them, none more so than the managers and supervisors who are to provide day-to-day guidance to their officers in the field. During the past year, two types of specialized training took place. The first was Executive training for captains, lieutenants, and selected civilian employees within the police department, plus a few civilians working within the Mayor's office. The second was training for the sergeants who head beat teams, to further their understanding of their new job. This section describes the curriculum and presents the results of a survey assessing their views of CAPS implementation.

Executive Training. The purpose of executive training was to give participants a better understanding of the CAPS problem-solving model as it applies to the development and execution of beat, sector, district, and area plans. Executive training took place at the 911 Center and each class lasted two weeks, between January and May 1997. Members of the evaluation team gave an afternoon presentation to each class about the project and its findings to date. The 10-day curriculum covered a different topic each day. Participants reviewed traditional problem solving and a review of the CAPS problem-solving process. One training component focused on problem solving and the planning process. Participants also had a session on leadership and how to deal with difficult employees. An entire day was devoted to running effective meetings,

including beat community meetings, beat team meetings, and other departmental meetings. Other training topics included team building, leadership styles, conflict management, legal aspects of discipline, planning, contracts, and information technology.

Beat Team Leader Training. The purpose of the beat team leader training was to equip sergeants with the skills necessary to help their team develop a sound beat plan. These two-day training sessions involved all sergeants who had been appointed beat team leaders. Training took place between May and July 1997. The training objectives included the ability to explain how beat plans form the basis of department strategies to address chronic crime and disorder; to be able to explain to their team the results of the first round of citywide plan development and where improvements should be made in their beat plans; how to utilize resource materials to assist their team in developing a sound beat plan; to enact the brainstorming and problem-solving dynamic for application at their beat team meetings; to recognize the elements that comprise a sound beat plan document; to complete a model beat plan form; to critique and suggest needed changes in an incomplete beat plan form; and how to guide their team's efforts to develop a beat plan.

Officer's Views of CAPS Implementation. Participants in the executive and beat team leader training sessions were surveyed to assess their views of CAPS. Because they were all managers and supervisors, the questionnaire focused on the assumptions that CAPS makes about the roles of supervisors and beat officers, and asked them to rate "how realistic" these assumptions are. In total, 386 sergeants, lieutenants, and captains were surveyed.

There was generally high agreement across the supervisory ranks. In the main, those surveyed thought the assumptions the department is making about supervisors and officers are quite realistic. However, the sergeants, who directly manage beat teams, tended to be somewhat less optimistic than their superiors, especially when questioned about the responsibilities of their officers. All ranks were somewhat less optimistic about the role of the community in CAPS.

Table 6 presents the percentage of respondents who were optimistic — that is, thought these assumptions were very or somewhat realistic. When it came to police operations, these supervisors and managers were the most optimistic about intervening in dispatching operations. Sergeants in the field are supposed to monitor their radios to ensure that beat teams remain in their assigned territories whenever possible, and most think this is likely to happen. On the other hand, supervisors at all ranks were more pessimistic about the enduring problem of facilitating communication between watches, and whether beat team leaders will secure the support of other teams for their units. Two-thirds or more were confident that beat officers will step forward to work with citizens and get involved in problem solving. However, many fewer (39 percent) thought that beat officers will take non-crime problems seriously (which mirrors what patrol officers think about them), and only about a third think that it is realistic to expect officers to keep their beat profiles up to date. In terms of their view of the public's role in CAPS, only a minority thought citizens would turn out in enough numbers at beat meetings or take responsibility for the safety of their neighborhoods.

Table 6
Optimism About Elements of CAPS Among Supervisors and Managers

Roles for Supervisors and the Community	optimistic	Roles for Beat Officers	optimistic
Supervisors will take beat team meetings seriously	74	Beat officers will stand up and lead productive public beat meetings	71
Supervisors will be able to teach officers how to use the problem-solving model being taught to citizens and police	70	Beat officers will rely on citizen input to help set their priorities and do their job well	66
Supervisors will foster an environment in the station that promotes face-to-face contact between officers across shifts	48	Beat officers will work to address city service delivery problems in the neighborhood	67
Supervisors will correct dispatchers if they do not assign the proper units to handle calls	82	Beat officers will attempt to acquaint themselves personally with citizens	100
Supervisors will ensure that tactical and gang officers will provide appropriate support to field units	51	Beat officers will take the initiative to solve problems proactively	67
Citizens will become more willing to take responsi-bility for the safety of their own neighborhoods	47	Beat officers will actually use crime analysis and mapping to identify problems	67
Citizens will turn out in enough numbers at their beat meetings	26	Beat officers will take non-crime problems seriously	39
Citizens will trust the police enough to work together effectively	53	Beat officers will update their beat profiles on a regular basis	33

When the sergeants who lead beat teams were trained, half were questioned about these matters before training began, and half at the end of the instruction. We did this because the department was concerned that the sergeants thought the training had been scheduled as punishment for drafting poor plans, and anticipated that their bosses would single out the worst plans for ridicule. Instead, the thrust of the training would be to equip them for drafting better plans in the future. Those who were questioned after training were somewhat more optimistic, especially on the items about which there was the most pessimism. However, in terms of officers taking non-crime problems seriously and keeping their paperwork up to date, this shift was just in the direction of "very unrealistic" to "somewhat unrealistic." Sergeants questioned after it was

explained (again) to them in training were somewhat more optimistic about inter-watch communication, but more pessimistic about the support of other teams within the department.

Security in the Chicago Housing Authority

The provision of security in the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) has been the joint responsibility of the CHA police and security guards and the Chicago Police Department. Public housing presents a unique set of obstacles to the implementation of CAPS, especially in the city's high-rise family housing developments. Poverty, crime and despair are highly concentrated there. The legendary cash-flow problems of the CHA have again necessitated new cuts in its security budget and a dramatic downsizing of its contractual security arrangements. It has been difficult to coordinate the activities of CHA and CPD personnel, except for short term "sweeps" and other special enforcement efforts. Some of the services required by public housing residents lie outside of the jurisdiction of city agencies, limiting the effectiveness of beat community meetings in those areas. In areas where beats encompass both large public housing developments and surrounding residential neighborhoods, there has been resistance by residents jointly to participate in CAPS-related activities. The prototype districts where CAPS was developed were selected in part because they did *not* have any major public housing developments, so difficult an environment did they appear to pose. However, the issue of developing an effective community policing program in the context of public housing has been on the minds of many within the CHA and the CPD.

At this writing the CHA is in the process of developing its community policing program, a process that will begin in earnest in the fall of 1997. It is now seeking agreement with the CPD over the level of "baseline service" that the city will provide for CHA residents. The CHA's plan is to then add value to that baseline, by providing special services — only some of which involve traditional policing — that meet the special needs of CHA residents. The baseline service agreement will take the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the City of Chicago and the Chicago Housing Authority. Agreed upon in principle already, the MOU will specify the 911 emergency response and follow-up investigative efforts that the city will provide to the CHA. In addition, under the city's CAPS program, each beat in the city is served by special beat teams and beat-team sergeants, and certain community organizing and problem-solving services are provided to them by district Neighborhood Relations officers. Each CHA building is located in a beat, and these routine community-policing services will continue to be provided to their beats. To facilitate coordination between CPD beat officers and CHA police, the CHA is now reorganizing its force following the city's district and beat boundaries. One difficult part of this new coordination of effort is that data flow between the CPD and the CHA police will have to be extensively reengineered. Currently, reports on crime and follow-up investigations do not always end up on the correct desks, and an unknown volume of incidents are not being properly recorded. New and complex demands will be made on dispatchers in the city's 911 Office of Emergency Communications, as well, and there will be complex radio frequency problems.

It is important to note that the concept of "baselining" is in accord with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (DHUD) regulations regarding the funding of the public

housing security programs. However, DHUD officials report that almost never can applicant departments specify just what services local police do or would deliver to residents in the absence of federally-funded security services. DHUD is primarily concerned with the "supplantation" problem, since nationwide most of their security dollars have gone toward funding routine police operations in public housing areas. Crafting a formal MOU for Chicago could be an important step in ensuring that the special needs of CHA residents actually get the kind of special attention intended by Congress.

From the CHA's point of view, the programmatic question raised by this new conception of their mission is, What additional services should and can they provide residents? The CHA wants, in principle, to minimize its role in the traditional businesses of policing — engaging in routine patrol, driving fast in response to 911 calls, and taking investigative reports. In practice we anticipate that CHA officers will need routinely to engage in "vertical foot patrols" within CHA buildings, for city police will not readily provide this service. They have already assigned CHA officers to specific buildings, a new departure that effectively gives them the "beat integrity" that CPD officers have had since the inauguration of CAPS in ordinary residential neighborhoods. Odherwise, the CHA envisions developing a broad package of preventive and service-providing projects for its police officers, and to coordinate their efforts with other service agencies and other departments within the CHA. The CHA envisions developing special foci on domestic violence, child abuse, and substantive abuse prevention, and for its officers to adopt a problem-solving approach to their work, focusing on recurring incidents. The CHA also intends to better coordinate the efforts of CHA officers with existing CHA social services, which range from scouting troops to alcohol education projects, a credit union, day-care facilities, career counseling, and the like. Of course, this new departure for the CHA will require the development of training materials and the extensive "retooling" of a still-traditional police force.

The project will also involve new commitment on behalf of the CHA to its tenant patrol program. Currently, tenant patrols are confined largely to senior housing (there are 58 senior buildings in Chicago), although extensive patrol efforts have been fielded in selected family developments, including Henry Horner Homes, LeClaire Courts and Cabrini-Green. The CHA estimates that 800 residents are involved in these patrols.

Among other advantages, this plan to supplement (or leverage upon) the city's baseline service package makes it possible for CHA to meet its financial goals. The costs associated with routine patrolling by car, responding to 911 calls, and conducting follow-up investigations by-and-large will be borne by the CPD, thus off-loading an expensive burden now carried, in part, on the budget of the CHA police. The City and the CPD are willing to formally assume this burden in part because it is clear that all residents of the city are entitled to these services, and in part because they have long despaired of the inability of the CHA to "get its act together" with regard to providing professional police service.

This plan also speaks to the issue of the ability of CHA police to "deliver the goods" under a community policing model. In our earlier reports on Chicago's program we have noted the important role played by other city service agencies in making CAPS work. We found that

the problems that citizens bring to the table when they meet with police to express their concerns have as much to do with physical decay, social disorder, and human service needs as they do with crime. During the early years of CAPS, the ability of beat officers to trigger the rapid and efficient delivery of a broad range of services solved many local problems and built a reputation of effectiveness for the program. Getting involved had visible payoffs. However, we found that many of these service needs could not be dealt with effectively by officers serving public housing beats. Many of the service problems plaguing CHA residents lie outside of the jurisdiction of city agencies. Problems such as broken elevators, missing lights, graffiti, litter and loose garbage, ravaged green spaces, and the like are handled by CHA personnel.

The CHA has tentatively identified a test CPD police district to test its new model. The 21st District includes about 70 CHA buildings housing approximately 14,000 people. The developments include Dearborn Homes (16 high-rises; 7 stories each), Hilliard Center (4 high-rises), Harold Ickes Homes (10 high-rise; 34 low-rise), and Madden Park (10 buildings). This is a difficult area. A Northwestern University survey of 60 adults conducted in a public housing development nearby found that 70 percent felt very unsafe within the development, and 88 percent thought their children were unsafe there. Fifty-eight percent reported that their neighbors had been attacked or robbed in the development. Future evaluation reports will examine the progress of the CHA in developing its new security strategies there.

Computerized Crime Mapping and Analysis

Computerized crime mapping and analysis was considered a key component of Chicago's community policing program from its inception. The intent was to enable officers to isolate "hot spots," discover crime patterns, match crime trends with other events and conditions and ultimately develop prevention strategies by means of ever-developing technology.

Initially the department planned to use its UNIX-based local area network to support its crime-mapping endeavor, but when that proved unwieldy, a team of sworn and civilian members of the police department developed a user-friendly PC-based system known as Information Collection for Automated Mapping (ICAM). The ICAM system, which received international recognition for its innovative crime-analysis application, allowed police officers throughout the city to quickly generate crime maps by using a hand-held mouse to make selections from simple menus.

As is often the case with information technology, yesterday's innovation is today's dinosaur, and the department quickly outgrew ICAM, which provided limited analysis capability. Users became proficient quickly and recognized the potential of a more sophisticated system for crime mapping and analysis. To meet that need, the in-house development team created the next generation of their system — ICAM 2, which retains the key functions of the original program while adding substantially increased capabilities. The system was redesigned based on input gleaned from users at focus groups.

A distinguishing feature of the new system is that, while continuing to be manipulated by mouse-driven menus, it taps into the many existing information databases of the Chicago Police Department and is set up to utilize new systems as they come online. Among the new capabilities that will eventually be accessible by officers on the new system are case status information, queries by victim, offender or vehicle description, criminal histories of locations by address, victim or offender name searches with photos and access to citywide crime data. It is to be completely developed in three phases, the last of which will provide a very sophisticated level of data and analysis for those at the command level.

At this writing, ICAM 2 is operational in 14 of the 25 districts and in six specialized units. The remaining districts are scheduled to be online within the month. Selected district personnel — three per watch — have undergone an eight-hour training session to enable them to provide instruction on the new system to their co-workers. The utility and application of the ICAM 2 system is something that bears watching over the next several years.

On the Horizon

This section outlines emergent efforts that may take concrete form in the future, and which may be discussed in later reports.

- Command ICAM, the final phase in the development of that system, is a command-level information and analysis system. Users will be able to generate reports that provide statistical information for both record keeping and management analysis.

- The accessibility of ICAM 2 on portable data terminals.

- Interactive crime mapping on the Internet, which allows residents to generate crime maps and top 10 crime lists by beat. Already approved and expected to be available within six months, this basic ICAM system will withhold victim and offender names.

- Electronic beat books — the automation of beat profiles, beat plans and beat implementation logs on the portable data terminals in squad cars.

- The redefinition of beat boundaries, an ambitious project that has been in the planning stages for quite some time, that will eventually reconfigure beats to more accurately match demographic, neighborhood and geographical realities. The department will soon begin testing "off-the-shelf" computer models to determine which best suits Chicago and the amount of customizing that will be required. This will be facilitated by the new flow of data available from the Office of Emergency Communications' 911 system.

- The role of detectives in CAPS which, as mentioned in a previous section, has been identified as a priority for several years, but which thus far has eluded focused attention.

- Development of a problem-solving database that will be used by beat teams and other department personnel to determine appropriate strategies for particular problems using "if...then" logic.

- "Measuring what Matters" — identifying new types of performance measurements that reflect the organization's current goals.

- 6th District Anti-Gang Initiative. This is an intensive problem-solving partnership between the CPD and the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, funded by the US Department of Justice. It will direct community and police resources on open-air drug markets in two beats.

- GAP Training — An outside agency will work with police trainers on how to effectively run beat community meetings. Training will be for beat officers, beat team leaders and beat facilitators. It is tentatively scheduled for autumn 1997.

- Area Plan Seminars — The CAPS co-managers plan to hold day-long personalized tutorials with area deputy chiefs to clarify the mechanics and expectations for their plans.

Project Papers
Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium

1.   The Public and the Police in The City of Chicago, by Tabatha R. Johnson.

2.   Winning the Hearts and Minds of Police Officers: An Assessment of Staff Perceptions of Community Policing in Chicago, by Arthur J. Lurigio and Wesley G. Skogan.

3.   Partnerships for Prevention? Some Obstacles to Police-Community Cooperation, by Wesley G. Skogan.

4.   Community Participation and Community Policing, by Wesley G. Skogan.

5.   Spring 1994 Supervisor Training Evaluation Report, by Arthur J. Lurigio, Sheila Houmes and Sigurlina Davidsdottir.

6.   Preparing Police Officers for Community Policing: An Evaluation of Training for Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy, by Gail Dantzker, Arthur J. Lurigio, Susan M. Hartnett, Sigurlina Davidsdottir, Kristin Donovan, and Sheila Houmes.

7.   Evaluation Design and Survey Methods Report, by Wesley G. Skogan.

8.   An Analysis of Beat Meeting Participation and Activity, by Scott Althaus.

9.   District Advisory Committees: The Prototype Experience, by Jill DuBois.

10.   Partnerships in Action, by Dominique Whelan.

11.   Community Organization Survey Methods Report, by Justine H. Lovig and Robert VanStedum.

12.   Community Organization Study, by Justine H. Lovig and Wesley G. Skogan.

13.   1995 CAPS Training Evaluation Report, by Marianne Kaiser.

14.   Joint Community-Police Training (JCPT) Interim Report, by Marianne Kaiser.

15.   Community Mobilization Around CAPS, by Susan Bennett. (currently unavailable)

16.   1996 Beat Meeting and Citizen Training Participant Study, by Justine H. Lovig, Jinney Smith, and Wesley G. Skogan.

17.   Evaluating Problem Solving Policing: The Chicago Experience, by Wesley G. Skogan.

18.   Measuring What Matters: Crime, Disorder and Fear, by Wesley G. Skogan

19.   Super Block Project, by Raj C. Udeshi.

Project Papers can be ordered for $4.50 each from: Police Evaluation Consortium, Institute for Policy Research, 2040 Sheridan Road, Evanston IL 60208. Please pay only by a check made out to "Northwestern University."

New Book on Community Policing in Chicago

Community Policing, Chicago Style. By Wesley G. Skogan and Susan M. Hartnett. Published by Oxford University Press, $29.95.