

Research and Program Evaluation in Illinois:  
Studies on Drug Abuse and Violent Crime

**Community Policing in Chicago, Year One:  
An Interim Report**

Prepared by  
The Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium

Evaluation Funded by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information  
Authority

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## Community Policing in Chicago, Year One: An Interim Report

In a formal sense, community policing in Chicago began on April 29, 1993. That was inauguration day for "CAPS" (Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy), an ambitious plan to reorganize the Chicago Police Department (CPD), restructure its management, redefine its mission, and forge a new relationship between police and city residents. This executive summary reports on the progress CAPS has made to date and presents selected results from an ongoing evaluation of Chicago's new policing initiative and the ambitious plan.

After describing some of the roots of this new approach to policing, we examine how change processes were set in motion by the CPD. This initial study was finished only one year after CAPS began, in April 1994, so many elements of community policing had been in place for only a short time. Since the CPD is a large, complex organization with many features that make it difficult to implement change, this was not totally unexpected. The obstacles to change were similar to what would be found in other organizations of similar size and complexity. To reach its initial goals for community policing, the CPD had to develop a vision of where the organization should be headed, as well as a strategy for organizational change. Additionally, the resources necessary for the task had to be assembled, and police officers and their supervisors had to be involved in the process.

What is examined in detail here, then, are the origins of community policing in Chicago – efforts to plan the new program, its initial trial in five prototype police districts selected to reflect much of the diversity found in Chicago's neighborhoods, and some of the lessons learned about community policing in Chicago during the prototype phase. Later reports will describe implementation of the program and its impact on city residents. There is no overall conclusion to this interim report, for the program is still in its infancy.

We are continuing our evaluation by monitoring the implementation process, as well as the outcomes of the program. We have been observing the planning process and strategic and tactical decisions made by CPD personnel. Our methods include conducting interviews, monitoring meetings and other events, analyzing documents, participating in ride-alongs, observing stationhouse activities, observing beat meetings and district advisory board sessions, and analyzing quantitative data on police workloads and activity. We have closely monitored the department's training efforts. We are also examining the community's role in developing and implementing CAPS by conducting personal interviews, monitoring meetings and surveying community activists.

To assess the program's impact, we are conducting surveys of city residents and police officers, systematically observing the condition of blockfaces and analyzing large amounts of existing crime and demographic data. The technical details of our large data collection efforts will be presented in later reports.

In reading this executive summary, the following should be kept in mind:

- There are no attributions of sources because everyone interviewed was guaranteed anonymity so they would feel comfortable about providing honest opinions and assessments.
- In order for the focus of the report to remain on community policing versus individuals, people are identified by title or position only and not by name.


- Sociological and economic patterns and data mentioned without source are from resources in the public domain and can be made available upon request. In the interest of space and readability, they were omitted from the body of the report.

### The Impetus for Change

By the beginning of the 1990s, crime provided an ominous backdrop to discussions about virtually every aspect of life in Chicago. The city's crime count peaked in the summer of 1991, and the 1991 homicide rate placed it fourth in the nation. Figure 1, which plots city crime over time, illustrates how dramatic the trend was. The character of crime also seemed to be changing.

Figure 1

**Citywide Part 1 Crime Trends**  
January 1987-April 1993



Pay telephones were no longer a neighborhood amenity; instead, residents reported they attracted street drug traffickers. The term "drive-by shooting" entered residents' lexicon. Beginning with the early 1990s, the percentage of homicides attributed to gangs grew higher. Assaults became increasingly lethal as the proportion of murder weapons that were automatic or semi-automatic jumped sharply. The courts prosecuted larger numbers of gun-toters so young that special measures had to be taken to try them as adults. Children also died violently in record numbers. Gang wars

erupted over the control of lucrative drug-selling sites. Some of the city's most notorious public housing projects echoed with gunfire almost nightly. Crime appeared to be the number one local issue, and the public wanted something done about it.

The question was, what could the city do about the crime rate? The economy was coming out of a deep recession, and the city's employment base remained shaky. Little remained of the federal safety net, and many civic leaders said they believed businesses and homeowners would vote with their feet by moving to the suburbs if they faced large tax increases to pay for local initiatives designed to address social ills faced by the city. The seemingly inexorable flight of the middle class from the city had slowed, according to the 1990 Census, but Chicago's demographic stability remained fragile. A 1993 study by the *Chicago Tribune* documented crime as the most frequently cited rationale people used for moving out of the city. Political leaders in Chicago said they felt there was little to be done about actual crime; however, doing something about the police department was feasible, since authority for that lay squarely within the mayor's office. Some of his key advisors thought that by improving policing, he could demonstrate he

was doing something about crime. Through politics, then, the issue changed from doing something about crime to doing something about the police.

The mayor faced several truths in that regard. It was unclear whether the increased levels of policing affordable to Chicago would be sufficient to lower crime rates. The police department's budget for 1991 was \$629 million, and it was set at \$686 million for 1992. Once debt, interest and pension payments were subtracted, the police accounted for about 25 percent of the city's operating budget. Financing a department of 12,500 officers is not easy in a period of fiscal stress, and the cost of hiring new officers clearly set a limit on the mayor's options for dealing with crime. There was also concern that the department was not as efficient or effective as it could be, even with its existing resources.

And, of course, there were political realities to be faced. The mayoral primary campaign could begin as early as spring 1994, and the mayor's supporters wanted to begin pointing to his accomplishments. The mayor's father once remarked that "good government is good politics," and community policing promised to provide the governmental half of that equation. The groundwork for discussing the issue had been laid during the late 1980s by community groups supporting neighborhood policing, a concept gaining popularity around the country. A report by the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, *Police Service in Chicago*, and the subsequent formation of the Community Policing Task force by a broad coalition of neighborhood groups stimulated a two-year public discussion of policing in the city. Multi-racial participation in the debate made clear there was broad interest in a new kind of policing and that community policing promised to be a uniting, rather than potentially divisive, response to the city's crime problem. While poor and minority neighborhoods were the most crime-ravaged in the city, their leaders had an interest in promoting a style of policing that better served their constituents – not just one that treated them as the target of tough enforcement efforts. They also had a stake in curbing the abuse of police power; an African-American named Rodney King was beaten in Los Angeles in March of 1991, and this was on everyone's mind in this racially divided city. The city's demography demanded that politicians pay careful attention to how their actions and those of the police would be received among Hispanics and African-Americans, and the rhetoric of community policing played well in this political environment.

Drafting a plan. City Hall approached the problem in standard fashion for the '90s — it commissioned a management study. The study was conducted by Booz, Allen & Hamilton, an international consulting firm. Its first report focused on traditional management issues, including such big-ticket internal items as medical leave, the financing of medical care for police employees and replacing sworn office personnel with civilian employees so that the former could be returned to street duty. The second Booz, Allen & Hamilton report turned from administrative and support services to operational matters, and focused on the department's large patrol division. This report included a number of specific suggestions to further reduce operating costs and increase the efficiency with which police personnel were allocated.

The report also described a specific strategy for making use of the hundreds of officers whose time would be freed up by the recommended management efficiencies. It called for division of district officers into two units. Some would be given permanent beat assignments and would answer as many calls as possible that came from their area. Other rapid response officers would pick up overload calls and be quickly assigned to emergency situations. It also favored freeing the officers for permanent beat assignments by cutting back on the city's traditional commitment of sending patrol cars in response to large percentages of 911 calls, dubbed a policy of "differential response." The plan also made reference to the need for neighborhood groups, the private sector and other city agencies to contribute what they could to the effort. It made use of the consulting firm's exhaustive analysis of where slack resources

might be found in the organization to document the argument that the department already had the resources that it needed to begin to reinvent itself. It called for phasing in community policing by beginning with experiments in selected prototype districts.

Implementation. However, it was clear that even with the support of the superintendent and City Hall, there was going to be considerable difficulty in getting the program off the ground. The new superintendent, one of the department's most effective spokesmen in the community, was clearly committed to the program. However, he inherited a politically savvy senior command staff that was far from convinced that community policing was a good idea. Many senior managers within the department disagreed with any program that seemed to divert resources from traditional enforcement efforts. Many thought it was another civilian fad and that they could wait it out as they had others in the past. Beyond the command staff were 12,500 police officers who would also have to be convinced that community policing was a good idea or at least that it was a program their on-the-spot supervisors really expected them to carry out. They in turn confronted a deeply divided community that too often saw the police as one of life's problems, not as a solution to problems. Translating the Booz, Allen & Hamilton plan into a real program that would make a noticeable difference in their lives would be a formidable challenge.

### Developing the Plan

In the summer of 1992, the soon-to-be-appointed community policing manager received a call from the superintendent's principal assistant, asking him to attend a meeting being held at the Chicago office of Booz, Allen & Hamilton. At that meeting, which was attended by the superintendent and several high ranking Chicago Police Department personnel, he was named the project manager for the community policing program that was to be launched the following year. In January 1993, he received full-time responsibility for the implementation of the community policing program and the title "CAPS project manager."

His first task was to identify areas for change and organize an analysis and planning effort around each of them. The issues identified included training, performance evaluation, neighborhood relations, crime analysis and automation, differential response and field operations. An implementation subcommittee was formed for each, headed by a senior police official. They were all volunteers, for virtually no personnel were assigned to the project. The subcommittee heads in turn pulled in other interested parties, and later an announcement was made that the committees were open to participation by anyone within the police department. They began their work in the summer of 1993.

Training was considered absolutely critical to promoting commitment to the program, as well as providing direction to officers and supervisors in their new roles. Putting a strong emphasis on training would also send a message to the rank and file that community policing in Chicago was real and that managers at police headquarters at 11th & State were committed to the program. Training also was to address two anticipated obstacles to the program: officers' suspicion that the program wouldn't last, resulting in a "wait and see" approach; and, their fear of stern discipline for making mistakes implementing this new program.

Performance evaluation raised many complex issues. Like many cities that have tried community policing, the Chicago Police Department understood the importance of devising a performance evaluation process that rewards new activities expected of officers and supervisors. This subcommittee was very aware that if officers — and districts as a whole — continued to be evaluated using the existing system, they would surely appear to be doing a poor job and receive poor performance scores. One of the great difficulties facing this subcommittee was the task of trying to develop measures for something that had not yet evolved. The lack of new job

descriptions for officers and supervisors served as a constant source of frustration for this group. Another problem hindering the development of new performance measures was the committee's lack of trust of rank and file officers; this would be a nagging problem as the department moved toward adopting a model of policing that relied heavily on officer initiative and creativity in a difficult-to-supervise environment.

Neighborhood relations were critical to the success of the community policing program. The development of partnerships with neighborhood organizations is a central component of many community policing programs. The Chicago Police Department understood that the residents of the city would be more cooperative and supportive of community policing if they played a role in developing the program. Thus, strategies for creating an environment where police and citizens could work together were considered vital to the success of the program. One potential obstacle for police working successfully with civilians was that sergeants and lieutenants were not accustomed to participating as teachers and coaches for their patrol officers. Police were also concerned about getting out of their cars and going into neighborhoods. This hesitancy was most apparent among officers who worked in neighborhoods where their relationship with citizens was strained and where they were concerned about their personal safety.

Computerized crime analysis was to be a key component of Chicago's plan for community policing. Through crime analysis, police can isolate "hot spots," discover crime patterns, match crime trends with other local conditions and events and develop strategies for prevention. Many steps were involved in getting this underway, however. Officers needed computer tools for profiling their beats, and needed to be taught how to collect and analyze data. The committee identified obstacles to the implementation of crime analysis, including the city's bureaucracy (which might keep the districts from receiving equipment in a timely fashion) and inadequate training of officers once equipment arrived in the districts. Another potential obstacle was that some community members might be unwilling to become involved with the police and share information, either because they were concerned about retaliation by other members of the community or because they felt that providing information to the police was outside their responsibility. Another concern of this subcommittee was that many special divisions within the police department would be unwilling to share information with beat officers.

The Booz, Allen & Hamilton report argued that without a new system of *differential response* in place, community policing in Chicago would face tremendous resource problems. CAPS is organized around the concept of "beat integrity;" that is, an officer stays on his or her beat *and* has the time to work with residents, business owners, schools and social service agencies to identify and solve problems. If those officers were busy most of the time, or were pulled from their beats to respond to 911 calls elsewhere, community policing would be difficult to implement.

The differential response subcommittee believed that the city could not afford to solve this resource problem by simply hiring more officers. Analyses by the Booz, Allen & Hamilton revealed that civilianization and other efficiency measures would not put enough officers on the street to free community policing officers from responding to large numbers of 911 calls. Instead, the committee explored new procedures for reducing calls where the department dispatched a car, by screening incoming calls and either diverting those that did not appear to require a responding visit or queuing them for a response during off-peak hours. Without a change, they feared officers' enthusiasm and support for CAPS would quickly diminish, because after being promised beat integrity during training, they would return to the streets to find they were still being dispatched to 911 calls over a broad area. The committee also realized the



public would need to be educated about what constitutes a true emergency and what their expectations should be about police response. The greatest obstacle this subcommittee anticipated was that the department did not have the capacity to divert calls that were not appropriate for 911 to differential handling, both because of antiquated technology at the Communications Center and a shortage of qualified dispatchers.

As it turned out, only an extremely modest system for queuing calls was developed during the first year of CAPS to help officers stay on their assigned beats. The city was concurrently making a tremendous investment in a new communications center that could handle this task, and some feared the cost and confusion that would result if an interim, stopgap system was temporarily put in place.


Field operations was one of the first and most visible changes officers and supervisors would see in the prototype districts. Important decisions had to be made about who would handle 911 calls and who would begin taking responsibility for the beats within the districts. Further, new roles needed to be created for supervisors so that they could adequately support and enhance the program. The importance of constructing a field operations policy that worked was absolutely critical for early officer acceptance and success. The greatest concern voiced from this subcommittee was that time was too short to properly plan field operations. Many time-consuming distractions hindered the patrol division while the plan was being developed, including developing contingency plans for possible reaction to the announcement of the Rodney King case verdict and a possible championship victory by Chicago's professional basketball team. The committee was also concerned about inadvertently creating a "split-force" if rapid response teams spent all of their time responding to 911 calls, while beat teams spent much of their time dealing with "non-crime" matters such as identifying and solving community problems.

### The Prototyping Strategy

The prototyping strategy, proposed in the Booz, Allen & Hamilton report of July 1992, recommended testing community policing in several districts before implementing the program citywide. In January 1993, City Hall leaders, top Chicago Police Department personnel, and members of the Booz, Allen & Hamilton consulting team met to decide on how many prototype areas there would be. While some lobbied for one or two districts, which could be staffed easily with existing resources, officials from City Hall insisted on more areas in order to signal the city's commitment to the program. Booz, Allen & Hamilton anticipated 40 additional officers would be needed to fully staff the beat teams and rapid response cars in each prototype area. This implied that 200 officers would need to be found to begin community policing in five districts. Debate raged as to whether this many officers could be found within the department, but the leader of the Booz, Allen & Hamilton team insisted it could be done.

The plan was finalized at a second meeting involving the mayor, city officials, the superintendent, other top Chicago Police Department personnel, and members of the Booz, Allen & Hamilton team. Again, the consultants argued for five prototypes, and although there was continued disagreement about the numbers of officers that could be freed for the program, the mayor decided to begin with the larger number. The department was asked to recommend 10 districts, from which the five would be chosen. Four of its choices were selected; the fifth was chosen by City Hall. The districts chosen were Englewood (7), Marquette (10), Austin (15), Morgan Park (22), and Rogers Park (24). The prototype areas, illustrated in Figure 2, represented a broad range of city neighborhoods. They ranged in composition from fairly affluent to desperately poor and from racially heterogeneous to solidly segregated by race. They would be the testing grounds for CAPS.

**Figure 2**  
**Chicago's Prototype Districts**



The Chicago Police Department learned many lessons from other cities. Original subcommittees contacted other police departments that were experimenting with community policing, and they read reports about these programs. The second Booz, Allen & Hamilton report included profiles of community policing projects in other cities that identified key implementation problems. The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority later sponsored several all-day seminars, bringing together academics and practitioners in the area of community policing to share their experiences with senior Chicago police officials. These included leading scholars who have conducted community policing evaluations and police chiefs and professional community organizers from around the country. In

addition, several members of the department's Research and Development Division staff conducted interviews, ride-alongs and focus groups to understand the concerns of both patrol officers and their supervisors. These sessions highlighted very specific obstacles which existed before CAPS could become a reality – obstacles that would require major changes in the operating procedures at the Chicago Police Department.

On the other hand, much of the work of the original planning subcommittees' work did not turn out to be very useful. The participants were, in the words of a seasoned observer, "good tactical planners but poor strategic planners." Their recommendations, prematurely specific and not prioritized, provided little useful guidance under the fluid circumstances in which the CAPS project manager found himself. The *issues* they confronted were real ones, however, and most continue to haunt the program.

CAPS, of necessity, emerged out of a prototyping process. Faced with inadequate information about many important matters, too little time to engage in strategic thinking and surprisingly little staff support for such a high-priority project, a "try it and see if it works" strategy was adopted instead. Planning became interactive and evolutionary, almost a "survival of the fittest" process. The staff tried out ideas, identified mistakes and tried fresh approaches instead. This process took advantage of the availability of the prototype districts, where policies and procedures could be given a dry run before they were finalized. It was clear that a refined model could be adopted citywide only after various approaches had been tested in the prototypes.

The emergence of Research and Development as a major force supporting organizational change within the department became crucial to this process. Until early 1993, CAPS planning

was severely hampered by the manager's lack of staff support. Historically, the role of Research and Development was to draft department regulations and directives, and initially it played only a minor role in CAPS planning. However, as it became apparent that CAPS would become a reality, a new civilian director was hired who brought in other specialists from outside the department. Research and Development took on a strategic role in planning, and provided the staff support for analysis and decision making that previously had been lacking. Research and Development also coordinated the work of a small number of outside consultants, whose contributions to strategic planning and identifying solutions to training issues have been very important.

Finally, most major participants contributed to the superintendent's official statement of his goals for the program, the department's report "Together We Can." This lengthy document described his philosophy of community policing and identified key components of change needed for the program to succeed in Chicago. It included the department's new mission statement, which calls for quality service and a partnership with the community that empowers it. This document drove many specific planning tasks, and underlies the work of the department's Strategic Planning Committee.

The plan that began to emerge from this process called for the Chicago Police Department to make fundamental changes in its mission and structure. Unlike in many cities, the Chicago Police Department would not form a special community policing unit; rather, the entire department was to be involved in the effort. The prototype strategy tested this by committing entire districts to CAPS rather than creating special units. CAPS would eventually be a citywide, fully integrated program.

Further, those responsible for the program at the Chicago Police Department and City Hall were committed to not oversell CAPS nor to proclaim it a panacea for all the city's ills. CAPS was not billed as an overnight fix for crime problems. Both police and citizens were often reminded that the prototype areas were test sites and that models of community policing would evolve from the experiences of those areas over time.

The program's senior staff has worked hard to avoid acquiring a "soft" image. The staff has emphasized that traditional police work will continue and be rewarded. Chicago Police Department managers have stressed that officers will not become social workers; rather, they will become skilled problem analysts and referral agents who are experts on conditions at the street level.

The prototypes selected for experimentation during the first year were diverse and challenging. As noted above, the decision was made to involve districts in CAPS that were ethnically and racially heterogeneous areas with high and low crime rates, and with a mix of homeowners and renters and various income levels. A conscious decision was made not to choose the "easiest" areas of the city to test community policing, although some of the most troubled high-rise public housing was avoided. Rather, the Chicago Police Department wanted a realistic gauge of how the program was going to work in a city as diverse as Chicago.

The Chicago Police Department involved the community from the start. Each prototype district was required to create an advisory committee to represent the various interests within its district. The committees were to be composed of community leaders, school council members, ministers and any other individual representing groups and institutions of significance in the district. Local meetings were to begin in every beat, meeting monthly at first. These meetings, open to the public, provided the community with an opportunity to participate in CAPS and meet local beat and neighborhood relations officers.

Internal communication at the Chicago Police Department was good. A variety of methods was employed to explain CAPS to the prototype district personnel and to receive input concerning how the implementation process was proceeding. Regularly scheduled meetings among district commanders, the Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information and key personnel in the prototype districts were held. Research and Development set up a telephone hot line for patrol officers and their supervisors to call with questions or comments. Research and Development created a newsletter to disseminate news about the program and to report on program successes. Research and Development also collected a variety of operational data and sought input from all levels within the department.

From the start, the Chicago Police Department identified critical areas for change. The department gleaned useful knowledge from visiting scholars and practitioners and from the experiences of other cities. Other cities showed that community policing could not succeed without adequate training for officers. Many cities have tried to implement community policing without specialized training, and they have failed to mount effective programs. The CAPS manager and key personnel in Research and Development realized it would be necessary for officers to understand the CAPS philosophy to support the program and fully participate in it. An immense training effort, mounted using non-traditional teaching techniques, employed both police and civilian trainers.

The prototyping strategy was sound. The districts selected provided the opportunity for testing in diverse and difficult neighborhoods. The pressure to implement the program on April 29, 1993, however, was one of the most difficult challenges faced by the Chicago Police Department. Since Research and Development was charged with both strategic planning and daily implementation issues, much of the work fell into the arms of that unit. While many good ideas were developed prior to the start-up date, there was simply not enough time nor staff to implement them properly before the program began. Research and Development and the entire department still struggle with this challenge. On one hand, the accelerated implementation schedule made it difficult to adequately plan various activities; but on the other, it forced the program into the field in timely fashion. In the absence of deadline pressure, the program floundered during the summer of 1992. Had the Chicago Police Department been allowed to implement CAPS on its own timetable, it might not be as far along. While the program has not yet reached some vital goals, a program model has been devised, tested, reworked, and refined.

### Leveraging Resources

By winter 1992 it was clear that community policing was going to be launched in prototype areas around the city. After a great deal of analysis and debate, it had been determined the Chicago Police Department could provide enough officers to staff five prototype areas, and this set detailed planning in motion. However, it was also clear that the department was going to need additional financial and organizational support before an effective program could be launched. From the beginning, the mayor intended that the improved delivery of city services would be an integral part of the program and that the prototype districts would receive priority attention from all city departments. This decision had major implications for the police officers who were to become involved in the public's need for services and for the Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information, which is charged with responsibility for coordinating and facilitating city service requests. The emerging community policing plan also implied an additional long list of resource needs: money for training, consultants, computer equipment and software, travel to conferences and planning and coordination expenses. The effort to secure these resources principally involved the superintendent, the City Hall liaison, and the director of Research and Development. Their success in leveraging these resources played a significant role in shaping the program.

Linking community policing to city services. Many cities have found it difficult to involve other municipal agencies in their community policing efforts, for it is easy to think that community policing is the police department's program. However, the involvement of city service agencies is an important component of a successful program. Adopting a community policing model usually implies (a) expanding the scope of the police mandate to include a broader range of community problems, and (b) involving police and the community in identifying and solving the problems that appear on their turf. This being the case, police departments then must rely on other agencies to actually perform a significant fraction of their task. Evaluations in other cities have found that interagency coordination is one of the least well-implemented features of community policing. Chicago's progress during the first year at integrating the efforts of a wide range of city services into CAPS is one of its earliest signs of success.

The evaluation used two methods to gather baseline information on the extent of neighborhood service problems. The first approach was to *ask* residents about their problems. The resident survey gathered information on the extent of several environmental and regulatory problems likely to come to the attention of CAPS officers. Respondents were asked to score a list of conditions by "how big a problem" they were in their neighborhood. These included questions concerning environmental decay: the presence of trash and junk in vacant lots, abandoned buildings, abandoned cars, and graffiti. In addition, there were questions about two alcohol-related problems that called for regulatory responses by the city: liquor being sold to minors and the presence in the area of taverns or liquor stores that attract troublemakers. The survey found that these problems were cited relatively frequently. Abandoned cars rated as a big problem by 16 percent of those interviewed; 18 percent reported that liquor sales to minors was a problem in their area; 21 percent thought abandoned buildings and liquor establishment attracting troublemakers were a big problem; and 23 percent thought that graffiti and trash-filled vacant lots were problems nearby. Just as striking was the tremendous *variation* with which these problems plagued various CAPS prototypes. This will be described below, in a discussion of conditions in the prototype districts. The survey thus documented the importance of identifying the magnitude of problems locally rather than citywide.

The second approach to measuring the extent of service problems was to *look* at these areas and systematically note the extent of observable physical decay. Teams of observers were dispatched to random samples of city blockfaces — both sides of a street, observed from intersection to intersection. There they observed conditions on each parcel of land. Observers also noted the presence of seemingly abandoned cars, and they peered down each intersecting alley to see if loose garbage had accumulated there. Only 5 percent of the sample blockfaces included obviously abandoned cars, and of those that did, most had no more than one or two. However, garbage-strewn alleys were more common. About 46 percent of alleys adjoining the sample block faces had loose garbage. Multivariate statistical analyses indicated the presence of garbage in alleys was related primarily to the land use and poverty level of the area, as well as its racial and ethnic composition. For each individual parcel, observers also noted the presence of graffiti, litter, dumping, poor maintenance of buildings, liquor bottles or cans and vandalism. About three-quarters of the parcels and 30 percent of the blockfaces we observed had none of these problems. Observers noted some evidence of physical decay in 20 percent of residential parcels, but in 41 percent of parking lots, 38 percent of commercial parcels, and 69 percent of vacant lots.

The decision to focus CAPS on service delivery had several purposes. Having the police involved in the requests for city services would demonstrate to beat officers that they could have an impact on neighborhood problems, and the infusion of city services into the prototype areas would be a visible change to both police and citizens. The move to involve city services in

CAPS was viewed as a tool for increasing the efficiency of those organizations as well. The Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information was given the explicit goal of making city services proactive, rather than reactive. The mayor notified his departments that they were going to work together to improve city services in Chicago and that the Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information would be responsible for the processing of information. The mayor's support of the program was visible elsewhere as well. The new budget supported additional city services and personnel to coordinate them. The mayor toured the prototype districts to view the problems first-hand. He also assigned a full-time manager to serve as a liaison between the Chicago Police Department and City Hall.

Table 1  
CAPS Service Requests per 10,000 Residents

Service Request	Englewood	Marquette	Austin	Beverly Morgan	Rogers Park
sewer & water	9	3	11	7	4
potholes	8	4	58	9	4
traffic signs	12	6	20	13	7
graffiti	10	22	19	20	3
abandoned buildings	106	19	81	14	1
abandoned autos	107	46	95	41	44
total	321	112	382	140	63

Note: total includes other scattered categories of requests. The service request data are for the period 04/28/93-05/09/94.

The Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information grew more and more accountable to the prototype districts as the program developed. Commanders could reach the deputy director of this office via his direct telephone line, and he gave them the numbers of each of the city service department heads. Regularly scheduled meetings were held with Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information personnel and the prototype district commanders. At these meetings the commanders were able to voice their concerns regarding city services and ask for follow-up or clarification of particular requests. A special weekly report indicated the status of all requests in each of the prototype areas. By the end of the first year the city had towed 2,200 autos from the prototype districts, special Graffiti Buster teams had removed graffiti from 538 prototype area buildings, and 322 street lights had been repaired. Except for complaints about abandoned buildings, an issue raising a host of legal issues, the Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information calculated they had fulfilled 91 percent of all CAPS service requests.

The extent to which CAPS service requests were logged in by district officers varied considerably, however. Table 1 presents the number of service requests reported to the Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information. They are presented as a rate (requests per 10,000 residents) to

control for significant differences in the population of the various districts (which ranged from 64,000 to 138,000). Both the total rate of service requests and rates for several high-volume subcategories of those totals are presented there. It is apparent that abandoned buildings and abandoned cars were the most frequent source of registered complaints, followed by graffiti, requests for traffic signs, and complaints about potholes. Two districts — Austin and Englewood — stood out as sources of the highest rate of CAPS service requests, while Rogers Park produced by far the fewest reports relative to its population.

Table 2  
Perceived Service Problems and Service Requests

Problem	District 07	District 10	District 15	District 22	District 24
Abandoned Autos problem	21	28	18	2	4
requests	107	46	95	41	44
ratio	5.1-1	1.6-1	5.2-1	20.5-1	11-1
Abandoned Buildings problem	41	28	23	4	3
requests	106	19	81	14	1
ratio	2.6-1	0.7-1	3.5-1	3.5-1	0.3-1
Graffiti problem	20	51	17	3	21
requests	10	22	19	20	3
ratio	0.5-1	0.5-1	1.1-1	6.6-1	0.1-1

Note: table reports percent reporting each a "big problem" and CAPS service requests per 10,000 residents. The service request data are for the period 04/28/93-05/09/94.

It does not appear that the rate at which CAPS service requests were registered was entirely a function of the level of actual problems in these areas. Table 2 aligns the results of our district surveys of the perceived level of three problems — abandoned cars, abandoned buildings and graffiti — with the rate at which these problems were logged in by the Mayor’s Office of Inquiry and Information. To facilitate the comparison, Table 2 also presents the ratio between problems and service requests. A higher ratio indicates (roughly) that problems were being translated into service requests at a higher rate. The link between the level of neighborhood problems and the rate at which service referral requests were generated is the nexus where community policing operated in these districts during 1993 and early 1994. Because the rate at which the Mayor’s Office of Inquiry and Information took successful action on these problems was quite high (except for abandoned buildings, where they completed action on only 74 percent of cases to date), referral is virtually a measure of problem solving (for these problems) during the first year of CAPS. Table 2 indicates some clear differences among the districts in their success at doing so.

Based on this comparison, the relative rate of service requests was quite low for District 10 (Marquette), especially in light of the magnitude of problems there. Fully 51 percent of Marquette residents reported graffiti was a "big problem" (in fact, this was the second biggest problem in the area); they logged in 22 service requests for every 10,000 people.

On the other hand, while only 3 percent of District 22 residents thought graffiti was a big problem in their neighborhood, they made 20 service requests per 10,000 residents, virtually an identical rate. Similar observations can be made concerning abandoned buildings and abandoned automobiles, for which District 10 stood at or near the bottom. Rogers Park (District 24) registered a low rate of service referrals for two of the three problems, abandoned buildings and graffiti, but a relatively high rate of requests for tows of abandoned cars. The clear winner in this regard was Beverly-Morgan Park (District 22), which combined a very low level of service problems (as measured by the surveys) with a robust level of service requests. District 22 made particularly aggressive use of abandoned auto tows and graffiti removal programs. Based on the problem-to-service ratio in Table 2, Districts 15 and 7 came in second and third on all the measures.

Financing the program. Once the city embraced the concept of community policing, the formidable task of finding the resources to finance the endeavor loomed. Many funding routes were pursued, some of which turned out to be dead ends.

One dead end was the January 1993 "tax bombshell." The mayor asked the City Council for an \$11.6 million property-tax hike to cover pay raises for the city's police officers. By early March, he was forced to back down from that proposal in the face of aldermanic opposition. Earlier, a Booz, Allen & Hamilton report recommended closing seven of the city's 25 police stations; they anticipated that officers freed up by this action would be committed to the CAPS prototype areas, and these officers were required to make the resource calculations add up correctly. Public outcry was immediate, and plans to close the stations were put aside.

Other efforts to generate new resources for CAPS were more successful. A grant for the first round of officer training came from the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. The ICJIA also supported the effort by hosting seminars for selected mid-level Chicago Police Department managers, at which experts discussed community policing issues. The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority also provided funds for members of the Chicago Police Department to travel to community policing conferences in Washington, D.C., and San Diego. Many members of the exempt staff had never been exposed to operational community policing programs, and it was hoped that attending conferences and visiting other departments would help stimulate sympathy for CAPS in Chicago. In the spring of 1994, Research and Development was also awarded a grant by the Chicago Community Trust to support the activities of its Strategic Planning Committee. This group of about 20 police and civilian members is charged with considering the future of policing in Chicago over the next five to 10 years.

The Chicago Police Department has also received a number of grants for specific areas in computer technology. The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority helped again by supporting development of the computer program the Chicago Police Department will use for beat-level crime analysis. The Chicago Police Department's computer systems are extremely outdated, and in need of much support. Some funding for this will come from a \$1 million grant from the Illinois Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Council, an organization supported by the state's insurance industry. The funds will mainly be used to improve computerized auto theft recovery and prevention programs. The Council's award will further support the development of computerized crime analysis at the district level; it addresses who looks at data, what they look at and how the data is produced.



In February 1994, Chicago was also awarded a \$4 million federal grant to hire 50 new officers. The mayor announced these officers would be hired over a three-year period, and they would be assigned to community policing beats. Currently there is a pending proposal to provide pagers for beat officers and cellular telephones for community leaders. This would support communication on the beat between officers and citizens, though funding at this time is still uncertain and limited. Finally, the city's 1994 budget includes funds to repair police and fire stations, and to acquire new cars and equipment. It also promises hiring 470 more police officers within the next 18-month period. During 1994, an average of 25 new officers will be added to each district, and by 1995 there should be an average of 43 additional officers for each district, all assigned using the department's district workload formula. In addition, future funding for CAPS training may come from the Illinois Local Governmental Law Enforcement Officers Training Board for a mobile training unit to support community policing.

### Bringing Officers on Board

At the beginning, community policing was a battle for the hearts and minds of the patrol force. Community policing requires officers to perform many of their old jobs in new ways and to they take on tasks they never imagined would come their way. They are asked to identify and solve a broad range of problems, reach out to elements of the community previously outside their orbit and put their careers at risk by taking on unfamiliar and challenging responsibilities. The battle must always be waged, for inevitably police officers are resistant to change. From their point of view, the battle is justified. They are cynical about programs invented downtown, especially by civilians. Civilian intrusion into department business touches a deep and sensitive nerve in police culture. They are resentful if "the community" was consulted about police roles and responsibilities, but they were not. They are cynical about the role of politics in selecting their leaders and their missions. Police in many cities are particularly cynical about notions like "empowerment" and other modern shop floor buzzwords, for typically their agencies are managed by punishment and fear.

While the battle for the hearts and minds of the patrol force is a difficult one, it can be won. There are numerous instances in which a combination of training and on-the-job experience has turned around the views of tradition-laden departments. Research in other cities indicates that officers doing community policing typically they think their work is more important, interesting and rewarding and less frustrating. They feel they have more independence and control over their jobs, which are important determinants of job satisfaction. Finally, they tend to take a more benign and trusting view of the public. In New York City, community officers found they were more exposed to "the good people" of the community, and that in walking their beats they got to know residents as people – they did not just deal with them in crisis situations. In Madison, Wisconsin, officers in an experimental district grew to see themselves working as a team, believed that their efforts were being supported by their supervisors and department and thought the department was really reforming itself. They were more satisfied with their job and more strongly committed to the organization than officers serving in other parts of the city. They also were more customer-oriented, believed more firmly in the principles of problem-solving and community policing and felt that they had a better relationship with the community. Department records indicated that disciplinary actions, absenteeism, tardiness and sick days decreased in the experimental area.


Police opinion. The evaluation is examining several aspects of the "bringing officers on board" problem. First, it examined the views of officers at the beginning of the program. Questionnaires completed by prototype and control-area officers before the department began its initial orientation training — and before virtually anyone in the organization knew much about the new program — probed their perceptions of their jobs, their supervisors and the communities

they served. Questionnaires were administered to 1,410 prototype officers at the beginning of 24 orientation sessions held at the police academy. Evaluation staff members described the survey and guaranteed their answers would be confidential. A letter from the superintendent of police endorsing the evaluation and survey lay on the top of each questionnaire, which took an average of 20 minutes to complete. The results provide some insight into potential impediments to organizational change, and a baseline for evaluating subsequent changes in officers' attitudes.

The officer survey indicated that officers were looking for a stimulating and challenging job (86 percent) that allowed them to exercise independent thought and action (87 percent), to be creative and imaginative (86 percent) and to learn new things (89 percent). However, less than half of those surveyed felt they had deep personal involvement in their current jobs. Their responses were divided down the middle over whether their jobs actually gave them opportunities for independence and control over how they did their work. Less than one-third thought the current structure of their job enabled them to actually see their work through to completion – something they sought. Only about one-quarter agreed they had any influence over

their job or that supervisors sought out their opinions. Only about one-third felt their supervisors let them know how well they were performing, and one quarter believed they could easily communicate their ideas to management. One-quarter thought that management treated its employees well, and even fewer felt that the department was open to change. Only 6 percent had confidence that the command staff picked the most qualified candidates for jobs. Fifty-eight percent thought the Chicago Police Department was a good organization to work for, and 50 percent thought it was one of the best in the country.

Figure 3  
Orientation Toward Community Policing



should try that. However, a majority thought citizens had important information to share about their beat, and that police should be concerned about problems there. Larger majorities endorsed making frequent informal contacts with police, assisting citizens and working with citizens to solve local problems.

The initial survey of officers also indicated that in important ways they were very ambivalent about community policing in Chicago. Figure 3 documents responses to a series of questions probing officers' orientation toward tasks often associated with community policing. It presents the percentage of officers who agreed or agreed very much with each statement. At the outset, there was not widespread enthusiasm for involving themselves in solving noncrime problems; only 30 percent thought officers

However, other questions revealed they were not very keen on returning to old methods of policing, like foot patrol, or in "marketing" their new services to the public. They were willing to devote department resources to community policing, but only in moderate amounts. They also did not particularly think that the new program would have any marked impact on the crime rate or their ability to make arrests, nor that it would improve their relationship with racial minorities in the community.

Figure 4  
Pessimism About CAPS Impact on the Community




Figure 4 describes the extent of this pessimism about the potential impact of CAPS on the community, which was considerable. Officers were also clearly concerned about the impact of adopting community policing on the department's autonomy and on the nature and volume of work that would come their way as a result. Fully 72 percent were pessimistic about "unreasonable demands on police by community groups," and 51 percent about "blurred boundaries between police and citizen authority."

Training. Once organizational change processes are set in motion, training is one of the most important ways in which officers can be "brought on board" and change can be implemented. Even if their hearts have been won over, in the absence of a comprehensive training program, officers will be forced to fall back on what they already know. "Problem solving" will inevitably focus on old, familiar problems, and the strategies that officers choose to deal with them will be those they employed in the past: conducting visible patrol, issuing summonses and making arrests. Officers will be particularly frustrated if they are told by superiors to do things they do not

understand, so the practical information content of training is important. But in addition, community policing calls for autonomous, creative action on the part of officers, so it is also important they be thoroughly conversant with the underlying values and principles that should guide their action in particular circumstances. Both their minds and their hearts are important and must be engaged.

CAPS training took place in three phases: orientation, leadership training and skills building. Key players involved in development and implementation of training included staff from the Chicago Police Department's administration and Research and Development divisions, consultants from Booz, Allen and Hamilton and civilians drawn from community organizations interested in CAPS or hired to participate as trainers. They devised a training schedule that could be completed before the inauguration of CAPS on April 29. Twenty-four orientation sessions were held on consecutive days from March 22 through April 15, 1993. They involved 1,779 patrol officers, sergeants and lieutenants. Leadership sessions were scheduled from April 12 to April 16, and 254 supervisors were trained. Three-day skills-building sessions were then conducted on two shifts a day at the South Shore Cultural Center, and a total of 1,474 police personnel, including sergeants, lieutenants, captains and deputy chiefs completed them. A few

focus groups were held along the way to discern if training was being delivered effectively, but the accelerated time schedule did not allow for significant changes in the curriculum until later.

The orientation sessions opened (after our questionnaire was completed) with a videotaped welcome from the superintendent of police, who made clear his commitment to the program. There were two hour-long descriptions of community policing and the CAPS model, separated by a discussion of how community policing differed from the traditional variety. There was a description of some of the paperwork requirements the new program would impose, and the community's role in the plan. At the end came a question-and-answer session, conducted on almost every occasion by the CAPS project manager. As perhaps the most dramatic segment, this offered most officers their first opportunity to speak freely with a member of the exempt staff about department issues. Those issues frequently had little to do with community policing, and the "Q&As" quickly became the place for officers to vent their frustrations on a wide range of issues. Later, this "venting" was viewed as an important contribution of the orientation sessions.

The skills-building sessions lasted three days. They involved mixed teams of sworn and civilian trainers, and were relatively small in size. The purpose of the sessions was to develop in trainees the decision-making and interpersonal skills believed essential to CAPS' success. The curriculum covered five topics: communications, problem solving, alliances, goal setting and ethics. The skills-building sessions were held away from the training academy; they were planned and conducted outside the control of the training division, and police attended out of uniform and were trained in groups of mixed rank. These were all startling departures from business as usual in the Chicago Police Department.

The evaluation suggested several conclusions regarding CAPS' training efforts. The accelerated pace of preparation for orientation training created problems. A review of available materials did not unearth any useful training material, nor any evaluations of community policing training, so everything had to be developed from scratch, without assurance that it would be effective. There was insufficient time to plan, evaluate and revise the curriculum in systematic fashion; consequently feedback comments and recommendations could not easily be incorporated into the material. The reactions of the trainers when they were trained was an important feedback mechanism. The hectic pace of preparation was also detrimental to the trainers. They did not have adequate time to internalize the CAPS philosophy, which led to inconsistencies in their presentation of crucial material.

Despite enormous time pressures and the absence of clear guidelines from other jurisdictions, those responsible for planning CAPS training scored some noteworthy achievements. The most important was that training, which involved a very large number of police personnel and civilian trainers, took place on schedule. Furthermore, an impressive package of training materials was developed, in terms of both quantity and quality. Finally, during the entire planning process, a significant degree of cooperation, coordination and professionalism was exhibited by various levels and types of department staff and by civilian consultants and trainers. This, however, was not always the case behind the scenes. Many of the sworn trainers were resentful that their curriculum was not used and that civilian trainers were not "cop smart."

The CAPS training program was designed to be a departure from traditional training practices. However, trainers were generally quite conservative in their presentations and mostly adhered to the lecture mode of teaching. Trainees were seldom involved in the sessions as "active learners." Although skills building trainers used more innovative techniques to draw participants into the learning process, trainees were never really responsible for taking notes,

responding or processing materials. More realistic exercises and activities, which have direct relevance and applicability to CAPS, should be incorporated into future training. In addition, future trainers might be encouraged to treat police officers as autonomous co-learners who can greatly benefit training sessions by sharing their experiential knowledge.

The overall conduct of trainers was exemplary. Trainers were quite enthusiastic toward their subject matter and respectful toward trainees; they seemed highly knowledgeable about their topics and attempted to maintain rapport with trainees and to relate their sessions to CAPS training and to policing in Chicago. Furthermore, they rarely engaged in behaviors that would make trainees feel awkward or uncomfortable. Nonetheless, several aspects of trainer performance could be improved. First, the data revealed that trainer performance during the orientation sessions was spotty. An effort should be made to bring all trainers up to the same standard of teaching. Second, trainers should be taught to make better use of instructional materials and media. Third, in line with the goals of CAPS, trainers must become more sensitive to gender, racial and cultural differences among trainees. Fourth, trainers should begin to use assessment techniques to evaluate trainees' understanding of the material. Focus groups and field interviews can also be effective mechanisms for examining officers' knowledge and perceptions after they have left training. Finally, the stress and workload imposed by the aggressive training schedule contributed to a significant amount of instructor "burn-out". Now that the program is operational it may be possible to stretch training over a longer time horizon.

Behind-the-scenes animosity on the part of the sworn trainers towards the civilian trainers existed, as evidenced in their comments during personal interviews at the conclusion of training. This animosity grew out of situations in which civilian trainers demonstrated their lack of understanding of police culture and Chicago Police Department operations. We failed to independently observe this, however, and it is not entirely clear that the problem can be blamed entirely on incompetence. The sworn personnel used in training were young and relatively inexperienced, as well as new to community policing themselves. It is possible they themselves had a distance to go before accepting that civilians would be active partners in the CAPS program. In future training, civilian trainers need to have more training regarding police culture and department operating procedures before conducting CAPS training.

If the Chicago Police Department intends to operate an academy where most of the training comes from within, then the role of sworn trainers and the training division must be given significant consideration during the next round of training. Many sworn trainers felt slighted because they perceived that their ideas and training plans were not used. They expressed hostility toward a curriculum they believed was imposed by a civilian consulting firm, although in fact there was a great deal of input into its formulation by Chicago Police Department staff who were not members of the training division. However, senior personnel managing CAPS did not agree that the training materials prepared by the training division were adequate, and they worked with consultants to prepare their own. The experience left a hostile feelings among sworn trainers, who felt that their expertise (although we observed that they were fairly young) was not used. In the future it could be wise to include this group of people in meaningful ways in the planning stages of the curriculum and to give them opportunities to make unique contributions to CAPS.

In the months following the first round of prototype training for officers, the Chicago Police Department developed a completely new set of training materials. It conducted nine focus groups that explored the link between the training officers received and their actual jobs, the information that they retained and what they thought about the instruction. They met with the director of our training evaluation to discuss changes in the curriculum. They concluded the initial curriculum was too conceptual and lacked clear guidance for officers and supervisors who

were anxious about nuts-and-bolts issues. In the future they will begin training with materials of reassuring clarity and specificity and then move to the concepts that lie behind the procedures and expectations. Two experienced consultants, one of whom was the acting director of a big-city training academy, played a major role in developing early drafts of the new material. The principles guiding training have been developed and executed in a curriculum. In spring 1994, 900 sergeants, lieutenants and captains were given supervisory training. However, at this date CAPS material is still not fully integrated into the recruit training program conducted at the police academy – an important issue in light of the large number of new officers who will be hired and trained in the next few years.

### Crime, Fear and Disorder

On April 29, 1993, the quest began to make CAPS operational. Plans had been laid for the redeployment of officers into permanent beat teams, and district advisory committees were to be formed. The officers had been trained, and a plan for the intensification of city services in the prototype districts had been developed. Around the city, community organizations were mobilizing to capture their share of action. From this point onward, CAPS would evolve – sometimes in different ways – in each of the five prototype districts. This section sketches the crime, disorder and fear problems facing the residents of each area, while the next describes their relationship with the police. Figure 2 depicted the prototype districts and some demographic features that illustrate the diversity among them.

Victimization. Based on official statistics like those presented in Figure 1, levels of recorded crime for the city as a whole were not particularly high when the program began. Personal crime was "normal," while recorded property offenses were lower than in the immediate past. Patterns of recorded crime in the five prototype areas were generally consistent with this pattern: official counts gradually rose from the beginning of 1987 until the end of 1991, when — as in the city as a whole — property crime began to decline in most areas. This decline was so marked that in three of five districts, levels of reported crime were at six-year lows when CAPS was inaugurated.

Our survey of Chicago residents included measures of victimization, in order to compensate for well-known difficulties in interpreting the meaning of figures on officially recorded crime (crime reported to the police). As anticipated, self-reported levels of victimization were much higher than indicated by official figures. For example, in Englewood the official burglary rate was 2.1 per every 100 households; however, based on our survey of area residents, almost 20 percent of households in the Englewood district were victims of attempted or completed burglaries during the same period. In four of five areas, rough comparisons between survey and officially recorded burglary rates suggest that self-reported victimization rates were 10 times higher than official ones. The exception was the Marquette district, where the survey rate of victimization was more than 20 times higher than the official burglary rate. Regarding property crime as a whole, half the residents of Marquette recalled being victims during the past year, but comparable official figures would suggest that only about 7 percent of district residents were victims of property crime.

Figure 5




Figure 5 presents the distribution of victimization in each of the five CAPS districts during the year leading up to the program. In each case the data represent the percentage of households victimized one or more times during the previous year. The five districts can easily be ranked for property victimization, but the pattern is more complex when data for personal crimes are brought into the equation. Nonetheless, it is clear the Marquette district had the worst crime problem of the group, while Morgan Park experienced the lowest levels of victimization.


The most consistent relationship to be found among the districts is that the most impoverished districts — Englewood, Marquette and Austin — faced the greatest problem with crime of all sorts, while residents of the more affluent districts — Rogers Park and (especially) Morgan Park — tend to be less troubled by crime. This pattern is clear in the official data and is generally supported by the resident survey.

Hot Spots of Crime. While they are useful for describing levels of victimization and fear for whole communities and for evaluating changes in victimization over time, surveys are not well-suited for identifying precisely which kinds of crime strike certain areas. This is very important, for the way in which crime was distributed *within* the prototypes varied dramatically. Far from being uniformly high- or low-crime areas, there was a great deal of variation in how crime was spread across each district. In two districts crime was heavily concentrated in only selected areas, while other parts of these districts were relatively crime-free. In other districts crime was widespread, but different types of crime sometimes were clustered in different places. The varying and uneven distribution of crime problems facing different neighborhoods has significant implications for community policing.

Like district crime analysts, the evaluation is examining district crime "hot spots," or geographical *concentrations* of crimes that were recorded by the police. Figure 6 presents the results for April 1993 for the Morgan Park police district. It vividly illustrates how closely crime mirrors the social composition of neighborhoods within the district. Most crime was confined to the eastern half of the district, particularly in Washington Heights and in the eastern half of the Morgan Park community. Most of the reported crime in the southern half of District 22 was centered east of Vincennes Avenue, while crime in the northern half of the district was concentrated mostly east of Beverly and Ashland avenues. Little criminal activity was reported



in the more affluent communities of Beverly and Mount Greenwood, which make up the west and northwest portions of the district. Hot spot locations were closely associated with variations in income levels and living conditions within the district.



Fear of Crime. Both trends and levels of crime undermine the quality of city life through their impact upon fear of crime. When fear of crime is sufficiently high, people can be imprisoned by it. It may lead them to believe that the police (and other arms of city government) are unable or unwilling to deal effectively with crime problems. Among the goals of community policing are providing reassurance to neighborhood residents, reducing fear of crime and helping citizens regain control of the streets and alleys of their communities. The spring 1993 survey of residents of the CAPS prototypes included several measures of levels of fear, which differed considerably from area to area.

Fear of crime was distributed quite unevenly across the districts involved as CAPS prototypes. Considerably more than half the respondents from Englewood, Marquette and Austin felt their neighborhood was unsafe at night, compared to about 40 percent of Rogers Park residents and just under one-quarter of those living in Morgan Park. Respondents were also asked if there was any particular place in their neighborhood where they would be afraid to go alone either during the day or after dark, and even those living in the safer districts were leery about some area close to home. By this measure there was less variation between the districts. Rogers Park residents in particular were likely to fear some local "hot spot." In addition, more than half the residents of Englewood, Marquette and Austin indicated that worry about crime prevented them from doing things in their neighborhoods. Once again, only about one of four residents of Morgan Park and about a third of those from Rogers Park felt that fear of crime was shaping their lives in an important way.

Disorder and Decay. Experience with crime is not the only factor that influences perceptions of criminal activity, fear of crime, assessments of policing or the ways in which people alter their behavior to avoid neighborhood hot spots. People also assess their personal risks and the state of crime in their neighborhoods by the area's appearance and the kinds of anti-social behavior they observe around them. Visible signs of potential danger, such as apparent gang members loitering on the street or drug dealers trolling for customers in the light of day, remind residents that their neighborhoods are potentially unsafe. Likewise, trash in the streets, abandoned cars and collapsing buildings signal danger and create other risks that degrade the quality of life for neighborhood residents. Research indicates that perceptions of social disorder and neighborhood decay are, like the experience of victimization, closely related to fear of crime, satisfaction with neighborhood life and evaluations of how well the police do their job.


Our neighborhood survey found that residents of Englewood, Marquette and Austin were most likely to report their neighborhoods were plagued by severe crime, decay and alcohol-



related and social disorder problems. The Marquette district consistently ranked highest in terms of neighborhood disorganization, and Morgan Park ranked lowest. The problems facing Morgan Park and Rogers Park were quite removed from those facing the other districts; far fewer Morgan Park and Rogers Park residents felt that crime, social disorder, alcohol-related problems and physical decay were big problems compared to residents of the three predominantly poor districts.

However, one of the most important findings of the survey was the great significance attached by residents of poorer districts to the decay of their communities. Problems with various forms of physical decay were more highly rated than many kinds of conventional predatory crimes in both Englewood and Marquette, and they were not far behind in Austin. Alcohol-related problems were on a par with conventional crime in all three areas. The opposite was true for residents of the two better-off areas; there, crime was felt to be the most urgent problem facing the area, and physical decay tended to be rated last on the list.

To present a clearer picture of the specific problems plaguing each area, Figure 7 presents the ratings of the four biggest problems reported by residents of each district.



Street drug dealing was the most commonly identified issue; it ranked among the top four problems in every area. Another common problem was gang violence, which was among the top four problems in all prototypes but Rogers Park. The large variation in both the intensity and the specific nature of the problems facing residents of these five communities is of great importance, for it documents one of the tenets of community policing — that police need to be attuned to local variations in problem patterns. Further, it seems likely that residents of Englewood, Marquette and Austin would rate the success or failure of CAPS on different criteria than residents of Morgan Park or Rogers Park. For the former, the

perceived effectiveness of the CAPS program might be judged on whether it succeeds in alleviating what residents view to be the most visible and chronic problems facing their neighborhoods: physical decay and social disorder. Even though these districts have the highest rates of official and self-reported crime, residents of Marquette and Englewood were more concerned with the poor physical condition of their communities. But in Morgan Park and Rogers Park, places where residents see crime as the worst problem, the perceived success of the CAPS program may depend more on how well it reduces car theft and vandalism, graffiti, assault and burglary.

### The Community Views the Police


Victimization, disorder, fear of crime and even physical decay all have a bearing on how citizens perceive the effectiveness of police efforts. Just as important is the relationship between police and residents of their districts. A positive relationship between them can empower both groups to work together against crime. A negative view from either side can increase the

hopelessness that many citizens feel in the face of crime and lead them to conclude that the police are doing a poor job. The success of CAPS depends on many factors, but the foremost factor in the hands of the department itself is its ability to foster trust and cooperation between police officers and residents.

Our initial survey of neighborhood residents included questions about the police. It asked respondents to rate the performance of the police on a number of matters, including their ability to keep order, prevent crime and help victims. The survey asked how courteously, fairly and helpfully police treated people in their area. It also queried about contacts with the police, and those who called or were stopped by police during the past year were asked a series of questions about how they were treated. Finally, the survey asked if respondents had heard of the new program, which had been publicized in the newspapers but had not yet begun operation.

The survey documented that, in just a single year, more than half of all adults in Chicago come into contact with the police. Figure 8 illustrates the frequency of nine different ways in which they recalled interacting with them in the past year. The most frequent kind of contact was reporting a crime; 27 percent had done so. Giving the police information or asking them questions was also common, while about one in eight recalled reporting suspicious persons, noises or events. Almost one-quarter of those interviewed indicated that they had been stopped by the police while they were driving or riding in a car, and 7 percent recalled being stopped while they were on foot. Based on these questions, about 61 percent of those interviewed had some experience with the police during the year before CAPS began. Not included in that


Figure 8  
Contacts Between the Police and the Public



figure, nor shown in Figure 8, were the 28 percent who said they received a parking ticket in the past year. Contact was not related to race or the police district where the respondent lived but was generally higher among males who had jobs. Age was particularly linked to recent experience with the police because of both victimization and the proclivity of young males to be involved in traffic-related incidents; 72 percent of those under age 25 had contact with police in the year before the survey, as compared to 50 percent of those older than 40.

Like many surveys of the general public, this one indicated there was broad support for the police among many elements of the community. A majority in all districts thought officers generally treated people well and that police tried to be responsive to community concerns. But there was less consensus that they were particularly effective at achieving some important outcomes of their work.

There was also considerable variation across social groupings in perceptions of the quality of police service in Chicago. The survey found that black and Hispanic residents of the CAPS districts expressed more negative attitudes toward the police. The most negative attitudes toward the police occurred among the unemployed, renters and those with a high school education or higher. Multivariate analyses showed that minorities, males and young people held the most negative views of the police. Some of these differences are illustrated in Figure 9,



which presents average scores by race and age groups on a 10-question scale measuring people's assessments of the quality of police service. The figure also indicates where the wording of the questions would place a "neutral" respondent.

Among demographic groups, only the youngest respondents — those with the most frequent contact with police — averaged a less than neutral opinion. Crime victims stood at the neutral position, while those who had not been victimized in the past year were much more positive. Perceptions of neighborhood crime, decay and social disorder were also strongly related to negative attitudes toward the police. Figure 9 depicts

average police rating scores of those perceiving no problem, some problem or a big problem in their neighborhood with street drug sales.

Among the factors not depicted in Figure 9 were differences related to contact with police. Those who had contact with the police — either because they called, were stopped or received a parking ticket — were more negative than the rest of the population. On the other hand, knowing the name of a police officer who worked in their neighborhood was strongly related to satisfaction with policing. Residents of Morgan Park, where more than one-quarter of those interviewed knew an officer who worked there, stood out in this regard. This is also a factor that CAPS is bent on changing. Social and experiential factors like those illustrated here had a great deal of influence on citizens' view of the police, and as a result, many district-level differences in attitudes toward police actually reflected differences in the social and economic composition of the CAPS areas.

On average, a majority of the residents of each area thought police treated people professionally and courteously. Residents of Morgan Park decidedly had the most positive view of police officers in their area. However, there was a considerable reservoir of distrust of police, and this distrust was shared by a substantial number of residents in all the CAPS districts except Morgan Park. In the other districts, approximately one-third of those interviewed felt that the police were disrespectful, ineffective, biased and indifferent to their problems. There was even more disparity in the perceived effectiveness of the police across the prototype districts. Respondents were asked to rate police on keeping order on the streets and sidewalks, preventing crime in their neighborhoods and helping people who had been victims of a crime. Across the board, residents of Englewood, Marquette and Austin gave police uniformly lower ratings. Only

one-third of adults representing those three, mostly poor, districts felt that police were doing a good or very good job at keeping order, preventing crime or helping victims. This is in stark contrast to the relatively high marks given police by residents of Rogers Park and Morgan Park. There, about two-thirds thought the police did a good or very good job of keeping order, while half representing Rogers Park and approximately 60 percent of those from Morgan Park felt the police were effective.

A major goal of community policing is to increase the responsiveness of police to local concerns through more sophisticated crime analysis, the involvement of citizens in problem identification and the creation of stable beat assignments for patrol officers so they can master the daily routines of life in the areas that they serve. At the outset, although large numbers of residents of some CAPS areas were dissatisfied with police performance, many already believed their neighborhood police were responsive to the concerns of their community. This perception varied somewhat by district: an overwhelming majority of Morgan Park residents believed police were concerned about community problems, while less than two-thirds felt that way in Marquette. Although many residents of the CAPS prototype districts felt officers showed concern for their neighborhood's problems, substantial numbers believed police could be doing more to join with community residents in solving these problems. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of respondents from Englewood, Marquette and Austin felt police were doing only a fair or poor job of working with residents to solve community problems. This sentiment among residents of the poorer CAPS districts was in stark contrast to that of those from better-off areas, where at least half the residents believed police were doing a good or very good job of coordinating their efforts with those of the community.

The efforts of law enforcement personnel to work closely with neighborhood residents were strongly related to the job performance ratings citizens assigned their local police. One of the goals of police innovators is to create organizational arrangements and foster an environment that encourages greater police-community cooperation, which in turn should increase the effectiveness even of traditional law enforcement efforts.

Anticipating the Future. To gather baseline information about the extent and distribution of awareness of the impending change in Chicago policing, respondents were also questioned about their knowledge of CAPS. Although CAPS did not officially begin until the end of April 1993, the mayor had already conducted a series of meetings to announce the program in the prototype areas, and there had been some coverage of the program in the media. Overall, 32 percent of those surveyed indicated that they had heard of the program, 67 percent said they had not, and only one percent were uncertain. Knowledge of the program apparently was relatively low in Englewood, Marquette and Austin; in these districts, only between one-quarter and one-fifth of residents were aware the Chicago Police Department was initiating the program. Those from the more affluent, lower-crime districts of Morgan Park and Rogers Park were much more aware of the impending change: nearly half of District 22 residents and more than one-third of District 24 residents heard something in advance about the CAPS effort.

We also asked Chicagoans if they were optimistic about the future of policing. Residents of all the prototype districts had uniformly modest expectations for the near future. They were slightly more optimistic about neighborhood police performance in the next year than they were about whatever changes they had perceived in the previous year. Between 15 and 20 percent of residents felt the police in their neighborhoods had improved in the past year, and about one-quarter believed police serving their area might improve in the year to come. Residents of the Austin district were somewhat more optimistic than most. However, in all the districts, around three-quarters of residents believed police protection in their area would either stay about the same or perhaps grow worse in the near future.

## The Program Unfolds

However thoroughly it was planned, the actual implementation of CAPS would inevitably be difficult, for effecting fundamental changes in an organization as large and complex as the Chicago Police Department is not a simple task. This section reviews a number of strategic decisions and leadership factors that have shaped the program to date. It also describes some of the roles played by the community in the functioning of the program. Here and elsewhere in this report we have described the planning strategy employed by the Chicago Police Department as a "prototyping process." After initial attempts to sketch the final program made it clear this was an unrealistic approach to planning, a "try it and see if it works" strategy was adopted instead. Ideas were tried out, mistakes were made, and new approaches were tried again. Throughout the process it was never assumed the program that received its first dry run in the prototype districts would be the model eventually adopted for the entire city. City Hall and Chicago Police Department managers envisioned a refined model would be adopted *after* various approaches had been tested in the prototypes.

A successful prototyping strategy relies on fast and accurate internal communication as well as a willingness to quickly change as events demand. Methods need to be developed to determine what to try, what worked and what should be redone because it did not work. Bad news has to travel upward in the organization as fast as good news. In this case, the communication system included many formal and informal discussions and meetings, with CAPS training officers visiting the districts and observing the program in action and assembling many focus groups to discuss concrete issues as they emerged. Of course, this process has drawbacks. In particular, the program could at times have appeared to be without direction. Officers could easily perceive its managers did not know where they were headed and were uncertain about how to reach their goals. This concerned both the CAPS manager and the Research and Development director, who seemed keenly aware of how the prototyping process could appear to the officers on the street.

The COS problem. One of the earliest and perhaps most significant problems in implementing CAPS was posed by the Communications Operations Section (COS) of the Chicago Police Department. A combination of technological shortcomings and management problems short-circuited early efforts to differentiate the dispatching of rapid response cars and beat teams. There were no clear, formal rules about how dispatching should take place. COS personnel did not understand the mechanics nor the philosophy of the program, and each of the prototypes shared a radio zone with other areas, forcing dispatchers to use different dispatch policies depending on the origin of the call. The COS problem demanded a great deal of attention, first to identify it and then to apply remedies. Management and technical issues had to be resolved, COS staff required training, and a call priority system had to be developed and approved at the highest levels of the department.

As a result of these many complications with dispatching, a revised General Order was issued on June 11, 1993, in an attempt to remedy the problems. Under the revised dispatch policy, a Priority 1 call can now be assigned to either a beat car on the beat in which the incident occurred or to a rapid response car (the original policy gave these calls to rapid response cars). Priority 2 calls still remained the primary responsibility of the beat cars. An important aspect of the revised policy was that dispatchers now had the authority to hold Priority 2 jobs until beat teams were free, rather than sending another available car. For dispatchers, this goes against everything they have been trained to do for years, for the old policy was simply to send the next available unit in almost every circumstance. Now dispatchers are responsible for assisting beat cars to maintain integrity by holding calls.

Another route to facilitating beat integrity has been a new emphasis on the managerial roles of field sergeants and lieutenants, who now are expected to closely monitor how beat cars are being dispatched and when calls are being held. However, while their job is to help maintain beat integrity, it is not to be done at the expense of public safety. When there is a need, special units, such as the district tactical squads are supposed to become more involved in responding to calls for service when rapid response and beat cars are unavailable. But since those units work autonomously and in plain clothes, they frequently "disappear" from the radio net and generally avoid taking on this duty. These new management roles for field sergeants and lieutenants and the more closely integrated efforts by special units are still in the developing stages. As they all become more involved in dispatching, as CAPS moves citywide and dispatching begins to be conducted in a uniform manner for all districts, there should be an enhanced environment for beat integrity to become a successful component of CAPS.

The lieutenant problem. The original CAPS plan called for a new district management strategy and a compressed rank structure for the department. The position of captain — previously reserved for watch commanders — was to be abolished (and it was abolished in the prototypes). Neighborhood relations sergeants, the district administrative manager, lieutenants and the crime analysts were to report directly to the district commander. This considerably increased the commander's span of control, but commanders could not be on duty 24 hours per day. At the lieutenant level there were positions for field operations, watch operations and tactical operations supervisors. In theory, the field operations and watch operations lieutenants were to jointly share managerial responsibilities on their watch that had once belonged to district captains, but as early as May 1993, problems between the two began to crop up. No one knew who had final authority over a host of practical management issues, a stressful issue in an organization molded along hierarchical lines. A focus group was held, involving lieutenants from several districts to identify the specific problems that needed to be solved. To date there has been no decision as to who will be in charge in every circumstance, nor how much, if any, their extra compensation might be. Instead, lieutenants in the prototype districts have learned to negotiate workable local solutions to the chain-of-authority problem caused by the flattening of the rank structure. In the words of the CAPS manager, they have learned how to manage.

The sergeant problem. The first-line supervisors of the beat teams are sector sergeants, and they are a vital component of a community policing program. They oversee the officers covering (usually) three beats, and are responsible for monitoring how they spend their tour of duty. Unfortunately, as the CAPS program unfolded, it became obvious the role of sector sergeant was not defined clearly, and these sergeants often felt unsure about what was expected of them. Confusion over their new roles was sufficient to convene a focus group to air their concerns about beat integrity, the coordination of city services, the continuing demand for "movers" (traffic moving violation tickets), dispatching problems and the role of rapid response officers in their sectors. Our interviews indicate that sector sergeants were disgruntled and felt overworked. They felt that, because there were too few sergeants and the radio call volume remained high, their jobs had not changed because of CAPS. Many of these issues, and particularly role confusion, will be addressed in phase two training, which began in April 1994.

Officer deployment. In the CAPS model, beat officers were to have a direct line of communication with both the neighborhood relations and crime analysis units, as well as with their sergeants and radio dispatchers. Their primary responsibilities included responding to Priority 2 calls on their beat, conducting special tactics such as foot patrols, attending community meetings, working with residents to identify and solve neighborhood problems and developing a beat profile (see below) to be used for problem solving. Only in emergencies were they to respond to calls off their beat or to Priority 1 calls. Rapid response officers were to respond to

911 calls throughout the district. This plan for officer deployment was imaginative, and it drove decisions about patrol force size in each district, but it proved difficult to implement.

As we have seen, at first COS was unable to dispatch officers properly. Eventually, training and better communication between sergeants and dispatchers concerning which cars were assigned to which tasks did a great deal to solve this problem. As the situation stabilized, meetings and focus groups revealed that officers with beat assignments were unhappy with this division of dispatch priorities. They argued they should be involved with Priority 1 dispatches to locations on their beats because those calls pointed to important local problems. In August 1993, the CAPS dispatch plan was altered to permit the dispatch of a beat team to Priority 1 calls on their beat. However, they are still very last in the queue for calls which do not take place on their beat, after rapid response teams, tactical squads and gang units.

The practical effect of this change is not clear. The original CAPS dispatch model was designed to ensure that beat officers had sufficient time free from 911 dispatches to meet with residents and engage in problem solving. In police parlance this is known as "uncommitted time." However, our interviews and observations suggest they were informally but frequently "checking in" on Priority 1 dispatch locations on their beat without being sent there, so as not to miss out on the action or the opportunity to show solidarity with other officers. It is also not clear beat officers currently have better uses for much of their uncommitted time. Their independent involvement in problem identification or problem-solving efforts is not yet high, and through their sergeants they are freed from radio assignments when they need to attend meetings or engage in other structured tasks. The current dispatch policy does not erode their beat integrity; it is estimated that they now spend about 70 percent of their dispatched time on their beat. However, the department's antiquated information systems cannot capture information on what they are doing when not on dispatch and no useful information on how much uncommitted time second and third watch officers (who are most responsible for the program) actually have. It is when their dispatched time begins to conflict with other problem-solving tasks they are trying to complete that serious consideration will need to be given to why, as well as where, beat officers will be sent.

Other evolving program elements. Other meaningful changes were made during the first year as a consequence of the prototyping process. They demonstrate the process was not a theory but had practical meaning at the street level. For example, one of the first edicts laid down by the CAPS manager in April 1993 was that each beat team was required to make five documented non-confrontational contacts with citizens each day. The purpose driving the requirement was to get officers communicating with the citizens on their beat. However, feedback indicated officers were simply going through the motions to meet this requirement. The information the beat officers recorded rarely contributed to problem identification or solving; rather, the requirement led to stacks of paper no one in the districts studied or analyzed. It gradually became clear the five-contact requirement was imposed prematurely and had little meaning for officers *or* citizens. To remedy this, the CAPS manager revised the requirement, and supervisors at the district level were told to carefully review officers' paperwork to make sure that contact with citizens was beginning.

The idea of encouraging officers to make more contact with citizens was not ill-conceived; it was the method and timing that didn't work. Attempting to foster better police-citizen communication by fiat in the form of a hard and fast rule backed up by more paperwork was very much in the spirit of the "old" Chicago police model. However, it was not congruent with the management model being put into place. In a very non-traditional move, the CAPS manager nullified the requirement based on the district-level feedback.

Many new program elements emerged as a result of the prototyping process. An intra-team form was developed to capture information from one watch that would be helpful to officers serving on the same beat on the next watch. In practice, the form created unnecessary paperwork, and officers demonstrated how the information could be captured by reworking already existing forms. The intra-team form was eventually dropped and another form was revised to gather the needed data. Roll call was another experimental arena for CAPS. Changes in roll call procedure were developed to encourage officers to have face-to-face communication during watch changeovers. This program element has not been fully implemented for reasons that vary from logistical — such as the lack of parking space for two simultaneous watches — to the lack of supervisory enforcement of this new policy. Another program tool not yet in place despite a long gestation period is the beat planner. This is a kit of forms for profiling problems on a beat and the local resources available to help solve them. It was intended as a vehicle to drive problem identification and problem solving, but while the planner has been developed, it is not officially in use.

Downtown leadership. At the helm of the program is the CAPS manager and the Research and Development director who, almost without exception, direct, plan, and attend all key meetings. Another important participant is the City Hall/Chicago Police Department liaison, who regularly attends and participates in most meetings. One of her tasks is to keep City Hall informed about CAPS issues on a daily basis. She also has taken responsibility for coordinating the link between CAPS and the delivery of city services in the prototype districts. She deals with the budget, equipment, personnel issues and facilities such as stationhouses that have a considerable financial impact upon the program and the city. The superintendent of police often plays a leadership role in unexpected ways. He appears unannounced at meetings, "just to listen in" on how things are going. He often gives opening remarks at key meetings which communicate his commitment and involvement in the success of the program. He participated along with the others in our survey of Chicago Police Department exempt staff. He appears on radio and television shows, demonstrating continued belief in and support of the program. He often directly steps in to deal with City Hall and spent a great deal of time on the text of the document "Together We Can."

These individuals also serve with the mayor's chief of staff and other assistants on an implementation oversight committee which meets monthly, usually at City Hall. These meetings serve two purposes: to keep the executives informed of CAPS' progress and to identify and solve problems having implications for the department's budget or staffing. A second forum for communicating and airing issues is the department's new Strategic Planning Committee. This group of about 20 police and civilian members is charged with considering the future of policing in Chicago over the next five to 10 years.

Varieties of district leadership. What cannot be measured, but is certainly a significant factor in the development of CAPS in Chicago, are the management styles of the district commanders. These have varied widely, and it is too soon to tell if any particular style can be linked to the success or failure of community policing at the district level. One district commander accurately characterized his style as "hands on." There was some disagreement as to how much hands-on management was necessary, and in fact, one of the most trying aspects of working in the district was how much time the commander spent on details. However, his attention extended to the activities of his district advisory committee, and he appeared to be highly respected by its members. He showed great deference to all those he addressed and appeared very grateful to all those who attended. A second commander described his own leadership style as "having confidence in his staff." His feeling was that being accountable allowed his subordinates to have ownership of their work. Some of his staff agreed, but others perceived this stance indicated his lack of involvement in the program.



A third commander indicated he led by participatory management. Many officers in the district viewed it as micromanagement. The commander met with a group of key community leaders on a weekly basis, and he orchestrated events at advisory committee meetings. A fourth commander characterized his leadership style as one that was accomplished through example and personal commitment, and he reveled in making difficult decisions. This commander's alliance with his advisory committee members was the most relaxed and natural of all the prototype commanders. On the other hand, the commander of another district described his own leadership this way: "I shout, I yell, I scream. Fear is very effective." No one we interviewed offered an opposing interpretation of his style. This commander did not involve his staff in decision-making about CAPS and at times seemed to have an obstructionist attitude about innovative policing strategies and technology. He was still involved in the department's traditional "numbers game."

Citizen roles: district advisory committees. An early task for the prototype district commanders was to establish district advisory committees. These are composed of the commander, neighborhood relations personnel and community leaders — individuals who are involved in local business and school councils, and employees of the park district and other city, state and federal government agencies. Their official role is to "identify and address the needs and problems of the community and advise the district commander of possible solutions and strategies; to advise and inform the district commander of the current matters of concern to the community; and assess the effectiveness of implemented solutions and strategies and inform the district commander of the progress or lack thereof of the solutions and strategies."

Each advisory committee has a distinct composition and their meetings take on different ambiances. One committee is run as a general meeting of a host of subcommittees and consistently attracts at least 60 people. All members of the community are invited, and many bring their children. All who attend are encouraged to become active members of one of the subcommittees. All of the subcommittees are active and report on their activities at the advisory committee meetings. A distinctive feature of this district's advisory committee meetings is that there is clearly a grassroots movement underway. The gatherings are part district meeting, part gospel session and part pep rally. There is much enthusiasm and great pride in each accomplishment that is announced.

In another district the advisory committee was slow to get underway. Its meetings are relaxed, but businesslike. Representatives of each beat attend the meetings, along with community leaders, the entire neighborhood relations staff and the district commander. A printed agenda is followed and the gatherings are well orchestrated. The most obvious accomplishment of the advisory committee to date is the uniting of the two major ethnic groups of the district in a working relationship. At a pivotal January 1994 meeting, it was decided that a professional in the area of problem-solving would be brought in to train the advisory committee and the district's beat representatives.

In a third district, advisory committee meetings began later than most. They are held in the roll call room at the police station, and there is constant traffic in and around the meeting. The commander officiates, calling residents to the front for presentations. Beat officers and tactical team members are often called upon to fill in details about recent missions. Notable achievements of the advisory committee are a letter-writing campaign to the judge overseeing the case of a reputed gang leader's parole violation and neighborhood clean-up activities.

In the fourth prototype, advisory committee meetings have been held on a consistent basis since July 1993. A large segment of the committee consists of community leaders who have worked together for years on issues facing the district. Neighborhood relations staff and

aldermen attend on a regular basis, and two judges who live in the community occasionally attend. A member from the area's principal community organization chairs the meeting. This advisory committee struggled for months to define its roles and goals. It was finally driven by its chair to adopt a clear mission statement and since become a smoothly functioning group. This committee also sponsored a program for delinquent youth, a court watch subcommittee and a beeper program for foot patrol officers.

In the fifth prototype district, monthly meetings are attended by an average of 20 committee members and officers from the neighborhood relations staff. The composition of the advisory committee has changed as organizations have disassociated themselves from committee members and city employees have been fired from their jobs. The committee has been forced to consider the extent to which its members represent groups and agencies or serve because of their personal qualities. The committee also had to consider whether organizers of beat meetings in the district could exclude particular people and keep them from attending. It has also initiated outreach efforts in an attempt to improve the representation of all races and ethnic groups in the district in various CAPS-related activities. This area has a history of community activism, and many key players are members of the advisory committee. The level of sophistication and experience among the members has enabled the committee to accomplish a number of noteworthy things at the outset, but had to do so despite the rather determined disinterest of its district commander.

For a variety of reasons, after one year some advisory committees appear to be accomplishing more than others. Our observations of meetings and our interviews with various district personnel and civilians lead us to believe advisory committees that appear to be experiencing the most success have citizens who reached a consensus about what the most important issues are that need addressing in the district. They experienced strong commander leadership in terms of committee involvement, understanding the mission of the committee and directing that mission in a proactive manner. Advisory committees that seem to be experiencing less success have citizens with divided opinions about what needs to be addressed, have a less positive relationship with the police and do not have clear police/citizen roles established. Surprisingly, the extent of grassroots organization in a district prior to CAPS does not necessarily translate into successful advisory committees. An important element we observed that led to advisory committee success was having community members who were highly involved, understood their mission and could move the committee in a proactive manner. These committees fared better than those without such individuals, regardless of whether these individuals had a strong background in community organizing.

Citizen roles: beat meetings. Beat meetings are open to the public, and most beats meet once a month. The purpose of these meetings is for residents to meet their beat officers, identify problems on their beat and ultimately enter into joint problem-solving relationships with the police. The meetings are usually attended by residents of the beat, neighborhood relations officers and the beat team officers. Neighborhood relations officers often take a leadership role, either chairing the meetings or doing much of the talking. Attendance by other officers was linked to the district commander's requirements. In many instances police attendance seemed more consistent than that of area residents. This became more pronounced in November and December of 1993 and January 1994, when citizen attendance fell at many beat meetings. Police and residents of the districts had many ideas as to why community participation at beat meetings was declining, but the most prevalent reasons were weather- and safety-related. One challenge facing all of the prototypes is how to build attendance at beat meetings. In addition to attendance issues, beat meetings have not, for the most part, developed into joint problem-solving sessions between residents and officers. We observed many beat meetings that became "911 meetings" at which citizens voiced complaints and officers listened and stated they would "check into the

matter." There is a clear need for problem-solving training for both officers and citizens in order to increase the effectiveness of beat meetings.

We also observed too many beat meetings being managed and run by neighborhood relations officers, while beat officers in attendance remained passive participants. Neighborhood relations officers run the risk of becoming the kind of community policing "special units" the department has been attempting to avoid creating if they continue to take such a prominent leadership role and do not allow beat officers to talk directly with the community.

Among the recurring issues that arise at beat meetings is confusion about when to call 911 versus other police station numbers. The advice given by police at meetings varied widely across and within districts. In one district, residents believed they might get more officers in the district if people called 911 about every imaginable issue. Another issue of considerable concern across the districts was how to deal with youth problems. There were discussions of curfews, programs by city agencies, parents taking turns inviting groups of children to their homes and what to do about youths hanging out in the parks. In several of the districts police officers brought up the priority status prototype districts have for city services.


Another important issue that came from the beat meetings was the great concern residents expressed about when they called 911 to report drug or gang activity and were later identifiable as the caller because of police action. In some beats residents have been retaliated against as a result of this apparently indiscriminate identification by police. It appears that a dispatch policy is required that asks whether the citizen desires to be identified or notified police were sent to a nearby location and that citizens be made more aware that their names and addresses automatically appear on the dispatcher's screen when they call, so they can in the future insist on confidentiality if that seems appropriate.

There has been mounting interest in the creation of a mechanism by which beat activists can contact their beat officers directly, between monthly or quarterly beat meetings. Currently, even the most involved can only call 911 or their district's neighborhood relations office. Because important issues and incidents do not wait for scheduled meetings, there may be a need to establish a communication link between citizens and their beat officers. This might be an important step toward formation of closer joint problem-solving partnerships between the police and citizens, who otherwise have only episodic contact with one another. One prototype district is experimenting with beepers, used by merchants in the business district to facilitate ongoing communication between them and beat officers. For this program, merchants along busy arterial streets welcome officers to use their telephones so they can respond when a beeper call comes in. The availability of telephones for officers to respond to citizens' calls is but one of a long list of important logistical and policy issues that must be solved before a program like this could be expanded to include larger commercial strips and residential areas. Another is misuse, an issue that bothers police officers. Our surveys of officers found that they were concerned at the outset about the increased volume of complaints and the potential misuse of beeper availability that might arise as a result of CAPS. Seventy-two percent were pessimistic about "unreasonable demands on police by community groups," for example.

CAPS and community groups. Across the country, community groups are agitating for a role in determining how the crime problems facing their neighborhood are defined and prioritized and for a clearly defined role in influencing how police will work with them to solve those problems. The rhetoric of community policing has stimulated this new involvement by community groups, for in most cities it promises them a place as an active participant in formulating and implementing the program.

Even before CAPS was formally announced, groups in Chicago were preparing for its arrival. Citywide umbrella groups such as CANS (Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, an umbrella group with Alinsky roots) had been agitating for community policing for several years. CANS representatives visited several cities to observe active community policing programs. They had been active in a blue ribbon committee appointed by the previous mayor to investigate the department's dispatch policy, which became a platform to explore just what police officers should be doing with their time. A CANS spin-off group, the Citywide Task Force on Community Policing, represents more than 70 organizations pressing for the program. Local foundations have funded technical assistance for smaller groups to help get them involved in community policing. On the other hand, Chicago is the home of numerous groups that are vocally concerned about police brutality and inequities in the recruitment and promotion of minority police officers. Large regions of this racially stratified city are characterized by implacable hostility between police and the community. CAPS beat teams reported to us that early in the program they were being greeted with chants of "Rodney King."

Our survey of the prototype districts gauged levels of community involvement in anti-crime efforts before CAPS began. As Figure 10 illustrates, there were large differences among the districts in initial levels of organized activity. Six of 10 residents in Districts 22 and 24 had heard of efforts to organize community meetings about neighborhood problems, compared to approximately half of residents from Districts 7 and 15 and 40 percent from District 10. Fewer residents were aware that meetings had actually been held to address crime problems in their neighborhoods. More than 40 percent of residents from Districts 15, 22 and 24 had heard about local community meetings to deal with crime problems, while less than one-third of District 7 residents and only one-quarter of District 10 residents were aware of such meetings. Attendance at these meetings was lower still, but 19 percent of Austin residents and 20 percent of Morgan Park residents had attended at least one meeting that focused on neighborhood crime issues. In other districts an average of about one in 10 residents had attended neighborhood meetings about crime.



More than 40 percent of residents from Districts 15, 22 and 24 had heard about local community meetings to deal with crime problems, while less than one-third of District 7 residents and only one-quarter of District 10 residents were aware of such meetings. Attendance at these meetings was lower still, but 19 percent of Austin residents and 20 percent of Morgan Park residents had attended at least one meeting that focused on neighborhood crime issues. In other districts an average of about one in 10 residents had attended neighborhood meetings about crime.

Police officers also varied greatly in their perceptions of citizen involvement in their districts. Our survey indicated that, from their point of view, officers felt only one out of two citizens were at all active in working with police to solve problems, and slightly more than two out of five citizens were actively working with each other to solve problems. Overall, residents of District 24 were perceived to be the most active, followed by residents of District 22 and District 15.

Preview of planned elements. As with any program, some elements of CAPS were slower to develop than others, and some did not come to fruition during the first year of the program. The following program elements have been in development and are expected to see the light of day during the second year.

The hiring and training of civilian district administrative managers was not completed until late in the fall of 1993, and they joined their respective districts in February, 1994. The evolution of this position will be monitored carefully as the evaluation continues.

Crime analysis is another important element of the CAPS program that was not implemented during the first year, but it is expected to be operational during the second year. The requisite computer equipment was slow in arriving, and when it did arrive it was slow to be hooked up and made useable. This was due to outdated electrical systems at the stationhouses and to confusion over who would train district personnel to use the new software. According to the original plan, crime analysis detectives were to make regular visits to the prototype stationhouses to help with crime analysis, but with the delay of equipment installation and software application, this has not happened.

Another program element that will be developed in the second year of CAPS is the beat officers' understanding and utilization of social service agencies. Officers are to be trained about the social service resources available in their districts and about how the public can access them. The goal is to have officers become expert at social service referrals, much in the way they became adept at accessing city services during the first year.

The prototyping process has at times been painful, with commanders disagreeing over what is effective and what is not. There is a delicate balance to be maintained between allowing CAPS to be tailored to the special needs of each district (which is important) and having commanders do whatever they please and call it "community policing." Clearly, the prototyping strategy was meant to develop standardized methods to apply when CAPS expanded to cover the city, methods that would evolve through trial and error. Patience has been required by those in command and by those implementing the program at the street level to view this process as educational rather than fragmented and disorganized. Mistakes have been made and lessons learned, but the larger question looms as to whether enough has been learned to implement CAPS citywide. While some problems have been worked out in the prototype districts, others have not yet been resolved.